

A SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

A course given in the Spring quarter, 1963

in the

Department of Political Science

The University of Chicago

by

Professor Leo Strauss

This transcription is a written record of essentially oral material, much of which developed spontaneously in the classroom, and none of which was prepared with publication in mind. The transcription is made available to a limited number of interested persons, with the understanding that no use will be made of it that is inconsistent with the private and partly informal origin of the material. Recipients are emphatically requested not to seek to increase the circulation of the transcription. This transcription has not been checked, or seen, or passed on by the lecturer.

The production and distribution of this transcription are subsidized by Relm Foundation, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Financial assistance was granted by Relm Foundation on application made in behalf of the recipients of the transcription. Relm Foundation is not responsible for any of the views expressed herein.

ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: A seminar by Professor Leo Strauss in the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Spring 1963.

1st meeting: April 2, 1963

This meeting I plan to devote to a general introduction to the Ethics. I believe I do not have to apologize for the fact that I give a course on the Ethics in a political science department, but just in case, this department is committed to the proposition that the only work which must have been read by any student who wishes to get the PhD. in political science, which he must have read, is Aristotle's Politics. Now the Ethics is the first part of Aristotle's Politics. One could not wish for a more powerful reason. But you will easily see that even without this subterfuge the case for studying the Ethics in a political science department could be made very easily. What is the subject of ethics? Let us bust the case wide open. Let us not assume that Aristotle is right and his adversaries are wrong. Let us take the broadest and least prejudicial view of the situation.

What is the subject of ethics if people were asked today? What would they say? Do I not hear an answer? You all must have heard that, what they would say today, the most general description of the subject of ethics. I believe they would say values. But there is, however, another discipline which deals with values and that is psychology. Now what is the difference, then, between ethics, the ethical treatment of values and the psychological treatment? I think one could say in the notion of ethics the view still lingers on that ethics deals with the true values while psychology deals with all values, whether true or not. Psychology does not raise the question regarding the difference between true and untrue values. Psychology doesn't raise the question because it could not answer it; psychology, being a science of facts culminating only in factual judgments, cannot make a valid distinction between true values and others. But can ethics answer this question? After all ethics is, to the extent to which it is still taught -- is supposed to be a science. So if ethics is a science it would seem to be unable to make a distinction between valid and invalid values.

Now if we wish to understand Aristotle we must keep this difficulty in mind, by all means, but on the other hand we must also forget about them because it is a question whether Aristotle's Ethics deals with values. I think one can say without any hesitation that Aristotle's Ethics does not deal with values. That is not an Aristotelian term. We will see later what Aristotle speaks about. The term values emerged in philosophy, as distinguished from economics, only in the 19th century in Germany in post-Hegelian German philosophy, and people at that time understood by the values the true, the good, and the beautiful. All norms in contra-distinction to the "is" or to reality. Prior to that time no need was felt to take together all values under one and the same heading, namely values. Aristotle's Ethics, to repeat, does not deal with values, i.e. with all values. Mr. Reinkin, read the first sentence of the Ethics to make this absolutely sure.

O: Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good.

S: Period. Some good. It deals only with good. It does not deal with the



beautiful; it does not deal with the true. Yes. But even this, the good, is too broad. The title is Ethics. I mean, this we know not only from the manuscripts of this work, in the title of which the term ethics appears, but also from the references to this work occurring in Aristotle's Politics: It's called the Ethics. Now what does this mean? That is an adjective, at least in Greek, ethica, derived from a Greek word, ethos, which is a favorite term in present-day behavioralistic social science. Yes, this is true: the capitalist ethos they also say. And the plural is ethoi. Now this means, simply translated, sufficiently for our purpose, characters, of course meaning that some characters are good and others are bad. Ethics is a doctrine of good or bad characters. This notion is not entirely new to Aristotle. It is at least alluded to at the end of Plato's Laws, Book I. I will just read to you this passage. After he has recommended wine drinking in order to find out about the characters of human beings -- you know, there is a fairly common view still today, I believe, that when people are more or less intoxicated they are less able to conceal what kind of men they are, to conceal their characters. This is the context. And then he says, "No one would dispute the fact that in wine drinking we have a fair test of one another and that for cheapness, safety, and speed it is superior to all other tests." "That certainly is true." "This then: to know the natures as well as habits of souls will prove one of the things most useful to that art whose task is to treat them, and that art is, as I presume we say, the art of politics. Is it not so?" "Undoubtedly." So here you have some study of the characters and this is politics. More precisely, the relation is this: first you have to know the natures and habits of the souls in order to treat the souls and the results of these treatments are characters. Now this is the political art which deals with the characters and we will see that the same is true in Aristotle.

But one could wonder: the treatment of characters in a purely political context -- does this not unduly narrow the difficulty? Are we not accustomed to making a distinction between individual ethics and social ethics and do we not lose sight of individual ethics if we look, from the very beginning, at the thing from the point of view of politics? Or is there a necessity for that? Differently stated, what, then, is the not narrow question, as distinguished from that narrow question, good and bad characters within the political context? What is the not narrow question? What is the comprehensive question, more comprehensive than the question of characters, as comprehensive as the question of values, and yet free from the peculiar assumption of this 19th century concept of values? What is the broadest question with which this book somehow must deal?

Now this question was formulated most simply by Socrates in Plato's Gorgias: how should one live? This is all-comprehensive and Aristotle must somehow deal with this question, how should one live, and for some reasons which we will find out he must feel that the question of how should one live becomes manageable only if it becomes a question of the good character. Now is this question of how to live truly the most comprehensive question? Does the raising of it not presuppose certain specific conditions?

Now I read to you a passage from the prophet Micah, Chapter 6, verse 8. The prophet Micah says, "God has proclaimed (or announced) to you, man, what is good and what he requires of you, and what does he require of you but to act justly, to love mercy, and to walk <sup>humbly</sup> purely with thy God." Here it is said: man has been told how he should live. The Socratic question presupposes that no such authoritative answer is available, that man must seek for it. Now we find

everywhere primarily an authoritative answer. If these authoritative answers cease to be credible or cease to be evident chaos emerges, anomie, as they say. Simply stated, an infinite variety of answers, because there is no longer the authoritative answer, and this infinite variety of answers includes the answer that the question does not make sense since everyone lives of necessity as his nature and his chance compels him to live. So the case is wide open once the authoritative answers are questioned, and this is surely the beginning of Aristotle too. Let us read again the first sentence.

O: Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good.

S: Yes. Let us stop here. Aristotle's first sentence is advisedly chosen. Aristotle begins with the fact that there is something in common to all human pursuits despite the differences, despite the doubts. There is something in common, from which he starts. In the Politics, the sequel to the Ethics -- has a similar beginning about all associations. All associations strive for some good. But there, in the Politics, Aristotle speaks only of associations. The Ethics is more comprehensive. It deals with all human activities, whether they issue in the establishment of associations or not. The Ethics begins with a statement regarding human life as such; not with birth and death, that is to say, with things which we merely undergo, but with everything what we "do."

Now in this sentence Aristotle distinguishes four things and divides them into two groups and this is meant to be exhaustive. "Every art and every inquiry; similarly action as well as election (or choice), appears to aim at some good." You see, he takes together art and inquiry, on the one hand, and then he takes together action and choice. Why does he do that? Now what is the difference between these two groups: art and inquiry, on the one hand, and action and choice, on the other. Or let us perhaps first understand the first distinction, between art and inquiry.

O: It sounds like the difference between art and what we would call science.

S: Yes, it is, in a way, the same difference, but he does not say science, I believe, because science could mean the possession of knowledge which possession would then no longer aim at something. The inquiry aims at it. The Greek word, by the way, is the origin of our word, method, but which there doesn't have this particular meaning but a broader meaning: the way toward. So an art is that knowledge which is active in the bringing into being of something which would not be without our bringing it into being: chairs and other things of this kind, whereas science is concerned with what is by itself, not by virtue of human production.

Now the other pair, action and election: they are more closely connected with each other than the first two were as is indicated by the fact that he says "action as well as election." Why does he make the distinction? Now I'm anticipating later developments: "no action possible without election," but on the other hand there may be election not issuing -- election or choice -- that is the same word -- without issuing to action. Why does he make the distinction? We don't know. We must see whether this distinction is so very important that he wishes to remind us from the very beginning that action and choice, although they are in a way inseparable, must nevertheless be distinguished from each other. Choice is, of course, not mere desire. That I say from the very beginning. And therefore one could perhaps say the list is incomplete, if we

*f. Barquet* take all human desiring of something, insofar as only that desire of a higher level called choice is mentioned. But it is meant to be comprehensive.

*The good & choice* Now in all these cases some good is aimed at. Now since the cases are innumerable, infinite, there is an infinite variety of good things. So we are confronted with that chaos of which I spoke before. Yes?

Q: Did you state what the reason might be for grouping together art and inquiry on the one side, action and choice --

S: No, I did not. What would you think?

O: (Inaudible reply).

S: Yes, but would it not follow immediately that in the first pair no choice is involved, strictly speaking? Choice strictly understood. In other words --

Q: Can one pursue, say, an inquiry, a scientific inquiry of any kind, without having some idea of where he's going? And that would presuppose choice. Wouldn't it? Unless you'd discovered something by accident.

*Choice  
Morals  
&  
Science* S: Yes sure, that you choose the subject of inquiry. Yes, but the question is whether that is choice, strictly understood; whether you do not use the word choice in a looser sense. We must leave this open. Well, I mean, one can, of course, give an answer in the traditional terms that only action and choice are moral phenomena, strictly speaking. Would you want to have such an answer? An art is not as such a moral phenomenon, what the shoemaker does, and his goodness as shoemaker is not moral goodness, as you can easily see. A man may be a very good shoemaker and a very great crook when he sells his shoes. There would be the moral goodness but his quality as a shoemaker is not moral quality as such, and the same is, of course, true of the scientist. This is today easy to answer. We don't have to labor that point. Good.

O<sub>2</sub>: (Inaudible remark).

S: Yes. I think it would be impossible to express this thought in Aristotelian terms. I mean, I think Aristotle would simply say -- (interrupted by a difficulty in the classroom). Now what was the question? No, Aristotle would say to the extent to which a man is not honest as a scientist he is not a scientist. For example, if someone pretends, claims that he has made this discovery where it was already made by someone else. Well, qua doing that thing he is not a scientist. He's just a swindler. The scientist as scientist is indifferent to this kind of thing. We must bring up this kind of question later. Let us first follow the argument. Let us read again the sentence we read, and the next.

O: Every art and every inquiry, and every practical action as well as every choice, seems to aim. . . .

S: Yes, well, practical action is a redundant expression. Every action as well as choice.

*The good def.* O: . . . as well as choice, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim.

S: Yes. All things. In other words, not only men. Since all these specific-



ally human activities strive after some good, all beings strive after the good. That seems to be an awful syllogism. Now Aristotle has shown that all human activities have something in common. He intimates now that all beings have something in common, at least all beings insofar as they strive for something. Perhaps there are beings which do not strive for something. What is true of all beings is in agreement with what we have seen regarding all human activities. All beings strive for the same. It's not wonderful? There's no chaos; there is no difficulty, because all beings strive for the good. That seems to be a solution, but, alas, that's only the beginning because in the next sentence -- how does the next sentence begin?

O: "It is true that a certain variety is to be observed among the ends. . . ."

*The good, what, & the variety of ends.*  
S: Yes. You see; well, all right, let us leave it at that: "it is true," but, but -- there is a certain variety of the ends. We are back where we started. The fact that one can reasonably say that all beings strive for the same is of no help. Obviously not, because the dog strives for some good and human beings strive for some other good, and the cat also for something different. Now what does he say about this difference in the immediate sequel? Now he speaks of ends, using end synonymous with good. What does he say about the variety?

O: ". . . in some cases the activity of practising the art is itself the end, whereas in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercise of the art."

*G. Book II, Rep*  
S: Yes, well, this is unnecessarily complicated -- "for some are activities and in others the ends are some works different from the activities." That is extremely simple. A shoemaker: the activity of the shoemaker culminates in the shoe and is for the sake of making the shoe. The shoe is the end of the shoemaker and the shoe is something apart from the shoemaking. There are other activities like dancing where no such product like a shoe is intended, but intended is the activity. This is clear. Now let us read on.

*Activities good for own sake & for something else*  
O: ". . . and in the arts whose ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves, these products are essentially superior in value to the activities."

*Variety of ends, if natural order*  
S: Yes, that -- why does he say? The works, products, "are by nature better than the activities." Yes. Now let us stop here for a moment and first follow this up. Aristotle does now speak of the variety of ends, but still, for the time being, of a very innocuous variety of human ends: ends like shoes or houses and ends like dancing. In the former case the activity is by nature inferior to the work. This little thing which is not slipped in but about which we have to think: everyone who looks at it would have to admit that in spite of that great variety there is some order in this variety, a natural order. It is absurd to say that the shoemaker makes shoes just for the fun of it. An individual shoemaker, more or less crazy, may do all kinds of things, but as shoemaker he aims at the finished product which is the shoe, whereas there is no such parallel in the case of dancing, for example. There is a variety of ends but there is also some natural order. Good. And now how do we go on from here?

O: "But as there are numerous pursuits and arts and sciences. . . ."

S: No, we must translate this more literally: "many actions and arts and sciences. There are therefore also many ends."

O: "... for instance, the end of the science of medicine is health, that of the art of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of domestic economy wealth."

S: Yes, you see what this fellow -- is this Rackham? Rackham; yes. Yes, that one shouldn't do. He doesn't say in Greek -- there is no addition of science and art. That is left open. Let us say, "the end of medicine is health; the end of shipbuilding is a ship; the end of strategy is victory; the end of householding is wealth." Yes. Let us stop here. Now we know by now, if we didn't know it before, that there are many ends which men pursue. Aristotle himself had spoken of it before. But there is a difference. He had spoken up to now only of a difference of kinds of ends: ends which are activities and ends which are things apart from the activities. He shows us now that the difference of ends is much greater than was said before. The examples are taken -- he speaks of three things here: actions, arts, and sciences. The examples are all taken from arts, without explicitly saying it. That is of some importance. These are all arts, not sciences nor actions. Now let us read from here.

O: Now in cases where several such actions are subordinate to some single faculty -- as bridle-making and the other trades concerned with horses' harness are subordinate to horsemanship, and this and every other military action to the science of strategy. . . .

S: Yes, well, "to strategy," let us say, because we don't know whether it is a science. Yes?

O: . . . to strategy, and similarly other arts to different arts again -- in all these cases, I say, the ends of the master arts are things more to be desired than all those of the arts subordinate to them; since the latter ends are only pursued for the sake of the former.

S: Yes, let us stop here. Only one thing: he never uses the word art. He uses, as is easily possible in Greek, the adjectives, omitting the noun, and you have to think, which noun would be proper. For example -- what would be an English example? Horse. You cannot form, unfortunately, this simple adjective, horsic, but if you would say "the horsic one," meaning horsemanship, then you would not know: is the horsic one a science or art. You have to use some sort of . . . That is some importance for the understanding. What he tries to show here is simply this: that there is an order of the arts. An order means also always here a hierarchic order, sub- and super-ordination. The variety of these arts does not impair the fundamental unity. That is the thought. And you can easily see: bridle-making is obviously meaningless except if the bridle is of some use and is of some use in the case of horses and donkeys and mules, or whatever it may be; and therefore the art of bridle-making is subordinate to the art of horsemanship. The bridlemaker must ask the horseman, "What kind of bridle do you need for bridling the horse?" And the horseman, in his turn, must ask the commander of cavalry, because if each soldier could have his bridle as he thinks that might create great inconveniences in battle. And furthermore, since the general of cavalry is subject to the commander in chief, to the general proper, the strategic knowledge is more architectonic; as Aristotle calls it, than that of the horseman. Good. Let us go on here, where we left off.

O: "And it makes no difference whether the ends of the pursuits are the acti-

vities themselves or some other thing beside these, as in the case of the sciences mentioned."

*but over action*

S: Here he says sciences. Yes. Now Aristotle enlarges that. He has made the observation only regarding art, but he says what has been said of the arts is true also of actions proper. The arts and their order is only an example illustrating the unity in variety, the order in seeming disorder. But one point only: he had spoken in this section before, "and every military action" is subordinate to the strategic art. Actions too may be subservient to an art. We must keep this in mind. Mr. Boyan, you wanted to say something?

O: I'm just not clear on this argument. Take the example of dancing: what is it subordinate to. I mean, you want to be a good dancer, let's say. Maybe you want the exercise.

*Distinction between name of order of arts and name of one or more principles of order*

S: Good. Aristotle never states that all human activities or all human arts are subject to one single art. Up to now, he has only said there is some order. We have, say, 35 different arts. . . . (several inaudible words). But he didn't say that they are all subject to one thing. You know, he only says there is an order here, not more. We come to that. That's very important.

*Problem in arts is in its human ends*

Now let us remind ourselves of the whole argument. The simple beginning of the Ethics is the bewildering variety of ends, and the variety is much greater than has come to light hitherto and anticipating what Aristotle will say shortly, I enumerate them: pleasure, health, wealth, honor, nobility, knowledge, etc. etc. Now Aristotle, at the beginning of the work, views that variety from the point of view of the variety of arts because there is an order of the arts and of their ends. But one can rightly state the question: is the order of the arts the order of the human ends? For example -- that question would be a subdivision of that -- the arts directed toward health and toward wealth. Aristotle has mentioned them: the medical art and the art of management of the household. But are there arts which produce honor and pleasure? That's at least a great problem. One could say, well, honors are given for services and there is an order of the services which is perhaps the same as the order of the arts. But as for arts aiming at pleasure, are there such arts? It would be a question. You see, the question as a paradigm: is the order of the arts sufficiently broad to cover the order of the human ends? Well, in Plato we have a clear answer in the Gorgias. Does someone remember it? Well, the pursuits aiming at pleasure are not arts, are pseudo-arts. For example, cosmetics is a pseudo-art, a false, a bad, imitation of the medical art or gymnastics. Instead of making someone really strong, to create an appearance of strength and health which is flattering, as Plato calls it.

Hitherto we have seen, however, that there is an order of the ends. Now he states -- and here we come to your question -- that the order must culminate in a single highest end. Let us see how he proves that, and let us even see whether he actually goes so far as to say that. In the immediate sequel, Mr. Reinkin.

O: If therefore among the ends at which our actions aim there be one which we wish for its own sake, while we wish the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which would obviously result in a process ad infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that this one ultimate end must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good.



S: "The Good and the Best." Now you see -- what does Aristotle say here? That there is a single end toward which all lower ends converge, so that we would have -- if we take strategy, victory, and then we have wealth, and then we have health, and then we have, say, dancing -- that is Mr. Boyan's example -- and perhaps also science. They all point to one end here. Does Aristotle say here that there is such a single end?

O: No.

S: What does he say?

O: He says, "if."

S: If, if, if. Yes, sure. But something, however, he says is true; if there is one then this would be obviously the best and most preferable, but he does make, however, one point. There cannot be a process ad infinitum. This he asserts. In other words, you make bridles for the sake of the horse -- for the sake of horsemanship -- and you pursue horsemanship for the sake, ultimately, of victory. And you can also raise the question, why victory? And one could raise that question. And then you get something like the well-being of the city, political community. Then you can still raise: why the well-being of the community? Then you come at something like my own well-being. And then you must stop. Perhaps you don't have to stop, but at some point you must stop. After a finite number of steps you must stop. Otherwise you become absurd. Is this intelligible? You would not know where to start actions if you do not have such an ultimate beginning. You would live wholly aimlessly, and one cannot live aimlessly. This is what he implies here. This, of course, runs counter to many modern views but if you have any difficulties here mention them. Only one thing you should not mention against Aristotle: that he asserts here that there is a single end because that he does not yet do. He says, "if." But what he says is there must be ultimate ends of some sort. Whether they culminate in one ultimate end -- that is for the time being left open. Yes, Mr. Boyan. Oh, Mr. McAtee.

Q: (Inaudible).

S: Yes. Who says that? "Blessed be those," the famous religious formula in the Old and New Testament. Blessed is really incompatible with aimless and useless and senseless. Yes. Let us not take our bearings regarding religion from what you read in certain modern sociologists. You know whom I mean by that; I suppose you do. Pardon? Oh, Mr. Boyan. Yes.

O: I think Aristotle is clever here because he says, "If."

S: Naturally he is clever. (A few words inaudible). But he was also more than clever. He was also wise.

O: One might evaluate many actions in terms of what could be called pragmatic ends.

S: Yes, but what does that mean?

O: I think it means everything is justified in terms of itself, and we don't look at the end far ahead but our end changes as we go along.

S: (Several inaudible sentences). . . . he doesn't say more hitherto, al-

though I admit, if I may use a vulgar expression, that he plots already here for the possibility of one and only one highest end. But he has not yet asserted it.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Inaudible).

S: No, you cannot act. If you contemplate this -- well, whatever it may be -- to go to a drug store to buy some, say, aspirin, and then you begin to wonder should I buy aspirin: this may stop your going to the drug store. And then you go on, you desire --

Q<sub>2</sub>: (To the effect that we may toss a coin).

S: Yes, but then you do not act, strictly speaking, anymore, because you are, then, simply swayed by winds. You act absolutely by chance. You never make a decision. That is to say, you never act. The flipping of a coin can take place only within a very limited context: when you know that both alternatives are reasonably equal and then you have to choose one of them --

Q<sub>2</sub>: That is, if thought is the criterion of action.

S: Why should it not be?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, I don't know. I said this seems to be the --

S: Yes, well let us not open all the questions. Let us limit ourselves to this simple observation: that there is a variety of ends but this variety is not necessarily a chaos because we see in a certain sphere, at least in the sphere of the arts, a hierarchic order. And Aristotle aims, indeed, at showing that there is a single end which gives an orientation to all our activities, and he will soon say what it is. But let us not take it up before; we have not given him a hearing. This is a simple rule of judicial fairness. Now where were we now? And we go on at this point where we left off. No, I'm sorry: I would like to read you one passage from a medieval commentator on the passage we just read. "And this" -- this refers to the passage read before by Mr. Reinkin -- "and this is" -- this for the sake of which -- "is one good or many goods or is the object of one art or of many arts." In other words, Averroes has seen it perfectly here. Here the question of one or many ends is not yet decided. Now let us go on from here.

O: Chapter two, section two. "Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to attain what is fitting, like archers having a target to aim at? If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the theoretical or practical sciences it is the object."

S: Yes, literally, "which of the sciences or faculties (or abilities)" does that. Note again the conditional character of the statement. If. If. He has not yet said it. Is it not likely -- let us assume that there is one end or a small number of ultimate ends. Would it not be good if we knew what these ends were just as in shooting if we know the target we are more likely to hit it than if we do not know the target. It's absolutely conditional and undeniably not deprived of common sense. Aristotle does not assert that knowledge of the single goal is useful or necessary for human life, for we do not yet know whe-

art must  
be spontaneous,  
due to choice.

ther there is such a single goal or, which we must also consider, whether that single goal is accessible to the majority of men. Then knowledge of it would not be useful for the majority of men. That single goal would be the theme of a science or an ability or faculty. Apparently, it could not be an art, properly understood. Now what is an ability in contra-distinction to an art or a science? We all know that. We only call it by different names. For example, some people have an uncanny ability to hit the target. I mean, not literally a target -- that also exists. But in other ways: you must have heard such expressions as a woman's intuition, or this man has an uncanny quality of guessing. He would be wholly unable to say why he believes that "a" will take place and not "b." But you have found in 99 out of 100 cases that he was right. That's an ability of sorts. That exists. And perhaps this is a guide for human life. We must consider that too. So this as to the very wide meaning of the term dunames here -- ability, faculty. Good. Now let us go on. Now he will gradually come to a decision.

O: "Now it would be agreed that it must be the object of the most authoritative of the sciences -- "

S: Yes, the most authoritative and the most architectonic of the sciences. That, architectonic; is of course taken from building. The architect rules the builders. He tells, directly or indirectly, to every man employed in the building process what he has to do because he shows them in advance the house they are supposed to build. And this is then used metaphorically of every commanding art: an architectonic art. So the most authoritative and the most architectonic art: if there is such a thing as one single good, that single good would be the object of the most authoritative and the most architectonic art. But we don't know whether there is such an art and we do not even know whether there is such a single good. Let us go on.

O: "But such is manifestly the science of politics. . . ."

S: Yes. Well, science, you can say -- "politics" would be a simpler translation. Politics: that peculiar kind of knowledge which makes a politician a politician, a statesman a statesman. Yes. Manifestly is a bit strong. The Greek word can have -- "such like appears to be politics" -- appears to be in its dual meaning: comes to sight and also merely appears to be. That is not so quite clear. Yes? So; in other words; we have already Aristotle's answer. This art which we seek, the master art, master knowledge, is politics; not our political science, not even Aristotle's political science as we shall see later, but the art which the politician or statesman possesses. But he has to give us some reason for this tall order. What does he say?

O: . . . for it is this that ordains which of the sciences are to exist in states, and what branches of knowledge the different classes of the citizens are to learn, and up to what point; and we observe that even the most highly esteemed of the faculties, such as strategy, domestic economy, oratory, are subordinate to the political science. Inasmuch then as the rest of the sciences are employed by this one, and as it moreover lays down laws as to what people shall do and what things they shall refrain from doing, the end of this science must include the ends of all the others. Therefore, the good of man must be the end of the science of politics.

S: Yes, "science of politics" is always -- let us say, "of politics." Now



let us stop here for just one moment. So Aristotle has, in other words, identified the single good, the highest good, and also the human pursuit aiming at it. How has he identified it? On the basis of things which everyone would admit, at least in Aristotle's time. Perhaps today there would be some doubts regarding some points. Now first of all, a master knowledge would be superior to all other knowledges. It would be the authority for them: tell them where to go and where to stop, and so on. Now which is that? What should you learn in school, in high school, in college, or in the army, whatever? There is one. Ultimately, the art of the statesman. Well, later on we will see, Aristotle makes a distinction, but he doesn't make that here. On the first level, everyone would admit it: that the city of Athens is perfectly entitled to tell which sciences or arts and to what limits are to be practiced by which age groups, for example, by which professional groups, and so on. This is one thing. Secondly, the most respected abilities in the city, strategy, wealth-getting and oratory, are obviously and admittedly subject to the political art. That is another very powerful argument. Furthermore, we are concerned also and especially with action as distinguished from sciences and arts. Which science or art tells you what to do, what actions to perform, and from which actions to abstain? Answer: the laws. But the laws are themselves the product of an art, the legislative art, which in its turn is only a part of the political art. Here we are. So on the basis of the political opinions, practically unquestioned, Aristotle reaches the conclusion, perfectly legitimate, that there is one and only one master art and therefore there can also be one master end, that end at which the master art aims. One brief comment in the immediate sequel.

O: "For even though it be the case that the good is the same for the individual and for the state. . . ."

S: It's, of course, always city. That goes without saying. Yes.

O: . . . nevertheless, the good of the city is manifestly a greater and more perfect good, both to attain and to preserve. To secure the good of one person only is better than nothing; but to secure the good of a nation or a city is a nobler and more divine achievement.

S: Yes. This also would be generally admitted. There may be some queer mavericks everywhere who deny it, but the ordinary man of ordinary intelligence would say of course. If someone can procure the good only for himself and another man can procure it for himself and others, the latter is a richer personality, as they would say today. He is -- that is something nobler and more divine than what the first does. So our question seems to be settled. Mr. Burnham.

Q: In the United States, the subordination of oratory to the political order is not admitted -- I mean, the first amendment.

S: What is not admitted? What do you mean?

O: The subordination of political speeches, the subordination even of scientific inquiry to the political art generally --

S: No, in a way not. Surely. Yes. In a way not, but the question is whether it would not come up in other ways, namely this: whether the true justification of the first amendment or the freedom of speech is not a purely pragma-

tic ground which could be very powerful; namely this way: that, of course, there is no earthly reason why malicious, obscene, degrading speech should be permitted, to say nothing of protected. There is no reason for it. And then there come certain practical difficulties. You have to forbid it, but then you have to institute censorship of sorts, however it may be called. That was the former practice, and this leads to certain difficulties. Censors are, after all, as we would say, bureaucrats and even if they are by nature men of perception and understanding the routine has a very bad effect. And therefore one can say it is a good rule of thumb to have the minimum of censorship: only in a case of extreme necessity like national security in war and this kind of thing. That one could say. But this assertion that there is an absolute right to freedom of speech as a natural right which overrides all other considerations is, in my view, an absurd opinion. But one thing is an absolute right of speech. Another thing is a rule of thumb: that on the whole freedom of speech is better -- also to keep the rulers informed of what the ruled think about them and keep them, therefore, in order a bit. This is another matter, but there is no absolute right of freedom of speech; of course not. There were some people who have asserted it, but no one has really been able to establish it, I mean, except on grounds of expediency, taking into consideration the absurdities of censors. Read the argument of Milton's Acropagetica.

O: No, I agree with you. I was making a more limited point though: that it is not, as perhaps it was in Aristotle's time -- it is not generally admitted today that at least some kinds of speech or pursuit of truth, perhaps, scientific pursuit of truth, is subject to the political art. I mean, it is generally admitted that obscene speech is subject to the political art. . . .

S: By the way, that is not simply true. Let us assume that there would be some agreement, which I believe is very unlikely, regarding all atomic powers that this kind of thing must be stopped. That would be, in effect, a prohibition on a certain kind of scientific inquiry. No testing; no underground testing, overground testing: certain inquiries can no longer be made. I mean, there is no intrinsic impossibility. I mean, I suppose that the exploration of poison gas as a weapon has been deplorably neglected because -- and there are other -- that is not simply true. That's not simply true. I mean, ultimately the question arises there. But let us not go into this thing because we cannot possibly solve all questions in reading one or two pages of Aristotle's Ethics. We only want to first see how Aristotle proceeds. Aristotle leads up to the conclusion, which is not his last word, by the way, that there is one and only one master art, the political art, which ultimately decides; which ultimately decides, for example, about what is taught in schools. This is still subject to political decisions today. Isn't it? I have heard that there were complaints about text books in this country and what they tell about -- well, in Germany you know there were politically established text books not only under the Nazi regime but under the American occupation period in order to prevent that. That's also a kind of master art regulating what is taught and to what extent. Let us read the next sentence and then we have reached a certain conclusion.

O: "This then being its aim, our investigation is in a sense the study of politics."

S: No, that is impossible. He says "the inquiry," using the same word as in the beginning, methodos; "the inquiry aims at these" -- at those things which I have indicated -- "the inquiry being a kind of politics," a kind of political

inquiry. That's important. What Aristotle does here is an inquiry, a scientific study. That is not an art and not an action. This is clear. Number one. This inquiry is not politics, the art of the statesman, but some kind of politics, politics in a sense. Aristotle's Ethics and Politics are not and could not have been the works of politicians or statesmen as such. It's something different. It's on another level: theoretically, on a higher level. The formula used here, some political inquiry, some kind of political inquiry, reminds of the remark of Socrates in the Gorgias where Socrates says that he is the true politician. The true politician -- of course, when a man says, "I am a true liberal" you can be sure he is not a liberal, or the true conservative is not a conservative, and similarly when someone says he is a true politician that he is surely not a politician, as everyone would see. At any rate, something of this kind happens here. Aristotle's Ethics and Politics are a kind of political inquiry, not simply political. Why he makes this qualification we will see gradually. Now it is not clear whether the politics, of which we have seen that it regulates all actions, is an art. If it were an art then the highest form of knowledge would be amoral or trans-moral in the same way in which the art of the shoemaker or of the blacksmith is not moral but amoral or trans-moral. But one thing is clear: that Aristotle's teaching in this book is an inquiry, a scientific study. Is it intrinsically moral or not? This we don't know. We must keep this open.

Now Aristotle has identified the ability or faculty which deals with the human good and he has shown in a manner the necessity of such a faculty or ability. He turns now to determine how exact it is. There is a knowledge of these things. But is it exact and how exact? Now what does exact mean? The Greek word is akrebes, which is still living on in acriby, I suppose not used in the United States, but it's used in German, for example. Now what does this mean? It is very interesting: in the Middle Ages they translated that by from which certain distinctions arise, but in a Renaissance translation I found the translation which is much more helpful for us: subtilis, subtle. And that is very good because it reminds us of what the Greek word, exact, originally means. They were not thinking primarily of mathematics but, for example, of a sculptor who works very neatly and very precisely, does nothing slipshod. This was much more meant by precisely than mathematical certainty. When modern science emerged in the 17th century Pascal opposed to the spirit of geometry, mathematical spirit, the spirit of subtlety, esprit de finesse. For example, if someone has a wonderful understanding of what is going on in the mind of a man to whom he talks, has a perfect empathy, so to speak, this is not exactness in the sense of social science because he couldn't prove a thing, and yet by following, point by point into every corner, as it were: that is exactness. This we must rather think of. Now Aristotle wants to determine here now the character of the exactness of this pursuit. Now one thing we know: the kind of exactness depends on the matter. For example, if you take a statuary -- whether he works on marble or clay or wood -- the exactness to be expected of him will be very different. Ethics can be only as exact as its matter permits. Now let us go on. Let us read the sequel, the immediate sequel.

O: Now our treatment of this science will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike. . . .

S: Oh, God. In all speeches. (Inaudible joke regarding departments of philosophy).



O: . . . in all discourses alike, any more than in all the products of the arts and crafts. The subjects studied by political science are moral nobility and justice; but these conceptions involve much difference of opinion and uncertainty, so that they are sometimes believed to be mere conventions and to have no real existence in the nature of things.

S: Yes. Let us stop here and we must first try to see. Aristotle speaks here now -- he takes up the question, how exact can this study be, and he says -- of course, the general statement was made, the exactness must correspond to the character of the subject-matter. And the exactness cannot be very high; by the standards of mathematics, let us say. For -- now I try to translate literally -- "the noble things and the just things about which politics," political knowledge, "speculates possesses much variety and confusion so that it is thought they are only by convention but not by nature." Now the noble and the just things are what we would call the moral things, but there is no such word, the moral, as we use it. Very simply, the just things are the things which you are obliged to do and the noble things are those which go beyond the call of mere duty. Therefore, they are noble; they are more highly praised. To use a simple example, paying one's debts is just. No one would call it a noble action. To go to jail because you have embezzled money is a just action, but no one would say it's a noble action. So the distinction is still immediately intelligible. You see, only now does Aristotle begin to speak of the fundamental difficulty of the immense variety of human goals, of the moral chaos. What he has spoken about hitherto, the variety of arts and the ends of the arts -- this was very minor. But if all noble and just things are by convention -- that means, by virtue of a decision made by the community and not intrinsically -- how can he find any bearing then except by mere conformism and simply following the lead given by our society. This is the first difficulty here, and let us see the next one.

O: "And a similar uncertainty surrounds the conception of the good. . . ."

S: Yes, not the conception; the good things. I mean, if Aristotle would talk so much about conceptions he would be a long time forgotten. He speaks about the good things, health, wealth, and so on. It's not a conception here. Yes?

O: . . . surrounds the good things because it frequently occurs that good things have harmful consequences: people have before now been ruined by wealth, and in other cases courage has cost men their lives.

S: Yes. Others have perished through courage. Yes. It's very simple. Yes. So you see, Aristotle makes the distinction between two classes of esteemed or estimable things: the noble and just of which he had spoken before, and now he turns to the good things. The good things are, if you want to use such an expression, morally neutral. Everyone would ordinarily admit that health is a good thing and that courage is a good thing. But look: some people have been ruined by the fact that they were healthy, because they went to some place to which they would not have gone if they had been sick, and in bed. And by going there they perished. Other people are courageous, undergo risks which they would not have undergone if they were not so courageous, and perished by that. These are very crude examples, but they indicate, at least, that what we ordinarily think are good things are, perhaps, not unquestionably and unqualifiedly good. Xenophon, who develops this theme at much greater length in *Memorabilia*, IV: ii, goes even so far as to say that wisdom, perhaps, is not altogether good because there are quite a few men who are, because of their wisdom -- they have been kidnapped by the king of Persia, so that it is better not to be wise. Mr. Boyan.

Q: (Objects to last point).

S: No, you have no idea how and common-sensical Aristotle can be. Take this very literally. I mean, take such a proof: if someone is the top fighter; hence, he will be put into a crack regiment. The chances of survival are much smaller than if he were known to be a very mediocre soldier. I mean, from a very broad consideration we have to consider even such simple things. Show the difficulty.

So, in other words, now only is the case bust wide open. We have the suspicion that all specifically moral things, the noble and just, may be only conventions. And regarding the good things, where no one can say that it is convention which makes health, or wealth or courage good, even there they are not unqualifiedly good. Where shall we take our bearings? Here that is a crucial step in the argument. Now what follows from that? We are so familiar with that today, you know, because we have all gone to social science and have learned that there is not a single thing which is unqualifiedly good. We know this at once, whereas in classical times this was the preserve of a few people who had listened to the so-called Sophists. But today millions are brought up in this way. What follows? Social science? Yes, one could say that, but Aristotle has one objection which he has already indicated. What becomes of the polis if you enthrone social science? So we must do better than social science and Aristotle indicates how he plans to do better. Let us read the immediate sequel.

O: We must therefore be content if, in dealing with subjects and starting from premises thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting a broad outline of the truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it is enough if we arrive at generally valid conclusions.

S: Yes, let us stop here for a moment. Now what does he say? We must be satisfied with a certain rough and ready premises. In other words, the fact that from time to time some people perish because they are healthy is not enough to say that health is not a good. Health is a good most of the time. That's good enough for us as practical men. This, of course, does not yet solve the problem of the noble and just things. That we must still take into consideration. We disregard the exceptions as we must. Otherwise we would lose our bearings completely. A deliberate abandonment of exactness in the sense of mathematics: deliberate. This does not go to the root of the matter by any means, but let us see how he develops that. Aristotle has now stated in a most general way what the subject of ethics is. He has now stated in the most general way how it must be treated and that we cannot expect the exactness, say, of mathematics. Now he raises the question, what about the hearer, the student, of ethics? What kind of a man must he be? Let us read that now. "In the same manner --

O: we may ask the student also to accept the various views we put forward in the same spirit; for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.

Again, each man judges correctly those matters with which he is acquainted; it is of these that he is a competent critic. To criticize a particular subject, therefore, a man must have been trained in that subject: to be a good critic generally, he must have had an all-round education.

S: Yes, let us stop here. Now what does he say? He speaks now of the student of what we may call ethics or politics. He must be aware from the very beginning what degree of certainty he can possibly expect. Otherwise he behaves like a brute, like an elephant in a china shop, when he wants in ethics mathematical certainty. That cannot reasonably be expected. Aristotle briefly mentions in passing what an educated man is. An educated man is not, strictly speaking, the scholar in the field but a man who has a reasonable familiarity with what the scholars in that field are doing. And an all-round educated man would be reasonably well informed about all fields of scholarship, which today is, of course, no longer possible but which was possible in ancient times. Now what is the key point? That is said only in passing. Aristotle says don't expect mathematical certainty, but he mentions another kind of speaker here as an alternative to the mathematician, and who is that?

O: The orator.

S: The orator. I mean, from an orator you do not demand apodictic proofs: plausible proofs. Now what Aristotle does in the Ethics is in between mathematics and rhetoric. For example, the orator appeals to the decent feelings of his listeners. This is impossible in mathematics, but in ethics it is perfectly possible. That's one example of what he has in mind. The orators, of course, can preach up anything and everything, and this is, of course, not what Aristotle means by the ethical teacher. So we see here that Aristotle still has not told us how we can overcome the moral chaos regarding the noble, the just, and even the good things. That he will tell us in the sequel. Now let us go on. Let us conclude this chapter.

O: Hence, the young are not fit to be students of politics. For they have no experience of life and conduct, and it is these that supply the premises and subject matter of this branch of philosophy. And moreover they are led by their feelings; so that they will study the subject to no purpose or advantage, since the end of this science is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether they are young in years or immature in character; the defect is not a question of time, it is because their life and its various aims are guided by feeling; for to such persons their knowledge is of no use, any more than it is to persons of defective self-restraint. But moral science may be of great value to those who guide their desires and actions by principle.

S: Let us read the next sentence because it is the conclusion of this introduction.

O: Let so much suffice by way of introduction as to the student of the subject, the spirit in which our conclusions are to be received, and the object that we set before us.

S: Yes. Now do you see what he says then, how Aristotle overcomes, provisionally at any rate, the moral chaos of the existence of which he has informed us? What does he do? I think one can state it very simply. The hearer of ethics must be a moral man. At least he must be a well bred man who comes to class with the understanding of the noble and just things, and also this general clarity about what ordinarily the good things are. The pursuers of wealth and so on, of this kind of thing, would not understand what he says. Aristotle does not begin, and that is crucial, with refuting what you can call immoralism: for example, as Plato does in his way in the first book of the Republic when Socrates



refutes Thrasymachus or in the Gorgias when Socrates refutes Callicles, and similar things. He doesn't do that. He presupposes men who would know from the very beginning that Callicles and Thrasymachus cannot be right, who take decency for granted. This is the deliberate and conscious limitation. How could this be politically justified? Yes?

Q: Does he ever make clear -- perhaps this is an answer to your question -- that this kind of moral man -- is he moral by nomos or is he moral by nature? He raises this question earlier.

S: Yes, he raises it, but he does not answer it in those terms. I mean, what does he take for granted? That the noble and just things are truly noble and just. That question is not answered in terms of physis or nomos. It's not a theoretical answer.

Q: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, he takes it, indeed. There are no self-evident principles from which he starts. There are principles evident to well bred men, and this is a very great difficulty. Let us face it. In other words, a gentleman called Aristotle who is, at the same time, more than a gentleman talks to gentlemen to give gentlemen the greatest possible clarity about what they, as gentlemen, are inclined to. If someone is not a gentleman, either clever or stupid -- it doesn't make any difference -- he is not a fit hearer of Aristotle because he denies the principles. (Quotes a sentence in Latin and then translates). "Against him who denies the principles one cannot dispute." That seems to be the beginning of Aristotle. That will become ever more clear to us. Aristotle does not deduce the ethical principles from any higher principles. In this respect he is very rare. In ancient times it is even unique. The predominant view is, for example, the Platonic view. You know, Plato gives a kind of deduction in the Republic and other places. Aristotle doesn't do it. Aristotle is very practical and he simply says what is the use of training in the political art in the widest sense potential tyrants and other undesirables. I want to train only gentlemen of whom I can be sure that they will not even think of becoming tyrants. Is this not a very defensible position? I mean, the gentleman has to know what tyrants are after and he has to know by what means tyrants come to power and keep themselves in power in order to get rid of them. But he does not have to become convinced that it is low to strive for tyranny. He knows that. He has been well bred. This is what you can call the Jane Austin element in Aristotle which is, however, by no means a negligible and indefensible thing. Aristotle was aware of these difficulties but the Ethics is not the place to discuss them. That is the great difference between him and, I would say, all other ancient philosophers. This lack of radicalism is a very great radicalism: simply to face this arouses difficulty. So the hearers must be decent men.

Q: (Inaudible)

S: Yes, that it would help us very much for our lives if we knew that good so that we can use it as a target.

Q: The question is again how are we going to get our bearings if there wasn't something other than convention. Is that correct?

S: Yes, we must know something, but since Aristotle is not an epistemologist he is relatively uninterested in the question of how we discover it. . . . (A few words inaudible).

Q: Yes, well, the point I'm trying to make is you are deriving these principles from something other than nomos, convention, itself. This is where you get your bearings. That he does say, or does he?

S: Yes, that he does not even say but we can assume that he somehow must aim at something more substantial than convention.

Q: On the other hand, the end of this subject is not knowledge but action.

S: Absolutely. In other words, theoretically it is of very minor interest. That's what he means by that. But practically it is of utmost interest. What does he mean by that?

Q: But the question is if we are concerned with action do we need to be concerned with these things that are derived not from nomos? In other words, we're going to have to work within the conventions of whatever we've got.

S: No, no, Aristotle doesn't say that his book is based on conventions. It's by no means as simple as that.

Q: I'm seeing a little difficulty here.

S: An enormous difficulty. Let us first read the parallel to that which follows almost immediately after; in the technical sense, a repetition. Now this is in the next chapter. We have only to read the end. In 1095a30 -- this whole section. You see, this chapter which would come now is, as a whole, a repetition of the preceding section of the Ethics, simplified in many ways but also, of course, adding something. Aristotle would never say the same thing all over again because this would make the book better and then he would have a better publication record with his department. But he has his reasons. (Laughter). It happens. It is fostered by the practice of judging people by the number and size of their publication. This wasn't so in ancient times. Now I want us to read now only this end to answer Mr. Boyan's question. "But it must not escape us that the speeches down from the principles and those toward the principles differ." Do you have that?

O: And we must not overlook the distinction between arguments that start from first principles and those that lead to first principles. It was a good practice of Plato to raise this question, and to enquire whether the right procedure was to start from. . . .

S: Well, not such a very clumsy expression, a word like procedure, but the way he simply says -- whether the way is from the beginnings --

O: . . . or up to the beginnings, as in a race-course one may run from the judges to the far end of the track or reversely.

S: Is he not clear? There are two ways in the race-course and there are two ways in inquiries. Yes. Go on.

O: "Now no doubt it is proper to start from the known."

S: Well, this is true generally. I mean, this is more universal than what he said before: from the beginnings or toward the beginnings. We start from the known. In every teaching and learning one must start from something which one

knows. This simple thing is, I think, clear; but it cannot be repeated often enough because all miscarriages in learning can be said to stem from the fact that people do not begin from what they know but begin from something which they believe to know. (Inaudible question and explanation regarding the race-course). You would see it in every movie on this subject. Good. Now go on. "Then we must begin from what is known to us, but this is twofold for some things are known to us and others are known simply." Now this may sound strange: known simply and not known to us, meaning what is known simply is that the nature of which would make the knowledge true knowledge, knowledge in the highest sense. We ascend, let us say, from the effects to the causes, but only the descent from the causes to the effects is genuine knowledge. I will develop this later on fully. We must first read that. I'm sorry. Now Aristotle says, then, with a little joke, perhaps we must begin from what is known to us. Good. Now how does he go on?

O: "This is why in order to be a competent student of the right and just. . ."

S: About the noble and just. Yes?

O: "... about the noble and just, and in short of the topics of politics in general, the pupil is bound to have been well trained in his habits."

S: Yes. In other words, he has a decent upbringing -- must have had a decent upbringing. Yes.

O: "For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so."

S: The "that" he simply says. We start from the "that." Yes?

O: "If this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to know the reason why it is so."

S: Yes. The "why." If we know the "that," Aristotle says very strangely, we do not need the "why." Yes?

O: "And the man of good moral training knows first principles already or can easily acquire them."

S: Now let us stop here. Good. Now what is the point? He makes here a distinction which we can call with traditional terms, although not necessarily their present-day meaning. There is deduction and induction, deduction from the first principles and induction leading up to them. This is in itself simple and clear. Now here you start from the things, from the principles /the former/ and where you start here is what Aristotle calls what is known simply, what is intrinsically known and not necessarily known to us, what is the principle from which all genuine knowledge seems to start. Here we start /the latter/ from what is known to us, in induction. For example, an earthquake: the fact of an earthquake, and we ascend to the causes of earthquakes. We would have a complete knowledge if we would have here causes connected with each other by descending from which we would be able to give an account of all earthquakes, all eclipses of the sun and the moon, and whatever have you. This is a simple schema. So the starting point here is the "that" and not the "why." Here the starting point is the "why," and which is a descent. Is this simple and schematic distinction clear?



Q: I think the induction and deduction is clear, but I'm still not clear on how anything can be known, knowable in itself, if it's not known, because isn't it the human mind which -- there would be nothing if there were no human mind --

S: Yes, but still, does it not make sense, common-sensically, to say that the highest principles of everything are not immediately accessible to us, that what we know primarily are rather dogs and cats and tables and this kind of thing and we ascend to them? Does it not, common-sensically, make sense? Let me try it here. What does it mean in our case? Aristotle addresses well bred people and these well bred people know that these and these and these things are noble and these and these things are just and these and these things are, generally speaking, good. They don't know why, but they know the "that," and that is sufficient that they can be listeners and what will happen to them when Aristotle comes to them? What will he learn from Aristotle, this well bred man? For example, he knows -- well, let us take a crude example: when children are taught that he should not spit. Let us take a simple example. He will learn from Aristotle why it is decent not to spit. Now this is, of course, a crude example and probably when he is 20 years old he knows already the reason why he shouldn't spit, but there are other things, perhaps, where he doesn't know it so clear. For example, regarding the relation of the two kinds of justice: that there is a justice which consists in simple equality, another which consists in proportionate equality. We will hear about that later. Or other subtleties of the magnanimous man and of munificence, and this kind of thing. So from Aristotle he will learn the why.

Let me state it now more precisely. Then I will answer your question. The doubt, the moral chaos, is caused by the fact that all moral things, all noble and just things, are believed to be merely conventional. That is to say, they are not intrinsically good. Aristotle would have to show them why the noble and just things are good. Do you see? They know only: one has to behave decently, i.e. nobly and justly. And they know somehow that this is good, but they cannot explain it. Aristotle will teach them why that is the case, exactly what, in his way, Plato is doing in such books as the Gorgias and the Republic and some other books. But here the difficulty arises -- (let me finish the argument and then we have a free for all).

So if we take this schema: these men know the "that" -- that these and these things are noble and these and these just. And Aristotle will start here then. He will lead them up. Aristotle could if he wanted, since he knows the principles -- he could teach deductively. He could teach deductively. In other words, Aristotle could say, "I will not make this qualification. Hitherto, I have said I will talk only to decent people." I will now address all people of sufficient intelligence, decent or no decent, and will prove to them that decency is good, whereas the indecent people, of course, say that the squares are fools, as Callicles and Thrasymachus say, in effect. He will teach that. The question is whether Aristotle does this too in his Ethics as a matter of fact. One thing is clear. Let me say it in advance. Aristotle does not do it. Aristotle does not give what we can call a theoretical ethics. He starts from these principles and goes down at least to considerable specification. That he does not do. And why does he not do it? Some answer is given, a very provisional but by no means irrelevant answer is given, in the immediate sequel which we shall now read, discuss briefly, and then we will have our discussion. Mr. Reinkin. No, excuse me. The situation was this: the hearer knows the "that" because he is well bred and such a man will either already possess or will easily acquire the principles. The man who is not well bred will not have or

acquire them easily. And now there is, however, the third type of man: the one who has no upbringing and also doesn't know these principles. What shall we do with them? Aristotle gives an answer by quoting a poet. Yes?

O: As for the person who neither knows nor can learn, let him hear the words of Hesiod:

Best is the man who can himself advise;  
He too is good who hearkens to the wise. . . .

S: Oh no, no metric translation. "He is altogether the best who himself understands everything. The decent is also he who obeys to him who has spoken well. But he who cannot think by himself nor hearing of another: he is altogether a useless fellow." So now which is, then, the one corresponding to Aristotle's hearer in the Ethics? Which of these three?

O: The one who partakes of good counsel.

S: Hesiod describes him more precisely: who has heard, who has heard from others. This is the status of the man who is merely decent man and is not a wise man like Aristotle. He has only heard it. He has been told as a child and as a young man: do this, don't do that. And gradually, by habituation, he has become a decent human being. As a decent human being he "knows" that these and these things are just and these and these things are noble. And Aristotle will then enlighten him on the basis of this knowledge acquired primarily by hearing, about that knowledge. But we shall see that this knowledge does not consist in giving a "why," answering the question, why is it good to be decent, but developing the full meaning of decency. For example, he knows something about courage, about temperance, about magnanimity and whatever it may be. And he has read quite a few poets and so which have elucidated it in various ways. Aristotle elucidates these things coherently. This we can say is -- at least, that the bulk of the first part is devoted to this question. Now but why can one say -- what is the simple justification of Aristotle's seemingly circular and unscientific procedure? You know, people are decent because they have been told to be decent and then Aristotle clarifies and sophisticates this meaning of decency without ever raising the question, why should one be decent, as Socrates does. There was a very famous moral philosopher in modern times who was absolutely anti-Aristotelian in these matters, but, as it happens, as it may very well happen, because of the depth of the anti-Thomism, understood this point very well. And that was Kant. I mean, they are radically different, but one thing they have in common. There is no deduction of ethics from pre-ethical principles, and one can give an answer which both have in common, a very simple one. If you say to a young man or a young woman, do this, this and this is not decent, and you get the reply, why should one be decent, what will you say about such an individual? I mean, questioning whether this is in fact decent or not: that's, of course, a different story. But why should one be decent? Well, a decent man never raises this question. In other words, there is no possibility of deducing decency from non-decency. This is the simple moral answer which Kant surely gives but which, in his way, also Aristotle gives. Only the situation in Aristotle is infinitely more complex than in Kant because in Kant this kind of moral knowledge, if we can call it that way, is higher, theoretically higher, strange as that may sound, than all theoretical knowledge, whereas for Aristotle theoretical knowledge is higher than this kind of knowledge. So in a simple schema (goes to blackboard) moral man looks here at something. That is the end, the moral end from which he starts and beyond which he cannot look and refuses to look. This is a rough structure of Kant's doctrine. All knowledge, in Kant's

sense, ultimately is subordinated and points toward a knowledge of this kind. Most philosophers, and Aristotle is also one of them, don't stand here as philosophers, but here. They look at it from the outside. As philosophers they are not subject to the moral law: in their capacity as thinking beings. That is also the case of Aristotle, but Aristotle sees also the necessity of a consideration which is limited by morality and that is what he supplies here. That is the reason why there is no deduction given. Later on when we come to the doctrine of the virtues you will see that Aristotle does not make the slightest attempt to deduce these virtues: show that there are so and so many and only these virtues. Then he would have to go into a higher principle: say, the human soul has so and so many parts and there must be a virtue for each of these parts. That's roughly what Plato does in the Republic. Nothing of the kind in Aristotle. That has to do with this deliberate limitation, and the grave question of course is this, which was, I think, implied by Mr. Boyan: is Aristotle not compelled to avoid this circularity? You know: that decency presupposes itself. Must there not be some higher principle through which decency is justified?

Q: May I raise a point: what is health? How is health defined?

S: A good condition of the body.

Q: Yes, I think it might be possible to derive decency from non-decency.

S: You mean good condition of the soul. Something of this kind is done surely by Plato, to some extent also by Aristotle. But the question is this: surely that would seem to be the most natural procedure but it is not simply the procedure of Aristotle and we must keep this question in mind. What I wanted to emphasize at the beginning was only this point: that Aristotle is alive to the grave question posed by that moral chaos, the moral skepticism which was, of course, as such as developed in classical antiquity as it was at any time in modern times. But we must see what is the way in which he counters it. Now in this section which we did not read -- well we can, perhaps, discuss it -- Father Vaughan, you read the first paper? Why don't you begin at 1095a11 and go on to 1099b8, and Mr. Reinkin takes the rest of Book I. But there were some further questions.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Inaudible).

S: No, I would say this question would become interesting only if we would come across a serious difficulty which cannot be explained from the subject matter but only by an external mishap. . . . Then we would take it up. But after all, this is not a philology class nor a philosophy class. We are political scientists. Well, I could have told you something of this but everyone can read it, I suppose, in Rackham's introduction: that there are three books which have come down to us in the Aristotelian body which are ethics: this famous ethics called the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the great ethics, the Magna Moralia, and that there are all kinds of hypotheses about their relation but this is polymathy. You know what that is? That is a Greek word which is quite good to remember. I do not know whether there is a simple equivalent to that in English. "Poly" means much or many and "mathy" means learning: much learning, knowing many things, and it implies an old saying. (Quotes it in Greek and then translates). "Knowing many things does not teach wisdom." One must, unfortunately, know many things but for some reasons. (An inaudible sentence stressing the same point). I think we have to say this ethics which we read has been the ethics throughout the Western world especially in the Middle



Ages and modern times, and is in wealth of subject matter by far superior to others, whatever the other forms may be. Surely one should also, if one has the time, study them, but most of you are, I'm sure, very glad if they get some acquaintance with a single ethics of Aristotle and then one chooses naturally the most perfect form of it, whatever the relation of it to the others. That's not interesting. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: In the passage that we were reading, 1095b, about line 8, where Aristotle says, "For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so; if this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to know the reason why it is so," and you explained this. The thing that I don't understand --

S: Well, is it not true that if people know that these and these things are the noble and just things, that this is for all practical purposes the most important thing? Whether they can give an account of it is less important. For action. Does it not make sense?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Well, except that what he is saying is that these people already knew what was good --

S: Yes, but that it is good, not why. That is a key distinction.

Q<sub>3</sub>: They know that it is good but --

S: That it is good but -- they know it by hearing.

Q<sub>3</sub>: And so, supposedly Aristotle would want to teach them why it is good.

S: Yes, to some extent. He says so. But what he does is -- in one sense he tells them the "why," I mean, if we follow this language: namely, he gives them the formal cause. He tells them what precisely magnanimity, courage, and so, is. But he does not tell them, at least not thematically, why is magnanimity good, why is justice good. He makes some passing remarks regarding justice, but this is not his theme. You understand the procedure most simply when you compare it with the discussions in the Gorgias and in the Republic, first book of the Laws and in other places, where the Platonic speaker, the Platonic mouth-piece, proves to others that justice is good. Or, let us say, decency is good. Aristotle does not prove that. He presupposes it, he says. He doesn't address Callicles-es and Thrasymachus-es and this kind of people. He addresses nice people and the nice people know it from their upbringing. And this is theoretically not entirely satisfactory: that goes without saying. But the question is, did Aristotle not indirectly meet this fundamental theoretical issue? The most urgent issue is surely the practical issue: that they be confirmed in their duties, as we would say, and enlightened about them rather than to become unnecessarily complicated as to why they should fulfill their duties. Does this not make sense?

Q<sub>3</sub>: The reason I don't understand what's happening is because if they already know this as decent people, then what more can they expect to learn from Aristotle?

S: Well, I wonder whether some of the -- I mean, read some of the practical minds, statesmen and this kind of people, and read what they write about the highest human things, and you will be surprised how very fragmentary and incom-

plete that is. For example -- is Mr. Emmert here? You have made a study of Churchill. You have seen that he says wonderful things; but when he tries to speak abstractly it's very poor. Now he has, of course, in his case, a wonderful justification because the matrix is so rich: you know, his life experience, and so on. But theoretically it is not satisfactory. When Aristotle speaks about the various virtues, very few very virtuous men, and outstanding by their virtue, would be able to write such a chapter on munificence or whatever it be. Aristotle takes the broadest view. It is of some importance. I think everyone of you who has tried to be virtuous and has read about a specific virtue in Aristotle has learned something because of the breadth of the consideration: things of which he has not thought. You will see it when we go on and come to the individual virtues, which are the clearest example of that. But later on other subjects come, like pleasure and so on. Mr. Seltzer.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Isn't there a deduction when he talks about the specific work of a man?

S: Yes, you anticipate. We will see later -- that will come up next time -- in the first book there is a kind of deduction, namely, very roughly -- well, I will not answer your question. We must follow the movement. There is something of this kind. Aristotle calls it, in a way, a deduction. I know that. But if you would raise the question, how this statement is related to the enumeration of the virtues at the end of Book II, then you would see there is no connection. It's not brought up. Surely. Aristotle knew that surely from Plato if from no other place: that a theoretically satisfactory account would require something like a deduction. And don't forget that the most influential adaptation of Aristotle in the Western world, the Thomistic adaptation, is not based -- in Thomas you have a deduction. But the Thomistic deduction is based directly on Cicero and such writers, Stoic tradition, which in its turn is a prolongation of the Platonic tradition, of this deducing tradition. In Aristotle that does not exist. That's his peculiarity. One can say Aristotle, in a proper, although not now generally used, meaning of the word empirical -- Aristotle is the most empirical. How do these phenomena appear to us in the life of action and not when we, as it were, withdraw from it and reflect upon it? That is Aristotle's amazing exactness and fidelity to the phenomena as they show themselves in action, when we live. Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>5</sub>: (Regarding Aristotle's relevance to other cultures).

S: (One or two inaudible sentences followed by the following). You only have to read with some care the story of Saul and David to see. . . . but I once explained this kind of thing in the presence of a student of Chinese things, of which I know nothing, and he said that is exactly -- I mean, the main points -- what the Chinese gentlemen have understood. There may be certain differences . . . but as far as Winston Churchill, who is surely not a man who is "doing" philosophy, was given the Ethics in an English translation when he was a very mature man by Lord Birmingham (?) and Churchill read it and found it absolutely convincing and said, "That's more or less the way in which I always understood these things." So there are some men, at any rate -- and Churchill had not gone through Oxford and Cambridge. . . . but indeed one can say this is somehow a consequence, an indirect consequence of Aristotle in Britain. I do not believe -- I think one can show -- by reflecting a bit one can show, and that Aristotle does not give us. . . . (all of this off-microphone and difficult to hear). On magnanimity, when you read that chapter, there are quite a few things which are, at first glance, obnoxious, and if you would read Thomas' commentary you would see that Thomas has interpreted it away, in a sense, because certain things are

clearly hard to take from the Biblical point of view. But, on the other hand, when you look around and you see -- for example, I saw this for the first time only a short while ago when I reflected a bit about Montgomery, you know, of El Alamein, and who, as you all know, has also a considerable ridiculousness. He's famous for that. But, on the other hand, . . . (inaudible words). But if you look at him he is a man of whom it has been said he was born to command. Now it is obviously necessary for every society to possess such men, especially for the military but I suppose, also, other things. Now, but a man born to command -- when you read the chapter on magnanimity, from this point of view: that what he describes is here the type who is born to command and knows it, of course, then quite a few things will fall into shape and it would no longer be a specimen of a peculiarity of this particular "culture" but will be a necessity of political society which was perhaps more elaborated by the Greeks than by people living in other cultures. Perhaps, but not more. But the fundamental human necessity of it becomes clear and the same applies, also, to other things too.

(End of tape. The following is a summary from student notes).

Surely Aristotle doesn't simply qualify the available morality. In "qualifying" it he modifies it. The Aristotelian Ethics is the Greek gentleman's morality as seen and purified by a philosopher, by a man who stands above that morality, i.e. modifies it.

Q: (Regarding the distinction between the good for the individual and that of the city).

S: More divine, more illustrious, more resplendent. The maximum is nations, not the cosmopolis. Regarding the divine, the word is used in the sense of very outstanding. I do not even have to refer to the American usage.

Q: Would this not reflect the pretty well established fact that founders are made?

S:- That is very good. But whether Aristotle would call a founder divine in the sense of a God is very doubtful. That he would use the word in this metaphorical sense is another matter.



2nd Meeting: April 4, 1963

... I will naturally only mention those things where I disagree with you. Now you quoted Ortega y Gasset. That quotation was very helpful because it shows, indeed, the tremendous difference between the views prevailing today and the view of Aristotle. There is no history, in Gasset's sense, in Aristotle, nor in Plato, nor in anyone until the 18th century. This is one point. . . . (Several inaudible words). Now you raised the question at the end, why not the contemplative life toward which Aristotle is leading up at the beginning, in the first book? What was your answer? You mentioned the fact that Aristotle points, from the very beginning to contemplative life, but only points to it and leaves it very vague. And what was your explanation of this?

O: Well, my answer was that in the final analysis it will not be simply contemplation, but we must wait until the final --

S: Yes, this is one answer, but the simplest answer, I believe is this: that Aristotle leads from what people are more likely to know and they are more likely to know the life of action than the life of contemplation. In other words, he ascends somehow. Not a descent. Ascent. That is one point. But as for this other question which came up last time -- and Mr. , I believe, raised the question, is not morality essential to theory? We speak of intellectual probity, for example. Well, this I gave a rough and provisional answer. I said there is a great difficulty. You can easily see -- if you would look up in the Summa, first part of the second part, question 58, the last article, where Thomas raises the question, does intellectual virtue presuppose moral virtue, and he says the intellectual virtue called prudence, practical wisdom, does, but wisdom, theoretical wisdom, does not. So you see -- and Thomas knew Aristotle quite well. So there is a real difficulty here. We will later on have to take up this question coherently.

Now there were certain terms which you used which did not make me very happy, Father Vaughan: material prosperity. Why material? Why not simply say wealth? The term material, you know, if it is an Aristotelian term, as you know, matter, material, does not have this meaning of bodily. Something very intellectual may be matter. It is something else: the genus or the species and this kind of thing. So let us leave it at the simple word, wealth, because when we speak of wealth we ordinarily do not mean by that literal wealth. We mean just a bank account and similar forms of wealth. But a more important term which you use is system, system of ethics. Now the word system is a Greek word, of course, and means something which you have put together, and is used, for example, of an army or anything put together by man. That doctrines, edifices, as it were, of this kind are called systems is rather late, and the term came in common use, as far as I know, in 16th, 17th, century, but the very precise meaning of the term system in philosophy is due to modern philosophy, and reaches its full clarification in Hegel only. So I think in a more careful language one should not speak of systems when speaking of the teachings of Plato and Aristotle.

Surely the key point to consider when one touches this book is that it is the oldest ethical treatise. Whether there were earlier ones before: maybe, but we surely don't have them. And Plato's writings are not treatises; obviously, of ethics or of anything else, but all dialogues. So this we must, indeed, keep in mind. That's the oldest ethical treatise which we have.

When you raised this, induced by Northrop -- and you could have been induced, as you know, by n other people because there is nothing Northropian in this thesis -- this we have been told since three centuries now -- it's almost nauseating -- that Aristotle's ethical teaching rests on his teleology. The teleology has been refuted, if not by Descartes and Newton at least by Darwin, and therefore the whole thing is baseless. Now I would argue against Northrop in particular in a perfectly legitimate way which is called ad hominem: let us see how it works on the Northropian basis. I happen to have read his book on East and West. I was asked to give a report on one chapter which dealt with Islamic culture. And can only say, if this is the consequence of the new science then the methods used by some central African tribes are preferable. Yes, but this question, of course, is a very grave question. Does Aristotle's ethical teaching presuppose his physics and metaphysics? It's a very grave question, and the distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom, which Aristotle makes, by virtue of which practical wisdom is in itself independent of theoretical wisdom, shows that there is a real difficulty here. Perhaps there are principles of practice which are not in need of any theoretical foundation. Perhaps. We do not know yet. So we must leave this open for the time being.

Now let us turn, then, to a coherent discussion of our assignment. I would like to remind you first of what we found out last time. Aristotle starts with an observation about the variety of ends. Ends mean here human ends, and it is perfectly open whether non-human beings and, in particular, inanimate things, have ends. This is still left open. There is a variety of ends and yet there is some unity there because there is an order among these ends, and this is most clearly visible in the arts. But is there one single highest end or is there a variety of highest ends which are more or less equal in dignity? That is left open. Yet there is one highest pursuit. This we know. And that is politics, the quality of the statesman. This being the case, there must be the highest end because there is the highest pursuit. Now one can, of course, raise n questions against this seemingly dogmatic assertion, but most people who listen to Aristotle, surely all who listened to this lecture, would have said, of course. Everyone sees that: whatever we may admire most -- think, for example -- even a physicist today is ultimately acting today according to orders of Washington. There may have been a time in which physics was not subject to such governmental orders, but our age has again become very radical and political. But, of course, we must reconsider that much more carefully. The second point is that the variety of ends is much more radical than Aristotle stated at the beginning. We are confronted with a chaos: all noble and just things seem to be only conventional, so great is the difference. (By the way, the word noble, which I explained provisionally -- it is the same word in Greek as the word for beautiful. And one could, perhaps, use something like resplendent in order to indicate the connection between the two. A beautiful horse and a noble action: in Greek it's the same word. There are languages in which you can use in both cases the same word. For example, in German. I believe also in Arabic. But you cannot do it in English. In French you can do it, of course, too: belle action. And so on. Good.) So all noble and just things seem to be by convention only, and the good things are so dubious. The most obvious goods prove to be evils under certain conditions. Yet Aristotle's answer here, as we have seen: we speak only to decent people and decent people are people who know that the noble and just things are choiceworthy because they are noble and just. And how do they know it? Ultimately by hearing. By hearing, by having been told by their betters, their parents or others. This was the main point we made last time.

Now in the immediate sequel, in 1095, a14 to b13, we find a repetition: a repetition of the preceding argument. If you turn to 1095b14 -- do you have that?

O: "Let us however resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed."  
-- (Ross translation being used).

S: Yes. Aristotle says here explicitly that we have made a digression. The preceding thing is a digression, an excursus, but an excursus of a particular kind. It is a repetition of what was said before. Now a repetition is never a simple restatement without any changes. Now what does he say at this point which he hasn't said before? I believe we see here that he takes now for granted that there is a single highest good, which -- he had not done so before. And the reason why he takes it now for granted is because all men take it for granted, because all men speak of happiness, and by happiness everyone means the complete human good. Now the word for happiness -- this is perhaps not even immediately intelligible to us because the Greek word for happiness has a fuller meaning. It is eudaimonia, in which the Greek word for god, or one word, daimon, is in. A man who is -- well, let us say, has been well treated by God, by a god. Eudaimonia. It has also therefore some meaning like pleasant; a very rich meaning compared with what we ordinarily mean today by a happy fellow. And one can, therefore, very well raise the question, is this not a particularly Greek notion that there is such a thing as happiness which is the comprehensive good? Now in modern times it was questioned, even while the term happiness was still used, but it was said in the way in which Aristotle, for example, understood it there is no happiness. Happiness is a state of completion; of repose, one could say, seemingly. And -- well, human life is incompatible with a state of repose. Human life is constant activity, constant change. Yes, but do we not have even in our present-day simple, folksy orientation a reminding of the fact that to be really well off -- that is something static, as they say now -- I retract the word immediately. A repose. Sometimes one says of a man he is on the top, on the top of the world. He is on the top. Or another simple expression: he is sitting pretty. Sitting. I mean, what can you do more than to sit pretty? So we still have a reminder that there is something where one would be perfectly satisfied with that condition and not wish to change it, because any change would be a change for the worse. However this may be, I limit myself to one point: in this section Aristotle does assert there is one highest good, but what it is is entirely controversial. So we have only the name, happiness, but that is, perhaps, of some help. Now let us proceed here. In 1095b14. Here we may perhaps begin at this point. Read again what you have read.

O: Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment.

S: So, in other words, this would give some substance to the name; happiness. A life of constant pleasure. From one night club to a Turkish bath, and you can go on. Yes?

O: For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life -- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life.

S: Contemplative and theoretical is, of course, the same. Yes.

O: "Now the mass of mankind. . . ."

S: The many, he says. Mass is a term stemming from Newtonian physics, or thereabouts. Yes? Good.



O: Now the many are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardapallus.

S: So, in other words, that's clear. In other words, some in high places live bestially and therefore the many who are status seekers -- there are quite a few at all times -- will simply say we live like beasts because that is a chic thing to do, because a king, Sardapallus himself, led. . . . (a few words inaudible).

Q: (Regarding the translation being used).

O: I went into the Ross because we had so much trouble with the Rackham.

S: Yes, good. And now? Among the people Aristotle is addressing there is no one who is seriously considering this life of mere sensual enjoyment. I mean, that is simply -- well, one can give reasons for that but they know that. They know this much: that it's impossible. Now we come to another kind of man. How does he call them?

O: A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honor.

S: Yes, well, "the gracious men, the men of some refinement, and the men of action: they choose honor."

O: ". . . for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life."

S: Yes, of the political man, I would say. Oh no -- of the political life. I'm sorry. I'm very sorry. Yes.

O: But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honor rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honor in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honored, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honor, the end of the political life.

S: Yes, let us stop here. So Aristotle gives here some argument why even this more respectable end of life, honor, rather than sensual enjoyment, cannot possibly fill the bill; because honor is something essentially incomplete or defective, and he gives some reasons for that. A man possesses honor if he is honored by others. Therefore the others give the honor. They can also take it away. And this is a very precarious position if you do not possess it but others dispose of it. That makes some sense; doesn't it? Furthermore, people are honored on the ground of something and this ground on which they are honored is, of course, more fundamental than the honor, and therefore this ground is some excellence, whatever that excellence may be, and therefore that excellence or virtue is much more reasonably the end. Yes?

O: "But even this appears somewhat incomplete."

S: Even virtue, at which we have arrived from honor -- even virtue is somewhat incomplete. Yes?

O: for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with life-long inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs.

S: Yes. You see, this phenomenon existed already in classical antiquity: that someone wants to defend a thesis by hook and by crook and then he can, perhaps, not be refuted because he refuses to look at the phenomena which manifestly refute him. This can happen. But no serious man would say that a man who lives in this manner, namely possesses virtue and is in the greatest misery -- that this is a happy man. I mean, that obviously, you know? Aristotle makes it, in a way, very simple. Think of the story of Job, the greatest example. Job was just, was virtuous, and yet lived in very great misery. Hence, no one in his senses could say that Job was a happy man. So virtue cannot be identical with happiness. It is here asserted. The other case is more difficult to understand: how someone -- that is because Aristotle takes virtue here in the precise sense, a habit. Now a man may possess a certain habit without ever having opportunity to exercise it. The extreme case would be a man who is asleep, who is asleep his whole life, but somehow he acquired the habit. Now could one call such a man happy? Good. Now the only way of life which survives this test is the contemplative life, and this is, of course, not yet here asserted, that the contemplative life is the only one which can be called happy. It is merely indirectly suggested.

Now in this whole section Aristotle does again not yet establish what happiness is. He makes only somewhat clearer what the non-vulgar views of happiness are. The vulgar views he had stated before. And now let us turn to -- yes, in the next chapter Aristotle deals with a diametrically opposite view. Here we have the views which are rather well known, the view of the vulgar, what they call now having fun, having fun all the time, because that fun is invariably sensual pleasure -- that's clear -- or the other of the more refined men, honor and maybe virtue. This is also not sufficient. And then he takes a diametrically opposite view never heard on the market place but only in one place, in Plato's Academy: the Platonic view that the good is the idea of the good. Let us read the beginning of that: 1096a11

O: We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own.

S: Yes, forms is a translation for the Greek word which is ordinarily translated by ideas, the Platonic ideas. Yes, go on.

O: Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.

S: Yes, both are friends, Plato and the truth, but truth is a greater friend. Now Aristotle criticizes Plato in all his works but nowhere else does he bring in such an apology for criticizing him and that is very clear: because this is a moral book, a book about human conduct, and his behavior is apparently improper, that he should blame a friend and such a friend. Therefore he makes this remark. Yes, we cannot possibly go into this discussion of the Platonic doctrine of the good because then we would have first not only to have read the Platonic

statements about the idea of the good, but also to have understood them, which is much too much to expect from anyone including me. By the way, what can we know about the Platonic doctrine of the good, merely externally? How would you have to proceed if you wanted to understand that? Where does Plato speak about that?

O: In the Republic.

S: Republic. Yes?

O<sub>2</sub>: Also in the Seventh Letter.

S: Not about the idea of the good as such.

O<sub>2</sub>: No, about the ideas in general.

S: Yes, about the ideas in general he speaks in many other places, but about the idea of the good only in the Republic in two passages and what that means is extremely difficult to say. Perhaps I can make it a bit clearer when we read the two passages which are immediately intelligible to everyone of you and are not so technical. Now let us turn to 1096b25. That's toward the end of this section.

O: "The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one idea."

S: Yes, or still more simply stated, there is no idea of the good. There is not the good of which Plato spoke, and therefore, of course, this cannot be the subject of ethics in particular. Now how does he go on here?

O: But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy.

O: Literally, "to another philosophy" because philosophy does not yet have this hard-and-fastness -- "to another inquiry," an inquiry of a certain kind. Yes, now let us stop here for a moment. Now one must understand it precisely. There is not one thing which is the good. There are many good things, many good things of different kinds. If you say, but there is always a concept, good: a good horse, a good action, a good house, a good demon, a good tyrant, or whatever have you. That there is such a concept Plato never denied and no one can deny it, but that is not what Plato is speaking about. Plato is speaking about a self-subsisting being, self-subsisting being called the good, the good, and that is what Aristotle denies. By the way, one point I should mention before we go on: that this passage is, of course, of very great importance although we cannot discuss it here, because it shows one thing: that if there are doctrines in the world which make questionable the whole notion of the human good then the ethical teacher must discuss them. There is a sphere of practical life and practical understanding where we all know, more or less, what good means in various contexts, and we do not need a theoretical basis for that. But if this whole sphere of action and of prudence is under attack then it becomes necessary for the theoretical man, for the philosopher, to defend that sphere. To that extent there is no simply independent practical science. It always will need a



theoretical science for its protection. But the question is whether this theoretical science protecting the practical sphere will give the decisive indications within the practical sphere. That's a great question. Now let us go on where we left off, Mr. Reinkin.

O: And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainable.

S: So, in other words, even if there were the good or the idea of the good this is not the good we are seeking here. We are speaking of a good to be achieved by man, which Plato, of course, admitted. Plato wrote one dialogue about the human good called the Philebus and there he does not speak of the idea of the good. So this would seem to show that this is a perfectly sound argument of Aristotle, sound even from Plato's point of view. Now in the sequel he shows the very simple argument, look, what can we do in practice with the idea of the good? Look at a shoemaker. He is supposed to make a good shoe. He will not be in the slightest degree a better shoemaker if he has seen the idea of the good. So what's the use of it? Let us read a few passages from the sequel: 1097a3.

O: This argument has some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good itself', or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby.

S: Which Plato, in a way, asserts. Yes. Yes?

O: For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing.

S: Yes. Now how does Plato's argument run? Well, the simplest statement, I believe, occurs in the dialogue called Laches. Here a conversation between generals, one of the examples mentioned. And the question is, is a certain kind of military training good or bad? One of the generals says it's bad, and the other says, good, as it happens up to the present day, as you know: the discussions around Secretary MacNamara, this way or that way. Generals always disagree more or less, more than shoemakers do. (Laughter). No, obviously, because it's much more important: victory than shoes. And now how does Plato proceed? The generals don't agree and therefore they must have an arbiter and the arbiter in this case is, for some reason, Socrates. And Socrates says, well, all right -- he doesn't utter any view for this or that particular kind of fighting. He only says, why do you want to have it. Somehow, someone suggests, in order to make the soldiers better soldiers, surely, better fighters, braver men, more courageous men. Yes, all right. But then we must know what courage is. What is courage? Oh, we know that. The generals know that -- and then they give answers which are deplorably poor and Socrates. . . . (a few inaudible words). So they don't know what courage is and then they decide at the end -- and they don't fight it out -- so at the end they decide, well, we must meet again in order to find out what courage is and then we can decide our question. Now that

is obviously a great comedy because Plato knows at least as well as we do that this is not the way in which such questions about this or that kind of military training are decided. In the worst case, people will rather toss coins than wait until some philosophers have agreed. But let us look at it one more way. We want to find out what courage is. Now courage is a virtue, an excellence of man, a good quality of man. Then we must raise a prior question: what is good -- before we can answer the question, what is a good habit. And then an infinite inquiry which is identical with the whole philosophic enterprise. This is a simple way to show that if one does not know the good one cannot answer any question, and that, of course, would be the end of all practice. Practice must have shorter answers. You know, where you don't have to raise all the questions all the time. And this is fundamentally what Socrates, in this eminently practical book, says. That is not the way to go about it. We see that people know the good quite well in limited spheres, shoemaker, generals, and so on, and then what we seek is indeed broader than what the general or shoemaker or physician needs, but it is akin to it. So if it is possible for the general, physician, carpenter, and so on, to know what's the good he is after it should not be altogether impossible to find out for us political men, perhaps future statesmen -- to know what that comprehensive good is which we try to establish in our cities.

So now -- we come now gradually to the definition, the formal definition of happiness. You see in the sequel, 1097a15, following, that the examples are again taken from the arts. This is a favorite example here. The arts: orderly, rational procedures which have an orderly structure, subordination, super-ordination. Here we can find our way somewhat more easily. And here the first definitions in more general things are given. Well, it is again repeated that this end, this comprehensive human good we have in mind, is called happiness. And let us read perhaps 1097b6. I'm sorry. We should begin a bit earlier: the last line of 1097a.

- O: Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else. . . .
- S: In other words, no one says I wish to be happy so that I can make shoes, but he might say, I make shoes because this might contribute to my happiness. Yes.
- O: . . . but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy.
- S: You see, happiness is higher than intelligence -- reason is not the right translation here -- intelligence -- and virtue. Happiness is that good which is never chosen for any other purpose whereas all other goods are also chosen for the sake of happiness. That's the first point. Therefore happiness is the highest good. Furthermore?
- O: Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship.



S: Yes, literally, "since man is by nature something political." So, in other words, self-sufficiency must not be understood that you suffice yourself. That would still be a very inadequate life; You must also suffice your nearest and dearest. Yes. Now there is, however, a difficulty here, as he points out right away.

O: But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series.

S: So, in other words, then you cannot possibly be self-sufficient for all your relatives, ascending and descending, even for your great great grandchildren and so on. Aristotle will discuss it later, as he says. Yes?

O: Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and farther we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others -- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.

S: So does he mean then that happiness will be increased if you add, say, intelligence and virtue, but that intelligence and virtue are not necessary for happiness, or does he mean that happiness must necessarily include intelligence and virtue? What would you expect? Include. Yes -- so that they would be necessary ingredients of happiness, whatever happiness might be in addition to intelligence and virtue. Now this will come out in the immediate sequel where we get Aristotle's definition of happiness. That is, of course, of the greatest importance. Yes, we cannot read everything, unfortunately. And how does he proceed? Well, let us read, at least, the beginning so that you get a notion of how he proceeds.

O: Happiness, therefore, being found to be something final and self-sufficient, is the end at which all actions aim.  
(-- Rackham translation again.)

S: Yes, this is now repeatedly asserted but this is not of very great help because we don't know what happiness is, and this answer is now given.

O: To say however that the supreme good is happiness will probably appear a truism; we still require a more explicit account of what constitutes happiness. Perhaps then we may arrive at this by ascertaining what is man's function.

S: No, function is such a very bad word. They like it so much since about 100 years. Work. The work of man. Now how does he proceed? We seek the human good, what is good for man as man, in such a way that it perfectly satisfies him, that he has nothing to desire beyond it, and that it cannot be taken away from him, at least not easily. That, however, cannot be something outside of man because, say, a house, even other human beings -- they can all be taken away from him very easily. It must be in him. So the question, what is good for a man, must be what does it mean to be a good man? It can only be in him. Yes,



and then -- let us see the sequel. The question which he raises here, what is the work of man, is not immediately intelligible. It becomes intelligible from what he says now.

O: For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a work or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the work, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a work. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain works or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a work?

(--Ross translation again.)

S: "Is he born for inactivity or for doing nothing?" Yes. Now you see how he does this: again the examples of the arts because these are most helpful for clarifying the situation. Now we speak of a good shoemaker. Where do we see the goodness of the shoemaker? The simplest answer is in his work. Look at his shoes? That won't do, of course. You have to wear them. But when you wear them you can say he makes good shoes. But the goodness of the shoemaker is, of course, not primarily in the shoe as a finished product. It is primarily in his activity, in his productive activity. And the Greek word which Aristotle uses, work, ergon, has a double meaning: of the finished work and the working. Now since we know that these various kinds of men have works and these works alone tell us something about their goodness, should the same not be true of man as man? Is there not a work of man as man as there is a work of the sitar player, the shoemaker, the carpenter, and so on? That is the question which Aristotle raises. Generally speaking, the artisans produce artifacts, of course: shoes, chairs, and so on. But man is not an artifact. Man is a natural being. Can we speak of works of natural beings? Aristotle must first show that we do speak of works of natural beings and then he has the basis for saying it makes sense to speak of a work of man. Now let us go on where we left off.

O: Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a work, may one lay it down that man similarly has a work apart from all these? What then can this be?

S: You see, an eye is not an artifact and yet we speak of a work of the eye, an activity of the eye: seeing. And a good eye is an eye which sees well, and the same applies to ear, etc. Therefore, since we see also natural things having works, works which can be good or bad, we have now the basis for considering the possibility that man, the whole man, may have a work which is the work of man, which he can do badly or well. Now what is that work? Then we have to look at man. Man does all kinds of things. For example, he breathes; he grows, and he can grow well and badly; he can breathe well and poorly and so on and so on. But these cannot be the work of man as man because these are works also as plants or of beasts. So we have to find out what the specifically human work is. Let us read where we left off.

O: Life seems to be common even to plants; but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every beast.

S: Yes. Perception means, of course, here sense perception. . . . (about three inaudible words). So, in other words, an ox or a horse or an eagle may have much better eyes than man so that the specific goodness of man cannot be found in these things. Yes?

O: There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle. . . .

S: Yes, "which possesses speech or reason." What do we know of rational principle? Good. Yes?

O: . . . of this, one part has such a principle. . . .

S: No, "as one which qua obeying reason, the other as possessing it and thinking." For example, you cannot say that your arm possesses reason, but it can obey it. When you, say, give yourself a command, raise your right hand, it obeys. And that applies also to desires. You desire water and you forbid yourself to drink water now and if you have your desiring faculty properly trained it obeys. Good. Yes?

O: And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the work of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'a so-and-so' and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-layer and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of the work (for the work of a lyre-player is to play the lyre; and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, /and we state the work of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the work of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, / human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.

But we must add 'in a complete life'. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.

S: Yes. So that is the answer to the question, what happiness is. A life in which the rational part of us does its work well. It always does its work because every human being is a rational animal, but then, of course, if it does its work ill that's a bad man. No man who is not a rational animal and who does not use his reason all the time, but mostly he misuses it and therefore is a bad man. This is his simple answer. And it is based on this principle: that every being has a specific character, specific nature, and a specific activity or work, and the goodness of that work is its virtue. In this sense you can, of course, speak of the virtue of a horse, the virtue of a hare, the virtue of a tree, the virtue of any being, understanding by virtue that the being does its specific work well. As Aristotle puts it, doing something and doing it well belong to the same genus. Doing it well is one kind and doing it indeterminately is another kind. In a way, we have finished the discussion of the first book. What follows are only illustrations and confirmations.

O: (As to what the theoretical situation would be if a being possessing speech were discovered on Mars, for example.)

S: How do you know that? Let us assume they are quadrupeds, quadrupeds who speak. Yes, but that's the question: prior to empirical evidence one might very

well doubt whether there can be thinking quadrupeds; I mean, whatever imaginative men like Swift and so have imagined about that. Aristotle's view is this: man is the only being which has a hand, as distinguished from paws or so, so the hand is, in a way, the specifically human organ.

Q: People talk about homo fabris.

S: Yes, but what does it mean? That is the being which has the arts. Faber is, say, artisan. And arts: that means reason. In other words, Aristotle's assertion is that the human body in its difference from the bodies of all other animals is so because it is a body of the rational animal. I mean, I do not know what Aristotle would say about such things as the appendix, but, for example, the main point, that man does not walk on four feet and that his walking on two feet is different from the walking on two feet of birds: Aristotle would say that can eventually be understood only in the light of the function of the human organs. There is one modern biologist, at least one; one I have read, a Swiss, writing unfortunately not in English but in German, Portmann -- some of you may have heard of him -- and he is apparently absolute tops as a modern biologist: he has made quite remarkable studies of this subject -- which is disgraceful that they are not accessible in English. I mean, he accepts evolution and all this kind of thing, these modern doctrines, with a very prudent reservation. He doesn't quarrel with that. And he shows precisely on this basis how absolutely necessary it is to understand, for example, the long gestation of human babies compared with those of any other beings of this kind and the peculiarly helpless condition in which the human baby is born: how this can be only understood in the light of man's being the rational and political animal.

Q: What is the name?

S: Portmann. It is really -- I mean, we make so many translations in pocket books especially which students can buy. This should be translated. When I saw it first and I read the paper cover they compared him to Baer, you know, the biologist who discovered the cell. And I thought that is, of course, one of these publisher's tricks to increase the sale, but after I had read it I was satisfied that this is a very reasonable contention. In other words, show us a quadruped which can develop Euclidean geometry, for example: then we must really reconsider the thing very profoundly. But hitherto there is no evidence. And there is, of course, another test: whether these beings to be found I don't know on which planet are able to generate offspring in intercourse with a terrestrial.

Q: Well, this would be a fundamental presupposition: that they could not.

S: Oh, I see. (Laughter). Then we are confronted with the interesting case of two species of rational animals.

Q: Then, what is the specific difference of --

S: We would have to find out. Perhaps the difference is not greater than that between two other species of the same genus which do not breed. For example -- I do not know -- what about the difference between deer and cows? Do they interbreed? I doubt it. Very well. Both belong to the same genus, bovine, and yet they don't breed. That might be an interesting subject of speculation, but also not very fruitful in the absence of any empirical evidence. We do that in 2015, when they have discovered them. It is one of the many subjects we must leave to this next generation. But let us now come to what we can possibly understand:



namely, Aristotle's teaching about happiness. Now what must strike us, and that has struck, probably, some of you is that the statement is extremely general, but we must make clear to ourselves how general it is. For example, a man who uses his reason well, as this term is defined hitherto, does not merely apply to Socrates or such people, but to a man like Alcibiades as well. Why was Alcibiades superior to practically all his political contemporaries? In the first place, of course, because of his fabulous capacity to use his reason. I will go a step further, which may sound shocking but absolutely necessary in order to understand Aristotle. Happiness as hitherto defined would even cover such a phenomenon like Hitler. Why was Hitler admired by the people who admired him? Not because he was stronger; he was not the strongest German. I mean, I'm sure there were boxers in Germany who could have easily have boxed him down. His qualities of will, his quality called by him intuition, which is, of course, an intellectual quality. So these are all intellectual qualities. Even if we say, well, why not beauty? And the answer is clear. When we speak of beauty in an emphatic sense we don't mean the beauty of a German shepherd's dog or an Irish setter or anything; we mean human beauty, beauty of a human being, and this beauty of a human being points to qualities of the mind, as you see in these cases which occur from time to time, that you see a particularly beautiful human being who is simply stupid. Then you are shocked because, you know, you don't expect such stupidity going together with such beauty. So we mean always qualities of the mind in all these cases. That's the difficulty, and this is by no means solved at this point of the argument.

So you see, one thing is clear: man's perfection, his goodness, his virtue, his happiness, can be found only in qualities of the mind. . . . (about four inaudible words), not in other qualities. Maybe the other qualities, of the body and so, are necessary but they are not that thing which constitutes the happiness. Is this clear? But if this is so then any capacities of the mind -- I mean, any good qualities, not stupidity, not a weak will and this kind of thing -- these are sheer defects, but the positive ones of strength of will, quickness of grasp, and other things -- this would, then, be the happy man. Hitherto, Aristotle hasn't proved more than that. This point I think he has proved: we would never be satisfied with a human being who is defective in that which is the specifically human. For example, a man may be a first rate tight rope dancer and we may admire him, but we would never say that is a perfect human being, an outstanding human being. We would say, an outstanding tight rope dancer; which is a quite different proposition because it is a very limited quality, but if it is a quality of the intellect, the mind, of the mind in the widest sense, then we admire him. That's what counts. And that all people do. The admiration of Hitler is not a refutation but a confirmation of what I say. He was admired on these grounds. The other things on which he claimed to have superiorities were not adduced by the more rational part of his environment. You only have to read what the German generals said after the Second World War. They all came down to these amazing qualities which this impossible creature possessed, but which he did possess. Yes, Mr. Butterworth.

Q: (Regarding use of the term "the will.")

S: Well, I used deliberately language which we would use more simply than the terms used by Aristotle, but Aristotle has in mind -- I mean, when he uses such words like logos, which is traditionally translated by reason, which however means also speech in Greek, and which is distinguished from nous, traditionally translated intellect or intelligence, but they switch into each other. And then, on the other hand, he speaks of virtue in the sense of moral virtue. Moral vir-

tue, he says, we shall find out a quality of choosing, i.e. of willing. So we can reasonably speak of qualities of mind and will. And if you think of such people like artists, for example -- use a modern term which Aristotle doesn't use. What is it? That what makes an artist is obviously a quality of the mind, in the first place, although it is not the mind of a mathematician. These are always the qualities -- to that extent Aristotle, I think, proved his point, but it proves too little. We do not yet recognize in that man as hitherto described what we ordinarily mean by an admirable human being. We must see how Aristotle finds his way to that.

Q: So far as the definition of the peculiar work of man, I was wondering whether Aristotle's method of approaching the subject by comparing man with other beings, non-rational beings, doesn't in a way prejudice what the answer, man's peculiar work, will be, and whether it isn't therefore somewhat of an arbitrary starting point for defining the work of man. I wonder if perhaps without thinking of other beings but simply trying to understand the work of man by examining man and only man -- I wonder whether one would necessarily come up with the same answer.

S: Yes, perhaps not, as some examples seem to show. But the question is then whether if you do that, what is done by modern idealistic philosophy including its existentialist appendix -- no, that is really true -- existentialism covers modern idealism (?) -- but then you simply forget that man is also an animal. I mean, it is so characteristic. The Greek word, *zōon*, which is Latin animal and *animā* animal and in English also animal -- we don't like to say that. The Greeks had a word for what we now call animal and that would be translated in English by beast. Man is, of course, not a beast but he is an animal, a living being. And you can as little think away the fact of the part of him which he has in common with the animals, need for food and so on, as the other. You get a very misleading notion of man if you forget that he is a being with a body and with bodily desires. I mean, for example, when Heidegger developed his doctrine of man in his first rate book then the key phenomenon somehow was death. Yes, but the fact that dying is something which man shares with all other living beings, surely with the animals, did not sufficiently come out and it must come out. One cannot disregard that and therefore you must see man as a part of that whole and where he is clearly closest to the animals, rather than plants or minerals.

Q: Well, one could take this into consideration and, for example, find something like feelings -- for example, I was thinking of Hume.

S: Yes, but what are feelings? What are feelings? Are these merely these things -- I mean, you touch a hard body or so? No. They are feelings, somehow, in the mind. They are tinged by men's -- for example, if someone has a feeling, a warm feeling, for suffering people that is something belonging to the mind decidedly. I mean, that is a question: whether Aristotle has sufficiently provided for feelings. He calls what we call feelings, pathe, passions. I mean, men must have thought in passions. We come to that later. I think that is really provided for by Aristotle. I mean, if you say man is the feeling being that would not be true. Look at a dog. A dog feels. He doesn't feel certain things which we feel but he doesn't feel them because he doesn't have intellect or reason. But feeling is something common to man and all animals as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals will give you in writing.

Q: May I ask it a little differently? When we inquire into the work of man is this asking what is the essence of man?

S: Yes, this because this work can only be understood as an outgrowth of the essence or nature of man. No animal can produce a mathematical book, to take a very simple example. No, I believe there has never been anything said, anything valid said, against Aristotle's definition of man and therefore also of man's perfection. But the question is, the definition as hitherto developed is much too broad to cover what we ordinarily understand by an excellent man because it covers, as I indicated, such people like Hitler, and somehow you don't believe that this fills the bill and we must see how Aristotle arrives at a more close definition of happiness, which he does in the immediate sequel.

Q: Is a teleology of nature not assumed at this point?

S: Well, I mean, I do not know -- well, let me put it to you: what does teleology mean? In the first place, primarily it means only that things in themselves point to their specific perfection. If that is meant by teleology I would say it's absolutely impossible to think non-teleologically, to speak of anything non-teleologically regardless of what Newton may say or may be said to have said. I mean, such a simple thing: a broken chair, a limping dog, a blind man. I take defects which various beings have pointing to the perfection. Beings are in such a way. Therefore, whatever the distinction between is and ought and so, reality and ideal, may mean, that so-called reality is of such a nature that it is in itself pointing toward perfection cannot be denied. Where it comes from and what havoc this may create in social science -- these are very posterior quarrels. The primary thing is that we don't deny them. Now whether this peculiar pointing, for example, of the broken chair -- cannot be seen as broken except towards an entire chair. There is a simple example somewhere in Melville. Some half-theological man says to an ordinary fellow who is an unbeliever -- he says he should pray and worship his creator and says look, this wonderful sight, sunset or whatever it is -- you have been given to see it by whom? And thereupon this fellow has the nerve to say, by an oculist in Philadelphia, because he was born half-blind and then this oculist had restored it. So, in other words, developed it means there is no teleology. All kinds of misbegotten beings run around and very few succeed. Yes, but good Melville, as many others of the same school, forgot one thing. What did the oculist in Philadelphia do? He looked at a normal eye which he didn't make, which somehow was available to him, and by looking at it he made the necessary operation on that defective eye to make a good eye. If there were no relatively perfect things there prior to any human art, human art would have no guidance whatever. That is the primary base of teleology. Needless to say, as Father Vaughan pointed out, teleology does not mean, as Voltaire ridiculed it, that -- how did he put it in Candide -- that the noses have been created so we can put glasses on them. You know? Is it not wonderfully well done? Well, this is, of course, nonsense. I mean, some sentimental people said that. Or rattlesnakes are there so that they can, perhaps, be used for making some kinds of medicine out of them. That is not what Aristotle means. Rattlesnakes are there for being rattlesnakes and skunks are there for being skunks and men are there for being men.

Q: Even if there is a human nature, well, Aristotle himself proceeds by examining what is the nature of this, what is the nature of that, but man in comparison to the non-human. It seems to be how he gets the rational essence --

S: Yes, sure. Yes, find something else. I mean, there were people who had said Aristotle's definition is wrong, is old-fashioned, is Greek, and what other vices a definition can have, and one must say man is a homo faber. That was said with great noise about fifty years ago in Germany by someone. Well, this



man simply hadn't thought because Aristotle had included homo faber, that man is the artisan. What does artisan mean except a specific kind of reason? Look at Aristotle this way: all men at all times speak of good or bad, superior and inferior, everywhere, and there is surely a great variety of views. Now Aristotle makes this statement: he says, I look for a formula which in my view covers everything. Men always mean, either fully or dimly, when they praise a man, and this is my formula. Do you find it wrong? Show me a concrete reason. And that, I think, one must ask to do. I mean this general skepticism is of no help. You must show specific cases where he does not meet the case. We must also not forget, we have not yet the evidence in: Aristotle's doctrines of the virtues in particular and see which virtues does he omit, and does he omit them because of his wrong or narrow definition? Then we will abandon him and follow another guide. Good. Now let us see how the sequel comes, where he completes it. 1098a20.

O: Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details.

S: So, in other words, that's a rough sketch; rough because of its great generality. It's too general. Yes?

O: But it would seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined. . . .

S: So, in other words, Aristotle claims that he has made a good sketch -- must fall within that -- and that is indeed the most difficult job; but the next, to make it neat, -- that can be done, he says, by anybody. Well, he burdens us because we are all, I suppose, anybodies, to do that job which he has failed to do. Now that is perhaps ironical and perhaps not. Let us go on.

O: . . . and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work. . . .

S: In other words, the progress of the ethical science. You know, one man adding something else, finally will build a beautiful edifice. Yes.

O: . . . to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike. . . .

S: So, in other words, this is now concluded. Aristotle has merely said, I admit that's a rough sketch but I don't have to go beyond it because anybody can fill it out. That's one thing. And now he makes another statement which is also provisional. Will you read that please.

O: And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so insofar as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth.

S: Which the carpenter is not. Good. Yes?

O: We must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to minor questions.

S: No, "that the by-work may not become larger than the work itself." Commentary on that: many issues of many social science journals. Yes? Good. Yes?

O: Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well-established. . . .

S: The "that," the "that." Yes?

O: . . . as in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing. . . .

S: The "that," the "that," that it is so.

O: Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.

S: Yes. So this is Aristotle's third and last statement about what one may call the method of his Ethics. Yes?

Q: Before you said that the "that" was the starting point and now he calls the "that" the first principle. I thought the first principle was the cause.

S: Shall we take it up -- will you remind me of the question? Yes, because I would like first to speak of something more general. Now Aristotle takes here examples from different fields, the carpenter and the geometer. The carpenter and the geometer: well, and we all know that the carpenter is perfectly satisfied with a right angle which is not a right angle but for all practical purposes a right angle; and the geometrician doesn't do that and in addition he is not concerned with using the right angle, but finding out some of its qualities and conditions and so on and so on. Now where is the ethical teacher? Who is the equivalent of the ethical teacher? Which of the two, the carpenter or the geometer? Carpenter; sure. This is one thing. We don't need a geometer here, the mathematician, because a mathematician would only make many remarks of complete irrelevance for practice. I mean, you all know what contemporary phenomenon we cannot help thinking of. Now this is, then, regarding the exactitude or (?). We cannot, we must not, try to be exact as a mathematician is exact. This would be a waste of time, and foundation money as we would have to say. But then there is something else. Aristotle speaks now of a different subject, namely the question regarding the knowledge of the principles or causes. In the second statement about method he had spoken only of the latter, of the question of the knowledge of the principles or causes. The real question is not of exactness. That can easily be settled: we need only a rough and ready exactness. But what about the knowledge of the principles of action? That is the great question and this is here taken up again. The "that" is the beginning, the principle. What does this mean here precisely? That these and these are the noble and just things: that's the "that." We begin with that. So this is an entirely different question. The "that" and that's different from the "why." Just as we take the carpenter as our model and not the geometrician, analogously to that we are concerned only with knowledge of the "that," that this and this is noble or just, and not with the "why." How is the "that" found: the question raised here. And he gives three examples: induction, sense perception, and some sort of habitua-

tion, and other things which he doesn't mention. What had he said in the second statement, about how the "that" is found by the people listening to him?

O: By habituation.

S: No. He quoted Hesiod, the poet. What did Hesiod say? How do these men know? (Inaudible reply.) By hearing. And hearing is, as you all know, a form of sense perception. Therefore, sense perception, I believe, is here in the middle. Good. This much, I believe, of the situation is perfectly clear. Aristotle addresses people who know that these and these things are the noble and just things, and the "why" is of no concern to him. But, of course, one cannot help -- we, at least, being in a sense theoretical people, cannot help -- must we not raise the question, why? And not so much as a so-called epistemological question, but as a substantive question. You say these and these -- say, honoring parents is noble. Why? Must one not raise the question and not leave it by saying that all decent men honor their parents, or I have been told from my childhood on that one must honor his parents. Is this not legitimate? Now if this is a question, a why, which must be raised then this man, the man who raised it, would be an analagon to the geometrician. He would, of course, not deal with mathematical subjects, but he would raise a kind of question which is not practical in importance, just as little as the geometric treatment of the right angle is of importance for carpenters, but a question which the theoretician cannot help raising. In other words, in the Ethics there are two men present, if one may say so, two human types: one, the addressee, and that is simply the decent men, the gentlemen, and for him it is sufficient that he knows the "that" and he will receive a coherent notion of the "that" which he already knows. He will become enlightened about the "that" already known. But there is also present the teacher, Aristotle, and Aristotle may have something to convey which is not identical with what the gentleman knows. In other words, what Aristotle knows about the "why" may be of no practical importance, but this would not preclude its being of eminent theoretical importance. Mr. Boyan.

Q: Is it admitted that the raising of the "why" may affect the "what" and have grave consequences on it?

S: May. That is not absolutely excluded, but it could be this: that just as in the case of the geometer -- knows lots of things about the right angle and all kinds of things which the carpenter doesn't even dream of, and it could be, as it was for many many centuries and millenia, that this was not of any practical importance. The carpenters went on building houses as they had always done, and didn't have to study geometry and listen to a geometrician -- come to them and explain to them. That might be -- a crude practical geometry which is good enough for carpentry, and the same might be true for ethics so that the practical life in action would not be affected by what the geometrician of ethics, if I may use the term in that analagous sense, would know. But it might also be affected. We know nothing about it yet. We begin only.

Q: The question, then, would resolve as whether those who -- the best men in society have an idea of the "what" in terms of ethics and perhaps they are all wrong.

S: No, this question, you can say, is never raised. The men of whom Aristotle speaks in the Ethics and the Politics are well bred gentlemen who know in a rough way the "that." And you don't get much information about the "why." The "that" will only be made more clear. It will be brought out coherently. That



is all that happens. And then you say, well, men might all be mistaken. The gentlemen everywhere, in all times and places, might have been completely mad and the true morality is the one which was discovered, say, by Sigmund Freud. There are such people. Aristotle would say it is extremely unlikely. It is extremely unlikely that the truth relevant for human life is suddenly discovered by one individual there, or maybe two; that men, being concerned all the time with the business of living and of living well, should not somehow know it.

Q: All white men in the 19th century, high and low, thought the white race was superior to the Negro race --

S: These were very special questions. But Aristotle's teaching regarding slavery doesn't leave anything to be desired, not only for Abraham Lincoln's use but for the use of the NAACP and perhaps even for Mr. Baldwin's use; namely, that, of course, the people whom you can decently treat as slaves are people who would be useless to themselves if they were not slaves. And this is a proposition which I still defend. It does not necessarily require an institution of slavery. You can also put them into certain houses. You know, I told you my story of the natural slave; I met one. But the question is simply what was discovered. And this is the only discovery: the power of man is much much greater than Aristotle thought. Aristotle would never have believed that it is possible to grow wine and to make good poetry north of the Balkans, and he has empirically been disproved. Now if he was wrong he underestimated the power of man regarding the power of northern Europe, although there would still be some people who say it shows in northern European poetry and so on that this is not Mediterranean. (Laughter). I have heard that. Well, the clouds -- you know, the clouds show, as distinguished from the blue sky. But surely, let us dismiss this as a joke. So Aristotle underestimated the power of man. Man can do much more. He can have civilized life, in his sense, on every part of the globe, and many races of men who by their geographical location were excluded from any of these are now capable of accepting them and then, of course, if it is possible then it would be glaring injustice to deny it to them, on the basis of Aristotle himself. That is very simple. But still, Aristotle has still one point from which we can learn something. Is man so powerful; modern man, as he believes to be? Is there not some element in his "pessimism," in his apprehensiveness, regarding the unlimited extension of man's power? And you have only to look at the more advanced members of the political science profession like Professor Norton Long and his studies on municipal government and municipal areas to see how this question of the limited community, polis, makes its reappearance in 1963 in Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, Washington, New York, and so on and so on; that here the notion that there are no limits to how men can live. Man still has the same natural power, which is limited to caring for other people, to knowing them truly and not via TV, which is no way of knowing them, that he had in old times. So, surely, Aristotle -- there is a point where Aristotle was refuted and I would say the first man who grew wine north of the Alps refuted Aristotle as much as Newton, more than Newton, but this doesn't do away with the fact that his notion of the limited power of man is not worth considering; especially this notion that human nature is infinitely malleable is a very wrong notion. Man's power -- that has been proven -- is much greater than Aristotle thought and even than Plato thought. I'm sure they did not believe that in the year 1963 there would be people in Atlantis, as Plato probably would have called it, reading Plato and Aristotle. I don't know what Plato thought about the length of time in which his books could possibly be read for physical reasons. Perhaps he thought of 8,000, 10,000 years; perhaps he thought only of 2,000 years. This would be over by now. But it is not difficult to take cogni-

zance of this fact. This every child knows. But the question is, what are the conclusions? Are the conclusions that what they said is radically wrong or only that it is in need of a certain modification? That would be the question. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Then if Aristotle's job is to describe systematically the good to people who already know what it is, what is his claim of the benefits of this study?

S: Well, I believe -- don't you think it would -- for example, let us take a man, a lover of liberty. Take a simple present day example. And on every case which comes up he takes the right side, which I believe would be that of the A. D. A. Yes? Let us assume. Instinctively. So he knows it. Don't you think he would be benefitted by reading a book by Professor Roche about what the whole position is, a coherent presentation? Would he not be clearer in his mind about the position? Would he not be also -- perhaps see in some cases where he did not see what liberty demands would see more clearly? I can only say read any of the statements about any of the virtues which Aristotle names and where the gentleman recognizing such, but which gentleman could have really put it together in this comprehensive way and not have forgotten anything? Aristotle thinks with modesty that the book might be good for gentlemen to read because they would get a clearer notion of what gentlemanship is. Well, after all, how did the gentlemen become gentlemen? By hearing. And the hearing doesn't mean merely that they were told, "Don't spit!" and some other obnoxious things, but they heard stories, Homer, and poems, all this kind of thing. So they heard wise men praising gentlemanship and appealing to it and showing it in a way, at least, and Aristotle believes that the way in which he does it, non-poetically, which means not only in prose but even not, without, telling any stories: that this might have an advantage which even the poetic presentations do not have. So now we must do a bit more. Let us read the immediate sequel, 1090b, 9 to 11.

O: We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premises, but also of what is commonly said about it. . . .

S: Yes, you see here Aristotle says what he is going to do in the sequel. The definition of happiness previously given was not given on the basis of hearing, of what the gentlemen knew from their upbringing and the poets. Aristotle started there -- that's important. Miss Huckins comes now into her own. (The reference is to the question toward the middle of page 17 which was deferred). Aristotle began here with the "why," with the principles simply, and descended to that, in this part which we read before which we can call the scientific part. As follows: the goodness of a being consists in doing its specific work well, but the specific work of man is reasoning, or living according to reason. Hence, the goodness of man consists in living according to reason. But this principle from which he started -- the gentlemen haven't given any thought to that. He starts deductively in the argument here. He proceeds deductively, scientifically. He does this. But this doesn't lead far enough because it's too general. And why -- what Aristotle has deduced about the goodness of man -- why should this be identical with what everyone somehow divines when he speaks of happiness? Why should that be? Who would recognize happiness in activity according to reason? Who would? Very few people. Perhaps no one. So it becomes necessary to look to some other source, to what people generally say, i.e. think, and this -- what people say and generally think -- will complete this a priori argument; a priori in the old sense of the word, namely starting from the cause down to the effect. Now we will add something which has an entirely different cognitive status. It is primarily only what people generally say and we must see what we learn this way. Now what do we learn that way? By the way, we understand from



this point of view how these strange remarks which sound so ironical, everyone can specify this universal and vague statement which Aristotle makes. Sure, because everyone has these opinions. . . . (About four inaudible words). Now the decisive point is in 1099a7. Will you read that? We cannot read the whole thing. 1099a7.

O: "Their life is also in itself pleasant."

S: Yes, this is a transition. Whatever he may have said before, the life of this kind of man is pleasant. Yes. Go on.

O: For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue.

S: Now do you see what he does now? The scientific definition, if I may call it, say, did not show us why we should wish to live according to reason, why we should be attracted by it. It only stated, on this general ontological basis, man's goodness consists in the life according to reason. But why should we be happy living according to reason. That's not clear. Aristotle starts now from something else: what everyone admits to be happiness. Happiness is a state where we are pleased, a state of pleasure. This is so. And people are pleased by an infinite variety of things. For example, there are dog lovers who are pleased by the sight of dogs. Now, then we come to a special case of lovers. Which are they? "In the same way also the just things are pleasing to the lover of justice and generally that which is according to virtue is pleasant to the lover of virtue." Go on.

O: Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant.

S: In other words, what most pleasure lovers seek, the Turkish bath and this kind of thing: these things are not by nature pleasant, Aristotle says here. Yes?

O: But the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgment is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos:

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;

But pleasantest is it to win what we love.

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one -- the best -- of these, we identify with happiness.

S: Yes, let us stop here. Now in this secondary context, in this supplement to



the scientific statement, as I called it, to the statement based on opinions, he adds now that pleasure is of the essence of happiness. Now if the life according to virtue is the most pleasant life then it naturally would also be attractive to every human being, or at least to every healthy and normal human being. Happiness consists, then, in virtuous activity. But -- now he adds that point -- but virtuous activity is that which is by nature most pleasant. Here he gives us an answer, by the way, to that great question he had raised before: are the noble and just things natural or not -- or are they only conventional? Now if the noble and just things are by nature the most pleasant then they must be natural. This is an implication here; no need for external pleasures because the pleasure deriving from virtuous activity is the greatest pleasure. Now this is, of course, not so simple as you all will see, but you must also see the way in which Aristotle completes this or fills out this lacunae. He fills it out by combining the scientific definition with what is generally admitted. Now what are the difficulties here?

Aristotle starts from an undeniable fact: that the truly virtuous man enjoys virtuous activities. In other words, a man who does the just things only because he is compelled to do so is not truly just, and the sign that he is not merely compelled to do so is that he does them gladly. He enjoys doing them. But the fact that he enjoys them, that the truly just man enjoys just action, does, of course, not in itself prove that they are by nature enjoyable. They might have become enjoyable to him by virtue of breeding so that what you are accustomed to do you enjoy doing; and therefore the question is by no means solved at this point. Now Aristotle argues indirectly in this way: who is the judge, the spudaios? Now spudaios, that is used synonymously with the morally virtuous man by Aristotle. Spudaios means, literally translated, the serious man; you know, the man who is not a clown, serious man, and whom you take seriously. This can, of course, also be used in a somewhat ironical manner, you know, like an homme serieux (?) in French. But still, the serious man, the virtuous man, holds this view. For him the virtuous actions are intrinsically pleasant, the most pleasant actions. But that only raises another question: what is the relation between the serious man, the morally virtuous man, and the wise man? Or are they identical? Questions which are, of course, here not yet even touched.

The main point: the life of virtue is the most pleasant life in itself. No external pleasures are needed. Let us read the sequel: 1099a31.

O: Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death.

S: You see now, this is very -- of course, crucially -- important. Think: what does beauty, bodily beauty, have to do with virtuous activity? Apparently nothing; and yet, as Aristotle says, if a man is extremely ugly then he cannot be truly happy. He comes much closer to the ordinary views. Or if someone -- what were the other examples -- comes of very low birth he can never be truly happy. A Greek gentleman's prejudices, as people say, enter here. Now let us finish it first.

O: As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition. . . .

S: Yes, "of good weather," one could translate that. Yes.

O: . . . for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.

S: Yes. Now you see, Aristotle had said no external pleasures are needed. Virtue is self-sufficient. But he adds now, 'external goods are needed. You must have friends, you must have some wealth, you must have some power, and so on. Yes, but the question is, is not the possession of these external goods also pleasant to men?' I believe experience would say it is pleasant. 'People enjoy if they live well, if they are wealthy, if they are of good family, and so on. So, in other words, the external pleasures are necessary for happiness, a very grave question. Aristotle will try to clean it, to tidy it up a bit in the rest of the first book, but we leave it at this for the time being. The pleasures deriving from noble actions are not sufficient for happiness. Now this is all said in this supplementary chapter, the chapter based on opinions as distinguished from what I called the scientific deduction. It is quite interesting that the noble and just things, of which he speaks quite frequently in these supplementary chapters, are not mentioned at all, so to speak, in the scientific chapter. I mean, there is one passage in which one could, perhaps, say that they are mentioned; just is never mentioned there. So here this speaks only of the good, not of the noble and just as such. In the supplementary chapter, the noble and just, that of which one thinks in the first place in an ethical context, comes in only there. This is the great difficulty and we must see how this will resolve itself in a later book. Surely, Aristotle has made this very clear to us by his way of treating that, separating very clearly this scientific treatment of the question of the highest good for man from that supplementary treatment, what the true problem of ethics is. Throughout the tradition the term is always the highest good, summum bonum, not the noble nor the just. The noble and the just find their justification in the fact that they are good, not the other way around. Now the noble and just, however, is what we mean by moral. Morality finds its justification in something which one can call amoral or trans-moral, but which is not in itself moral, the nature of man. Now we must see whether this leads us to any further understanding of the sequel. Did I answer your question which you had before? Yes. Mr. Butterworth.

Q: (Regarding the fact that Aristotle skips over a consideration of the specific work of the beasts.)

S: Oh, I mean, in some cases it's not difficult to say. Look at beavers; look at bees; look at spiders. Well, you see, they produce specific works. In the case of a dog or a horse it's probably more difficult but Aristotle would say that there is one work which all animals have and this is the highest work of which they are capable, and that is the generation of offspring. The highest moment in the life of a horse and of a dog and of any other being is when he perpetuates the species. And this is, of course, also very important for man, but for man it is not the highest.

Q: If I'm not mistaken though, he doesn't state how certain species of the animals relate one to another; in other words, why various animals exist and what the relation is --

S: Yes, but the question is -- I mean, let me put it this way: the extreme no-



tion of teleology is, of course, a proof that there must be carnivorous animals, herbivorous, poisonous snakes, and what have you, this species and sub-species and so on. But this Aristotle never -- I mean, Aristotle speaks of that; for example, in the first book of the Politics. But his serious teleology is a strictly internal one. I mean, rattlesnakes are not for any other purpose except to be and to produce other snakes.

Q: Can he consistently keep away from considering what their final purpose is in relation to the rest of the species?

S: I mean, if there is such a universal teleology there would be only one answer: that the being for the sake of which the universe can be said to be truly alive and without which it would be dead, even if all other animals were around, is man.

Q: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, but man he would say, man. And this is -- of course, Freud and so many others would say, well, that's human pride. We are so proud. But the answer is very obvious. The dumb animals can't even be proud. Our very pride is the proof of our excellence. Pride, admitting that it is a bad thing, is nevertheless something of which only man is capable, of the earthly beings. By the way, as for the definition of man or the definition of happiness, the Greeks called the animals not man the speechless ones, koaloga; come to think of it, you still speak of the dumb animals. Well, what does it mean to be dumb except to be speechless, and this throws light on man. Man is the animal which is not dumb but which possesses speech; and that is what Aristotle says. Aristotle only is not so behavioralist that he says man is the only animal which produces verbal symbols. You must have heard that -- because he would say, what makes it possible for man to have verbal symbols, and then you would come back to such a thing called reason. You must have some concept of house which covers all houses and not only /makes sounds to simulate a sort of cave man pointing out individual houses -- followed by a few inaudible words/ and that's reason. I mean, I have read some of the criticisms of the Aristotelian definition. They abound in modern times, at least beginning with Rousseau, and they simply don't hold water. The Aristotelian is the best which has hitherto been propounded. I mean, if Aristotle had said all men are reasonable he would have been the greatest fool that ever was because we know that most men are not reasonable. But Aristotle never meant that, because an unreasonable man is unreasonable in a different way than a dog or cat is unreasonable; because a cat cannot but be irrational, or a dog. However irrational a human being may be this is always a kind of use of the reason which he has. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Suggests that there must be some limit to the notion of man as a political animal).

S: Not to his speaking of political animal. I mean, man cannot live well quite alone. In order to be self-sufficient, man must also suffice for some others, but he says for some. If you would draw the line too large, then no man can be self-sufficient. He takes this up later on: to what extent do we depend on our happiness for the happiness of great grandchildren. Because that would be very awkward: we would turn in our graves all the time and this would be a very bad situation for our happiness. (Inaudible reply). Yes, but also in a different way, then it would mean that a descendent of a miserable ancestor can never be really happy. It would also be difficult. No, we come to that chapter. It is



of no use to discuss it without having the text.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Before you pointed out that Aristotle and Kant agree in saying that one cannot deduce ethical matters from non-ethical. . . . (Rest of question inaudible).

S: Yes, I said this already last time but I said that Aristotle, within the Ethics -- I mean, I made a distinction now which I had made already last time. Aristotle is, as ethical teacher, in the first place like the carpenter, practical, not scientific. But to some extent he is also like the geometrician. You understand the difference between the carpenter and the geometrician. Qua carpenter he takes the position of Kant, but qua geometrician he differs from Kant. Kant cannot be a geometrician. Aristotle can be both. Is this now a bit clearer? So there is surely -- I didn't deny the difference, but Aristotle has, in an amazing way, also seen the great point of Kant, although it was not for him the only point, and the reason is very simple. Well, I don't know what you know of Kant, but everyone knows that Kant wrote a Critique of Pure Reason, which is meant to be a critique of all theoretical or speculative metaphysics. So there cannot be -- theoretical philosophy is exploded and what you retain is only modern science, let us say, Newtonian science, and that is, of course, below moral philosophy. I mean, can one not -- I don't have to prove that to you. Good! Because it is very important but, in a way, also meaningless. And therefore, since there is no theoretical life possible in Kant's point of view, the moral life is the life, is the life of man, and therefore theoretical philosophy itself must be integrated into a moral context, not into a theoretical context. Aristotle, of course, integrates moral philosophy ultimately into a theoretical context. Now the Kantian solution did not satisfy everybody and one can say that the great successors of Kant, especially Hegel, felt that Kant had only discovered a new dimension of theory, a new kind of theory; namely, that pure reason, theoretical or practical, which Kant laid bare in his peculiar way: this is the thing in itself. That is roughly what Hegel says. You know, Kant's formula was the thing in itself, i.e. the object of theoretical metaphysics, is not knowable and is accessible to us only via the moral conscience and only for practical purposes, for moral purposes. And Hegel accepted, in a way, Kant and said, yes, but Kant, didn't you see that you discovered in what Kant called the transcendental consciousness -- this is the true subject of theoretical metaphysics. But still; there is an important similarity between what Kant does and what Aristotle does, but no identity. And I also didn't speak of an identity; only in one key point, that Aristotle, to a very large extent, argues on the basis of this simple reasoning. A decent man is a man for whom the question, why should I be decent, doesn't make sense. For Aristotle the question does make sense in the last resort. For Kant it does not. That's the difference. But for large stretches of the Ethics he agrees with Kant.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Did Hegel in any sense maintain the correspondence theory of the truth, which both Kant and Aristotle did? I don't think so --

S: Explicitly, probably not.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Because this seems to be the one link between Aristotle and Kant: they both held this theory --

S: Yes, yes, everyone held it. Everyone held it until certain events in modern times.

Q<sub>4</sub>: And then it was exploded.

S: Yes, in Hegel, one can say, in a way of course not because if the truth is the totality then there is no, strictly speaking, correspondence but the comprehensiveness of the whole and the exhaustiveness of the dialectical way is the only guarantee of the truth.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Now if someone were trying to -- say some figure, "x" -- were trying to reinstate, even on a modified level, the Aristotelian-Thomistic position wouldn't they have to reinstate the correspondence theory of truth which is pretty well exploded?

S: Who says so? Who says so? I would deny it. I mean, what is called by this high-falooting name is just the common sense view of truth. Common sense, surely. If what I have in mind about, say, Mr. Anastaplo /i.e. one of those present in the room/ -- that is true only if it corresponds to what Mr. Anastaplo is, does, and so on. That question cannot be settled, by the way. That is the great question of Descartes' doubt; all things after Descartes are based on that. They are all more or less sophisticated elaborations of Descartes.

3rd Meeting: April 9, 1963

. . . very interesting and good paper. Those of you who do not know Mr. Rein-kin should know that he is by training a mathematician but in contra-distinction to other mathematicians who have turned to political science or political theory he is not a mathematician when he deals with political theory, as you surely have seen. He is very much concerned with theology, as I happen to know, although I'm not sure whether that theology is not slightly heretical. This I do not know, but I fear. Now the remark about Henry James and Mickey Spilane I thought was very good although I can test the truth more from the Mickey Spilane side, unfortunately, because I have read more of him than of Henry James. That is deplorable but true. Now when you began in a very emphatically theological tone you were, of course, perfectly right because naturally Aristotle doesn't discuss Biblical teachings. He couldn't. But at the bottom of the Greek religion there is an analagon to the Biblical prophets, and this you have seen very well. But you said at a certain point, Aristotle excludes from consideration here divine happiness, and you referred to a specific passage.

O: The opening of chapter nine.

S: Yes, now let us see. What do you call chapter nine? Oh, I know what you mean now: whether happiness is teachable or whether it comes -- yes, but that is not divine happiness but man's happiness must not be understood as god-sent. That's a different question. No, then you expressed yourself not quite clearly. Good. This was very fine -- what you remarked (I hadn't thought about it but surely that deserves consideration), that the two key examples in the discussion are Priam and Croeseus, two barbarians. That is surely worth considering. You linked this up with a statement of the Politics which Aristotle doesn't give exactly in his own name but as a general Greek statement: that the barbarians are by nature slaves. And this creates all kinds of interesting possibilities which I will not now take up. But you said, in his teaching regarding the slaves Aristotle says the barbarians must be brave in order not to be slaves. That is at least how I understood you and I wondered what your evidence for that is.

O: No, I spoke of their having to be externally free.

S: Oh. Well, what did you say then, the whole statement?

O: Barbarians are only free if outwardly free but Hellenes are not slaves just by circumstance.

S: I see now. That's this statement in the third book of the Politics, but I would draw the opposite conclusion. I would say that here if Priam is called a man who was fundamentally happy in spite of his terrible misfortunes at the end of his life; then it proves that barbarians are not necessarily natural slaves. And that is, of course, what he means in the Politics too where he only explains his position by a provisional adaptation to a common Greek view, to a common Greek opinion, which he does not seriously accept. All right. And then when you spoke of the problem of natural slaves you made a dig at someone, I fear at someone present here and I thought maybe at Mr. Boyan. Or am I totally mistaken? Because Mr. Boyan being the representative of the most extreme liberalism in this class as far as I know. At least he is the only one in this room. But this is really of no importance. I did not quite follow your remarks about your being advocate of the devil. This was a somewhat involved statement. Perhaps



it should be involved. (Inaudible remark). Yes, I'm afraid I'm not so unfamiliar with these matters not to make sense of what you meant but it was a bit involved, nevertheless. And the only criticism I could make of your paper is that you made a wholly "unrealistic" assumption in your paper: namely, that everyone sitting here has read the assignment carefully. Those who did not, and I'm sure there were some, could not possibly follow your statement. But you can rightly say that's their fault, not yours. Good. I thank you again Mr. Reinkin.

This question to which we have to turn now, the question which we have to take up today, was taken up implicitly and probably also unconsciously last time by Rabbi Weiss when he tried to state an objection to Aristotle's definition of happiness. The reference is to a series of questions and answers in the second meeting beginning on page 13, bottom, and continuing through page 16.7 Now let me state this difficulty now as it became clear to me afterward. Now for Aristotle the happy life is the life according to logos, to reason, and it makes sense to say that man is distinguished from all other animals by his logos. And from this point of view Aristotle's definition is unimpeachable. But is this sufficient? The logos may be the characteristic of man but this doesn't mean that it is the highest in man. This is, I believe, what he meant. Now what is that highest? Aristotle himself admits that there is something higher than reason or logos or ratio and he calls that nous, intellectus, the understanding, as distinguished from reason. Now could there not be an intellect, a mental perception, without logos, without reason, a mental perception which, as it were, shatters all logos and all nomos or law? Then, from this point of view, the perfection of man would not consist in any activity, in any work, as Aristotle puts it, but in a certain suffering, in a certain way of being affected: pathos as distinguished from \_\_\_\_\_, in an experience of the principle, of the \_\_\_\_\_. So from this point of view the highest to which man can raise cannot be achieved by an ascent, by a methodic ascent from the primary seeing to the principles but, as it were, a sudden interruption, a sudden appearance of -- a sudden presence or a sudden call: nous without logos. Now this -- what I try to describe -- is generally known by the name of mysticism, but in a wide sense where it also would include the Biblical revelations, something which transcends the work of the logos. Now still, of course, here the logos comes in. God speaks. He puts his seal on speaking; for example, on the Ten Commandments. Here we have a "that" -- do not kill, do not murder -- without a reason, without a "why," a mere command. Or if it is a reason -- for example, prohibition against murder because man is created in the image of God -- but then the question arises, is creation known, knowable, by human reason. Then if it is not, if it is a teaching of revelation and not of reason, then you have fundamentally the same situation: that you are up against something where logos as logos, reason, does not lead to. To this, of course, one can say, following the dominant western tradition, this may be so but this transcends philosophy as philosophy, and therefore Aristotle, as a philosopher, does not have to be concerned with it. And perhaps we leave it at that and we try to understand in what way Aristotle comes across this problem of what we call, in Latin tradition, religion. There is no Greek word for that.

Now let me first remind you of the context of what we discussed last time. We saw Aristotle's scientific definition of happiness; of course, scientific in his sense, not in the sense of present day science. And this scientific view, this result, is then brought into agreement with the common view in the next section, 1098b9 to 1099b8. And here we see something which was not mentioned in the scientific definition: namely, the happy life must be pleasant and therefore Aristotle asserts that the life according to reason as the doing of noble and

just things is intrinsically pleasant and the noble and just things are the things by nature pleasant. The whole problem seems to be solved, but then one difficulty comes out. We still need, in addition, external goods. In other words, the virtuous actions, the just and noble actions, are not sufficient. But if we need external goods we cannot exclude the possibility that the possession of these external goods is in itself also pleasant. So we might need pleasure in addition to the pleasure deriving from moral actions. Now at this point we take up 1099b, 6 to 9. That was where we begin today. Do you have that?

O: As we said therefore, happiness does seem to require the addition of external prosperity, and this is why some people identify it with good fortune (though some identify it with virtue).

S: You see. So since happiness is a complex thing consisting of virtue plus, say, we call it "e," equipment -- that's an expression which Aristotle uses later -- equipment -- since this is so, well, one may say, what's more important of the two? And the nice people, of course, say always virtue. But there are also people who are not nice and they say, the equipment. Give me first wealth and other conveniences and then I will very gladly be virtuous and it's fairly simple to do that. But since Aristotle admits, "v" plus "e," there is a difficulty, and this he discusses in the sequel. Now let us read the immediate sequel.

O: It is this that gives rise to the question whether happiness is a thing that can be learnt, or acquired by training, or cultivated in some other manner, or whether it is bestowed by some divine dispensation or even by fortune.

S: Yes, well, by chance. So, in other words, because this is so, because this is this complex phenomenon, perhaps happiness cannot be achieved by man himself. Perhaps it is a gift of the gods. Or is it a consequence of virtue or of some learning or training? But the key question, which Aristotle discusses from now on: is man capable to procure for himself and by himself his happiness? Hitherto it was taken for granted that he can do that because it is an actualization of a natural possibility. Now let us go on here, where we left off.

O: Now if anything that men have is a gift of the gods, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is divinely given -- indeed of all man's possessions it is most likely to be so, inasmuch as it is the best of them all.

S: You see the way in which Aristotle argues: simply taking ordinary conceptions. What is what deserves to be called divine? Of course, the best. Of course, the best. Everyone knows that; because the gods are better, higher, than man. Yes?

O: This subject however may perhaps more properly belong to another branch of study. Still, even if happiness is not sent us from heaven, but is won by virtue and by some kind of study or practice, it seems to be one of the most divine things that exist. For the prize and end of goodness must clearly be supremely good -- it must be something divine and blissful.

S: Let us stop here first. So, in other words, the divine character of happiness must not be denied, and this is, of course, one can say, an easy thing for a Greek because the word happiness, eudaimonia. Daimon, god, is a part of that. It obviously has a relation to the divine and to the gods, but this is clear. We will soon find a different reason which has nothing to do with the Greek language

but let us leave it at this for the time being. But even if it is a consequence of human activities it might still not be intelligible as such because it might differ from these activities, being the prize for them. Now the prize is something different from the activity for which the prize is given. Happiness does not cease to be divine even if it is acquired by what man does, because there would still be an "x" added to it. Now let us go on: the next sentence.

O: And also on our view it will admit of being widely diffused, since it can be attained through some process of study or effort by all persons whose capacity for virtue has not been stunted or maimed.

S: Let us stop here. If happiness has its root in man, as Aristotle still asserts, most men can acquire it. If it is merely god-sent it would be the privilege of a few elect. If it is common, then it must have a root in human nature. But Aristotle implies here also one point: not all men can become virtuous, only all normal men. A natural fool, a moron, cannot become happy, a great problem from every point of view, religious or philosophic. But this is clear: not all men can become happy. Now let us go on.

O: Again, if it is better to be happy as a result of one's own exertions than by the gift of fortune. . . .

S: In other words, it would be not distinguishable from a gift of fortune if it could be traced to a merely arbitrary will of gods and did not have some natural conditions like virtue: that only the virtuous will be happy. Then it is not a matter of chance. But if some people, say one in a million or one in a thousand, then it would not be distinguishable from a gift of chance. Mr.

Boyan.

Q: Doesn't Aristotle also argue that not all men can be happy because not all men can be virtuous?

S: That's, in a way, the same. I mean, we are speaking now of "can" and not of "who will be." Aristotle would say very few people are, in fact, virtuous, but that would not preclude the possibility that they could be virtuous if they had made the necessary effort. And here he is speaking only of the "could be," of the possibility, and he says only few human beings are deprived of it and they are the defective human beings and this means, in this stage, not more than moronic or practically moronic people. This remains. Aristotle means a bit more, as we shall see later. Now go on, Mr. Reinkin.

O: . . . it is reasonable to suppose that this is how happiness is won; inasmuch as in the world of nature things have a natural tendency to be ordered in the best possible way, and the same is true of the products of art, and of causation of any kind, and especially the highest. Whereas that the greatest and noblest of all things should be left to chance would be too contrary to the fitness of things.

S: Now Aristotle asserts that happiness must have its root in man, for by denying it one would make happiness the work of chance and this would be preposterous. Happiness must have an orderly origin and must come into being in an orderly manner, by nature. And the reason is this: happiness is the most noble and the most noble must be orderly, according to nature. The natural is orderly, not at random. That is the premise here.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Of course, it's difficult for us to accept this assumption. Why does the



most noble necessarily have to be natural?

S: Yes, sure. I mean, for us today at first glance it sounds like a wholly unwarranted optimism. Is that what most modern people would say? Sure, and this is what -- is the lesson enforced by modern natural science. I mean, the orderliness of the process has nothing to do with having nobility. It's a mathematical orderliness and not another one. Whether this mathematical orderliness is not -- can be taken for granted -- why should the whole be so that you can speak about it best in mathematical terms? Is it not strange? That is a difficulty in itself, but this is taken for granted somehow: that mathematics has nothing to do with beauty proper, with purpose. That is now taken for granted. The only question is whether it can be maintained if you take into consideration everything and do not limit yourself to physics and chemistry. After all, it is necessary for a natural science, for a science dealing with all beings in time and space, as they say, whether this must not take into consideration man as well. And the Aristotelian and Platonic science, natural science, started from man and found in man the key to all sub-human things; and perhaps the account of the sub-human things was not in all respects as good as the account we have now. But the modern starting point, from the sub-human, surely fails when it comes to speak of man. I mean, that's the least one must consider before one throws out Aristotle. Well, one also has to take into consideration, above all, the so-called problem of knowledge. What does knowledge mean as a consequence of the modern understanding of nature and what did it mean according to the old understanding of nature? In the modern point of view knowledge has an essentially constructive character. Now what are simple -- well, the classic formula: Kant, the human understanding prescribes nature its laws. So the scientific account is a human project, the human project but still the human project. And the implication, of which Kant, of course, was fully aware, is then you must make a distinction between nature in itself, the thing in itself, of which we know nothing, and the phenomenal world, which is the world which science, as it were, constructs. That's a grave difficulty. The whole account given in a way of a construction is fundamentally hypothetical. It is fundamentally relative to man, just one being among infinitely many different beings in the whole, whereas from the older point of view there is a natural harmony between the human understanding and the whole, and therefore the account is not hypothetical but true. I think someone brought up this question, Mr. Erickson, about the -- how did you call it -- the old conception of truth? The correspondence theory of truth: that's it, that is the point, whether man is by nature open to the whole as it is or whether man makes the whole, as it were, open to himself by his construct. This is from the very beginning, from Dacon on, at least, the difficulty in modern thought. In other words, it is not good enough to say what Aristotle says about a certain flea stemming from dirt, you know, by putrefaction, spontaneous generation -- whether this is true or not. That is a very narrow view. You have to take into consideration also the whole doctrine of man, and especially the whole doctrine of knowledge, and see whether modern science stands up so well as it seems to be when it is the question of whether there can be flea emerging without any generation from dung. Maybe Aristotle was wrong with that, but this is not the most important question. Yes?

O<sub>2</sub>: Couldn't you here, though, avoid that bitter issue by just saying that you take the happy man as the wholly developed man -- is not better than an acorn turning into a fully developed oak. . . .

S: Yes, but still, you see, but when you speak of the acorn you imply a teleology, that the acorn --

Q<sub>2</sub>: A regularity of --

S: Yes, but a special one going from the imperfect to the perfect. That's not the kind of regularity which is supposed in the Newtonian laws: a different one. But this is a very long question. We would have to study, at the very least, the second book of the Physics, where Aristotle makes clear the fundamental difference between mathematical necessity and the non-mathematical necessity which is teleological necessity. We would have to take this up. Surely we cannot go into the whole issue. I only wanted to make clear that the issue is not decided by the famous triumphs of modern natural science because these triumphs were accompanied by terrible defeats in other fields of human understanding. And one would have to strike a balance: which is more important from an overall point of view, whether it is not possible ultimately to integrate the modern discoveries, especially in physics, into a Platonic-Aristotelian scheme otherwise. These are very long questions and we cannot do here more than to remind you of these open things which are not finished in any way by the fact that modern natural science has been victorious and the logical positivists believe they can give a rational account of modern natural science, because this account is not as rational as it looks. Mr. Butterworth.

Q<sub>3</sub>: In this passage that we're just reading it seems to be that there is one very subtle and tacit premise: that the divine is equated to chance.

S: Yes and no. I mean, there is one understanding of the divine in which one cannot recognize more than chance, which Aristotle . . . But what men mean by the divine is, of course, not chance but the super-human, the most perfect, and that cannot be chance. The vulgar understanding of the divine is, if analyzed, nothing but chance. (The question is pursued further, inaudibly, regarding usage of the word tyche in the passage being considered). Yes, but for this reason: because, I mean, the crude understanding. Then only the merely irregular in the extreme sense, the random -- that is what they worship as the divine and that Aristotle rejects. Now let us go on first here, Mr. Reinkin. I hope you keep always your finger at the point where we left off.

O: Light is also thrown on the question by our definition of happiness. . . .

S: Literally, he says what we are inquiring becomes clearer from the logos. One can say from the definition of happiness. Yes?

O: . . . which said that it is a certain kind of activity of the soul according to virtue; whereas the remaining good things are either merely indispensable conditions of happiness, or are of the nature of auxiliary means, and useful instrumentally.

S: Yes. More literally, that the others are by nature helpers and useful in an instrumental way; organically, according to the original meaning of organic, instrument; organon means instrument, tools. It has nothing to do with organismic in the original meaning. Now what Aristotle says, then: the conclusion agrees with the scientific statement about happiness: namely, that it is a natural perfection of a natural being. So, in other words, there is no random thing. There is a clear connection with natural processes. Secondly, happiness has necessary conditions, and if it were merely a gift of chance then it wouldn't have necessary conditions. Now these were three conditions -- let us remind us of them -- good birth, good children, and beauty. Let us not forget that. So these tough

points are also there. And other good things are by nature instrumental to happiness: friends, wealth, and political power. In other words, say, dogs and cats would not fulfill the conditions. If it were merely a matter of chance dogs and cats, nay lice and rats, would be as useful helpers for one's happiness as friends and wealth can be, which is manifestly untrue. So happiness is bound to specific conditions which it would not be if it were merely a gift of chance. Yes; go on.

O: This conclusion moreover agrees with what we laid down at the outset; for we stated that the Supreme Good was the end of political science. . . .

S: Yes, political science is -- of the political. That can be science; that can be art; that can be concern. You know, it's only the adjective; the noun is not given. Say: of politics. Leave it open. Yes?

O: . . . but the principal care of this science /or of this/ is to produce a certain character in the citizens, namely to make them virtuous, and capable of performing noble actions.

S: Noble deeds; yes, to make them good and doers of noble deeds. So here what is the point? We are concerned with happiness, the highest human good. The highest human good appears to be the object of the highest human pursuit, politics. Now what does a politician in the highest sense do? He is trying to make men virtuous. He has a specific concern. All this proves that happiness is not a matter of chance. Otherwise it could not be related to a regular human procedure, the procedure of the political man. Yes?

O: We have good reasons therefore for not speaking of an ox or horse or any other animal as being happy, because none of these is able to participate in noble activities.

S: Yes, we must also understand this properly. If happiness were an unqualified, unconditioned gift of God or chance of course a horse could be happy -- why not -- as well as a man. The mere fact that happiness is bound to the condition that the human being is made happy shows that it is not a random affair. Yes. Now the sequence we don't have to read -- well, we might still read it, yes. The immediate sequel.

O: When children are spoken of as happy, it is in compliment to their promise for the future. Happiness, as we said, requires both complete goodness and a complete lifetime.

S: In other words, we do call certain beings happy although they are unable to be happy, but they are unable to be happy not simply but only for the time being. A child cannot be happy, and of course we talk all the time of happy children, but this is a somewhat imprecise expression, Aristotle says. They are happy by promise. Yes?

O: For many reverses and vicissitudes of all sorts occur in the course of life, and it is possible that the most prosperous man may encounter great disasters in his declining years, as the story is told of Priam in the epics; but no one calls a man happy who meets with misfortunes like Priam's, and comes to a miserable end.

S: So Aristotle has completely excluded, in the preceding argument, that happiness can be a gift of chance. And yet chance raises again its ugly head. In a



way, happiness does depend on chance, on good luck or bad luck, as proven by the case of men of supposed great virtue like Priam who had such a miserable end. Now in discussing this whole section we must never forget one notion to which Aristotle doesn't refer in his Ethics but in his Metaphysics, in the first book, 902b. When he speaks of understanding, of a life of understanding, he says -- and after having shown that it is superior to any other human life --

Hence also the possession of it might justly be regarded as beyond human power, for in many ways human nature is in bondage so that, according to Simonides, god alone can have this privilege /namely, of a theoretical life/ and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him /i.e. not the highest knowledge/. If then there is something in what the poets say and envy is natural to the divine it would probably occur in this case above all and all who excel in this knowledge would be unfortunate /namely, because the gods would be envious of this happy man/. But the divine cannot be envious; nay, according to the proverb, poets tell many a lie, nor should any other science be thought more honorable than one of this sort.

And so on. So this -- that's the only reference of Aristotle to this; Metaphysics, 902b20, following. The rarity of the Aristotelian reference to this does not prove its irrelevance; and secondly, that Aristotle says the poets say that must not deceive you about the fact that these were not only the poets who said that, who could, of course, easily be dismissed. Plato does the same thing when he attacks the popular notions in the Republic: the poets, the poets! But he makes clear only occasionally that the poets, of course, get these notions from much more authoritative people: from the official cult of Athens and other places. So this notion that happiness is a treacherous thing because of the gods' envy is, of course, somehow here discussed. Now let us turn to the sequel. I mean, we cannot read that all. I try to give a brief survey of the immediate sequel. Now this fact; that happiness is a treacherous thing, that the gods are envious of happy men, is underlying the view that one should not praise anyone happy as long as he lives, because this would only increase the envy. So keep quiet if you are happy. Of course, this is a special saying of Solon in the story in Herodotus. One cannot praise oneself as happy as long as one lives. That would be the greatest folly because it would be provocative; nor can one praise as happy anyone else except after they are dead or when they die, at the point of dying. But this cannot be said by people like Aristotle, as he makes clear, by people who say that happiness is some being at work, some activity, and the premise is that the dead cannot do anything. Aristotle and his like must say of a man who is engaged in such work, the right work of man, for a reasonable length of time -- they must say of such a man that he is happy, even if the end is terrible. But someone could say, well, Priam was presumably a perfectly virtuous man, and this is, after all, terrible. You cannot possibly call Priam, after the capture of Troy, or after the death of Hector, at any rate, a happy man. Then let us call a man happy or praise him as happy who is wholly outside of any misfortunes. Then Aristotle says then, of course, we cannot praise anyone as happy, anyone, because as long as we live we are exposed to fate. But then you cannot praise as happy the dead either -- he turns this around -- for the following reason: either they have no activity whatsoever -- then they cannot be happy -- but even granting that the dead have -- they are somehow affected by what happens to the living to whom they are attached: their descendants, their friends, and so on. Now if you say, but the dead don't have any sense perception, as Aristotle is willing to admit -- and then he says this doesn't dispose of the difficulty because when we speak of the happiness of the living we also consider facts of which the living

in question have no awareness. Take a simple case: there is a happy couple, have wonderful children; and everyone praises them as happy because of these children. These children are, let us say; now in Central America, perhaps with the Peace Corps or in any other function, and then they are killed. The parents hear of it only years later. In the moment in which these children are killed the parents are objectively unhappy although they don't know it. So our happiness or unhappiness does not depend on our knowing; and this is important. Well, I think you can all understand it: they live in a fool's paradise. They don't know that the major support of their happiness has disappeared. Now what is the context in which he makes this point? So we must consider what happens to the friends of the dead after their death. We must consider that, and the dead are affected by it and therefore we must consider what happens after the death. The overall context: we cannot praise as happy the dead, even the dead, because even the dead are still exposed to fortune. Is this point clear? I mean, the argument is alien to our ordinary way of thinking but we should understand him. What is the difficulty?

O: It's really incomprehensible to me.

S: Really? Well, let us perhaps finish this part and then it may become clear, because Aristotle will go somewhat deeper into the analysis. So one point is clear. Now another consideration: whatever might have to be said about the happy man, he cannot be understood as changing from happiness to unhappiness or back all the time. I mean, being happy cannot be something like a chameleon which changes its colors every moment. Happiness is something lasting. This is a statement of the problem. So happiness must be lasting in spite of the fact that there is some dependence of happiness on chance. That's the overall problem. Now in 1100b11 he gives the solution to the problem. We can only read the chief passages: 1100b22. Let us begin there.

O: But the accidents of fortune are many and vary in degree of magnitude; and although small pieces of good luck, as also of misfortune, clearly do not change the whole course of life, yet great and repeated successes will render life more blissful, since both of their own nature they help to embellish it, and also they can be nobly and virtuously utilized; while great and frequent reverses can crush and mar our bliss. . .

S: Well, the thought is very simple. I mean, there are minor misfortunes which would not destroy happiness and one must make this common sensical distinction. There are major blows. Yes, go on.

O: . . . both by the pain they cause and by the hindrance they offer to many activities. Yet nevertheless even in adversity nobility shines through, when a man endures repeated and severe misfortune with patience, not owing to insensibility but from generosity and greatness of soul. And if, as we said, a man's life is determined by his activities, no supremely happy man can ever become miserable. For he will never do hateful or base actions. . . .

S: Priam, in other words. Think always of him. He can never become miserable.

O: . . . since we hold that the truly good and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly way, and will always act in the noblest manner that the circumstances allow; even as a good general makes the most effective use of the forces at his disposal, and a good shoemaker makes the finest shoe possible out of the leather supplied him, and so on with all the other crafts and professions.

S: Let us stop here for one moment. You see, again Aristotle reaches a solution by looking at the arts. Shoemaker and general are taken as arts. They are the model. Good and bad luck are, as it were, the matter for the art of the virtuous man. Just as the shoemaker here is given poor leather -- now the good shoemaker will, of course, excel in making a tolerably good shoe from very poor material. The shoe is by far inferior to the one made by a not-so-good shoemaker from excellent material, but the art, the understanding of what he has to do, is, of course, much greater. So the man like Priam who behaves nobly in this great misfortune -- this virtue is higher, in a way, than that of a man who lives always in misery and has different material to work on. And, of course, the question is the danger of good luck -- you become inflated and all this kind of thing. There is also such a danger; and the other danger is to be so cowed down and made so paralytic, as it were, as Aristotle will say later. Which is the greater one?

Q: If happiness is an activity and not just an art then if the material is too bad the shoemaker can't make the shoe and he's going to be, quite likely, unhappy. That is, he's not made happy just from being -- having a supreme art -- he's happy from being able to make shoes --

S: All right. Yes, but Aristotle would say, look, let us assume there is no leather and it is absolutely necessary, given the condition of the ground, that there should be some protection for the feet. Well, then, of course, wood -- wooden shoes are a perfectly legitimate thing as you know if you have been to Holland, Michigan, and not to Holland itself, where you see them. But then God knows what he would do with grass, with leaves.

Q: Supposing he's hiding in prison --

S: Sure. This is not still settled; true. But it is only made clear that a considerable amount of misfortune does not take away the possibility of virtue.

Q: But doesn't he kind of make it true just by definition by saying that the only man he counts miserable is the man who does base things? The man who is unable to act at all he --

S: Yes, that is what he tries to avoid. This was the famous Stoic solution to the problem, not Plato's and Aristotle's. The formula is happiness equal to "v," to virtue, and therefore if you are in a concentration camp and exposed to the most malicious S.S. man and so on, then you can be perfectly happy: Stoic solution. This is, of course, wholly unreasonable, and Aristotle, in his great practical wisdom, rejects that.

Q: But except on that Stoic basis -- on Aristotle's own basis then a man with great strokes of bad luck can be not just not happy but miserable, by any sensible meaning of the word miserable.

S: Yes, well, Aristotle will find a much more common sensical and convincing answer. We come to that. Let us go on, Mr. Reinkin, where we left off.

Q: And this being so, the happy man can never become miserable; though it is true he will not be supremely blessed if he encounters the misfortunes of. . . .

S: No, not supremely. He will not be blessed, blissful. Yes. Well, as he would say, it is a considerably diminished happiness, but he is still more to be admired than a man who lives affluently as a master of a criminal racket.



Q: Then this seems to attack his definition of happiness as activity because we admire a man who is unable to act at all, even unable to think if he has been brainwashed, if he has virtue --

S: No. What Aristotle has in mind is; of course, that he will show in his posture, say, towards his fellow prisoners, toward his torturers -- that will show still, his virtue. Let us first finish that; a few more lines.

O: Nor yet assuredly will he be variable and liable to change. . . .

S: Multi-colored. Changing his colors all the time. Yes.

O: . . . for he will not be dislodged from his happiness easily. . . .

S: Easily. There is a point. You see how he uses this unscientific, but by no means meaningless, term. Good. Yes?

O: . . . nor by ordinary misfortunes, but only by severe and frequent disasters, nor will he recover from such disasters and become happy again quickly, but only, if at all, after a long term of years, in which he has had time to compass high distinctions and achievements.

May not we then confidently pronounce that man happy who realizes complete goodness in action, and is adequately furnished with external goods not for any casual period but throughout a complete lifetime in the same manner? [Switches to Ross translation] Or must we add 'and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life'? Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled -- but happy men.

S: Yes, happy as human beings. In other words, perfect happiness, perfect immunity to chance, to misfortune, cannot be expected. Now before we go on I would like to tell you a few points which I found in the medieval commentaries. As a rule, I read only medieval commentators because they are serious men, philosophers, whereas the modern commentators are, as a rule, classical scholars, by definition, not philosophers. And in especially the most recent commentary which I bought for an enormous price they discussed wholly uninteresting questions. When did Aristotle write that? When he had not yet severed the umbilical cord connecting him with Plato? Of course, questions which can never be answered, and yet the arguments are pitiable because if Aristotle makes a very sweeping remark, unqualified, which reminds of certain passages in Plato he says he's still with Plato, as if Aristotle did not have the right, from time to time, when he mentions a subject in passing, not to leave it at the loose statement. This is disgraceful. But in Thomas Aquinas, for example, he makes this point which is very interesting: what about insanity? And here he gives the judgment which I'm sure is in the spirit of Aristotle: insanity is to be judged like death. That is to say, as little as you can say a man became miserable by dying you can say he became miserable by -- from the point of view of the survivors you can say that but it has nothing to do with his own happiness. In another passage, on the basis of a probably wrong translation which was available to Thomas -- but it is, nevertheless, interesting because if someone understands Aristotle he will even if he has a wrong translation bring out a thought which is Aristotelian in kind; in style, you know, even if Aristotle didn't state it -- and he says -- well, Aristotle does not say -- the happy man will never fall into the misfortunes of Priam, which Aristotle does not say, because he will prevent them by his

prudence. In other words, he would have made peace. Much earlier he would have thrown out this abomination, Paris, and said you Greeks can do with him what you like: this good-for-nothing. So he was not truly prudent. But one point is, of course, true and I'm sure that corresponds with the sobriety of Aristotle. He would say many misfortunes which we pity could have been prevented if people had been sufficiently cautious and prudent. We should not be so sluggish to disregard this simple, homely verity. Averroes, the great Islamic commentator, refers very interestingly in this discussion to Job, <sup>Averroes</sup> you know, which would seem to be the refutation of Aristotle. But what does Aristotle say? Job behaved nobly in his misfortunes and therefore remained happy in spite of the famous losses of his fortune and his children which occurred. I believe it is not a Biblical interpretation but it shows how an Aristotelian can find his way in the Biblical data. /"Aristotle," four lines above, is probably a slip of the tongue for Averroes/. Yes, Mr. Kirwan.

Q: I don't understand the point about Thomas' insanity.

S: Thomas says insanity, which just hits a man and is out with any virtuous actions, has to be judged like death. This man is no longer -- just as a man cannot be said to have lost his happiness or virtue by his death you cannot say that a man has lost his happiness or virtue by insanity. That's the simple end of his life as a human being capable of happiness or virtue.

Q2: This does raise a whole series of questions, though.

S: Yes, sure. Modern novelists wouldn't like it, by which I do not mean to say that you plan to be a novelist, Mr. Boyan.

Q2: It raises some difficult questions about the whole approach. What is insanity? What degrees at which can we say that a man has certain psychological misfortunes and so on, and which he cannot --

S: What do you mean by a psychological misfortune? What do you mean by that: psychological misfortune?

Q2: Okay. Let's take the extreme case of a man who has paranoid -- modern term--

S: In other words, it is technical insanity. I mean, something which is not due to the fact, for example, that he had unreasonable expectations which were disappointed and then he becomes -- how shall I say -- irrational; because Aristotle would, and Thomas, of course, would also, say these unreasonable expectations. To that extent, it is simply a kind of natural punishment for his original folly. That you do not mean. You mean something that just hits a man without any fault or folly of this kind. Yes. That's insanity. Yes, I mean, in other words, Thomas does not discuss the question whether the insanity is of this kind that he must be locked up with a straitjacket or whether he can still run around for some time. This is an unnecessary subtlety. Is it not? From this point of view: he is a pitiable human being who cannot be held responsible anymore, whether it is one of these long range diseases or whether he has to be locked up immediately.

Q2: Yes, this isn't like total irresponsibility. Then there are all these questions of degree, which I'd like to put into the discussion.

S: Yes, that stems from the whole question of freedom, human freedom, which will be discussed later by Aristotle. But here I think Thomas is perfectly

justified in leaving it at the general statement about insanity without going into the question that there are borderline cases where you can say he's rather insane but not quite insane: this kind of thing. Then you can take whichever way you choose. That is not a fundamentally interesting question because the main point is clear. To the extent to which it is insanity he has given --

Q<sub>2</sub>: Unless you believe the statistics that come out now and then.

S: Which statistics? You must tell us.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I think there was one in the New York Times before it went out of business and came back.

S: Maybe that was the reason for the strike.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I believe a study done in New York or some area -- I've forgotten the exact area -- 7 out of 10 people had been under treatment for some time for various neurotic --

S: Yes, then one would have to go into the question. Many people undergo treatment because they have nothing better to do, you know, and all this kind of thing. Or perhaps --

Q<sub>2</sub>: No, these were all poor people.

S: Even poor people may do it because they have been told there are certain insurances which pay for that. That's luck. I mean, I know nothing of statistics, but this is not sufficient: the mere bald data. We have to go over it with a fine comb. It's very simple. If it should be true that the incidence of insanity is much greater today in the big cities, highly industrial cities, then one really would have to raise the question whether the life people lead under this condition is not so abnormal. Sure. Aristotle would be the first. He said Babylon is no longer a polis, and Babylon was not as big as New York.

Q<sub>3</sub>: What is the problem that you raised in saying that Aquinas maybe had a misreading of the text here?

S: Oh that's trivial; because Aristotle doesn't say that the happy man, the blessed man, will never fall into the misfortune of Priam. Moerbeke mis-translates that. William of Moerbeke.

Q<sub>3</sub>: No, but I mean, is that true though, that Aristotle doesn't say it and that Aquinas. . . . (a few inaudible words).

S: But I have never studied William of Moerbeke -- because it might be true that he had a text, the Greek text, which was different, because Moerbeke has ordinary competence in these matters. I simply don't know what the chances are that he would simply mistranslate. I do not know. Then he must have had a different text, and then maybe Aristotle did say it, and then it would be still simpler for Thomas Aquinas. But I believe he did not say it and yet Thomas went into it and tried to see how to interpret this strange sentence from the Aristotelian point of view. And that he did. Now go on where we left off, 1101a, 22 to 24.

O: That the happiness of the dead is not influenced at all by the fortunes of their descendants and their friends in general seems too heartless a doctrine, and contrary to accepted beliefs.



S: Yes, let us stop here. Aristotle states here why one cannot neglect the fate of the descendents and the friends after the death of the happy man. And the first, neglect of that would be loveless, literally translated. Loveless, feelingless. And second, neglect would go against the opinions, against what people generally believe. People generally believe that the dead are affected by what happens to their nearest and dearest after their death. Good. Now to anticipate: Aristotle will come to the conclusion that the dead have, from every point of view, hardly any awareness of what happens after their death and therefore we can dismiss it. But what does this mean? Is he not, then, loveless -- he, Aristotle, himself -- by in fact dismissing that possibility?

O: That seems to go against the point that you made about objective happiness. Whether the dead are aware of it or not they can be said to be unlucky --

S: Yes, but if they simply are not, then there can also be no objective happiness or unhappiness for them.

O: We still would call them unlucky. There is the same evidence for saying that they are unlucky as for saying that this person who didn't know his children were dead --

S: No, but you see even objective happiness, as I called it for convenience sake, presupposes that he is.

O: I'm denying that. I'm saying that the way we use this -- we call people unlucky and I'm saying it neither presupposes that they're aware that they're unhappy nor does it presuppose that they exist.

S: No, if they do not exist then you cannot possibly -- I mean, a non-existent being -- yes, but then we are inexact, and I think Aristotle -- would you say -- now, say the Hohenzollern family or the Hapsburg family were once very famous and all kinds of things happened to their descendents. There may be some who have to earn their livings as waiters, as far as I know, and so on, or they have to marry commoners. And so this kind of thing happens. Now would you say that, say, Frederick the Great's happiness is in any way affected by the fact that his descendent has married some oil man in Texas. Well, you could say an oil man in Texas is something very good. It's almost as good as an old sovereign.

O: You dribbled (?) it off by mentioning his remote descendents. Let's take his immediate descendents. He's just as unaware of his immediate descendents.

S: No, but the point is this: but he still is.

O: No, he's dead, but his immediate descendents --

S: Yes, but it depends very much -- Aristotle denies that he is -- please, let us wait a moment. Do me the favor. I can make it clearer later on. Now I wanted to discuss only one question. Now let us assume that Aristotle comes to the conclusion the fate of the descendents is of practically no importance for the happiness of the dead man. Then Aristotle is loveless; according to his own teaching. Now in Greek, love, the term we use, afilon, is the same as the word for friendship, filia. We have an Aristotelian reply to that. What about love or friendship? That is a very high consideration, but the fact is there are various kinds of friendships. Mr. Anastaplo, you smell it. Aristotle had spoken about friendship before, and what a friendship, his friendship with Plato, and what did he say about that?

O: It takes second place to the love of truth.

S: Ah ha. So, in other words, if our attachment to human beings is incompatible with the truth then it must give way to that and cannot be called, strictly speaking, lovelessness. That is the point I thought we should bring out. Now let us read the sequel in 1101a, 31 to 34. That is the conclusion.

O: Also it makes a great difference whether those who are connected with any occurrence are alive or dead, much more so than it does in a tragedy whether the crimes and horrors are supposed to have taken place beforehand or are enacted on the stage.

S: Yes; let us stop here. So the terrible things which are merely told in the prologue, let us say, of a tragedy and then there are terrible things which take place before our eyes on the scene. Now the former, the things merely told in the prologue, correspond to the terrible things happening to the dead, and the others which take place on the scene before our eyes correspond to the terrible things happening to them while they were still alive. The happy dead do not become miserable through the misery of their descendants and vice versa, because it touches them -- I mean, Aristotle makes here a concession to the popular views -- it touches them barely. They are, as it were, in a state of dormancy where you barely hear anything. In this context Aristotle uses a pious Greek word for the dead, which he uses perhaps once more elsewhere but in the Ethics only here: kekimikotas, which we would translate the departed, or something, which indicates the origin of the whole problem. Now this word comes from a Greek word meaning to be tired, to get tired, to get fatigued; in other words, a state of diminished capacity to hear, to perceive things. So the dead -- the sick; it may also mean sick. Now we all know, when men are very sick they are unable to be concerned with the fate of their nearest and dearest. In other words, a state of dormancy so it would not reach them, or if it would reach them, in a very diminished state so it can barely affect them. This is surely a concession to popular notions: that he presents it this way. So in brief, we may forget about this grave problem of the fate of the descendants as far as the happiness of the man in question is concerned. Mr. Boyan.

Q: Are we to say, then, that we'll be common sensical about it and interpret this discussion about the dead metaphorically, in terms of the dormancy of certain alive people?

S: That is not the point he has in mind. Aristotle has somehow to face the issue as understood on the basis of common Greek beliefs, which he does not simply dismiss but with which he has somehow to live and to make concessions to that.

Q: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, well that is another -- Aristotle's doctrine of the mind. But surely in this sense I don't believe that Aristotle would have thought that the dead can have any memory of things going on on earth. This kind of memory he surely did not mean.

Q<sub>2</sub>: The curious thing is why he would discuss this issue at all, why he would give this so much discussion. Why does he find that necessary? If Aristotle's own views may not be in accordance with popular notions why does he just not omit the issue entirely?

S: Well, a very simple answer: he did not live in a liberal society. In other

words, really this simple thing which is so grossly underestimated: there was no liberal society before the modern era. There were easy-going societies. An easy-going society is a society which does not enforce the laws regarding beliefs. That existed. Athens was, to some extent, such a society. To some extent; don't forget Socrates. But there was no legal protection. And Aristotle had to flee Athens and he said -- that had also political reasons connected with Alexander the Great -- but the official charge was again impiety and Aristotle is said to have said he fled Athens in order -- lest Athens sin again against philosophers. So this existed. But more specifically, the men addressed are gentlemen. Now what is a gentleman? A gentleman is, in a general way, an educated man. He has read the poets and he enjoys reading the poets, listening to the plays and songs, and so on. But one gentleman we know, in a way, best, thanks to Thucydides, is Nicias and Nicias was a very pious man in the sense of ordinary Athenian beliefs. So the gentleman may very well be a man who will take these things seriously and Aristotle has to argue that out.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I guess what I really wanted to know is why this is relevant (?) here. What's the connection of this --

S: I mean, to state it stupidly but simply, because eudaimonia, happiness, reminds of the whole question of the gods. Everyone is reminded by it. But there is a deeper reason; this was really an accident of the Greek language. This will become clear from the sequel. (By the way I would like to know the time because so many people left.)

O: Five minutes after five.

S: (Oh, only as early as that, so we have plenty of time. Good. One must never take one's bearings by public opinion.) So Aristotle has not yet settled the issue. It comes up in the sequel. The question which he discusses now can be stated as follows: is there not, after all, something in happiness which goes beyond what man can bring about by the use of his own power? This part of the religious assertion is still there, and we will see that is not denied by Aristotle. Is there not something in happiness which is merely given and not acquired -- God given, as the common expression is? Now this he discusses in this otherwise strange chapter, namely beginning 1101b10, chapter twelve in both countings, and the formula is this -- let us read the first sentence.

O: These questions being settled, let us consider whether happiness is one of the things we praise or rather one of those that we honor; for it is at all events clear that it is not a mere potentiality.

S: A mere faculty, ability. Well, now let us see what he means by that. This distinction is now crucial for this chapter, between the praiseworthy things and the things worthy of honor; but honor in a full sense: in the sense in which you honor the gods. Let us say reverence to make it quite clear. Does happiness belong to the praiseworthy things or the things which deserve reverence? Well, we all know. We have a very good word available from the Biblical tradition, but not only from there because this is something which people know everywhere: blessing. Is not happiness a blessing? And if it is a blessing then it is not something for which men can be wholly responsible. A grace: you will see that this is not a far fetched thing here. Yes?

Q: Could it be that the things that we praise can be understood more easily than the things that we honor?



S: Surely, because they are more within the realm of power -- realm of man. Yes, sure. When he says not an ability -- or how do you say, potentiality -- he means by this such things, it appears from a parallel passage in the Magna Moralia like rule, wealth, strength, beauty which, as such, are neither praiseworthy in the strict sense nor worthy of reverence, but somehow good without the

. In the case of wealth you all see it: a reasonable amount of wealth is good but no serious man praises another man because he is wealthy. We can say he is a lucky fellow but we do not praise him. We still less will bow down, revere him, unless he is a flatterer of a low character. Good. Now let us go on from here.

O: Now it appears that a thing which we praise is always praised because it has a certain quality and stands in a certain relation to something. For we praise just men and brave men, in fact good men and virtue generally, because of their actions and the results they produce; and we praise the men who are strong of body, swift of foot and the like on account of their possessing certain natural qualities, and standing in a certain relation to something good and excellent.

S: We can roughly say praise always refers to something to which the praised quality is related. It is good for something. That is true of all objects of praise. Even if we say only with a view to the deeds following from it: we praise the courageous man with a view to the courageous deeds, with a view to something else. Praise is always with a view to something else, not of what is simply for its own sake. That would do only the things which we revere, where we are not concerned with its consequence, utility, etc. Now we may skip the sequel and turn to line 25, where he says no one praises happiness as he praises what is just.

O: . . . no one praises happiness as one praises justice, but we call it 'a blessing,' deeming it something higher and more divine than things we praise.

Indeed it seems that Eudoxus took a good line in advocating the claims of pleasure to the prize of highest excellence; when he held that the fact that pleasure, though a good, is not praised, is an indication that it is superior to the things we praise, as God and the Good are, because they are the standards to which everything else is referred.

S: Yes. Now that is an extremely important statement pointing toward the detailed discussion of pleasure in Book VII and beyond. Now Eudoxus: this was a most respectable hedonist, a mathematician, and his hedonism was respectable, Aristotle says later, because he lived a perfectly decent life so no one could say he was a hedonist merely because he wanted to have what advertisers call lots of fun. So Aristotle does not contradict Eudoxus' view that pleasure is something worthy of reverence, as distinguished from praise. But I think, lest you are completely misled by this remark, let us read the final statement of Aristotle about pleasure. It occurs in the tenth book, 1174b, toward the end. 1174b, 31 to 33.

O: But the pleasure perfects the activity. . . .

S: Yes, pleasure perfects the activity --

O: (Page 597, section 8). But the pleasure perfects the activity, not as the fixed disposition does, by being already present in the agent, but as a supervening perfection, like the bloom of health in the young and vigorous.

S: I think that's a wonderful explanation of what Aristotle means. It is something which supervenes, which you have not bargained for, like the bloom of youth, something which would not strictly be necessary for young people, a grace. To the extent to which pleasure is that pleasure has a quality which the virtuous activity lacks and in that sense Aristotle accepts the hedonistic teaching, which has nothing to do with vulgar hedonism.

Q: (Regarding the distinction between happiness and blessedness).

S: There is no distinction. They are two different words; one word, eudaimon, reminds of daimon, naturally, of god, a god, and the other word, makarios, which we ordinarily translate by blessed, reminds of makares. That is also something -- well, the heroes after death -- the island of the blessed: that is Makares. I mean these religious notions are here obviously present, but Aristotle tries to state them in a non-religious way. We can state it as follows: the very best, man does not owe to himself although what he does may be and is the prerequisite of his receiving that best. Only at the end, as it were, at the peak of a virtuous life, would it come but it is not something which is, as it were, simply automatic. And the indication of that is pleasure because you may do something very competent, whatever it may be, and still not derive pleasure from it. That happens. And whether that pleasure comes or not: that is not guaranteed by the activity. That's an empirical fact. The human consequence of all this is this: the right posture toward the best is gratitude -- and that remains unimpaired in Aristotle -- not self-reliance, not demanding -- I have a right to demand that for what I did. That is so. In this sense, Aristotle still preserves the Greek piety. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Doesn't the introduction of pleasure bring in the question as to whether or not -- it's so often said, you know, that in order to comprehend one opposite one must know the other, and doesn't this introduce the idea, or bring it in tacitly, that in order to really derive pleasure from virtue one must know vice, in order to really enjoy good food one must have starved or have seen others starve? You know, the notion is quite familiar and I just wondered where Aristotle treats it because I'm sure it's in Aristotle.

S: No, that is also in Plato, because these pleasures which are merely, as it were, the compensation for previous pain are the lowest. Plato uses occasionally an example and Aristotle also alludes to that somewhere in the second book of the Politics, if I remember well: a simple example, if you are hungry or thirsty then you suffer pain and the following great and intensive pleasure is only the other side of the preceding pain. For example, if you are not very hungry the appetite with which you eat is smaller than if you are very hungry. Good. These are the lowest pleasures, but then there are pleasures where the mere absence of the pleasure, absence of food or drink, is not unpleasant, and Plato gives the example -- I believe it's Plato -- gives the example of nice smells. I mean, unless you are a hopelessly corrupt human being you cannot suffer from the absence of good smells, you know, like some so-called aesthetes, snobbish people. You cannot suffer from the absence of good smells as you can suffer from the absence of food and drink. These are therefore freer pleasures because you are not compelled by your nature to seek them. That's one way of putting it. But we come to Aristotle's books on pleasure later on, in lessons following. Good.

Now in the sequel, 1102a5, following, the last chapter we can say, Aristotle expresses this simple thought: however complicated this equation may be -- we must always think of that -- one should perhaps put it this way to make it a

bit more true to what Aristotle says, "e," small "e," or if you think that's still too much make it an epsilon, following the calculus -- you know, very small, smaller than any other magnitude you can assign, but still something else is needed in addition. /The reference is to Dr. Strauss' equation, explaining Aristotle;  $H = V / e$  ./. So the core of happiness is virtue. Therefore we must study, above everything else, virtue; and that he begins to do. Let us read the first statement: 1102a, 5 to 7, the beginning of that chapter.

O: But inasmuch as happiness is a certain activity of soul in conformity with perfect goodness /virtue/, it is necessary to examine the nature of virtue /arete -- do you say virtue rather than goodness?/

S: Yes, say virtue; it doesn't make any difference. Now you note, of course, a distinction which is made as a matter of course between virtue and happiness. They are not identical. It's this epsilon always to be considered. Now then in the sequel he gives a further reason why we must study virtue. The highest human good is the concern of the political man, but the political man is concerned with virtue above everything else, as we have seen before. How does he say here? He wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. This is a different formulation from before but it means the same thing: doers of noble deeds. Aristotle doesn't say as clearly as Xenophon does that it is the virtue of the good leader to make happy those whom he leads. He is a bit more cautious. He says: to make them virtuous; because he may make them virtuous and that does not necessarily guarantee their full happiness for the reason given. Let us read the sequel, when he speaks -- an example of this, we have the legislators of the Cretan --

O: . . . witness the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta, and the other great legislators of history. . . .

S: No, of course history doesn't exist: "if some others of this kind have come into being" or "have been." Yes. Now this judgment seems to contradict the negative things Aristotle says about Crete and Sparta in the second book of the Politics. But this is, of course, nonsense. Aristotle simply gives here a provisional statement. Anyone, any gentleman, would say that the Cretan and Spartan laws are fine and that's good enough for the purpose. That they are better than the Athenian Aristotle, I'm afraid, would admit, because Aristotle was not a democrat, but he would say they are very defective. Now the key point here is this: politics and morality are coextensive. The highest form of practice is the political life. The good man, the perfectly virtuous man, is as such fit to rule in a good polity, as is made clear in the Politics. In other words, Aristotle's coordination of morality and politics must not be mistaken for Machiavelli's. I mean, it's not a subservience of morality to politics but they are coextensive. Now in the sequel he develops the thought that virtue is, of course, the virtue of the human soul and hence the statesman must have some knowledge of the human soul. How will he know the goodness of the human soul, i.e. virtue, if he doesn't have some knowledge of the human soul. Let us read a23, following. "The politician must speculate about the soul."

O: (Begins at the wrong place).

S: No, I meant later, a few lines later. "The politician must speculate about the soul but he must speculate for the sake of these things which we are discussing, and -- " yes, do you have it?



O: The student of politics therefore as well as the psychologist must study the nature of the soul, though he will do so as an aid to politics, and only so far as is requisite for the objects of enquiry that he has in view: to pursue the subject in further detail would doubtless be more laborious than is necessary for his purpose.

S: Yes, well, this is, of course, of utmost topicality and, as it were, what the doctor ordered for us: no scientific psychology required for the understanding of political things. I remember the case of the social smile, which was discovered. When I asked a student once, which psychological discovery is of any political importance, and then he mentioned the social smile, and I told him that this is not even important for electioneering candidates, you know, who have to kiss babies, because it doesn't make the slightest difference to them whether that smile is social or pre-social. (Laughter). Well, you know, mere muscular change. That's clear. So I think that is still true; and here there is, of course, full agreement between Plato and Aristotle. The psychology which Plato gives in the Republic is deliberately provisional and as crude as the psychology given here. But you wanted to say something.

Q: It occurred to me: this interpretation that politics and morality are coextensive -- how does that stack up against the question that Aristotle raises in the Politics where he asks the question, is the good man the same as the good citizen, and he says no?

S: Oh, that's very simple. Everyone here in this room can refute Mr. Glenn. Don't you remember?

Q: I'm not stating a position; I'm asking a question.

S: Yes, but I would like to show you how simple the answer is by asking someone in the class. Mr. Emmert.

O: He means the best regime there.

S: Yes, well, the good citizen is relative to the regime. There can be a good citizen in communist Russia, in Nazi Germany, and there can also be a good citizen in an aristocracy and so on. A good citizen is relative to the regime. Good man is not relative. Good man is in this sense absolute, but the good man, if you look at him and see what this involves -- then you see that the good man and only the good man is fit to be a ruler in the best regime. This is not the only way. I mean, only the ruler in the best regime will show forth the good man in his fullness. In other words, a good man who is good enough to be a decent taxpayer and soldier in the community is a very qualified good man. That's not the good man in his fullness. Very simply -- for example, a judge must, of course, be just to a much higher degree than a simple man who never goes before a law court; obviously. These things which lie dormant in the ordinary man are activated, actualized, in the judge; now still more in the statesman who has to take momentous decisions without the guidance by the law which the judge has. That is what he means.

Q: Well, then politics and morality are not simply coextensive.

S: They are coextensive. They are not identical, but they are coextensive because there is no moral virtue which in its fullest form does not reveal itself in political action.

Q: It seems to me that it would be more precise to say that good politics and morality are coextensive.

S: Yes, but bad politics is by definition defective politics and therefore we can disregard it. I think it is very important: the distinction between individual ethics and social ethics so familiar today is alien to Aristotle. From the very beginning he says political science is concerned with that. That's the most comprehensive view. A man is essentially a social being, a political animal, and therefore the doctrine of the perfection of man must be political. There is something in man which transcends the political but this comes up in this work only at the end of the book; you know, the contemplative life. Now one could say this: what is the difference between modern scientific psychology and the crude psychology which Aristotle uses? In fairness to Max Weber, that much maligned man, one must say that he was sound regarding psychology. He didn't believe that scientific psychology can be of any use for the social scientist and he put it very simply: the type of psychology which you need is that which you need for playing bridge. You know, a certain understanding of human beings: that you need, but scientific psychology is of no use and one must understand that. Now what is, however -- what is the recommendation of modern scientific psychology which Aristotle doesn't see? I think one can say that the modern scientific psychology is related to the notion of manipulating human beings. Then, of course -- if that were our chief task then we might have to know all kinds of things which we do not know, but for Aristotle the task of the statesman is, of course, not to manipulate human beings but to exhort them, to appeal to them, to preach to them. This word which has such a bad meaning in present day social science was, of course -- is perfectly proper for the statesman. Well, in America you have Lincoln, who did a lot of preaching, and his greatest acts are connected with acts of preaching. By the way, the other reason of course is that mass society and its special problems may create difficulties which require for certain kinds of studies about people getting tired and what not which were not necessary in more simple societies.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, even in playing bridge a man who has played thousands of hands with people of different nationalities and made a statistical study of whether Japanese tend to finesse. . . . and there would be a role for a science there.

S: Well, all kinds of things -- you can also have a science of postage stamps, but the question is whether it's useful.

O: I think I found a locus where Aristotle does take up this Madison Avenue approach implicitly, /Politics/, 1308a, to which I referred. He gives five modes of deception by which oligarchies keep people out. These are petty tricks well worthy of recommendation by a social scientist.

S: Yes, for such low class people, such low class regimes. But in the first place, Aristotle --

O: And he says they don't work.

S: Ah ha; yes, sure. But apart from that the really clever oligarch discovered them without any professors at their elbow. So that's good. Now let us continue where we left off, a26: "This subject, about the soul, is spoken of" --

O: . . . some of the teaching current in extraneous discourses. . . .

S: Yes, extraneous discourses: in Greek it is exoteric speeches. Now this word, exoteric speeches, is really ambiguous. It may mean popular, outside of

serious consideration, for merely popular literature, but it may also exoteric to, outside of, the present study, and therefore belonging to natural science or psychology. I mention this only in passing.

Now then Aristotle proceeds to divide the soul according to a very common scheme into a rational and irrational part and says what part means here is irrelevant for our political inquiries. That is a theoretical question of great importance but here irrelevant. And a part of this irrational part is what we share with the plants, the merely vegetative in us, and this is most effective in dreams in man, i.e. at a time when there is no important difference between decent and indecent people, so therefore politically absolutely uninteresting. Good. Another part of the irrational part participates in reason either by disobeying or by obeying, very simply. Your digestive process: you can't command it. But you can command, for example, your arm and the arm obeys, and you can also command your desires, I mean, simply to stop, at least not to bother you anymore. This is another part of the irrational soul and this is, of course, of great importance. There is a parallel to this, Aristotle notes in 116, following, in the obedience or disobedience of the members of our body, which are subject also to logos. The man who is completely intemperate, i.e. who cannot control his sensual desires in any way, is a kind of paralytic. Just as in the case of a paralytic the arms and legs do not obey, in the case of the absolutely intemperate man the desires do not obey in any manner. But this would not be a case of excusable, criminally excusable, conduct: the question which we may take up later when we come to the question of responsibility.

Q: (Inaudible -- seeks explanation of 1102b23, following).

S: Well, very simply, that a man is paralytic -- a paralytic, strictly understood, we see. But that a man is paralyzed as regards his will we cannot, strictly speaking, see. I mean, we see him behave in a certain manner but you do not see the paralysis as such. We infer that.

One may therefore say -- that is 1103a, beginning -- this is a minor subtlety -- hitherto he has said there is an irrational part and a rational part. And there is an interesting irrational part here: that's the desiring part -- your desires which obey or disobey the reason, but the fact even that they disobey it proves, of course, that they can obey. In the case of the digestive system you cannot strictly speak of disobedience because there is no possibility of their obeying. Aristotle says, therefore, you may also divide it as follows: he introduces a bipartition of the rational part, the rational part proper, the commanding part, and that part of man which is by nature fit to obey through reason. So what he called first a subdivision of the irrational part you can also call a subdivision of the rational part: one which is ruling and in itself rational and the other which is merely obediential. And then let us read the end, 1103a4, because here he introduces a distinction.

O: Now virtue also is differentiated in correspondence with this division of the soul.

S: That is, a division into a rational part, strictly understood, and a part which is rational only by being able to obey reason. Yes? Go on.

O: Some forms of virtue are called intellectual virtues, others moral virtues: wisdom or intelligence and prudence are intellectual, liberality and temperance are moral virtues. When describing a man's moral character we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but gentle or temperate;



but a wise man also is praised for his disposition, and praiseworthy dispositions we term virtues.

S: Yes. In other words, this distinction between the two kinds of rationality is underlying the distinction of virtues into intellectual and moral virtues. The virtues of the intellect as intellect reside entirely in reason. The moral or ethical virtues reside to some extent in our appetitive life, in the sub-rational part. And, of course, Aristotle is here concerned in the book primarily with the ethical virtues and only later on does he speak of the intellectual. Mr. McAtee.

Q: I want to go back to something that we discussed earlier. That is, throughout this you've been talking about the fact that Aristotle has guided himself -- in this section we read today -- by generally received opinions. And it seems to me that there are several cases in which what he says is strange. And I have in mind this statement when he says that once a man has lost his happiness it will take him a long time to get it back again. But it seems to me to be contrary to what most people would say. They would say a good man, in other words, is someone who if he lost his happiness would get it back immediately.

S: No. Well take -- oh, there are many examples. For example, you see -- I mean, I have seen and I believe you have seen people who were very happily married and then the wife dies. I assume it is a genuinely, reasonably, happy man. And this destroyed, in a way, for him his happiness; and then, say, after ten, fifteen, years -- there's a beautiful description of that not exactly in this form in Tolstoi's War and Peace. Prince Andrew's first wife died and when Spring comes. . . . Then the wound heals, as we call it. That is what Aristotle means, and the deeper a man is the longer it will take for the wound to heal.

Q: You don't think he was speaking, as I would say, almost as an historian; in other words, from experience.

S: Aristotle always speaks from experience. I mean, how can you speak about such matters without experience?

Q: I had in mind something which he knew somehow or could read in people who knew it or else he knew it himself.

S: No, but I think that is a very common thing. Or people lose a child, a son in war. How long will it take until the wound has healed? And one can say this is one criterion by which we distinguish superficial from non-superficial people: how long it takes for such wounds to heal. And this is what Aristotle has in mind. You know, there are people who are unable to suffer, who on such occasions simply get drunk, you know, and this kind of thing, or travel a lot. You can do that. But other people think that it does them good to suffer because it makes them more human. And this is what he has in mind. I mean, that Aristotle does not come up with an elegant solution as the Stoics did, happiness equal to virtue and that's all, is, I think, to his credit; because the Stoic solution -- that can be defended in classrooms, perhaps, but not in life, and Aristotle would say the test of such assertions surely is whether you can live on them.

Q: (Refers to Job, "who after all was very unhappy and then happy.")

S: But here the problem is stated in very different terms. Yes.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Is Aristotle's two part division of the rational part of the soul comparable to Plato's entire division of the soul?

S: No, he doesn't speak of the bipartition of the irrational part into desiring and --

Q<sub>2</sub>: I was thinking that the three parts of Plato's division would be equivalent to the two parts on the rational side, the commanding and the obeying.

S: No, Aristotle uses here a simpler distinction which Plato also uses first in the Republic before we get the tripartition. This is a good question for later: what Aristotle has to say about that third part of Plato's, the thumos or spiritedness. We must keep this in mind.

I will take up in conclusion the question of Mr. Butterworth. I will at least read it. "If Aristotle has come upon his first principle by deduction and yet insists that he must proceed by way of induction should we not expect him to demonstrate his first principle on inductive grounds? If he does not do this, what can we reasonably conclude?" Yes, but the question is simply: Aristotle presupposes here something in his deductive thing, namely that each being or each class of beings has a specific perfection, a specific perfection, so the perfection of a cat, a perfect cat, is something radically different from a perfect horse and from a perfect human being, and so on. Now this overall relation between beings, specific beings, and specific perfections is here presupposed, but how did he get it? This is not said here. And then something like induction would surely be the beginning of the argument, but induction, of course, never means in Aristotle Baconian induction; never. I mean, therefore the question which was so crucial for Bacon later on, contradictory cases, doesn't play a role. What induction means you can see -- for Aristotle a single case is sufficient or uncontested experience. For example, when Aristotle would say man is a bi-sexual animal, i.e. the species consists of males and females, then he would say, well, I have never seen a human being who was not male or female; and if someone would say, Miss Jorgensen, or what her name was, or Mr. Jorgensen, he would say, well, if this happens once in a billion of cases it surely needs some study but that doesn't affect the fact from which we must start, that man is a bi-sexual being, and this is essential to man, the human race. That is the way: uncontested experience. That's one thing; and the other thing is a simple case. For example, how does Socrates proceed? That was what was originally called induction. Someone says -- in Laches, the simple case -- courage means attack, attack, attack, and then Socrates says, but look, the don't attack. They run away and they are very brave people. You know, they are horsemen and they turn up for a second and then they run away. So the definition of courage in terms of mere attacking is deficient. That's induction. Induction means to take cases which you have observed and draw conclusions from them. That is the primary meaning. The Baconian notion of induction is entirely different and that modern notion led, of course, then to the notion of the controlled experiment. This is not Aristotelian.

Q: (To the effect that Aristotle would consider Socratic induction to be dialectic and that Aristotle, in contrast, is trying to offer demonstrations).

S: Yes, not quite. I mean, when you read later on -- that's a question which we should take up better later on when we have more evidence -- for example, when Aristotle defines courage and he does more than merely giving a definition. He describes it; he articulates it. Then, of course, this is only the result. I mean, Aristotle presents to you the results of his inquiry. He does not present to you his inquiry, but we would have to reconstruct it and I think we can see -- and we can do that if we make some effort -- he looked around, not only once or

twice but for quite some time, and saw, what are the kinds of things which we praise as courageous, and -- did I not forget something? -- and then looked for other things and then gradually he reached a point where he was unable to think of any other case. Well, then, he said now it's good. In other words, this kind of guarantee for completeness which modern man somehow seeks Aristotle was not so concerned with. The guarantee for completeness was that he could not think of any objection to it, and this was, of course -- for which he was attacked by people like Kant especially. That is, the so-called doctrine of categories: you must have heard of that. And Aristotle just gives his list, and Kant says yes, but this is rhapsody, you know, a mere enumeration, no deduction. There are these categories. There cannot be any others: nothing less than that was sufficient for Kant. Aristotle would say no, from what shall I deduce them? I just look around and if it is complete then it is complete. And that was a great difficulty. I mean, for Aristotle there is not this -- no a priori in this modern sense, you see, and that creates a difficulty for all modern readers. A famous pupil of Kant reading the Poetics for the first time was shocked by this mixture of statements which surely would belong to an aesthetics, on the one hand, and then Aristotle goes into very great details about how to build up a tragedy: you know, empirical, technical detail. For Aristotle the difference didn't exist. He wanted to give a complete account, as complete as he could, of tragedy, and whether one could there make a distinction between a priori and a posteriori -- this question didn't exist for him because Aristotle was not concerned with intellectual control but with openness: to see the thing, not controlling it but looking at it. That corresponds to what I said about the difference between gratitude and self-reliance: a fundamentally receptive posture toward the world, not one where you stand outside and try to control it, the Cartesian and modern posture. This is very hard to understand. I mean, it is not so hard to understand it in purely descriptive terms but that it is alive in one, that takes a long experience with these things. I mean, and I remember the first time when I read Aristotle. I couldn't understand this -- I was, of course, brought up in the a priori country, in Germany. But when I read such Aristotelian arguments, say, in the first book of the Physics. And when he criticizes Parmenides. Parmenides had said being is one; and Aristotle says, why? And then he says this, furthermore, besides, in addition; n arguments, as many as he can think of, and no attempt to reduce them into a system where one demands the other; just take them, here, here. Therefore, one should never speak of a system in Aristotle. It took me a long time until I saw how sensible that is; but we modern people, to the extent to which we have received modern training, are not open to that. I mean, you see, these logical positivists are, of course, opposed to all a priori construction; you know that, and this is bad German metaphysics and this kind of thing, but in their way they make the same mistake. You know, this kind of demand for completeness and this inability to simply say if something is vouched for by uncontested experience then I start from it. And then they say, how can you do that? Then you arrive at pre-Copernicus. Then you will say the sun is rising in the east and setting in -- you know? Or no, that you would say. The earth -- oh yes, I'm sorry. All kinds of things come in -- witches and what have you? You know that. Aristotle would say, I can take care of witches without denying common sense. The mere fact that witches were at home in Thessaly rather than in Athens would be an interesting indication of what to think about that.

Q: But this same point where you see Aristotle as different from Kant --

S: From modern philosophy. There are no guarantees except those which are -- man cannot guarantee it by his own power. If the whole were not in such a way



that it were open to man and man by nature in such a way that he was open to the whole nothing could be done. This is simply given and we must try to understand that "that." We cannot leave it at the mere "that," but if we do not start from it and take it for granted -- I have tried to describe it a little bit more precisely but also rather narrowly in this epilogue when I compared Aristotle to the man from Missouri. You know, the man from Missouri as distinguished from the social scientist. Aristotle also wants to be shown, but not in that way in which we in this building are supposed to be shown, at least according to the ruling methodology.

4th Meeting: April 11, 1963

(The student paper was read after the session had already begun. The class opened with Dr. Strauss' lecture, which was subsequently interrupted by the reading of the paper.)

S: We have this difficulty. Aristotle had discussed in the first book happiness, and reached a general definition according to which the core of happiness is virtue, and therefore the question now is what is virtue and that is, generally speaking, the theme of the second book. Now in the second book he discusses first how virtue is acquired or how we become virtuous and with what virtue is concerned before raising the question, what is virtue. And it would seem to be the more rational and sound procedure first to say what is virtue. Now why does Aristotle proceed in this way. Let us remember the difficulty we encountered in Book I. The starting point was the variety of human ends, the variety of noble and just things which lend support to the view that perhaps all just and noble things are merely conventional, and the variety of the good things which leads to the view that anything which can be said to be simply good -- are not all good things somehow dependent on chance in such a way that something which is ordinarily good may accidentally become bad?

Now Aristotle appeals first to the divination all men have that there is one highest good which is called by all, at least by all Greeks, happiness, eudaimonia, and he gives what I called the scientific definition of it, scientific, of course, in an Aristotelian sense. Happiness is the activity, the being at work, of the specifically human according to excellence or virtue; say, the most perfect activity of the specifically human. Now this is, of course, very wide and includes, on the one hand, the purely theoretical man, the man wholly unconcerned with a life of action, as well as, say for instance, a first rate tyrant. You would also need that there. Now then Aristotle brings this definition together with what people, in general, say and only by mating, as it were, the scientific definition with the popular view does he come closer to the ordinary view. And here it appears, then, that happiness consists chiefly in virtuous activity in the ordinary sense of the term, activity of moral virtue. And the agreement with the popular view is shown most clearly by the fact that in this context it is said that the noble and just things are by nature pleasant; in fact, they are the things which are by nature pleasant, as compared with pleasures of the senses, and so on. And if they are by nature pleasant it goes without saying that they are natural. So here that seems to be a complete solution of the difficulty.

So happiness means, then, gentlemanship -- of course, practiced gentlemanship -- as pleasant. If it were not pleasant it would not be happiness. But after we had reached this point a new difficulty arose because there is some dependence of happiness, even if the emphasis is altogether on virtue -- there is some dependence on chance. And Aristotle follows this question in all its windings but the net result is that this dependence cannot be entirely denied, but it cannot be helped. Such things as the fate of Priam can, of course, happen, Priam here being supposed to be a perfectly virtuous man. That can happen, and still it is preferable to be a miserable Priam, miserable in the vulgar sense of the term, than to be a happy crook. This is the last word. And I think we all can understand, even if we should not share, this view.

Now the fundamental difficulty is, then, this: in the scientific definition of happiness Aristotle had not spoken of moral virtue as such. He introduces moral virtue thematically by starting from the soul and its parts. In other

words, he rises again to a scientific consideration of sorts. He shows it in this way: the possibility and the necessity of something like moral virtue without any regard to popular sayings or feelings. The soul consists of two parts, very roughly: one is the strictly rational and the other is which is in itself not rational but which can participate in the rational. And accordingly, there are two kinds of virtue: the virtue of the purely rational part, the theoretical or dianouetic virtues, and those which belong, as it were, to the irrational part, the moral virtues. Now this distinction is in this form Aristotle's distinction. I mean, the term moral virtue or ethical virtue does not occur in Plato, for example. But this doesn't mean that the distinction is, so to speak, an invention of Aristotle. We understand it directly today and wholly independently of the Aristotelian tradition. I give you a simple example from popular culture. Perry Mason is described somewhere as a man who is sharp like a steel trap and clean like a hound's tooth. That's a distinction; the sharpness, that's intellectual virtue, the cleanliness -- (interrupted by laughter). Now honestly. I mean, one must not be snobbish; one must simply appear in mind. (?) I remind you also to the New Testament reference to the serpents and the dogs. The serpents refer, in Aristotle's terms, to intellectual virtue, and the dogs to moral virtue.

Now only the dianouetic or theoretical virtues reside in reason simply, in what is simply human. Moral virtue resides, at least also, in what man has in common with the other animals. And this settles already a question which is explicitly settled only in the tenth book: that the theoretical virtues are of higher rank than the moral virtues. Surely moral virtues are specifically human and the reason is they require, they presuppose, reason, right reason. Let us read 1103b, 31 to 32. Shortly after the beginning of a chapter, chapter two.

O: Did you say the Ross was better?

S: Whichever you have.

O: Now, that we must act according to the right rule. . . .

S: Yes, let us say right reason. Let us use the old, simple translation.

O: . . . is a common principle and must be assumed -- it will be discussed later, i.e. both what the right reason is, and how it is related to the other virtues.

S: Yes, let us stop here. So Aristotle says, of course moral virtue stands and falls by right reason but he postpones a discussion of that for later. He abstracts from that here, and the reason, I believe, is this: because he wishes to make clear in advance the place of moral virtue in the economy of human life. Now let us, then, look at the plan of today's assignment. In the first section, 1103a14 to b25, Aristotle speaks of how moral virtue is acquired. Answer: it is acquired by habituation, not by learning. He will explain that later. Not by learning, as we acquire mathematics or this kind of thing. But -- this is my comment -- (procedural interruption regarding student who unexpectedly learns that he will have to read his paper). Now, as I say, moral virtue is acquired by habituation. But look: is moral virtue the only thing which is acquired by habituation? To take the most simple example, brutes also acquire certain habits which we regard as good. For example, when we say, "Good doggy." By habituation. Now in the next section, 1103b26 to 1104a11, Aristotle gives another excursus on the exactness to be expected here, and where he repeats the earlier



statement in a strong form: there is nothing stable in moral matters, nothing stable. And he doesn't say here that is what is the impression of people, but he says it definitely. Good. Then he goes over in 1104a11 to b3, that virtue is acquired by the doing of actions which are in a mean, neither too much nor too little. Again one can say, a parallel to that we find in the training of animals. That the dog, for example, should jump at these and these kinds of people but not at others, at this time of the day and not at other times of the day, not at everyone, too much, not at no one, too little. So we find here also such a parallel. And then in the last section here, in 1104b3 to 1105a16, moral virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain and is achieved by pleasures and pains; and the most massive case of these pleasures and pains are, of course, bodily punishments and bodily rewards, the stick and the carrot, and in the case of man, of course, more praise and blame, but on the basic level again as in the case of brutes too. 1104b30: let us read that, a short passage.

O: There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance; the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure. . . .

S: Especially about pleasure. Yes?

O: . . . for this is common to the animals, and also it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous appear pleasant. Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy. . . .

S: Well, here we may stop. So you see, the basic stratum is that of pleasure and pain and this man shares with all animals and he has this on every stage of his development. So moral virtue has to do with that part of man which he has in common with the brutes. This is the overall lesson which Aristotle makes clear before he goes into the question of what precisely moral virtue is. But to come back to the key point, the moral virtues are acquired by habituation. Brutes also acquire good habits in this manner, but on the other hand there is also something which the brutes do not have at all which is acquired by habituation and these are the arts. For example, to become a shoemaker: doing certain things -- to do them easily by frequently doing them. Habituation plays a great role there too. Therefore the question is, which we have to take up anyway, what is the difference between the moral virtues and the arts since both are acquired by a kind of habituation. Aristotle speaks of that -- we may also read that -- in 1105a26, following.

O: (Returns to Rackham translation.) Moreover the case of the arts is not really analogous to that of the virtues. Works of art have their merit in themselves, so that it is enough if they are produced having a certain quality of their own; but acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of character. For the possession of an art, none of these conditions is included, except the mere qualification of knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail, whereas the other conditions, so far from being of little moment, are all-important, inasmuch as virtue results from the repeated performance of just and temperate actions.

S: Now if you remember Aristotle's high regard for knowledge as most emphatically stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics you see that from this point of view, as far as we can see now, the arts are superior to moral virtue, because knowledge is a very minor matter although an indispensable matter in moral virtue. In arts it is the all-important thing. And therefore -- this only confirms what I said before -- what Aristotle develops in this first half of the second part is to indicate to us the rank, the relatively low rank, of moral virtue, before he enters the question of what moral virtue itself is. Yes?

Q: Are you suggesting that he does say that animals can have moral virtue?

S: No. But there is an analagon to moral virtue in the training of animals: habituation. And even there is a certain responsiveness, perhaps one should not say to praise and blame, but to friendliness and unfriendliness in the training of animals, as everyone who has had any contact with animals knows. Good. Now I have to decide a great moral question: what shall I do to Mr. Mueller?

Q: A moral question?

S: Yes, a moral question; sure. I mean, I have to reach a just decision. In other words, you are not prepared for reading your paper.

O: I have my voice.

S: You have your -- and?

O: And a paper.

S: All right. What follows?

O: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, that is wholly irrelevant, because we are concerned here with the just and not with the pleasant. (He proceeds to read his paper).

It was not always easy to follow you, Mr. Mueller. Only one point for those who have not had any acquaintance with Aristotle: the term practical wisdom, used by Mr. Mueller, is the translation of the same word which is also translated by prudence. . . . (a few words inaudible). Because the meaning of prudence has become so low that people had to coin the term practical wisdom to remind us of the original meaning of prudence, lest there be any error. What did you say in criticism of Ross' remark regarding the beginning of the second book. I did not quite follow that.

O: Well, he speaks of virtue as being of two kinds.

S: Yes, he says twofold -- Aristotle -- but it is not different. No I think one should translate literally -- I grant you, but I don't believe that here so very much depends -- Aristotle surely means two kinds. Why he says here only twofold -- I couldn't answer that question. It would surely have to be answered.

O: I don't know whether I'm justified in saying this, but this may remind us of what virtue is. . . .

S: Yes, that is not so simple. That creates a difficulty: that there is a distinction of the perfection of the mind as mind and the perfection of manners, as

they say, or character, a different story. You stated quite forcefully the difficulty: why could moral virtue not be produced by teaching. After all, I mean, one must face that. Why couldn't it be done? Are there human abilities which cannot be produced by mere teaching, I mean, apart from moral virtue? In other words, which cannot possibly be acquired by sitting in a classroom and listening to something. I mean, for example, mathematics you can learn that way. Mr. Reinkin?

O: Not really.

S: To some extent. Listening, of course; I mean, not dosing.

O: But until you set out to prove your own theorems --

S: Yes, but still, but to some extent you can. All right. Yes, but still, to some extent. But I give you a very simple example: what you cannot learn by listening -- tight rope dancing. You have to do it. And so moral virtue is, then, closer to tight rope dancing than to mathematics. And Aristotle has this in mind. Well, the example is surely very crude and improper in many ways, but it is also very simple. Yes?

Q: The division into chapters and sub-chapters -- is this prompted by Aristotle's --

S: No, the division differs from edition to edition.

Q: There's no small particle at the beginning of each chapter?

S: No. This is in no way of interest. I mean, it makes sense, the various divisions, but that doesn't mean. . . . (several inaudible words).

Q: Is there any way that in reading the original Greek manuscript you can tell where there are paragraphs?

S: No, that I couldn't tell you. I have never looked at a Greek manuscript because I would be wholly unable to read manuscript Greek. But I would say, if you follow the printed text and disregard all divisions you come across natural divisions. I mean -- sure -- for example, when he says in today's assignment, at a certain point he says, "Thereafter we must see what is virtue." Clear division. Hitherto, we had not spoken of what is virtue. Mr. Boyan.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Regarding use of the word "curiously" in the paper.)

S: Yes, well, did you not mean curiously in an older meaning of the term curiously.

O: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, well, this, I think, sounds like the old translation of the Bible -- the word curiously -- meaning working very carefully and assiduously, something of this kind; not in the sense of being curious.

O: No, certainly not that, but in the sense of an object of art, manufactured, this word curious is used. . . .

S: Well, let us not -- this question is, of course, absolutely crucial, the difference between learning an art and acquiring a virtue, and we have to go



into that. Now I remind you of the context: virtue is the core of happiness. What is virtue and, in particular, what is moral virtue? Why Aristotle begins with moral virtue and not with the theoretical is an important question, but one can say moral virtue is more accessible and also more in demand, generally speaking, than intellectual virtue. Really: all the time we have to be concerned with whether a man is honest or not -- I mean, when you go to a shoemaker and so on -- whereas intelligence, that is a special case. We need it only from time to time when we elect a mayor of the city or so, which is a relatively rare thing.

Q: Isn't it the case that the men whom Aristotle is addressing his lectures on man have moral virtue but not intellectual virtues?

S: Yes, sure. Surely, but this would only, of course, postpone the question. Why did he select such an audience for this subject? Now let us read the beginning of Book II. "Virtue being twofold, one being dianouetic, the other moral . . . ." Yes?

O: Virtue being, as we have seen, twofold, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that word.

S: Yes, well, that is extremely simple. Ethos [short "e"] means habituation or habit and ethos [long "e"] means character. Whether the etymology is correct or not is, of course, not of the slightest importance to us. The substantive connection is clear: you acquire a character by habituation. Now the dianouetic virtue is acquired by learning in schools and in the clearest case by mere listening. I thought of Mr. Reinkin's difficulty because you do not learn reading, writing, reckoning, by mere listening, and this may also be true of higher parts of mathematics. Therefore, I thought of a simple example which you cannot possibly learn otherwise except by mere listening: natural history in the old sense of the term. The description of a lion, especially in a country in which there are no lions: you can learn about that only -- or of the stars, for that matter -- only by listening to someone who tells you, by listening and, of course, intelligent listening, by understanding as distinguished from action. But Aristotle says here it requires experience and time. Does moral virtue not also require experience and time? Is it not strange? Why does he say that? That is really difficult. Well, one thing is clear. I do not know whether it is relevant but the learning as distinguished from the acquisition of a habit begins later than the acquisition of habits, as everyone who has ever seen a baby and what is done to him will know. The learning proper -- I mean, not learning in the wide sense used by psychology where he learns, of course, from the first day, so to speak, but that someone teaches him -- starts later. I cannot explain this: why he puts this emphasis here on experience and time in the case of learning, dianouetic virtue, unless I assume that this can start very early, very early, and, so to speak, without experience and time which has passed the beginner ready with acquisition of habits. Now he develops, then, in the sequel a thought: let us also read that, the immediate sequel.

O: And therefore it is clear that none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can be altered by habit.

S: Literally, "none of the things which are by nature is habituated differently," is habituated so that it acts differently. Yes? "Like the stone, by na-

ture goes down can never be accustomed, trained, to rest." What was the other example?

O: . . . nor can fire be trained to move downwards, nor can anything else that naturally behaves in one way be trained into a habit of behaving in another way. The virtues therefore are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit.

S: "To completion by habit." Yes. Moral virtue is acquired by habituation, not by learning. What this difference means we will gradually see. We do not possess moral virtue by nature. Things which a being possesses simply by nature cannot be affected by habituation without losing their nature. We are by nature able to acquire the moral virtues for our appetitive life is by nature able to obey logos. That's a natural ability, and therefore we can acquire it. By nature means here what is actual at a moment, at the moment of birth, but we have also to consider, of course, the dispositions which we have at the moment of birth. A certain latitude or flexibility which the human baby has at the moment of birth, in a different way a puppy, is as natural, of course, as its fixedness. But it is a disposition; it is not a fixed quality. For example, you cannot transform a beagle puppy into a St. Bernard puppy but you can make it housebroken. To that extent it is not fixed, housebroken or not housebroken, but beagle is fixed. Yes?

Q: Would Aristotle want to answer the question whether man is by nature something good or bad, or is he both?

S: Yes, surely, he is neutral. He is neutral, but if we understand "by nature" in a narrower sense, that we do nothing whatever about it, which is, of course, already one decision, not to do anything -- it calls for a decision. Doing nothing means to make a decision and by virtue of that decision where you do nothing you merely become invariably bad, whereas what Rousseau, in a way, meant probably, if you do not interfere he will become good. That is surely a difference.

Now this, what we have read hitherto, could be understood to mean that we possess by nature the possibility or potentiality to act virtuously. This understanding is rejected by Aristotle. By nature we do not possess the dunamis, the potentiality, to act morally, but we possess only the potentiality of acquiring moral virtue. Now Aristotle makes this clear by distinguishing moral virtue from the simpler case of sense perception. We possess the potentiality of seeing by nature, from the moment of birth, and the act of seeing can therefore follow immediately as an actualization of a natural potentiality. But this is not the case in the case of moral virtue. We do not possess the ability, the power, the potentiality, of acting morally. We must acquire it. Yes, Mr. Burnham?

Q<sub>2</sub>: The funny thing about the analogy, though, to the stone is that it is possible, as Aristotle himself has said in other places, for even a person's capacity to acquire virtue to --

S: Yes, there is no question that it can --

Q<sub>2</sub>: -- to be destroyed.

S: How could it be destroyed?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Later -- well, through very poor living conditions in childhood he loses the capacity for it.

S: Maybe, but that is an extreme case. But then he would really cease to be a human being: if he would completely lose it. But it may not be possible to develop it because of poor external conditions, but the possibility he has as a human being. By the very fact that he is a rational animal, which every human being is, he has the possibility of acquiring virtue. The conditions required for actualization of the potentiality may not be available. Then he can never acquire it. Do you see the difference?

Q<sub>2</sub>: But even the capacity, I think Aristotle would have to say --

S: I don't think so. Aristotle would probably say it can -- well, then he ceases -- then he becomes a radically defective human being like a moron or insane man. That, of course, can happen. We have discussed that briefly last time. But as long as he is not insane or moronic he still preserves the possibility, but it may no longer be possible for another reason: because he is now set in his ways. Say, when he is fifty or so then there is the almost hopeless case. Good.

Q<sub>3</sub>: This definition of nature as what one has at birth is somewhat different from the definition of nature as growth toward an end.

S: Yes, that is true, but the situation is this. Let us say the nature at the beginning, at the moment of birth -- or at the beginning, more generally, because an acorn may also -- it doesn't have to be a human being. And then there is an end. Now an acorn grows into an oak if nothing untoward happens. Here there is no growth, but man must do it to reach his end. But this doesn't do away with the fact that both the beginning and the end are by nature. That the process of actualization requires human cooperation does not do away with the fact that the beginning as well as the end are not made by man. In the modern view it is roughly so that the beginning is, of course, still regarded as natural but the end is made by man. They call it today frequently an ideal and mean by that something which has no other basis but a human projection. Men project it. Or value: same thing. And here this is not in any way -- this is determined by nature. The perfection of man can only be this because the nature as nature points to it, although the nature, in the case of man, without human cooperation can never achieve it.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Well, what I'm curious about -- we still talk about natural justice. If justice is a moral virtue, therefore an acquired habit, what is the meaning of the term natural justice?

S: That which is just in itself without any human determination or establishment of it. For example, the tax laws now or later are determined by human beings. They are positive laws. But, say, the principle underlying it, that there should -- everyone protected by the social order should contribute according to his powers to its preservation is more than a mere establishment of positive law. Even if there should be many societies which do not act on this but would say, let us put the highest taxes on those whose second name begins with an "A" to "C," which, of course, would lead to name changing, I suppose, or would say, let us put the highest taxes on those who cannot shoot duck. That's also possible, but again one would say it's a disgraceful principle.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Then there is a natural power in man towards moral virtue, even though they



are acquired.

S: Yes, yes, sure. Oh yes. Absolutely. It is a bit more complicated but in the present stage we leave it entirely at that. Now let us continue at a32, when he says, "We acquire the virtues after having been in activity before," meaning we do not acquire sense perception, we do not acquire the faculty of seeing by seeing. We have the faculty of seeing before we see, but in the case of the moral virtues we do not have that faculty or potentiality before we have done something about it, before we have acquired it. Yes?

O: The virtues on the other hand we acquire by first having actually practised them, just as we do the arts. We learn an art or craft by doing the things that we shall have to do when we have learnt it: for instance, men become builders by building houses, harpers by playing on the harp. Similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.

S: Yes. As a curiosity, he says people become house builders and we become just. In other words, we gentlemen would, of course, not be craftsmen. But this only as a little curiosity. So the parallel to the acquisition of moral virtue is the acquisition of the arts. A boy entering on his apprenticeship with a shoemaker cannot make shoes. He does not possess the power, the dunamis, the potentiality, of making shoes. He only has the potentiality of learning to make shoes, the potentiality of acquiring the potentiality of making shoes. And how does he acquire that potentiality of making shoes? Answer: by making shoes. Well, he will do first abominable things with that leather but gradually he will be able to make a shoe. We acquire the dunamis of acting nobly by acting nobly. That is difficult, but it is really common sense. Aristotle is very precise. Needless to say, the noble activity preceding the acquisition of the dunamis, virtue, is not perfect. As a matter of fact, it is very imperfect, as imperfect as the shoe work done by that apprentice is who has not yet acquired the art of the shoemaker, but this poor fumbling thing this boy is doing is necessary if he ever will acquire the art, art of shoemaking. Similarly, we must act "nobly" in a fumbling manner if we want ever to become noble simply. Think of when you observe how children who are tolerably decently bred, how their decent breeding shows in these early stages, how many tactless they inevitably commit, but which are nevertheless to be compared to the first shoe made by that apprentice. Without these little clumsinesses they would never become truly decent.

Q: Did you say that the apprentice acquires the potentiality for shoemaking by shoemaking -- is the same as saying he acquires the art?

S: Now let us make a simple distinction which I believe I used before. Let us speak of moral virtue simply. We have by nature not the potentiality of virtue but the potentiality of acquiring virtue, but once we have acquired virtue then we have the potentiality of acting nobly because virtue means the potentiality of acting nobly.

Q: Then there is a difference between the potentiality for virtue and the potentiality of acquiring virtue.

S: Yes, well, in former times they made a distinction between a proximate and a remote potentiality. For example, a tree in the forest has a remote potentiality of being a table. Once it is a board in a carpenter's workshop then it is in a close proximity. That's something similar. But what Aristotle wants to

make clear is this: how do we acquire virtue? And this leads to the seemingly paradoxical thing that we are supposed to act justly before we are just and only by acting justly before we are just do we become just. This sounds very paradoxical and many Sophists must have made beautiful fireworks with this difficulty but nevertheless it is simply so.

O: It also sounds like Machiavelli.

S: On the contrary, Machiavelli learned certain things from Aristotle and put them into a different -- I believe I have really stated this point. It's very simple. But I cannot do that now. Yes? Mr. Fleming.

Q: I'm confused, sir, about something you said earlier. In your earlier remarks to the class you said that knowledge is not necessary for virtue. . . .

S: Well, some knowledge is necessary, but it's very trivial.

Q: Sometimes Aristotle is really not precise in the way he expresses things.

S: Oh, he is very precise. He doesn't say everything, all the things necessary, at the same time. That is not imprecise. And what he wants to make clear is this. Take a very simple example. The knowledge required regarding one special brand of temperance, say, one shouldn't smoke -- the knowledge is very simple. You don't have to know medicine. It's, of course, an idiotic habit. So everyone can know that. But to do it, the habit, that is the art, not to know, I shouldn't smoke. That we all know. This is the point, against the simplistic notion that moral virtue is knowledge, which, of course, never was Socrates' notion but it was frequently so understood. Aristotle rightly points out this point: that the hard thing is doing, not listening or preaching.

Q<sub>2</sub>: What is the meaning of the parallel with the arts here, when a few pages later he is going to say it is a wrong analogy?

S: Yes, but the arts goes through the whole book, as we have seen. We cannot understand moral virtue if we do not see both the kinship and the difference, by the way up to the present day. What is much of our social science trying to do? To replace moral virtue by an art. Is this not so? Manipulation; manipulating human beings in this and this direction -- it's an art. And moral virtue is, of course, not manipulation. We will have plenty of opportunities to discuss it.

Now let us first follow Aristotle's argument. We cannot read everything. Now Aristotle is now concerned only with establishing one point: that moral virtue arises through habituation. And then he uses the example, the statesman, because we know, morality and politics are coextensive, which doesn't mean they are identical. The statesman makes the citizens good. How? By habituating them, not by mere preaching. Or he speaks here of the legislator, but the difference is here not so important. Now how does the statesman do it? Aristotle doesn't develop it here. The legislator, of course, by punishments and rewards, but that is not mere preaching and mere telling. Laws must have teeth in them. A mere teaching has no teeth in it. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: I was impressed here, though, that the lawgiver is making somebody else good. That's not a very good analogy.

S: Why not? I mean, look, it is really very precise. The starting point of the whole argument was this: the variety of ends. Is there not some order? Is

there not a single end toward which all converge? And Aristotle says, well, let us look at the arts, which all pursue an end. The arts have a certain order and they all lead, however, to one highest art called the political art, and then the end which the statesman pursues will be the highest end given the fact that the statesman's art is the highest art, as everyone admits. You see, the people to whom Aristotle talks are not social scientists; they are citizens. No, I don't deny that a social scientist can be a citizen but that is a mere accident. (laughter). Yes, an accident in the strict sense: he happens to be a citizen. And that is happiness as is there defined: happiness -- core, virtue. So let us simply call it moral virtue and not happiness. Now how does he make the citizens good and doers of noble things? By punishment and rewards, by praise and blame, and this is something different than mere teaching because this affects and changes the life of the people in a way in which a mere teaching cannot be expected to do.

Q<sub>3</sub>: How does the statesman himself become good?

S: Because others have educated him.

Q<sub>3</sub>: But not by his habituation.

S: Morally good he became by habituation. Sure. Yes, well, let us follow that. Now the premise which must be made clear and comes out in the sequel: we all undergo habituation, every man. There is no man in the state of nature, so to speak, who has not undergone any habituation, but it may be bad habituation and good habituation. What we call absence of breeding is, of course, a kind of breeding: namely, bad breeding. People who don't take this into consideration don't understand. Good. Bad actions, regardless of whether in morals or in arts, produce bad habits or bad craftsmanship. Acting well as a child or as an apprentice makes you a good man or a good artisan. Everything depends on habituation from the earliest childhood. That is the first point; and that is true, in a way, even of the arts but still more so of moral virtue. Now let us read 1103b12 to 13. No, let us read before: "from building well they will become good builders and from building badly they will become bad builders." Yes?

O: Were this not so, there would be no need for teachers of the arts, but everybody would be born a good or bad craftsman as the case might be.

S: Yes, everything concerns the actions. (No, I'm sorry.) Yes, here is the proof. Some people are good and others are bad regarding both arts and moral virtue. This is a fact; everyone knows that, and furthermore it is universally known that this is connected with the kind of breeding or training they got. This is all that Aristotle says. That's all. Now, of course, we could make some connections. Does it not depend very much on the nature? You see a fellow who is a particularly nice man and you happen to know that he had the most horrible, hopeless . . . You know, all these stories you hear about separation of the parents and this kind of thing, and a slum area and what have you. So, in other words, nature plays also a great role we know and Aristotle knew better than any man. Aristotle deliberately abstracts here, for the time being, from nature. He acts here provisionally on the premise that breeding is practically omniscient. He knows that's not the . . . but that is only provisional. Now let us read b26, following

O: (I have been urged to go over to the Ross by Mr. Seltzer.) Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to



to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them. . . .

S: Yes, you see how bad that is. "It is necessary to consider what regards the actions." He doesn't say nature. The word nature has been so misused all the time: "how one must do them." Go on.

O: Back to Rackham translation. -- since our actions, as we have said, determine the quality of our dispositions.

S: No, dispositions -- how shall I say -- I would say let us translate this word by habit. . . . (several inaudible words). In other words, the habits, i.e. vices or virtues are acquired by action. This we know by now. A man acquires a good habit by doing the corresponding things. He acquires a habit of bravery by doing brave deeds, relatively speaking; not necessarily opposing an elephant but a dog, but you know how a child learns to make his first step. Everything concerns the actions: what we have to do in order to become good, not the mere understanding, that is to say the "what." This is another reason why the discussion of the coming into being of virtue precedes the full elucidation of the "what" of virtue which comes later. Again we see here another point. Ethics is of no theoretical interest. We do not learn much about the nature of the whole from ethics, the reason being that the truth of ethics, as Aristotle will make clear in the sequel, resides in the particulars: what I, circumstanced as I am, should do here and now. That is the really true and genuine and substantive ethical statement and this has, of course, no theoretical importance. It doesn't tell me anything about the whole. Now let us read the immediate sequel: where we left off.

O: Now the formula "to act in conformity with right reason". . . .

S: Yes, this we may drop; the next sentence. (Reads the very next sentence.) Yes, this I don't mean; the following.

O: But let it be granted to begin with that the whole theory of conduct is bound to be an outline only and not an exact system, in accordance with the rule we laid down at the beginning, that philosophical theories must only be required to correspond. . . .

S: No, this is just terrible -- "that the speeches should be demanded" -- I mean, they make a terrible pedant out of Aristotle -- "that the speeches should be demanded according to the matter," to the subject. Yes?

O: (Back to the Ross.) -- that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health.

S: All kinds of things can heal a disease under circumstances.  
The same is true of moral matters. Yes?

O: The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.

But though our present account is of this nature we must give what help we can.

S: Yes, let us stop here. So moral matters have nothing stable. No rule of action can be universally valid. One has to act always with a view to the situation, as we would say today, with a view to the , to the proper moment. Now this is not peculiar to action. It is true also in certain arts like medicine and piloting. These examples, I believe, are deliberately chosen. In Plato these are also favorite examples. What is in common to these two arts of medicine and piloting? (Inaudible reply). No, the very obvious thing: life is at stake, obviously, in important cases. They are, in this sense, dangerous arts, and therefore the gravity of what is at stake here leads to the consequence -- well, think of a simple situation: no one can say what might be reasonable in certain circumstances. For example, in a plague. What would you do in a plague? It is wholly unknown. The plague described by Thucydides: the Athenians had to do something. Or in a storm; I mean, the pilot never weathered such a storm and that he can do better than a non-pilot -- I mean, you would still trust him more and yet what is really the in such a situation. Now no one can say what might be reasonable in certain circumstances. This does not mean that nothing whatever can be said of universal validity. We have already said it in a way: the action to be chosen has to be reasonable. This is universally valid. It must be most conducive to the end in the circumstances; in the case of the pilot, to bring the people to port safely.

Q: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, that is, in a way, true, but we have to come to the description of virtue and see how . That's later, when we come to that. But let us look at certain -- for example, what does the pilot know? He knows the end: to take the vessel safely to port. And he has, of course, experience about what different things can be done in different cases. He is an experienced man. But what does the moral man know about the ends, as described hitherto? It's very hard to say. That remains here in the dark. Yes?

O: He knows that he wants happiness and he knows, I guess, what happiness is.

S: Yes, but look, the situation is this. The comparison with medicine is, of course, very important. Virtue is something like health of the soul. But the physician learns first anatomy and physiology and some things, you know, so that he knows what the health of the body is. Aristotle explicitly said no study of psychology; which would be a study of the normal human being. This is, for the time being, very dark, but I think we should leave it at that. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Would this be the appropriate moment to take up Mr. Franklin's argument. If Aristotle is admitting here that the circumstances are going to determine what is right or wrong -- does that make sense?

S: Yes, in what sense, the circumstances? The circumstances determine to a considerable extent what has to be done. For example, take the case of a pilot. The circumstances do not determine what he should do. The end determines what he should do: to bring the people safe to port. Similarly, what is the moral man to think of? What is the end? That is dark hitherto. Morality is the end. So it is to act morally for the sake of morality. That seems to be the situation with virtue. That's dark. The question is whether Aristotle must not determine some end other than moral virtue itself in order to find his bearing, and perhaps this is the deepest difficulty in this book. Let us leave this open and let us return to the explicit argument which can be stated as follows. Aristotle says, as it were, this: it is very hard and, in a way, not very useful to

97 speak about moral virtue in general, but something can be said about moral virtue in general and that he is going to do in the rest of Book II. Let us first read 1104a11, where we left off.

O: First of all then we have to observe, that moral qualities are so constituted as to be destroyed by excess and by deficiency -- as we see is the case with bodily strength and health (for one is forced to explain what is invisible by means of visible illustrations). Strength is destroyed both by excessive and by deficient exercises, and similarly health is destroyed both by too much and by too little food and drink; while they are produced, increased and preserved by suitable quantities. The same therefore is true of temperance, courage, and the other virtues. The man who runs away from everything in fear and never endures anything becomes a coward. . . .

S: Is this true, Mr. Boyan? Is this true: what he says here? The analogy is obvious, but is this true, that a man who is running away from everything is bound to become a coward? Is this true? And the next sentence, "the boy who never fears anything at all but runs toward everything becomes overbold," foolishly bold. Yes. Good. That's all we need in order to see that we acquire virtue by doing actions which are somehow in the middle and not more do we need now.

Q: This is the man who becomes a coward, but at the same time this is the man who we call a coward.

S: Yes, it only means our language is good. What else does it mean? You say he is a coward and we call him coward --

Q: No, what the text says, he becomes a coward. What I don't understand is if he does all these things we say he is a coward and we don't say he becomes a coward.

S: No, he speaks here of the becoming. He's still concerned with how we become virtuous and he says someone who, as it were, is trained in running away from everything is bound to become a coward. A boy who is trained not to run away from anything but run towards everything including earthquakes and tigers, if he survives is bound to become overbold. More he doesn't say.

Q<sub>2</sub>: He is not saying that this is the whole story though.

S: Of course not. Aristotle wants only to say now some very general things which can safely be said.

Q<sub>3</sub>: A man who we call a coward doesn't become a coward because he ran away from everything he feared. He might have become a coward for other reasons.

S: Yes. How, how?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Maybe, when he was a child, every time he opened his mouth he was whacked in the face.

S: Yes, sure. Good. That is true. Yes, that is also true. Good. But I thought you meant something else. One can say some are born cowards and others are born overbold. Aristotle will speak of that later. That's an important point. But let us first finish this section where we left off. "Moderation and courage are destroyed. . . ." Do you have it?



0: Thus moderation and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency and preserved by the observance of the mean.

S: Of the mean. Yes, that's the point. So Aristotle says now a bit more about the genesis of virtues and vices. First he has said they are acquired by habituation and now he says they are acquired by habituations in actions which are neither too much nor too little, which are in the mean. From this, incidentally, it would follow that in extreme situations where the mean actions are not possible the virtues will not be able to arise. A certain normality of life is required for the acquisition of virtue, which I believe is also a very common-sensical statement: that there are places and circumstances in which you would not look for much virtue. As Descartes once put it when he was accused of being a nobleman -- you know, some opponent, and he said to this professor, I can't help it, that in my view it doesn't make any difference where you make your first steps in virtue, whether on a castle of a nobleman or among the camp followers of an army, because that was the mother of that professor, you see. But as a rule it does make a difference. Yes. You see, he was very vicious, malicious.

Q: Even in his theoretical description of the nature of virtue Aristotle presumes a more or less normal actual world. In other words, the theory is not pure theory but is based upon the average world in which --

S: Yes, sure. Well, but this is again a very common-sensical statement frequently said and explicitly said by Aristotle in the Politics, that if people are very bad, children of tyrants, or very poor, the chances are that they won't be good. That he says. In other words, there must be a certain normality of the situation. If very young children are exposed to all kinds of ugly and base things that doesn't do them any good. I think the most modern psychologists in the profession still admit that. But let us come back to the main point. No man grows up without breeding: first statement. There is no unbred man, strictly speaking. But the breeding is either good or bad breeding. But everyone has undergone some kind of breeding. If the breeding is good he becomes good. If the breeding is bad he becomes bad. Now many objections. Sure: that's provisional. We later on have to consider also the contribution of nature to virtue, nature apart from breeding. Some children are simply nice from the very beginning and others are nasty from the very beginning. That's what Aristotle knows, but he doesn't speak of that here. Good. Now Aristotle -- let us first -- we cannot read everything, unfortunately.

What is true of the coming into being of virtue is also true of the virtuous actions, i.e. of the actions which you perform after having acquired virtue. They are all also mean actions, in between a too little and a too much. Now what is, however, the difference between the coming into being of virtue or vice and the actions following from the established habit? And Aristotle gives here this answer, roughly, in 1104b3, following: the good man derives pleasure from the virtuous action. He does no longer need a painful effort to become good. He derives pleasure from it, whereas the one who is not yet good does not. All moral virtue has to do with pleasure and pain. In the first place -- and this is the theme of what follows -- in the first place moral virtue consists in deriving pleasure above all from morally good actions. Secondly, all virtues are concerned with actions or passions. All actions or passions are followed by pleasure and pain. Therefore, all virtues are concerned with pleasure and pain. And this is indicated also by the fact -- how we treat vicious actions. They are punished and punishment means infliction of pain. Punishment is like medicine,

but of course the difference is this: that medicine is not necessarily unpleasant whereas the punishment is meant to be unpleasant, to correct a false kind of pleasure by inflicting pain, to make that pleasure painful. Moral virtue comes into being by pleasures and pains. Moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains. Now let us here begin in 1104b29.

O: The following considerations also will give us further light on the same point.

There are three things that are the motives of choice and three that are the motives of avoidance; namely, the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant, and their opposites, the base, the harmful, and the painful. Now in respect of all these the good man is likely to go right and the bad to go wrong, but especially in respect of pleasure; for pleasure is common to man with the lower animals, and also it is a concomitant of all the objects of choice, since both the noble and the expedient appear to us pleasant.

S: Yes. You see, there is this distinction between the pleasant, the noble, (which, of course, would include the just -- that's what we call moral), and the expedient or useful. But pleasure is most important insofar as it is most universal, i.e. common to all animals, and it follows all election -- pleasure or pain follows. And now let us read the immediate sequel.

O: Again, the susceptibility to pleasure has grown up with all of us from the cradle.

S: So, in other words, as very young babies when we are wholly unable to think of the expedient and the noble we already feel pleasure and pain. Yes.

O: Hence this feeling is hard to eradicate, being engrained in the fabric of our lives.

Again, pleasure and pain are also the standards by which we all, in a greater or less degree, regulate our actions. On this account therefore pleasure and pain are necessarily our main concern, since to feel pleasure and pain rightly or wrongly has a great effect on conduct.

S: Yes, you see, Aristotle agrees with hedonism about the fact that pleasure is natural and most fundamental and universal, but he does not arrive at a hedonistic conclusion because what ultimately counts is what we find our pleasure in: to enjoy well or ill, and this is not simply defined in terms of pleasure.

Q: Didn't John Stuart Mill also speak of qualitative differences among pleasures?

S: Yes, but the question is this: whether John Stuart Mill understands the desirable kind of pleasure merely in terms of pleasure or in terms of something else. Very simply: hedonism -- pleasure and pain. Now, of course, everyone admits that there are bad pleasures and good pains, but the question is whether the bad pleasure is a pleasure which is followed merely because it is followed by pain and the good pain merely because it is followed by pleasure. Or differently stated, as Epicurus did, the purest pleasure is the good pleasure and the pleasure which is admixed with pain in any way is not so good, whereas the distinction is always made in terms of pleasure, of the greater pleasure, the purer pleasure, the more lasting pleasure -- or whether it is made in terms of something else so that the goodness of a pleasure does not depend on its being pleasant but on an

independent principle of goodness. That is developed very simply in Plato's Gorgias, for example. Now this is the view which Aristotle takes. There is another principle which cannot be called pleasure. By the way, the simple form is this. All animals seek pleasure, but each species has pleasures of its own. The pleasures of an elephant are not the pleasures of a rat, and neither are the pleasures of man. Now the difference between elephant, rat, and man has, in itself, nothing to do with pleasure but is based on the constitution of the various species of beings. Do you see that? That is what Aristotle means. Mr. Erickson.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (To the effect that Mill has been accused of inconsistency on the ground that there is a certain wavering in his work so that one is not sure precisely where he stood.)

S: Yes, he was a very amiable man and consistency sometimes doesn't go together with amiability.

Q<sub>3</sub>: The hobgoblin of small minds.

S: This I would not necessarily say. One should try to be consistent. One should try to be consistent. It's better. It's also more pleasant.

Q<sub>4</sub>: (Refers to the Christian martyrs who derived great pleasure from being thrown to the lions).

S: Yes, that I do not know.

Q<sub>4</sub>: So then the question becomes, isn't this a little bit more complicated than is stated here?

S: Yes, but Aristotle says only something very simple, just as he said this very simple thing: the actions by the performance of which we acquire moral virtue are in between somehow, neither too much nor too little. He also says the whole field of morality has to do with pleasure and pains. That is not meant to be a complete description. Aristotle doesn't believe that you can simply reduce the noble to the pleasant. I mean, and the artifice, so to speak, of breeding is to make the noble things the most pleasant things for a man: a change in the desires of the human being so that they regard the noble things as the only pleasures which they really pay any attention to. In other words, if there is no coincidence of pleasure and noble, then the man is not good, according to Aristotle. Very simply: a man who doesn't find pleasure in just actions is not truly just. If he thinks only, it is my damned duty to do that. . . . (a few inaudible words), then Aristotle would say then he is not truly just. I mean, his whole heart is not in it. That is what Aristotle means: the just man enjoys acting justly. But you see, these are just actions. Just actions are not as such pleasant actions. They must become pleasant actions. I think if you start from the phenomena which he has in mind and not from the seeming difficulties in the abstract statements it is not so hard to understand what he means.

Q<sub>4</sub>: I think I understand, but I was trying to see how the martyrs receive pleasure.

S: Yes, but to that extent you could say Aristotle answers this question. They found pleasure in the things which are truly -- which deserve to be pleasant, to be attractive. Good. Yes?



Q<sub>5</sub>: (As to whether the notion of the noble, the good, and/or the just becoming pleasant doesn't go against what Aristotle said in Book I that the noble and the just are by nature pleasant.)

S: What does it mean: by nature pleasant? It means for a healthy, mature human being. That's what he means by that.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Would it be making him too modern, then, to say that he is saying that they ought to be pleasant?

S: Yes, the question is what is the status of the ought? Ought could imply that it is never really achieved. Aristotle takes it for granted that there are just or virtuous men. There are; not a mere ought. If you speak of ought you might imply it does never have to be actual. Good.

Q<sub>5</sub>: But he would say that it is actual; in fully developed man --

S: He would say, I know such people.

Q<sub>5</sub>: -- the pleasant is the same as the good.

S: Not quite. I mean, for example, I suppose when you come in a cold winter, a very cold winter, into a warm room they also would say that's pleasant, as everyone would say, but they wouldn't pay any store by that. They would say surely, that's pleasant, but that's nothing which is important to me. What's important to me is what is the truly pleasant or by nature pleasant, justice and so. Mr. Lyons.

Q<sub>6</sub>: What is the expedient --

S: Oh, that is simple: what is good for something, not desirable in itself, whereas both pleasure and the noble are meant to be desirable in themselves. Bitter medicine is the simplest example. No one would choose bitter medicine for its own sake. You choose it because you believe it is conducive to health. Or preliminary examinations are only expedient, are not noble or pleasant. I believe there is universal agreement as to the question. Yes? Good. But let us continue at 1105a17: next chapter, then.

O: A difficulty may however be raised as to what we mean by saying that in order to become just men must do just actions, and in order to become temperate they must do temperate actions.

S: The difficulty which you all must have heard of. Yes? Good.

O: For if they do just and temperate actions, they are just and temperate already, just as, if they spell correctly or play in tune, they are scholars or musicians.

But perhaps this is not the case even with the arts. It is possible to spell a word correctly by chance, or because someone else prompts you; hence you will be a scholar only if you spell correctly in the scholar's way, that is, in virtue of the scholarly knowledge which you yourself possess.

S: Now let us stop here for a moment. One can do the just things or the grammatical things without being just or a grammarian. Hence, one can become just by doing the just things. That's what Aristotle wants to say. Well, the example

which he has in mind: how you learn writing. At that time you were not writers. Let us call now a writer a man who can write; let us say, write English. You were not writers when you went to school the first day and yet you began -- you wrote. Why? Someone made something here on the blackboard -- that's an "I" -- at least that's how I began -- and you imitated. And you imitated all other letters; and after some time, after you had imitated all and learned how to put them together vaguely, then you were writers. But you did writing without being a writer. Similarly, children or young people do noble things without having a noble character. Now let us follow the sequel.

O: Moreover the case of the arts is not really analogous to that of the virtues. Works of art have their merit in themselves. . . .

S: Yes, works of art -- of course, he doesn't mean a painting. He means a shoe or a table and any other of these primary things. Yes.

O: . . . so that it is enough if they are produced having a certain quality of their own; but acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of character.

S: In other words, he must be in the habit of doing these things. Yes?

O: For the possession of an art, none of these conditions is included, except the mere qualification of knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail, whereas the other conditions, so far from being of little moment, are all-important, inasmuch as virtue results from the repeated performance of just and temperate actions.

S: Yes, let us stop here. Now Aristotle brings now into the open a question which must have been always in our minds: what is the difference between an art and moral virtue? Now let us take an example: a good carpenter. A good carpenter doesn't mean, of course, a morally good carpenter. He may be morally good. You see it very simply: as a good carpenter he makes good tables. Is he in addition a good man? He will also be honest as a buyer and seller. But a man may be a good carpenter and dishonest and another may be a bad carpenter and very honest. I hope this is clear. These are the simple facts from which Aristotle thinks he should start. Now let us look at a good carpenter. He may be a man who sleeps or is drunk most of the time and does his work only in order to get money for further whiskey, and he can be the best carpenter in town. There are such people. You hardly get him because he is usually drunk, but if you get him he does a much better job than any other carpenter. Is it not possible? So you see, he does not choose the good work for its own sake. That's not important for him. He may do it only because his longing for whiskey is so great that he must pull himself together and make another table. But he is a good carpenter. But a good man who does a good action in order to get an equivalent of whiskey is, of course, a bad man because he doesn't do it for its own sake.

Q: Would you mind contrasting this with the doctrine of the Republic?

S: The same thing. I mean, it is only because of my great reverence for the AMA that I didn't use the doctor. /Apparently misheard "doctrine" as "doctor."/

Q: How does the just man in the Republic compare with the artist or artisan?

S: The same is true. A man can be a first rate surgeon; for example, who had never any and is perfect, and yet most of the time he is not available because he drinks. I'm not now going into the question whether the drinking might not eventually lead to an impairment of his art, as it could but it needn't. That's exactly the same case. We can say the virtuous man does the noble things for their own sake. He is dedicated to them. He enjoys doing them; whereas nothing of this applies to the good craftsman. He doesn't have to be dedicated to his craft and enjoying performing it in order to be good. Now this is crucial, absolutely crucial, this distinction -- we will come across it again, especially in the sixth book -- in order to understand the peculiar character of moral virtue and also the enormous difficulty which Socrates creates when he says all the time, or seems to say, justice or the other moral virtues are just like the arts. You remember, constantly in the Platonic dialogues this occurs, and which is, of course, absolutely a paradox and even crazy. But what does Socrates have in mind? And when we understand that we understand also what Aristotle is driving at. Here we have the clear distinction of art and of moral virtue and we can say art is, strictly speaking, amoral which doesn't mean, of course, that it's immoral -- amoral. The morality going with it -- for example, that he has to be cautious and careful -- this is not, strictly speaking, morality. It is simply good craftsmanship. And here moral virtue: and here there is nothing corresponding to art proper. Where does the difficulty come from? The difficulty arises from the fact -- no, this distinction between art and moral virtue: that is a way of Platonic arguing and also, by the way, in Aristotle. The difference: that art is in some way superior to moral virtue -- the element of knowledge is so very important and here so very unimportant -- points to something higher than both, as it were, which has the good qualities of art and moral virtue without having the bad qualities, disadvantages. And what is that? Of course, philosophy. That is surely the Platonic way of looking at it; to some extent, also the Aristotelian way: that all human pursuits which are of any respectability point to philosophy. Now what is the precise situation? The philosopher has one thing in common with the artisan: that his perfection consists in knowledge; and that is the reason why Socrates always starts from artisan, and even Aristotle starts from the artisan, as we have seen. He has this in common with the morally virtuous man: that he is dedicated, that he enjoys. That is of the essence: to enjoy the knowing, but in such a way that the dedication necessarily follows from the knowledge. This is surely the Platonic view and, I believe, also the Aristotelian view.

Now this may sound paradoxical but part of the paradox arises from a simple misconception: namely, from the identification of the philosopher, in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense, with the professor of philosophy. Now a man can be a professor of philosophy without having anything to do with philosophy, except that he knows some facts which concern, somehow, the philosopher. In England they speak now of people who do philosophy, which is a beautiful expression and brings out the difference. One could almost say doing in philosophy. So when Aristotle, in the tenth book of the Ethics at the end, speaks of the theoretical life all these reflections prepare for what he says about the philosophic life. Also the difficulty we discussed before: the physician, the man concerned with making bodies healthy, has a clear knowledge of the healthy body with a view to which he treats the sick body. What does the moral man have as an equivalent? Does he have an equally clear knowledge of the healthy soul with a view to which he treats the sick souls? A great question, very dark. This other difficulty also points to a higher solution which can only be found in the theoretical life. Now Rabbi Weiss, you had a point to make?



Q: Well, I was wondering whether the artisans or carpenters can do their work for the sake of the work --

S: Oh, sure. Sure, but it is not of the essence of that artisan. That's the point. A man may be a first rate carpenter and be exactly that good-for-nothing I described. I mean, of course, he is the opposite of a good-for-nothing in his capacity as a carpenter, but otherwise, for his family and so on, he is a good-for-nothing. That's possible. Good. Well, I would like to take up this question -- a few more passages -- we have to discuss this briefly. Yes, this point is made clear throughout: a man is not moderate, for example, if he is moderate regarding the food he takes, because this moderation may be due to fear of an operation; where a physician told him if you eat so much you have to undergo an operation, and then he is moderate. He is not a moderate man because his motivation is fear and not the intrinsic beauty or decency of moderation. Now then in the next chapter -- I can only state this very briefly -- he begins with a definition of virtue and he states the problem as follows. Virtue can be only one of three things: a pathos -- the simplest translation would be a passion or you can also say an affect, an affection -- a power, or a habit, hexeis. And he shows that it is only a hexeis; hexeis is, of course, difficult to translate. The traditional Latin translation is habitus and from which the English word, habit, is derived; and I have nothing against the translation; but it is, has become, such a misleading word. I mean, virtue is, of course, a good habit. But it is also something else: when you speak of smoking as his habit you do not necessarily mean a bad habit. It's just his habit. But it is surely not the kind of habit which virtue is. The point which Aristotle makes is this: we have various kinds of passions. He enumerates eleven of them here at the beginning of that chapter; say, anger and fear, envy, hatred, emulation, and pity, and many others. Virtue is essentially a posture towards passions. It cannot be a passion; a posture toward. Therefore, habit must here be understood in the meaning of a posture toward. The Germans have a very good word for hexeis: haltung. That is really almost the same as in Greek, derived from halo, to have, to hold. Haltung. Well, attitude -- this word has become so -- too frequently used including the adjective, attitudinal, which you surely must have heard, but, well, let us try it for once and say an attitude towards a passion, and can never be a passion. That is, I think, the key point which he makes. Virtue surely is not in any way a habit in the sense of something enslaving, but an acquired freedom, a mastery. When one reads Aristotle and thinks a bit about it on the basis of our ordinary understanding one sees -- what else could you say about virtue in the most general way except that it is a habit? And the same is true of vice. But there are some modern resistances about it which have to do with a certain crude notion of habit, something which you thoughtlessly, automatically, mechanically, do. This is, of course, not meant by Aristotle; and probably a part of the modern disinclination toward the term, habit, is that in modern thought, especially since Kant, virtue is understood to originate radically in man's self-determination and therefore also in man's self-education, whereas for Aristotle as well as for Plato it is clear that the foundations are laid in an education applied to the young by others, not self-education. And, of course, at a certain moment the individual must himself take the responsibility but he is able to take the responsibility only by not having had the responsibility before, but being bred and trained up to this point. This is, I believe, one of the resistances which we have in modern times.

There is also one implication which I believe is not altogether irrelevant which Aristotle will bring out later on when he speaks of justice: when we say virtue is a habit in our present meaning of the term we imply also, I believe, an occasional very rare deviation does not destroy it, and I think that is also

meant by Aristotle. So that, in other words, a just man doesn't cease to be a just man if he is very rarely unjust. I suppose Aristotle doesn't mean a gross injustice, a very great crime, but for example in simple human relations that he prefers for some silly reasons one individual to another; the less deserving to the more deserving. This kind of thing is, strictly speaking, an unjust action, of course, and this would not affect his being a just man, fundamentally. I think that is also an implication of what he means by it. Now in the sequel he will develop this more fully: what kind of habit moral virtue is -- because, after all, an art, possession of an art, is also a habit but of a different kind. This he will develop in the sequel. Mr. Kirwan.

Q: Can I go back to the distinction between art and moral virtue? The drunken carpenter -- it seems hard to accept this because it would seem that the carpenter, in order to become a good carpenter in the first place, would have to have an appreciation of his art, like it in and of itself, and then later, maybe, become drunk but --

S: Well, we are speaking of the good carpenter. Now the apprentice cannot be a good carpenter because he is an imperfect carpenter, being only an apprentice. So that he may have had and must have had some interest and some devotion and so on when learning it: that may be perfectly true. And he may also have had it earlier, say, but then when he was 35, 40, he began this unfortunate habit and his art did not suffer from it. This is perfectly possible and does not necessarily -- I mean, if he would -- how shall I say -- if his art itself would suffer from it; of course then he would no longer be a good carpenter but it needn't be. I mean, I have seen such cases, you know, of amazingly competent people, much more competent, and no moral qualities like honesty, reliability, temperance and so, or courage, going with that. That's possible. And what Aristotle makes clear is this: that here in this case we look only at his production. He makes a table as good and in as short a time as no one else can. That's a good carpenter.

Q: The man who builds a table may have, even though he is an alcoholic --

S: Well, I didn't even say alcoholic. Likes to drink.

Q: Well, if he drinks in excess is what we're talking about. This man may value the end of a good table, may have a pride in his work that the habit of drinking may eventually dissolve, and you see this man in process, taken to the extreme of delirium he will no longer be a good carpenter.

S: Yes, sure. That's clear. Sure. But for this reason I didn't speak of an alcoholic. But let me see. I can only say what -- I may be wrong but if I err I err with Aristotle because Aristotle makes it very clear that this doing for its own sake -- that is what you mean, the pride in workmanship -- is not of the essence of the work. This would, by the way, be a quite interesting study. In modern times, as you surely have heard or read, a kind of ethics of work emerged. You know? Ethics of work, and people have all kinds of theories about it: Puritanism and ultimately even medieval monks -- you know: ora et labora, and this kind of thing. Good, but we cannot be sure that this was the way in which the Greek artisans understood themselves and were understood. You know? We don't know that. In other words, whether this peculiar morality of workmanship is something peculiar to the Christian world. One would have to investigate that, and whatever this may be, in Aristotle there is nothing of this. I mean, to begin with, these statements -- also even in Thomas Aquinas, when Thomas Aquinas says that only prudence, practical wisdom, requires moral virtue; the other in-

tellectual virtues, wisdom, art, and so on do not. That sounds, to begin with, wholly unintelligible to us, but I think Thomas here renders only what Aristotle says; because these qualities which the philosopher must have or the mathematician, for that matter, or the carpenter or the physician which are necessary for making him a good carpenter, good physician, good mathematician, good theoretician in general, are not understood as moral virtues here, for the simple reason -- yes, I know the reason; it is at my feet and I didn't see it -- because he regards them only as means. Do you see? Only as means and the moral man regards them as good for their own sake. That's the point. So it is obvious, then, and I overlooked it. You see what kind of things we can all do. That's the point. You see, in other words, if he has to be temperate, honest -- granting you everything which I do not grant but for argument's sake only -- they would be necessary only as means. Nietzsche, who in a way understood Plato amazingly and without knowing that he was understanding Plato -- no that happens, because he had read it in -- he did not recognize many things which he said -- makes once this remark. He says the praise of the three things, chastity, poverty, and obedience -- or let us rather say submission in order to make it simpler -- the philosophers, he says, always lived that way on the whole. I mean, he doesn't speak of the professor. They lived that way, but not qua virtuous but only because they regarded them as indispensable for the theoretical life. And he uses this example: he says that these temperances or abstinences of the philosopher are as little moral as those of a jockey who also has to abstain from quite a few things in order to be a good jockey; and no one would say the jockey is a morally good man but he is a good jockey. That's the parallel. Do you understand it now? But in one thing you are right: there is something which developed in modern times, I think, very clearly, and which has something to do with the pride of the artisan in his work and in his activity and, generally speaking, a morality of work by virtue of which many people, including artisans, may today feel very differently from a Greek artisan. That would in itself be of some interest but it is surely not of philosophic interest. It would be of secondary, historical interest. Yes, Mr. Butterworth?

Q: The point where we were talking about how circumstances determine the actions to be taken: did I understand you correctly as saying that it is possible that this is the crucial point of the book for Aristotle, in that wouldn't the end that he sets forth have to be changed in the circumstances?

S: Not the end, no. I mean, I would first take issue with the expression, "the circumstances determine." That is not what Aristotle means. He means that the acting man with a view to the circumstances, not determined by the circumstances artergo (?), from the back, and being, as it were, a play thing of the circumstances, but looking, as it were, sovereignly at the circumstances: that given this set of circumstances I can only act this way and given an entirely different set of circumstances I can only act an entirely different way. It is not a determination by circumstances, but looking at the circumstances, reaching one's decision on the basis of an appraisal of the circumstances.

Q: But isn't it possible given a certain set of circumstances that a man would have to abandon the end of moral virtue?

S: No, Aristotle would deny that. He would simply say if the action which he commits in these extreme circumstances and which he commits in this situation conscientiously -- in other words, not for a reason of cowardice or any other reason -- then it is a conscientious act. But Aristotle will make considerable qualifications because we will see that at the beginning of the third book -- where he will say that there are certain actions which can under no circumstances become conscientious actions.



Q: Yes, but wasn't it once in the Fall Quarter that you finally said that maybe Aristotle --

S: Yes, but that is very complicated in Aristotle. I mean, the argument proceeds and one has to go much beyond that, and then the great question arises, of course, -- then you would go into the whole question of politics. You know, in the day by day life of the citizen very important questions do not arise at all. But they arise in critical circumstances of the commonwealth. Well, the simplest example: lying is generally regarded as low and base, but this does not prevent any state that ever was and ever will be from employing spies. Now a spy is, of course, a professional liar, because if he would come, say, to Russia and would say I am here an agent of the State Department you can imagine how effective his espionage would be. So he must -- regardless of whether he is a simple agent or whether he is an ambassador doesn't make any difference as far as the morality of the action is concerned, nor does it make any difference whether the man goes out as a spy himself or sends him out as a spy. Morally it's the same; perhaps even graver. Good. Now if this is so, then a great difficulty arises. That is what we discussed in Xenophon. There is a simple conversation between Cyrus and his father when his father /slip of the tongue/ says, well, all these things which I was strictly forbidden to do, to steal, to lie, to rob, to kill, now I am supposed to do as noble actions. This is the problem. In other words, it would not arise in daily life in peace but the gravity of the question is not dependent on the frequency of the occurrence. I hope you will admit that. I mean, there are people who are very nice but not very thoughtful: who say what happens very rarely you don't have to consider. Now that would be, indeed, a pleasant way of looking at things. Life becomes much easier. But it is, of course, philosophically impossible. Good.

Q: But am I not right in sort of pushing that even from this broader perspective, the perspective of a statesman, that that end which Aristotle has set up now in referring to moral virtue has to be --

S: Yes, but then we would have to go much beyond that. We would have to raise the question which Aristotle doesn't raise explicitly at all then. What are the ends or end with a view to which we ultimately choose? For example if you say this, as Aristotle would clearly: we choose bravery, a brave action, because of its intrinsic nobility. Then this doesn't dispose of the question, why are actions of courage regarded as noble? Why are they given this high status? Then you have to bring up the question, why, which of course Plato brings up, but which all other philosophers I believe one could say bring up, except Aristotle. And then you would have to come back, for example, to the polis. Obviously, if you have a polis and therefore you have the possibility of war you must have soldiers and therefore from this point alone courage would be highly praised. Aristotle will make clear that this is not the only reason why we praise courage highly, but we don't have the rough material for that.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Regarding Job, if the virtuous man simply is in a sense like the child regarding happiness, virtuous without knowledge of a certain kind, this is the same as you find in religion.

S: No, I mean, the seriously religious man. . . . (several inaudible words). Yes, but that is a question, whether you could call the way in which Aristotle's gentleman "knows" that the virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sake -- whether you can call that faith.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I was thinking that regarding happiness, the moral man would not say that now also he is at the same time happy, but he is just like the child.

S: Oh no. Aristotle means this -- I mean, it all turns around this key proposition of Aristotle: that the actions which are by nature pleasant are the moral actions. If this is true, then it follows that only the morally virtuous man can be happy.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Can be, but then another element would seem to come in in the sense of knowledge.

S: Yes; well what is the knowledge? The knowledge you meant here is only that this now, not to run away here but to run away there, is noble. That's all the knowledge you need. But we come to that. Aristotle has not yet defined what he means by that. . . .

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Inaudible).

S: No, one thing is clear, that the morally virtuous man is for Aristotle not the highest human being. That is perfectly clear. That's the difference between Aristotle and surely Kant but also some things in certain Stoics. There is something in Stoicism which points in the direction that the morally virtuous man is the most perfect human being. But in Kant and not only in Kant, of course -- in the whole 18th century they tried to replace the religious man, if I may say so, as the best man, by the merely moral man, and this up to the present day. That is modern moral rationalism. That was not in Aristotle. Historically, immensely powerful; I mean, the better liberals today -- that's their view: that the highest that one can expect and for the sake of which everything else should be arranged is the morally virtuous man. They don't speak anymore -- they would probably say the man of integrity or they have other -- but they mean fundamentally this. For example, Mr. Mikeljohn on this campus: he is a kind of Kant. He would take such a view.

Q<sub>3</sub>: A man who fulfills his potentialities completely.

S: Yes, that is something different because what is the order of rank among the various potentialities. That's different. But the primary thing is, I believe, the status of morality.

5th Meeting: April 16, 1963

... that you brought up, the last question, because it would be much more easy to understand than the references to Aristotle's Logic and the Metaphysics which you made and which, of course, are in a way inevitable. Of course, Aristotle speaks about quite a few of the subjects which are barely alluded here at great detail in the logical writings, Metaphysics, and so on; and the natural thing, if one doesn't understand these terms, is to go back to these things. I mean, that's perfectly inevitable but it is not wise with regard to us; you see, because we, then, try to explain something difficult to understand by something more difficult to understand because these passages in the Metaphysics or in the Logic are, of course, not so simple and you look up Ross' translation -- I mean, or for that matter, if you know Greek the Greek -- is not necessarily helpful. It may not be helpful. Do you see what I mean? General rule: one must never try to explain the dark or the obscure -- these blatant things don't need explanation -- by reference to things which are still more obscure. This is difficult, and of course you are not the only one who does this; by no means. The literature abounds with this kind of thing. But, as I say, when you refer to this manifest problem: Aristotle says there are certain actions which are simply and unqualifiedly bad under all circumstances and I, who claim to be in fundamental agreement with Aristotle, say the opposite, then that is his home. I mean, and also the example obviously is easily intelligible to everyone, even if he has never looked at Aristotle.

Now to come to a few specific points. The definition of virtue: of course, it is meant to be a correct definition and therefore it will be a definition by genus and specific difference, but you must here make a distinction. There are many virtues and virtue is, of course, primarily always a specific virtue; say, courage. And courage would then mean -- the definition -- courage is that virtue -- that's the genus: related to that and that, fear and confidence, which is the specific difference. And now, of course, there is also needed a definition of virtue as such and here again we find the same difficulty; we have to indicate the genus to which virtue belongs: say, state of character or something of this kind, and then what kind of a state of character because there are states of characters which are not virtues. That's clear. This was not, perhaps, brought out very clearly by you.

Now the translation haltung which I suggested last time has this advantage: because it corresponds -- it is almost a literal translation of the Greek word, hexeis, derivative from echein, to have, to hold. But I did not make clear at that time that haltung in this emphatic sense in which I used it suggests rather virtue than vice. I mean, this free sovereign attitude towards these creeping desires: that is, of course, characteristic of virtue rather than of vice. Now you see what I mean: say, the man who has a vice of complete lack of self-control. He doesn't have an attitude of sovereignty over these desires. Do you see that point? He is completely under the spell. What Aristotle means by stating that he has a hexeis is that this being a slave of the passions is something for which he is responsible, which he has acquired by habitual subservience and for that reason it is also a hexeis, habit. But haltung is for this reason, perhaps, not such a good translation as I suggested first.



Now when you speak of the occasional remark of Aristotle in 1106a6, when he calls the virtues dispositions according to the translation of Ross and Rackham, I would say I think the translation is correct -- <sup>hexeis</sup> ~~diathesis~~ <sup>(?)</sup>, the word which he used here, hexesthai, but while Aristotle may very well distinguish elsewhere where this is the theme between a disposition in the sense you said, something which may last only for a short while, and a hexeis or habit which is lasting, there is no reason why in a more provisional discussion he might disregard the difference/disposition and habit and take them together with every kind of motion as motion. After all, the disposition, however short lasting, is not a motion. A state is a status; a state or status may last for only a second but as status it is not a motion. So, in other words, this kind of thing is based on the fact that one does not take into account sufficiently the fact that Aristotle is nowhere pedantic. Now, of course, this doesn't mean that he is -- how shall I say -- a man of levity, but on the contrary, because pedantism can be said to be a form of levity although it looks very heavy; namely, because it is based on a lack of reflection. There are various strata -- so to speak, an infinite variety of strata -- and it is not possible nor advisable always to speak on the highest level of theoretical reflection, not only because it is inconvenient but also you miss certain things which you see more clearly if you are not so precise at every point. Aristotle's philosophy has always the character of an ascent from what we all know and see immediately to the principles, from what is first for us to what is first in itself, and this must somehow be preserved if we want to understand him. I would go further and say it must be preserved if we ourselves want to understand anything. Aristotle is such a teacher, such a great teacher as perhaps no other philosopher is, because he always keeps us reminded of the character of our knowledge as an attempt to ascend from the primary given to what one can call the principles. /Note: in the seventh line of this page Dr. Strauss' apparently left out the word "not" between the words "might" and "disregard" and it should be inserted by the reader for the correct meaning of the sentence./ Mr. Burnham.

Q: (Regarding class scheduling.)

S: (Settles the scheduling matter and continues as follows.) So now I really should say something of a more general nature about Aristotle's Ethics, but somehow I believe it is wiser first to discuss our assignment. Now we are discussing now the second book of the Ethics and I remind you of the overall context: we have first been told that the highest good is happiness and that the core of happiness is virtue. We naturally have to know what is virtue and this, what is virtue, is the subject of the second book. To that extent the plan is perfectly clear. Now I have discussed last time briefly the difficulty that Aristotle discusses first how is virtue acquired before he discusses what virtue is, and he begins the discussion of what virtue is in 1105b19, where Mr. 's paper started. But we had last time a brief discussion at least of the first section up to 1106a13 and we will continue there, 1106a14. Now we have been told that virtue -- of course, also vice -- is a habit, a habit acquired by habituation, and it is not something which we possess by nature without any effort on our part, as we possess a stomach or the sense of sight and even the faculty of reasoning. But this is too general. We must also know what kind of hexeis, of habit, virtue is because there are other habits apart from virtue and vice.

Now what Aristotle answers in general is this: it is a hexeis, a habit, which makes the being in question behaving well and doing its work well. The distinction is not entirely irrelevant because what we are concerned with in every case is how a being looks -- its looks and its power. So, in other words, if you have a horse which fulfills all other functions of a horse but just doesn't look like a horse then there would be something wrong. And in the case of man

it is perfectly clear, where Aristotle had said -- we must never forget this shocking assertion -- that happiness requires also beauty. Now so this perfectly happy man who is as handsome as Lord Alexander, perhaps, or more -- he must also, of course, not only look so well -- he must also do the work of man well. Both things belong somehow together and this we must mention in passing. Now what Aristotle says here, then, at the beginning is every being has its specific virtue. For example, the eye has a virtue different from the virtue of the stomach, obviously. A good stomach is good not by virtue of seeing but by virtue of contributing to digestion, and vice versa. Then Aristotle gives also the example of the horse and this is a typically Aristotelian example of which I don't know whether Mr. -- you felt a difficulty here; that was my impression. What was the difficulty?

Q: My question was what does it mean to say a horse was good in itself.

S: Well, now, what he says: it makes a horse excellent, let us say, and good at running and carrying the man who is on his back and not running away in battle. Yes, I think it has something to do with the difference between doing the work, having the power, and on the other hand what we may loosely call the looks. A horse might conceivably be very excellent in running, in carrying the man on its back, and in not running away in front of fire, artillery fire maybe, and yet somehow be deficient, ill-looking and I don't know, having other kinds of defects, and therefore we must distinguish that.

Q: (Objects to the translator's term, "a horse good in itself.")

S: Yes, well, that was his attempt to translate it. He says literally, the virtue of a horse makes both the horse respectable, excellent, however you want to translate that word *spoudaios*, and good at running and so on. That is what he says. But I think this distinction between looks and powers which goes very deep into the whole pre-history of these problems is helpful to the understanding. I thought you found a difficulty in the fact -- and a great difficulty -- that Aristotle, this damned anthropocentric fellow, judges the goodness of a horse entirely in terms of its usefulness for man. You know, after all, a horse might be impossible for these human purposes and even be a better horse. A large literature exists about the effect of domestication on animals. You know, a real lion is much better than a lion in a cage and so on and so on. Yes, but Aristotle, of course, thinks naturally that for the animals which can be domesticated the domestication is an improvement because it is an indirect participation in reason. Sure. And that is not a human prejudice but that is objectively so because reason is higher than non-reason. But however this may be surely Aristotle speaks here only of the virtue of a horse understood as a domestic animal or a war animal. And whether the virtue of a horse taken only as a natural being is different: that he doesn't discuss here and there is no difficulty in that, I believe.

Q<sub>2</sub>: It would affect his point though, wouldn't it?

S: Which? Not necessarily, no, surely not.

Q<sub>2</sub>: So that if you said a horse is a good horse if he ran in the fields well or reproduced a lot or something --

S: Yes, the latter. /Q<sub>2</sub>: That would be o.k./ Yes. Yes, certainly. Let us begin to read at 1106a24, because we cannot possibly read everything. So, in other words, since this is so the virtue of man, of course, would be the habit

through which man will become good and by starting from which he will do his work well, as is true of the eye, the stomach, the horse; also true of man. That's clear. Now?

O: We have already indicated what this means; but it will throw more light on the subject if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue.

Now of everything that is continuous and divisible, it is possible to take the larger part, or the smaller part, or an equal part, and these parts may be larger, smaller, and equal either with respect to the thing itself or relatively to us; the equal part being a mean between excess and deficiency. By the mean of the thing I denote a point equally distant from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody; by the mean relative to us, that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one and the same for everybody. For example, let 10 be many and 2 few; then one takes the mean with respect to the thing if one takes 6; since  $6 - 2 = 10 - 6$ , and this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion. But we cannot arrive by this method at the mean relative to us. Suppose that 10 lb. of food is a large ration for anybody and 2 lb. a small one: it does not follow that a trainer will prescribe 6 lb., for perhaps even this will be a large ration, or a small one, for the particular athlete who is to receive it; it is a small ration for a Milo, but a large one for a man just beginning to go in for athletics.

S: Milon was a terrific athlete, you know. I don't know how many pounds of steaks he had to eat every day. I believe a whole steer, it was said, or something of this kind; quite a fellow surely. Yes.

O: And similarly with the amount of running or wrestling exercise to be taken. In the same way then an expert in any art avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks and adopts the mean -- the mean, that is, not of the thing but relative to us.

S: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. Now Aristotle is on his way to tell us what kind of habit virtue is, a good habit, and vice, bad habit. But what is good? What does goodness mean? In a general way, Aristotle says, the equal. He could also have said the proper, the fitting, and this is, of course, simply tautological, as people would say, but it is naturally not tautological because all these different words point to different things. They therefore help us on our way. Now the equal is something like the middle, like the mean, but there are two kinds of means and I think Aristotle is here very explicit because the gentlemen to whom he talks are not mathematicians. So he explains to them some very simple things: that if you have here, say, this, there is one mean, here, and that is the same for all. All people do it. But then there is another kind of mean which is not that mathematical mean, although in certain cases it might coincide with the other, but which is the mean for us. And he gives a simple example from gymnastics or medicine: you must not eat too much -- that's excess -- and not eat too little -- that's defect. It's not perfectly simple? And this varies from individual to individual. It varies, but not only to the individual -- for example; whether he is very tall or very small and this kind of thing -- but, of course, also to the situation. For example, if they had not had any food to speak of for a whole week, say in war, and then they eat, naturally something more is the mean. Much more may be the mean on that day than during peacetime. That goes without saying. In brief, the mean in the non-mathematical sense is determined with a view to the whole of circumstances of which the bodily charac-



ter of the individual is only one part -- the job at hand, the weather, age, and so on and so on. And this is the point which we must keep in mind: that this mean with regard to us, with regard to the individual to be treated, is not a peculiarity of morals but also of the arts; at least, well, obviously, of the art of a shoemaker. Clearly, the shoemaker will not make the same shoes for all people who have even the same size of the feet. Obviously not, because are they supposed to be used for dancing or are they supposed to be used for hiking. That would obviously make a great difference as to what a good shoe would be for the occasion. But this is very important: that, to repeat, the same is true of the arts; and we must know what is the difference between the mean as sought by the arts and the mean as sought by morals. That we must keep in mind. That is not in any way clear. Now read the immediate sequel please.

O: If therefore the way in which every art or science. . . .

S: Every art or science. You know that. Yes?

O: . . . performs its work well is by looking to the mean and applying that as a standard to its productions (hence the common remark about a perfect work of art, that you could not take from it nor add to it -- meaning that excess and deficiency destroy perfection, while adherence to the mean preserves it) -- if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work. . . .

S: Let us stop here for one moment. Here Aristotle brings in some evidence. After all, he seems to speak quite suddenly of the mean and it is not necessary when you hear the good that you think of the mean. I suppose there are quite a few cultures in which this identification of the good with the mean would not occur as naturally as it does in Aristotle. Aristotle knows this somehow, and he gives another example. There is some parallel between morality and art; this we know from the very beginning -- parallel. And now in the arts it is perfectly clear; everyone sees that. What is the perfect work of art? We are not speaking now of fine art: simple homely arts like the shoemaker, carpenter. What do you say of the perfect work of art? It is exactly right. That means you cannot add something to it or take away from it. Everything is necessary. This is what we understand by perfect thing, by perfect work of art. And the same, of course, would also be true -- that, as it were, confirms the prejudice that moral goodness too might be a mean. Yes?

Q: But at least for us isn't it true that the idea of virtue as a mean has slightly an unpleasant taste to it? I'm thinking of the idea of compromise as not being a positive virtue in itself, but just a balancing of --

S: Yes, or mediocrity. Horace could call it golden mediocrity but when you hear today the word mediocrity that is -- in the Latin it could very well be called mediocrity. Yes, sure. In one of the early speeches in Nietzsche's Zarathustra there is something about that along these lines: that this kind of virtue as mediocrity is something very low. We will see that Aristotle was by no means blind to it, to this difficulty. But we must follow him first in many spheres. For example, in the arts it is undoubtedly true that you have to keep in the mean. There is always a possibility of doing wrong by doing too much and of doing wrong by doing too little. That's a mean. Why should this not be true of actions? Now let us see. For example, a perfect book; let us take something more difficult than a shoe. A perfect book is also a book where you cannot take away anything nor add to anything. Otherwise it wouldn't be perfect. I mean, if a sensible critic can say this and this important thing which ought to be in

-- say this motivation for this action of this individual or this footnote in a scholarly book -- then, to that extent, if this is done not deliberately for good reasons, then it's, of course, a defect. But, on the other hand, if you look not at a perfect book but at the perfect doctrine, perhaps you would have difficulties in saying, in determining in terms of mean. You would simply say the perfect doctrine is the doctrine which is adequate as an account of a matter to be discussed and the mean consideration is entirely irrelevant. It may be an excess of brevity or an excess of explicitness and length. That is irrelevant to the doctrine. So Aristotle speaks only here of moral matters, not of intellectual matters. You must keep this in mind. Plato, who is much more outspoken on these subjects than Aristotle is, has suggested in one of his dialogues roughly this: that regarding moral matters, mean -- he doesn't use the word but he means it; regarding matters of the intellect, excess. No excess can be great enough. Well, very simply, if you call a thinker a moderate thinker you couldn't say anything worse about him; but if you say of a man, in his action he is moderate, you praise him. So mean has only to do with the arts and with moral matters. Good. Now let us continue where we left off, Mr. Reinkin.

O: . . . and if virtue, like nature, is more accurate and better than any form of art, it will follow that virtue has the quality of hitting the mean. I refer to moral virtue, for this is concerned with passions and actions, in which one can have excess or deficiency or a due mean.

S: Now let us stop here for one moment; I'm sorry -- because we have to discuss it. So Aristotle has said something about the arts, and of the arts it makes very much sense, of the shoemaker or carpenter, to say the good work is in the mean. And this creates some plausibility that the same might be true of virtue, moral virtue, but is there not an important difference between the two? Is this not, so to speak, the mistake of Plato and Socrates: to have said virtue is an art, as Aristotle means all the time? Yes, there is a difference, Aristotle says very emphatically. There is a difference, and what is that? Moral virtue is much more exact than art. This is very strange, very strange; and why is it very strange? Yes?

O: Because I would say that it would be easier to find the mean in art than the mean in moral virtue.

S: Yes; that has nothing to do with the exactness. Has it? I mean, for example, say, the higher branches of mathematics may be very difficult to learn and yet they might have the highest degree of exactness. No, but Aristotle himself had said something: you shouldn't expect too high an exactness in morals. That's the point. Now how do we explain that? Let me state the difficulty: the good in matters of morals depends decisively on circumstances and therefore no exactness should be expected. That is what Aristotle had told us before. He went even further: he said, when speaking of the difference between arts and moral virtue, that while in art knowledge is, of course, decisive, in moral matters knowledge is the least important point. No knowledge to speak of there, he had said in 1105b, 1 to 4. Now Aristotle says the opposite is true. Moral virtue is more exact than art and better than art. Why?

O: Well, he says "if"; doesn't he?

S: No, that he says simply. Moral virtue is more exact and better than every art, just as nature is. This is not contingent; no. No, no. Now Thomas Aquinas explains this as follows: the good man cannot act badly if he wills for his goodness consists precisely in never willing to act badly. The fundamental will

of acting well makes impossible a momentary will to act badly. That has nothing to do with a denial of freedom of the will, but look at it. I mean, a good man is a man who always wills to act justly, for example. If he has a whim just now to act unjustly just for the fun of it or to <sup>/used French expression/</sup> -- I don't know what -- then to that extent he is not a good man because it is really very bad of him to make jokes about such matters, in such matters. He is only inclined to the good, as nature is. But the artisan can do his work badly if he wills. That is not essential to him as an artist or artisan: that he does it well. The inclination to the good work is not a part of the artisan as artisan. What is essential to the artisan is the capacity to do good work, not the inclination to do that. There is a Platonic dialogue in which that is discussed, especially the larger Hippias. A man who possesses an art is shown by the fact that he can consciously do well as well as badly. The man who possesses knowledge -- well, the example is lying. Who is the best liar? Of course, a man who knows best. You can't lie about the back side of the moon if you do not know the truth. I mean, you can make unsupported assertions; that's not lying. But to lie, consciously to say the untruth, you must know and therefore the knower is the best liar. Good. That is the kind of knowledge in art. The artisan can deliberately, willingly, do the bad thing because he can do the right thing. And the case of moral virtue is different. Moral virtue does not permit this two-sidedness to the moral man which the artisan as artisan necessarily has. Good. There are, of course, other differences between the arts and moral virtue which we will take up later when we come to the sixth book. One I could mention already now: that every art deals with a partial good: shoe, house, what have you. And moral virtue is concerned with man's whole good, at least up to a point. Now Aristotle continues as follows -- we do not have to read that --

Q: Can I ask a question? Yes?

Q: What is the difference between arete and what some people call an ethical virtue?

Arete,

S: Virtue, is a general term, a generic term: applies to the stomach, to a mouse, to a lion, to a dog. Q: (Inaudible.) Well, among the human virtues it is distinguished especially from intellectual virtue. So my simple example: mind sharp like a steel trap; intellectual virtue; clean like a hound's tooth, ethical virtue -- an honest man, a reliable man, to take present day examples. This is ethical virtue, but intelligent, clever --

Q: Arete: would this be what?

S: Applies to both. Sure. Excellence is a simple translation for arete -- of any being.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I think I understand this distinction between the good artist and the virtuous man but I'm not sure it's well taken. Do we call an artist good who does bad work?

S: That is a necessary consequence of his being a good artist. He couldn't do it deliberately bad.

Q<sub>2</sub>: How are we going to know whether he is good or bad --

S: Well, I mean, he makes now an atrocious blunder. Sometimes he's like a clown: atrocious things in handling a table or whatever it may be. A second later he does it infinitely better than anyone else and you see that he is --

Q<sub>2</sub>: But then you know he's good: because he did it infinitely better, not be-



cause he did it badly.

S: Did anyone ever say you can recognize the goodness of an artisan from the fact that a single man does a very inept thing in hammering or whatever he does? No one says that. You must take the whole thing. Look at it in a practical way. You come into a room in a carpenter's shop and see someone handling a hammer in a preposterous manner and then, of course, you would say he should have become, perhaps, a professor but surely not a carpenter. And then you see a minute later he does this in a superbly competent manner; and then you say he must have been joking, but he could not have done this jokingly if he did not possess the art. But it is of the essence of the artisan that he can do it deliberately both ways. The moral man cannot do it deliberately both ways. I mean, to that extent he is simply not a just or moderate man. I mean, think of this: a man who would, for example, rob -- you know, with a gun -- rob a man just for the fun of it. Then you can say, of course, he may have a certain art of handling a gun. This may be proved by that -- or handling human beings in general, appealing to their fear -- but you cannot possibly say this is a just man. A just man would not do this even in a joke, of course.

O: Another relevant point to the answer: the good artist may in fact do things badly -- the whole existence of parody, if not Plato in the Manexanos, Gilbert and Sullivan.

S: No, that is something different. Well, look: you must admit that everyone who enters the theater and especially if there is written very clearly, "Comedy," excludes for, I believe, everyone the suspicion that this is done in life. It is done on the stage. I mean, whatever terrible things happen in Platonic dialogues, perhaps, from time to time this is also clearly some -- everyone knows that. Every novel you read is, of course, a lie. For example, that Mr. Miller should have loved Miss Smith and then all kinds of conflicts: all these things are, of course, not true. Obviously not. I mean, on this and this day this and this happened: everyone knows that's not true but no one ever said these are all liars, and if the Greeks said the poets are all liars they did not mean that by it. They meant something else. So this creates no difficulty. Indeed, one thing is, of course, true. People who are in an extreme way concerned with morality, in an unreasonable way concerned with morality, objected to art throughout the ages, as you know. Think of Plato; think of Rousseau, and not to mention many others who said art is immoral, not for some reason for which D. H. Lawrence -- this kind of thing -- but on the simple ground that they are all lying all the time. But you must admit, that is not a serious question on our level.

Q<sub>3</sub>: How can we even call art a virtue if by definition virtue is a habit and if the artist is not habituated to always performing good art, how is he even virtuous in what he does. . . .

S: But the artisan is not, as such, virtuous, as I tried to explain last time. No, but this is exactly the question.

Q<sub>3</sub>: I thought we talked about intellectual and moral virtue. Virtue. S: Yes, yes. But virtue is habit and the artist is not habituated. . . .

S: No, no, not every virtue is a habit, but let us put it this way: let us limit ourselves to the simple case of moral virtue and art. Both are habits. That is exactly the problem. What habit is moral virtue as distinguished from art? That is the question we discussed. Now let us really go on first and we will

then take it up completely. Now in the immediate sequel Aristotle says we must in each case -- for example, regarding fearing or pity, we must not fear or pity more than it is proper nor pity and fear less than it is proper. There is in each case -- in the case of fear, in the case of pity, and in the case of each individual, namely in the case of each particular situation of this individual -- only one way of acting rightly and innumerable ways of doing either too much or too little. This is the problem here. Now to see the difference -- first, by a simple example: let us take something which is helpful. Pascal spoke of a spirit of finesse, a spirit of subtlety, in contra-distinction to the mathematical spirit. Yes, well, the arts would not be such a good example because we don't necessarily speak of the subtlety of a shoemaker or carpenter and so. That might look a bit far fetched. But if you take, for example, a perfect hostess, to take a very different example; how she has to act -- she plays it by ear and there are very fine lines. Take such a nice example: a guest is paralytic -- how to help him and yet how to rub it in, that he has this defect, and that depends obviously very much on the individual. In some cases the best thing is simply not to pay any attention, in other cases necessarily to pay attention. That is what Aristotle has in mind and of which he thinks there is no parallel in the arts, no exact parallel. Now why he brings that out we must see later. Let us turn to 1106b36; next chapter.

O: Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and passions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it.

S: That is the definition of virtue. Let us see whether we can understand it. I would translate it slightly differently. "Virtue is then a habit of choosing or preferring, being in the mean with regard to us, that mean being defined, determined, by logos, and how the reasonable (or sensible) man would determine." The mean has to be determined by logos, by reasoning, but depending on infinitely variable circumstances and therefore only the man on the spot can determine what is the right thing in a given situation. Therefore, this is more closely defined by saying "how the sensible man would determine," namely the sensible man on the spot. You can't tell in advance if you don't know the circumstances. Aristotle explains therefore in perfect accordance with this . . . in 1109b20. That's toward the end of the book. (A few inaudible words in last sentence).

O: However, we do not blame one who diverges a little from the right course, whether on the side of the too much or of the too little, but one who diverges more widely, for his error is noticed. Yet to what degree and how seriously a man must err to be blamed is not easy to define on principle (logos). For in fact no object of perception is easy to define; and such questions of degree depend on particular circumstances, and the decision lies with perception.

S: Yes, what he means, of course, is for example in the case of colors, this shade, that shade: how will you express this in speech? Well, you can give wave lengths and this kind of thing but then you don't speak of colors anymore. When you speak of colors as this or that shade you have to show it and people see: perception, sense perception. Now we can enlarge it and use the term perception in a wider sense where it does not apply to things strictly sensibly perceived. And this is what Aristotle means. The decision in the finer questions of morality cannot be given; you play it by ear. Whether this is a tactful action in these circumstances: you have to know the circumstances and you have also to know certain things which you don't quite know -- what kind of a man, how great

is the sensibility of this particular individual? How far should you consider the sensitivity? That's a problem which everyone who has some responsibility for other people, human beings, has. For example, a teacher: how far should you encourage a given student? You should encourage him, but there is in the other way also the danger of coddling him and not being severe enough -- how to draw the line in a given case. How can you say that? You must know that student very well, which you do not know to begin with, and that's the difficulty here in these cases which have anything to do with -- why, we have a word for what Aristotle calls perception -- tact. Tact is, of course, one of the senses: touch, tactus. This is what Aristotle means. Aristotle doesn't leave it by logos, although this is, of course, something which could possibly be defined or spelled out in speech but is not necessarily spelled out in speech before you do it and the moment you do it. That is what we mean by tact, and this, of course, this kind of tact, does not play any role in the arts.

Q: How does this playing it by ear differ from pragmatism?

S: Pragmatism doesn't know any principles, very simply stated, or it neglects it. Aristotle says there are of course principles like the perfection of human nature and the fact that someone finds his highest fulfillment -- I believe they say -- in tight rope dancing and another who finds it in benefiting his fellow men, how can the pragmatist make clear that the one, the latter, is higher in rank than the former. I believe they can't do it. Aristotle can. So pragmatism overdoes the tact side and forgets -- good. And there are also people -- of course, in a way are more terrible, you can say -- who forget about the tact side and therefore are always right but always tactless. The great-grandfather of Bertrand Russell as described by Lord Cecil in his book on Lord Melbourne is a beautiful example of a man without any tact, and we have also other examples of people of eminent tact, no sense of principles. Both are necessary. I believe this thesis makes sense. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Some pragmatists would deny what you said about them.

S: Well, there are some people who are inconsistent and are saved by their inconsistency. What would they say?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Couldn't you argue that the pragmatist doesn't have a lack of principles, but his principles are doubtful --

S: Yes, then they would come very close to Aristotle. Yes, but I cannot find it in fact. I mean, I agree with what you said first. On the one hand they deny principles and surely unchangeable principles. But when it comes, for example, to the nice question of freedom of speech then they are extremely immovable indeed. So, in other words, one should say they are both adherents of tact and of principle but each in the wrong place. But the main point is there is not a reasonable position. Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>3</sub>: (Suggests a distinction between formal and informal principles.)

S: Yes, that is what I indicated by the suggestion how far is not true also of the arts what Aristotle says of moral virtue. That is not made sufficiently clear.

Q<sub>3</sub>: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, that is not -- I mean, it may be formally perfect, but I don't believe



it is materially sufficient. (Q<sub>3</sub>: Inaudible.) No, well, look at the artisan. It is not sufficiently clear to cover that case. But we don't have yet the evidence in, gentlemen. If you and Mr. Mueller will forgive me we go on now without interruption for about ten minutes. Now where were we now? Let us read where we left off.

O: And it is a mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect.

S: Now let us stop. Virtue between two vices, which vices have this peculiarity -- that's important -- that one is an excess and the other is a defect. This is important. For example, the case of intelligence: it is not so that it is surrounded on the one hand by a defect, say stupidity, and on the other hand by an excess of too intelligent. That doesn't exist. That doesn't exist, and therefore this is, of course, very helpful to distinguish the moral virtues from the intellectual virtues in general. Good. And now, what did you say?

O: Furthermore, it is a mean state in that whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right in feelings and in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean.

S: Yes, let us stop. Here he brings out the specific difference between the arts and moral virtue: namely, that the matter in which moral virtue works are the passions and actions. The shoemaker's matter is leather or wood. The carpenter's is wood and I don't know what; not actions. He doesn't work on passions and on actions. That is crucial for the essential difference, but a difficulty remains: why put passions and actions together? What is that which unites the two? This is not answered. Finding the mean and choosing it: that's important. So the choosing, the choice, presupposes the finding, naturally. The man who chooses the right but is not able to find it by himself -- is he truly virtuous? Is he truly virtuous who has always to listen to someone else; and then he will obey, the good boy, but will he be a good man? That is the question and that is, of course, very crucial for the whole status of moral virtue. Let us go on.

O: Hence while in respect of its substance and the definition that states what it really is in essence virtue is the observance of the mean, in point of excellence and rightness it is an extreme.

S: Yes, now this is very difficult, very difficult, for me at least. Now the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean can be stated as follows -- I mean, against the grossest misunderstandings. Here we have the two extremes and then we have a mean. Now Aristotle would say, the true mean is never that. That's not a true mean. That's a kind of mere compromise. The true mean is always on a higher level; always. Well, from the Politics where this is made absolutely clear: democracy, oligarchy, all the extremes. The mean, polity, higher, and aristocracy, still higher, also a mean. Now why are they higher? Answer: because a new principle enters which is absent from both. In other words, it's not sufficient to say that a polity is a regime which preserves the advantages of democracy while foresaking its disadvantages, and the same regarding oligarchy. That is not enough. It doesn't bring out the positive principle. Now the positive principle is stated: democracy is concerned with freedom, mere freedom without any qualification, oligarchy with wealth, and the polity is concerned with some form of virtue. This is a new principle. An aristocracy is concerned with virtue as a whole. That's the Aristotelian teaching -- what he means. But here, very strangely, he says what is essential to moral virtue is not rank, (that's good), but being a mean. It's very hard to understand, very hard. How can we

explain that? I mean, it is of no use to turn to the Metaphysics about the definition of excellence and that kind of thing. This is surely very strange on the face of it. Now let us look. Let us look at it from a practical point of view, the comparison with gymnastics. The man who finds the right diet, the right training, for this individual circumstanced as he and he alone is . . . (a few inaudible words). Now let us apply this to anger, fear, whatever it may be. The case of the gymnastic trainer is, of course, much better, much simpler, than that of the moral man because the gymnastic trainer knows for what purpose: he should become the best runner, the best wrestler, whatever it may be. The end is determined. But what is the end here in moral virtue? With a view to what should he now temper his anger in this and this way and on another occasion another man in that and that way? With a view to what? Where is the end? Where is the end? The end was said to be -- never forget that -- happiness. But what do we know about happiness? We know only virtue is the core of happiness. So we are back where we are: virtue, or more simply stated, the virtuous action, is done for its own sake, whereas what the gymnastic trainer describes and what his student does serves an end different from the prescribed action. Here the prescribed action is said to be the end. This is, I think, the fundamental difficulty of the whole discussion and, of course, I do not for one moment believe that Aristotle didn't know the difficulty, but this is the fundamental difficulty, I believe, of the whole thing. The assertion that virtue is essentially a mean between two extremes and not a peak: could this not be connected with the fact that the end with a view to which the distinction is made is left in the dark? This, I believe, is the real difficulty. Now Mr. McAtee, you wanted to say something?

Q: (To the effect that the end which Dr. Strauss had in mind was the law.)

S: Yes, but oh God, Mr. McAtee. Sure, it's wonderful . . . (a few inaudible words) to say the brave man does not run away from the enemy when the law tells him here you must stand -- the law, of course, or the commanding officer; it doesn't make any difference because the commanding officer has his power by virtue of the law; that's simple. But if the law is bad.

Q: But the law is the law.

S: Eeee -- now, no. As Aristotle in his wisdom said, the legal is somehow the just. He doesn't say the legal is the just; meaning that any law is better than complete absence of it.

Q: I think this difficulty runs all through here.

S: Yes, sure, but that doesn't mean -- I mean, to cross reference to other difficulties doesn't face the difficulty. That doesn't solve it.

Q: (Inaudible -- refers to the legislator).

S: Yes, but the legislator must, as Plato would put it, look away from, toward something, in order to make the laws good and Aristotle knew that, I'm sure by his own inequalities, --

Q: (Sees the solution in the distinction between moral virtue and intellectual virtue).

S: Yes, but that is exactly always the question; sure. Yes, but the question with which we are concerned is how far does this fundamental difficulty which we

found already in Book I regarding the relationship between happiness and moral virtue not affect even such relative details as the definition of virtue, the formal definition of virtue, given in Book II. Now will you be so good and continue in 1108b30 -- where we were, or did I make a slip? Oh no, I'm sorry. Where were we now?

O: We were about to start 1107a9. "Not every action or passion however admits of the observance of a due mean."

S: No, that we do not need. We cannot possibly read that because it would take us too long. Let us turn to 1107a33, but we cannot really read this although it would, of course, deserve a very close study. I would like to say only one thing. What we have read is the conclusion of the definition of virtue and the whole difficulty is in there. After Aristotle has completed it he wishes to make his definition of virtue more precise, more detailed, and then he shows that all virtues are in fact means between two extremes. In other words, we might find all kinds of difficulties regarding the definition, but when we look around us at the things which are regarded as virtue we find that as a matter of fact in each case there is an excess and a defect. Take the simple case: courage. There is something like cowardice, obviously, but there is also, on the other hand, something like foolishly bold, however you might call it. Similarly regarding temperance, regarding sensual pleasures, there is intemperance obviously, but there is also a complete abstinence of sense or practically a complete abstinence of sense. You know, people who would eat bricks if someone could make them eatable. You know, this kind of thing, and this is a defect here. So now Aristotle tries to show this in all cases. Someone may be concerned with honors in the sensible way and one may be concerned with every kind of badge he can properly get anywhere, including photos in the Sun-Times and in other places; and another man may be wholly indifferent to this kind of thing -- that's also not good; it's a kind of inhumanity. But in many cases Aristotle is compelled to admit that there is no word in the language for that and this is, of course, probably due to the fact that not everyone felt as clearly as Aristotle that every virtue is in fact a mean between two extremes. To that extent, this long enumeration also indicates the difficulty with which we are concerned. Well, people, we cannot read all these things. There are quite a few very subtle remarks into which we cannot go now. Instead I would like to take up a more general question because one can easily get lost in these details. There are many very fine and subtle remarks, of course. Now first there is a question by Mr. McAtee: "Is there any relation which is common to intellectual virtue and moral virtue and equipment?" Now equipment is, of course, never virtue. Equipment is low.

(The question seems to be whether there is a proportion -- intellectual virtue is to moral virtue as moral virtue is to equipment.)

S: No, no, no. That you cannot say. No.

Q: Would you say all virtues are means?

S: All moral virtues are means according to Aristotle. The case of justice is very special --

Q: Murder?

S: Yes, is murder a virtue? What is murder in Aristotle's language?

Q: A vice?



S: No. A vicious action, because murder can stem from all kinds of habits. It can stem from irascibility; it can stem from hatred. I don't know where it can stem from, all kinds of things. No, a vicious action. Now what was your point? You got that point. Mr. Mueller.

Q<sub>2</sub>: In a way, there is a mean with regard to passions too, relative to a man. Is it possible then that the pity that "A" feels is too much pity for "B" to feel, according to the analogy of Milo and his --

S: Yes, yes, sure --

Q<sub>2</sub>: And would this be true of the virtues?

S: No, but the same man -- you must look at this -- well, sure. Well, to the extent to which you mean now it can be defended. The pity which a general is supposed to feel in war or more specifically in combat is, of course, a different degree of virtue than which, say, a relief nurse is supposed to feel. Yes? I suppose. So good. But generally speaking, must you not feel a different -- this example: when an 8-year-old little child lost his or her mother and when a 50-year-old man lost his father, would not the degree of compassion differ? Good. Now would it not also depend very much on whether the pitying individual has himself suffered a comparable loss at the same time, and if he has not suffered it? Obviously, an infinite variety. The great question is, of course, this passage I believe -- yes, this point which you raised -- oh yes, I must mention that. Can you give me the simple reference to this passage, Mr. Vari, where he speaks about the things where there cannot be any mean at all? Yes, let us read that: "not every action nor every affection (or passion) -- "

O: The top of page 97, our translation.

S: Yes, read that.

O: Not every action or passion however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice, shamelessness, envy, and, of actions, adultery, theft, murder. All these and similar actions and passions are blamed as being bad in themselves; it is not the excess or deficiency of them that we blame. It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them -- one must always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances, for instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right manner. . . .

S: You see, he can make jokes if he wants to.

O: . . . the mere commission of any of them is wrong. One might as well suppose there could be a due mean and excess and deficiency in acts of injustice or cowardice or profligacy, which would imply that one could have a medium amount of excess and of deficiency, an excessive amount of excess and a deficient amount of deficiency.

S: Well, good. In other words, then you could say he is a virtuous man because he is a moderate man; he is moderate in his cowardice. I mean, which is a subtlety but which is, of course, also an obscuring subtlety and therefore we should better not try with that. Now this point -- this is extremely important -- I'm sorry Mr. Mueller, I must not forget that -- extremely important, as Mr. Vari pointed out, because -- for me, at least, it is very important because it

flatly contradicts what I believe. But let us leave it only at this question; let us try to understand it. What is the cognitive status of this remark? There are certain passions, say envy, which are simply bad. You cannot say he is a virtuous man because he is moderately envious. If he is envious he's a bad man: very simple for Aristotle. And also you cannot say someone is -- how shall I say -- murdered at the right time and the right place: impossible. Aristotle says that; perfectly clear, no ambiguity. What is the cognitive status? How do we know it?

O: It's an assertion.

S: Yes, very well. It's an assertion supported by what? These things are called -- when people speak of murder they mean a bad action. So. And there cannot be a mean. Very good. This, I think, is a beautiful case of what Aristotle means: the "that" without giving the "why." You remember that: the key passage in the first book. The "that" is sufficient. We know that murder is bad. That is something from which we start. If it is bad there cannot possibly be a right mean: perfectly clear. But naturally we must say, if only in order to fight evil men -- we must know why people generally hold everywhere that murder is bad. We must do that. Aristotle doesn't do it, but we must do it and we can be sure that Aristotle has not completely neglected to giving thought to this matter. But here he doesn't do it and surely the statement as it is made makes absolute sense, practically. Ultimately -- stated with some theoretical precision -- why do we not know here the "why" and only the "that"? Because we do not possess sufficient knowledge of the human good with a view to which we make these definite assertions: murder is always bad and envy is always bad. We are still on the way to it.

Q: But doesn't he sort of give a why in line 25 here where he says there can be neither an excess nor a deficiency? Isn't he saying that by definition excess is not a mean and by definition deficiency is not a mean? Isn't that sort of a "why"?

S: Yes, but you must admit, a circular "why." [The questioner agrees.] Yes, that's no good.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Robin Hood made the point that theft isn't always bad.

S: Yes, well, other people have made the same thing. This question, by the way -- Aristotle discusses this subject almost in these terms in the first half of Book III; namely, when he discusses the difficulty -- to determine what is the right thing in given circumstances -- which is an indirect way of taking it up. Mr. Mueller, what was your point?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Well, it's partly answered possibly, but the question I raised before, virtue being the mean relative to us: the "us" is a little bit unclear -- relative to different men just as one would feel pity in different ways towards different people on different occasions, as the prudent man would judge, so with courage -- so possibly with courage, so possibly with justice --

S: Yes, yes, sure. Surely, that is the problem with which we are concerned. For example, well, let us say this -- but I'm anticipating what we have to discuss next time. Yes, in the case of courage: now courage does not mean, of course, always to expose oneself to the danger of death because that is the over-bold fellow. The truly courageous man will sometimes run away. The coward will always run away. The over-bold fellow will never run away, and the courageous

man will take his stand when it is noble to take his stand. Which are these cases? You are confronted on the Midway at 12 o'clock in the night by an armed gangster who asks you for your money. Is it ignoble for you or for me to give him the money? I believe most of us would say it is not ignoble. It is not -- how shall I say -- a sign of resplendent courage -- but surely a sensible man would give him his money because he would say my life is more valuable than money. But there can be other cases. For example, if it is someone with his sweetheart, I believe they call it, and the question is that he should surrender his sweetheart to these people. That would be a different case. Would it not? Would it be different from money? Obviously. So where to draw the line? Now with a view to what? If you say in the first case it's clear that life is a higher good than money and especially the, I suppose, limited amount of money you are likely to carry at that time and place, then there is no question. But obviously salvation of life is not the highest consideration because then you could never get an army -- on the basis that the preservation of life of the individual is the highest good for that individual. So, well, in practice we know what happens. We will say if he is commanded to stop on that lost, forlorn post he must stop there. And so. Then there come different occasions: how to behave as a prisoner of war. We have seen the case of Powers. You have read the case of the prisoners of war in Korea which are very difficult to judge for anyone who wasn't in that situation. And so there are, then, these interesting borderline cases. In other words, regarding the simple cases no one has any doubt about that, but the interesting cases are the borderline cases because they show the fundamental difficulty. With a view to what do you make your choice? And you cannot possibly say with a view to preservation of life. That's impossible because then a soldier has no standard anymore, nor a policeman, for that matter, nor everyone of us involved in certain tough situations. So what is that standard? If you say nobility then you say something and also nothing because what is the noble? How do you define the noble thing in the circumstances? That is the difficulty which Aristotle doesn't solve for us, and the solution which he gives, as the nomos dictates, is good enough for most practical purposes but not for all and not for the most important ones because you have to raise the question, is the nomos sound or unsound. The nomos may tell you to do these and these things and you will be shot, in war especially, if you don't obey the nomos. But it may be an unreasonable nomos. So you have to go beyond that. This is exactly the question which I would like briefly to discuss coherently.

Now Aristotle begins very clearly in the first book. Happiness has its core, virtue, but in such a way that virtue is inferior in dignity to happiness. Virtue is praiseworthy but happiness is venerable (timion). And naturally virtue is primarily moral virtue. Aristotle doesn't give a reason for that. He just does it, and he devotes Books II to V to moral virtue. And of course the understanding of moral virtue will probably lead us to the insight that maybe we have to go beyond moral virtue, higher than moral virtue, but this is not developed here in any way. Let us limit ourselves for the time being to moral virtue. The morally virtuous man chooses the noble and just things for their own sake. That is a definite assertion of Aristotle. He derives enjoyment from acting morally, as such. If he does it for any other reason then he is tolerable but he is not a moral man, not a good man. He must not do the moral things as means for an end. So Aristotle rejects, then, what we can call utilitarianism; utilitarianism being the position according to which morality is useful or expedient for such things as preservation of life, for living with others, and so on, in different ways represented by the Epicureans and by Hobbes. Hobbes, in his work On The Citizen (De Cive), chapter 3, paragraphs 31 to 32, should be read. That's a very important statement especially also because it takes issue with Aristotle's definition of virtue as mean; and he rejects that.



Q: Who does?

S: Hobbes in De Cive in the given place.

Q: (Asks for repetition of the place cited.)

S: De Cive, chapter 3, section 31 to 32. So Aristotle surely rejects utilitarianism. Moral virtue is not for the sake of something else but it is its own end. But on the other hand, Aristotle also is not -- Aristotle occupies a mean position between utilitarianism, on the one hand, and what I shall roughly call moralism, and that I will explain now. Moralism I would define as the view that morality is the highest thing or the only thing of absolute worth. This is the position taken especially by Kant; who consistently opposes eudemonism, namely concern with happiness. You know, this was the admitted principle by all moral philosophy up to Kant and Kant rejects it, and consistently because whenever you speak of moral virtue and moral virtue is not the same as happiness, then happiness somehow threatens the status of moral virtue. Therefore it must at least be dislodged from the position which it had traditionally occupied. In Kant you have to read especially the beginning of his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. The first two pages are wonderfully revealing of Kant's position. Now Kant himself knew that he had a preparation in that: namely, in Rousseau. He himself said of Rousseau that Rousseau has brought him into right shape. Now Rousseau's position is not so elaborate and so technically clear as that of Kant, but some points are very clear. Again, in Rousseau not everything is equally revealing. His Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, his first publication, is most revealing in this respect.

Now Rousseau uses the term conscience and he calls conscience the sublime science of the simple souls. Everyone has, possesses by nature, the knowledge required for acting morally and precisely the sophisticated people are those morally endangered because a kind of subtle science overlays this simple and sublime science. Now ultimately, however, there is a background to this view, and if I may sound like a sociologist, believe me, I do not mean it as a sociologist. Behind what Kant stated eventually with the greatest clarity, prepared decisively by Rousseau, there is this famous movement called, at least on the European continent, the Enlightenment, a movement of the 17th and 18th centuries, which exploded, in a way, in the French Revolution but did not necessarily explode, as is shown in this country. Now what is the characteristic assertion? The bond of society is morality, not merely interest. This is a very powerful stratum of the Enlightenment which identifies morality with a well understood interest: you know, the utilitarian strain, but that is not essential -- this utilitarian morality. But the practical meaning of that is morality is the bond, not religion. There may be a kind of religion which goes together with morality called natural religion, deism, as Kant admitted to some extent. But the key point is morality is the core; and you see immediately what a terrific political importance this issue has. Only in this period can we say did morality take on this absolute status which it never had before and after. There are some preparations for that in certain Stoic teachings, but we cannot go into that. Now prior to the Enlightenment moralism, the assertion that moral virtue is the highest or the only thing of absolute worth, as Kant puts it, was challenged by both philosophy and theology; by both. By theology obviously: faith, religion -- however it is called -- is higher than mere morality. Morality is regarded as indispensable but it is not sufficient and that is true, of course, in Judaism as well as in Christianity, and I have no doubt in Islam as well. I don't believe that a really orthodox Muslim, of the Middle Ages surely, would have said that it is perfectly sufficient to be a virtuous man without being a Muslim. Is this not

true? And the same was, of course, true of Christians and of Jews. But the more important thing in our present context is; of course, the philosophic view. Moral virtue is not the highest but the highest, particularly, clearly in Aristotle, is philosophy. It's higher than moral virtue. This is also the teaching of Plato. Plato seems to have asserted that moral virtue is the highest but when you look more closely at what Plato means, say, by justice, you see: that is, to say the least, inseparable from philosophy; to say the least, if it is not simply identical with philosophy. So if we do ~~not~~ see that the absolutization of morality is a very particular phenomenon not going together with the moral consciousness of the human race at all times -- only then are we prepared to understand Aristotle's specific position. /Note: the second part of the preceding sentence should be read as though the first did not contain a negative./ Aristotle does not say, believe, that moral virtue is the thing of absolute worth.

Now when we turn to Aristotle's discussion in the Ethics, to the extent to which we have read it up to now, we see that he has indicated the problem already in the first book, particularly by the relation between what I called, for convenience sake, the scientific definition of virtue and the ~~where~~ where he brings in the things said about virtue; as it were, the minor of that syllogism -- the major being the scientific definition and the things said the minor, and then he reaches a conclusion. Now let us try to understand that; and let us assume from the outset what we will see later very clearly in the tenth book, that thinking, understanding, is the most important thing. But from every point of view: even for those who will not devote themselves to a life of thinking there is surely a need for control of the passions. I mean, it is obvious from every point of view. From every point of view some control of the passions is obviously necessary, and therefore one could very well say, well, what are the moral virtues? The properly controlled passions. And this control requires habituation. Someone born with very strong irascibility will need a very long period of controlling his savage beast, anger. Habituation rather than instruction because to realize that to be constantly angry whenever you are opposed in any matter, however trivial -- that this is foolish -- this insight can be acquired in one second, so to speak; surely in two minutes. But this is by no means sufficient, the learning. The most important thing here is the habituation.

But what is the status of moral virtue? Virtue is the core of happiness. That's one assertion. Or is it not eventually the means to happiness? And this is, of course, an entirely different proposition. In the latter case happiness would be the theoretical perfection, the end with a view to which the passions are to be controlled. You control the passions in order to have a clear head, and obviously the passions, the uncontrolled passions, are incompatible with clear thinking, as you can find out by empiri, empirically, every day without having to read the Journal of Abnormal Psychology. Or you can also take another point of view: is there not, after all, a very massive end which we all recognize as indispensable and with a view to which we must somehow understand moral virtue, the control of the passions in particular? Sure: society, in general; living together (sweet saying). Moral virtue is obviously also needed for living together. Well, let us take a group of men none of whom is ever thinking of devoting his life to thinking. Obviously, if they do not exercise a certain degree of self control of their fears, their loves, their angers, they cannot live together well. So there are, then, two ends which we surely must recognize--living together, society, or as Aristotle would say, the polis; and the other is thinking--with a view to which moral virtue would have to be understood ultimately. And if we look at these ends we can perhaps find the reasons for all these mere facts given now. For example, why is murder generally regarded as bad? I mean, without going into any deeper question we can simply say that society is



incompatible with the permission of murder; incompatible. Society is not incompatible with killing, but the killing must be done when and where and to whom it is properly applied, i.e. which is roughly defined by the law. And we find also all other things. This will do.

711  
2266  
Now at any rate, however this may be, Aristotle leaves it undecided which of the two ends is here at the back and he probably means both ends somehow enter. Contemplation, thinking, can be the end only for a few. Now why not forget about these few who are so rare and don't play a great role? Why not forget about them? Now this I think we must understand in order to come closer to the true motives of Aristotle's thinking. If I say the end is society and I have to understand all moral virtue in the light of society -- Hobbes is a remarkably clear representative of this view in this section to which I referred you. Hobbes simply says the end is peace and all moral virtues have to be understood as means for peace. Morally virtuous means to be a peaceable man. That's part of the story, without question, but it is not sufficient and we see this most clearly, I believe, when we turn to Machiavelli because Machiavelli's whole doctrine is based on this principle: all virtues are to be understood as means for the polis, for the city, the political society, and of course the city doesn't demand merely peaceableness -- this was Hobbes' somewhat narrow view -- because the city also needs soldiers and Hobbes forgot about that for some strange reasons, part of it being his own absolute distaste for danger. But this is, of course, not sufficient. He has much more serious reasons.

So Machiavelli takes the broad view. Whatever the habits which the city as a rule requires: these are virtues. Good. But what does the city require? What are the ends? Surely self-preservation of the city, surely its prosperity, its glory; it's roughly these things: independence of foreign domination, prosperity, and glory. And whatever is required by these things is good and the habits required with a view to these things are the virtues. It's a defensible position, but what is the difficulty -- and that is, I think, the reason why Aristotle comes in. Well? Is this ken -- independence of the political community, prosperity, and its prestige -- the sufficient? The Machiavellian assertion necessarily leads to Machiavellianism; necessarily. Anything conducive to that end is good and anything obstructing that end is bad. This follows necessarily from it. Our general feeling would be there must be something higher in the light of which the city determines what is right and wrong, higher than its selfish interest, the collective self-interest. We all somehow feel that. Therefore when we hear today the view that the national interest is the highest consideration in foreign affairs -- that it will ordinarily prevail we all know but that it is the highest consideration is, of course, subject to that question. Must we not make a distinction between the national interest, say, of the Congo, and the national interest of France? I mean, this concession we must make to General deGaulle, I believe. In other words, we say also, in old fashioned language, between a civilized society and an uncivilized. Where does this come in here? Where has Machiavelli supplied for that properly? He has not provided for that properly and Aristotle tries to do that. There must be something higher than the interest of the polis, narrowly conceived, if we are to have a decent society. It makes sense. Now how does Aristotle get out of this difficulty? Schematically, his answer is very simple. The city as a whole must aim at virtue. The city as a whole must aim at virtue, and Aristotle says, indeed, no city has ever done it properly, but still, that doesn't do away with the soundness of the demand. So the polis must be in the service of moral virtue. Moral virtue must be higher than the polis. It cannot be understood merely as a means for the polis. It is a defensible and I think even a necessary assertion. And now there is a strange thing: if you think in specific terms, as you have to think in everything and es-



pecially in moral matters, about these two ends, heterogeneous ends, the polis and thinking, you see that what these two different ends require regarding control of the passions is not altogether dissimilar, to make an understatement. For example, it is clear that a man who is habitually intemperate, habitually cowardly, habitually irascible -- and what the other vices are -- is neither a good citizen nor apt to think. There are even other things, subtler things, which are necessary. For example, a city cannot exist without having people who are born to command: say, armies. Born to command: I mean, you need these kind of people, and they can be very obnoxious from time to time because they almost invariably know that they are born to command and they do -- well, I think General deGaulle and General Montgomery are good contemporary examples of this kind of thing -- but they are obviously very useful men. Now if you elaborate that you come close to what Aristotle means by magnanimity: a man who claims high honors while deserving high honors. Yes, but there is something else. The magnanimous man -- this great virtue which Aristotle will praise so highly in the fourth book -- however also has something to do with the thinking man, the thinker, who for entirely different reasons -- namely, because he sees so clearly the ephemeral character of everything human -- is also, for this reason, magnanimous, does not take the petty things very seriously.

So in brief: somehow, by a strange artifice of nature, one could say, nature has so arranged things that the thinker and the polis require roughly the same kind of habits, roughly the moral virtues, and to that extent moral virtue, I think, can be said to be natural in Aristotle's sense. There is a kind of strange artifice which is ultimately not so strange if you think of the definition of man. Man is the animal which possesses logos, which possesses speech, and speech points, on the one hand, to speaking, communication, society, and on the other hand to thinking; so that, in other words, the rationality of man is the common ground for that. But the crucial practical implication is this: that the requirements of thinking and the requirements of society are not altogether identical. There are certain subtleties. The Aristotelian doctrine of virtues, as developed later on, especially in the concrete parts, second half of Book III to the end of Book V -- this is, when you think a bit about it, to a large extent obviously necessary if men are to live together in a non-savage manner. And yet on the other hand there is also a certain excess. There is some splendor, some, which is not sufficiently understood in terms of the utilitarian purposes of moral virtue, but because it reflects the highest perfection of man, thinking. I believe roughly this is what Aristotle has in mind in the Ethics. He does not say this in this form, but he says only one thing very clearly in the tenth book: that the highest perfection of man is thinking. And the question arises, what's the relation of the thinking to moral virtue, and that is not made clear, not made clear at all. The best commentary on this subject in Aristotle you would find in the other Ethics, in the Eudemian Ethics, towards the end, where he speaks of two types of morality, the gentleman's morality and another kind of morality which is not the gentleman's morality. And, of course, in concrete terms the question is this: must the thinker be a gentleman in the sense in which the gentleman understands the gentleman? That is a question which Socrates answered quite clearly with no. Aristotle answers it, in fact, also with no, but not as clearly. That is Aristotle's special delicacy and tact in these matters.

I think if one tries to understand a book which is really worth studying then the question always must be -- I mean, a book of depth -- where does the author stand? From what point of view does he look at things? And I would say, at least in the cases where I have done the necessary study, I have found that the author says from the very beginning, or close to the beginning, exactly where he stands in the precisest possible form, but we don't read it. We don't read it

seriously enough. Now Aristotle had said on page two in the ordinary editions what is his kind of inquiry. And he calls it, gives it a name, some kind of political understanding, politikē; and he distinguishes very clearly in the context from the simple political understanding, the political understanding which the statesman and legislator need. And it is very closely related to that, as is indicated by the fact pointed out by some of you that when Aristotle has to define what is the right action in specific terms: as the nomos would say, the work of the nomotētis, of the legislator -- but it is not identical with that. Aristotle's point of view is not identical. Aristotle looks in the direction of the legislator but he looks also, as it were, higher at the same time, and this is, I think, the point of view from which one must understand the Ethics in general, and ultimately every individual utterance in particular. Mr. Kirwan.

Q: I'm confused. Initially it was established that moral virtue is a means to happiness and then a means to the polis also --

S: Yes, what is happiness? Yes, well, all right, say happiness. But then the question arises, what's happiness? We have only been given a very general answer: the activity of the specifically human in an excellent manner. But what is that activity of the specifically human in the most excellent manner? Thinking. You see, Mr. Kirwan, I believe the difficulty which everyone like you, i.e. who has some training in Thomas, has when discussing the Ethics can be stated very simply. I will give some examples whenever I find them very clearly in Thomas' commentary; then I will tell you where the difference shows. I mean, the key question which must have bothered everyone of you from the very beginning is this: what is the cognitive status of the moral principles according to Aristotle? This question is extremely difficult to answer in Aristotle. Very crudely you can say, and many people have said it -- all classical scholars say it all the time -- the principle is the generally accepted principles of Greek morality. Now Aristotle would, of course, be a disgraceful philosopher if he had identified himself with the prejudices of his community. That's absolutely out of the question. I mean, occasionally he adopts them, for limited purposes, naturally, but not fundamentally. That's out of the question. But Thomas' answer is very clear: there are first principles of the practical reason just as there are first principles of theoretical reason. But in Aristotle there is no reference to first principles of practical reason, (number one). Number two: the other answer which is more specific of Thomas is that there is a habit of moral principles called synderesis, as you know, and this can be loosely translated by conscience; so to speak, the general part of the conscience. The very term is wholly alien to Aristotle. That doesn't exist. Therefore the Aristotelian position is different here from the Thomistic position and I must emphasize this point.

Q: I was not thinking of Thomas. I was trying to understand the sense where for Machiavelli the end of the city is self-preservation, prosperity and prestige; for Aristotle we must go above this and to go above this is to go to moral virtue. So in a sense it's a means, i.e. to control the passions, and also an end --

S: Yes, that is the difficulty. You see, that is the difficulty. I can state it very simply. For the philosopher, for the thinker, moral virtue would be a means. For the non-philosopher moral virtue is the end. In other words, the highest at which he can aim is to love moral virtue for its own sake and not merely as a means for the grandeur of the city. That's clear. Now I can also -- let me see, I have here a note which I can read to you.

Moral knowledge in Aristotle: well, what are the first reflections which we can reconstruct, as it were, when reading the book and considering the difficulties? First, it must be a kind of knowledge which does not require theoretical



wisdom, for otherwise all except the few are condemned to immorality. That's the difficulty of Plato in the Republic; I mean, or they have this very problematic morality which the non-philosophers have in the Republic. This is clear, but another reason for this: the wise man may not be particularly concerned with large parts of moral knowledge. If you consider 1107b25, following, what Aristotle says there about one of the virtues connected with honors, you see -- I think you sense it there -- this is not something with which Aristotle himself, in his own life, or men of his kind, would ever be concerned. But the non-philosophic man, the citizen, is legitimately very much concerned with that. More generally stated, the wise man does not need moral virtue as such, i.e. as choiceworthy for its own sake, because his end, thinking, obviously demands it. You see, but moral virtue as defined is to choose morality as choiceworthy for its own sake. This becomes questionable in the light of the highest end. In other words, the wise man has a criterion for choice: what is conducive to thinking and also for thinking in the circumstances in which he is now -- a criterion which the non-wise man lacks. Now the non-wise man can take the greatness of the city as the end, on the highest level, but this end is not high enough because it does not give him a criterion for distinguishing between a merely powerful and prosperous city and a city which deserves true respect; which is, I mean, not only prosperous and wealthy, but also truly civilized. And this he gets in this way. But we must read much more to answer that. Yes?

Q2: I wonder if you would say whether you think Aristotle's doctrine that the end of a polis is ultimately reconcilable to the ends of a thinking man or the philosopher through institution of moderation which is requisite to both of those -- is this view of Aristotle ultimately in conflict with the view of Plato that the ends of the philosopher are in conflict with that of a polis as represented by the execution of Socrates.

S: No, no, that's not so simple. The execution of Socrates proves only that the city of Athens as constituted at that time was defective. It doesn't prove in itself anything against the polis. Proof: in the Laws, Plato sketches a polis in which Socrates could never have been condemned to death. So in other words, from this point of view the polis is not essentially incompatible with philosophy. There is ordinarily a tension, perhaps, but this, I mean, one can say for the time being. Now in Aristotle, I believe, the same is true. As described in the Politics, a city which is a good city does not necessarily contain within itself philosophy; does not necessarily. When you look at the section about the parts of the city, the parts which a city absolutely needs and needs for its perfection, no philosophers. Plato, in the Republic and indirectly in the Laws, asserts there must be philosophers. And a medieval Aristotelian has stated this very nicely, the Aristotelian view: that the city needs as city only one kind of teacher, if we disregard the teachers of military arts and rhetoric, which goes without saying. They are priests. The city as city does not need the philosophers. And this is so and, of course, this is a great question. Somehow, from Aristotle's point of view, surely philosophy is necessary for the perfection of man, as the question, to guarantee at least that the city is, to a certain extent, open to philosophy although it can exist somehow without philosophy -- this is guaranteed, I believe, by moral virtue as Aristotle defines it in his Ethics. Moral virtue, as defined by Aristotle in his Ethics, is not identical with what the common sense of mankind everywhere says to be moral virtue. You only have to read what he says about the more refined moral virtues like urbanity and gracefulness and so, which today would be called merely aesthetic, I believe, and which Aristotle regards as moral virtues. In other words, the concern of the city, at least in its higher parts, with refinements, which develops without the doings of philosophers -- there are always poets and such people, and sculptors



and so, around. This points somehow to philosophy in Aristotle's view. Now did I answer that question to the satisfaction of the one who raised it? I forgot now who it was. [Apparently received an affirmative reply.]

Q<sub>3</sub>: Winston Churchill was praising very highly the German enemy during the hardest, critical --

S: Yes, Rommel. Yes.

Q<sub>3</sub>: And I would imagine if he caught his soldiers doing that he would have punished them.

S: Yes, surely if he would have been killed by a British bomb and Churchill wouldn't have cried for one moment. Sure. But this doesn't mean, of course -- this is one of the great things in men: that they can admire their enemies. I mean, this is at least the way in which one would have to look at it from the point of view of the classical thinkers. To love the enemies is a difficult thing. But men -- I mean, at least men who are not completely stupid -- cannot help admiring first rate enemies. Obviously you have to do that. Churchill vs. Rommel, for example. I mean, do you mean to say this is a sign of the fact that the polis points beyond itself? You can admire the enemy general as a general. That's very good. So that is perfectly true. As a matter of fact, all these predicates we give, just, moderate, urbane, or whatever it may be, are, of course, essentially not limited to the members of the particular polis or even of the particular nation. Obviously not. I mean, therefore, it is so absurd -- this view which now is so powerful that they mean, of course, only Greeks. And Aristotle never meant -- I mean, we can prove it from Aristotle's own books: when he speaks of Carthage, which was not a Greek city, and praises it at least as highly as he praises the most highly praised Greek cities. That is absolute nonsense, of course. Well, we have read the story about Priam in the first book of the Ethics, who, according to all ordinary notions, was a barbarian and Aristotle treats him as a perfect gentleman. I mean, these people, I think, judge more or less in a strange way, a very complicated and inverted way, from their own narrownesses to the narrownesses of great thinkers. They simply don't know what a thinking man is. That is true. I mean, I say this without any harshness although it sounds harsh. But this reminds me of something which a man who was, in a way, my teacher said -- Husserl, who discussed a certain logical theory, and then he proved its absurdity and he called this an absurd doctrine. Footnote: when I call these doctrines absurd I do not mean to say harsh things about these men; absurd has here a strictly objective meaning -- which, of course, made it worse, naturally. Good. That I cannot help. But it is -- well, Aristotle says man is a political animal. He means man and not the Greek; obviously not. He could have said a Greek is a political animal.

Q<sub>4</sub>: I have two questions, one very general. In regard to your censure on going into other writings, especially into the logical parts --

S: No, you must have understood my qualification. If you know this other writing of Aristotle better than you know the Ethics then it's fine, but if you know it less well than the Ethics then it is of very dubious value.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Are you suggesting that we can't start to understand the reasoning that is prominent in the Ethics unless we understand the reasoning put forth in these other logical --

S: But I absolutely deny that. Look at whom Aristotle addresses here or in

the Politics. In the case of the doctrine of the soul he makes it perfectly clear that a very crude version of the doctrine of the soul is perfectly sufficient for his purpose. Now what is true of the doctrine of the soul is, of course much truer of logic proper.

Q<sub>1</sub>: But isn't it true that when we're reading the Ethics we're not getting the basic teaching which is being put forth to these citizens; that even by the very fact that we sit here criticizing the book, going back and forth, that it shows--

S: You mean, we. I mean, the best of us and in us is addressed by Aristotle to the extent to which he gives some kind of political science, some kind of political understanding or science; not the political science proper. In other words, we are not addressed qua gentlemen but qua; somehow, theoretical men. That's true. Yes, but still, you must not forget, let us be really practical men. We, given the present circumstances -- it is possible to be trained in political science without being trained in philosophy. I mean, that is one of the data of the situation and, as they say in social science, this data is given. You must have heard that. So we have to live with that. Now, therefore, since most of you -- I know some of you are exceptions -- have not had any training in these things, and I would say or perhaps only a very bad training which is worse than no training, it is much better if we limit ourselves to what we can try to understand with our available means. You know. That I think is common sense -- to do that. I do not wish to blame Mr. Vari for that, but I used him, as it were, as a kind of guinea pig to bring out some of these problems with which I -- Mr. Vari.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Maybe because there wasn't sufficient time, but you didn't discuss what Aristotle's reasoning is about continuous divisibility. . . .

S: Well, don't believe one thing: that I can understand every passage in the Ethics; it's very, very tough. But as I understood it, it's this: well, you all know what a continuum is, a continuum as distinguished from numbers which are discontinuous or discrete. Every continuum is infinitely divisible. The modern mathematicians have beautiful expressions of that. has something to do with that. Into this kind of thing we don't have to go. Now why is it relevant here? Now take anger, and there can be something which we would ordinarily call an extreme of anger where apoplexy immediately follows, and then an extreme of the absence of anger -- someone does atrocious things to him and he just shrugs his shoulders. And it is impossible to find here a discontinuity; impossible to say this is another kind of anger. These are all degrees of anger and there is no discontinuity between the extreme anger and the extremely little anger. Is this intelligible? That is what he means. And he says in spite of this continuity of the matter with which we deal a discontinuity enters when we come to speak of virtue and vice because then we distinguish between the right anger and the wrong anger. There is a discontinuity. Is this not clear? But you do not understand the problem of this rightness and wrongness if you do not see that it refers to a continuity in the matter. If the matter were already discontinuous, if we had here right anger and here wrong anger, that would be very simple: It would be very simple and we would say, well, those who feel the right anger, here, they are good men; those who feel the wrong anger are bad. But, unfortunately, the continuity; and where does this come in? And then Aristotle can only give, to begin with, this very formal distinction: not too much, not too little. And he refines it a bit more by saying the too much and too little is not mathematically, arithmetically, defined but is defined with a view to the individual in these individual circumstances. This, of course, leaves open the question which we raise all the time: with a view to what does he say

this is the right thing? Common sense, the knowledge of the "that," as Aristotle would call it, is of great help and if someone would say a father, maybe, is more entitled to be angry towards his child than the child is entitled to be angry towards his father, this makes some sense. Otherwise, I believe -- at least those of us born up to a certain year. Good. And similar, certain general rules of this kind make sense, but they are, of course, not specific enough. There may be situations in which the son may be entitled to be angry with the father and also others where the father has no right to be angry with the son. You know, this kind of thing; but here the difficulty arises. But all the difficulties, one can perhaps say -- I cannot show that but I suspect it -- that Aristotle means that the difficulties are rooted ultimately in this continuity. You know that: the passions are not of different kinds. I mean, of course, fear is a different passion from anger, but the particular passion concerned, the various angers are not qualitatively different qua passions.

(At this point the tape ran out. The following is an almost literal paraphrase of the remainder of the session, taken from stenographic notes).

The labels of the good and the bad passions are not easy to pick. We have to determine then. A particular passion is constant. Anger is always the same. But each act will be different.

Q: How do you arrive at the assertion that for most passions the middle way is right, with exceptions, like envy etc.? I do not see the cognitive status of this.

S: It follows from the general statement. Wherever you speak of virtue there can be two kinds of mistakes, excess or defect. Therefore there always can be too much or too little.

With the analogy of the continuous line, you divide it. One part is small, one part great. This in itself does not say that the smaller part is better than the larger. It is "value-free." But when we begin to talk about the passions -- for example, anger -- the smaller or larger part is bad, already introducing another element. It is impossible to say in general that there is or should be "x" degree of passion, that on the passionometer above 70 is not good. It is much more difficult. To that extent moral science has a higher cognitive rank than medicine. As mere passions they cannot be judged. They have to be judged in the circumstances. You can give a crude approximation, but you cannot say "always."

Q: Why is the mean the right way?

S: When you look around, always when people praise an action as good, it is in between deficiency and excess, especially in the case of moral actions. Delicacy is necessary, with one's own eyes to "hit it exactly between wind and water." When you cannot take anything away or add anything, when it is really constant. You can figure it out for yourself in an action of some interest. Crude cases are not so striking; for example, murder. But take the example of the perfect hostess: the exact mean.

Q: Is it correct to say that due to the nature of man most of the passions require the mean?

S: Ultimately you can say that. More practically you say that this is a continuum: the two ends are in fact never the right thing. In other words, a man



insensitive to desire, fear, pity, anger, does not exist or there is something wrong with him. Also, the other extreme is impossible. But then since all vices are also in between these extremes, the question is which in-between to choose. Every human action, good or bad, is in between two theoretical extremes. The difference is the right or the wrong in-between.

In the list of the passions, there are eleven. Do they all have a corresponding virtue? No, that is not the case. Most striking is the passion of compassion, a mere passion, i.e. morally neutral for Aristotle. But there are people who are simply beastly and some who are too soft. The right mean is however we might call it. We can call it gentleness. But Aristotle uses this term regarding anger and not mercy. That may have something to do with Greek notions. In the Rhetoric Aristotle makes clear that a man who has no compassion is bad -- or who has compassion on the wrong occasion. But there is no virtue for that.

Q: Wouldn't charis be the virtue?

S: That is not quite the same thing. That is gracefulness.

6th Meeting: April 30, 1963

... and its good quality was partly due to the fact that you kept in mind our present problem and the alternative to Aristotle so powerful in our age; and especially the quotations from Mr. Lasswell were very revealing in this respect. Now I have to say a few words before we turn to the discussion, and first the terms used by Aristotle. That is very difficult and I do not know whether what I am going to say is a solution to the problem, especially to every particular passage. But let us first make clear what the terms mean. Aristotle speaks first of what is ordinarily translated the voluntary and involuntary, following our language, especially legal language. But what Aristotle speaks first of should be translated spontaneous and non-spontaneous. This is something which man has in common with the brutes and which, of course, also children have. We do some things spontaneously and we can simply say gladly, and other things we do not do gladly but only under some compulsion. The compulsion may be compulsion proper -- someone forces our hand -- or it may be an indirect work of compulsion, ignorance. You know, we are prevented from seeing what we do. That is also not done gladly. Now this is spontaneous and the non-spontaneous and, of course, we cannot be held responsible for what we do under duress; and duress first literally understood, someone forces you, gripping your hand, to kill another man. That can happen and indeed no one would ever say you have killed that man. That is clear. There are slighter cases which we will discuss later. There is a so-called psychological compulsion. We come to that later.

Now then we have something else; there is one term which Aristotle uses which would correspond grammatically, as it were, to our word will. But this precisely is not what he means by will. This is rather wishing. That's wishing and these can be very low and insignificant wishes which the scholastics called veleitias, veleitii. For example, you wish I were now in bed and didn't have to sit here. And there may also be wishes of a much more powerful kind. You wish to be happy; you wish to be healthy. But what we call will is that which Aristotle calls choosing, choice, preference, however you translate it, and this, according to Aristotle, never refers to the end but always to means. You wish to be healthy but you cannot be said to choose health. You choose to be operated upon or not to be operated upon or whatever the case may be. So this in order to make clear very provisionally the meaning of the terms. The grave question is -- which Mr. stressed properly -- do we not also choose the ends. Is Aristotle not compelled eventually to assert that we also choose the ends? This, however, remains dark. The starting point is we choose means to ends. Choice, as Aristotle understands it, is always the end result of deliberation and we do not deliberate about the ends. When physicians come together for a deliberation -- Aristotle's favorite example -- they do not deliberate as to whether they should heal the patient, but how to heal the patient, and therefore the choice recurs to operation, doing nothing, pills, and so on. Good. That is a model for moral action proper.

The question of freedom of course comes up, this famous classical -- Aristotle takes freedom for granted and the basis for that is our ordinary conduct. We say all the time, by implication and sometimes even explicitly, you could have acted differently. When someone is punished, wherever it may be <sup>not wherever</sup> -- for example, in an examination if a student is punished and, say, gets an "F" this does not necessarily imply -- that's interesting -- that he could have gotten a "C," "B," or "A;" he might have been unable to. Therefore we do not call this punishment except in a metaphoric manner. But if someone is expelled because of improper conduct from a university or college the implication is he could have

(Six lines above: insert "not wherever" between "it may be" and "for example.")

avoided it. He could have done it. And also when we praise we say it is a meritorious action because he chose freely to act in this manner. Now there are great difficulties here, great difficulties which were known at all times. There were people who denied freedom, so-called determinists already in classical antiquity, but the issue came to the fore in modern times and the most famous discussion up to the present day is still Hobbes' discussion with Bishop Ramole (?), Bishop Ramole representing the traditional Aristotelian position, defending freedom, and Hobbes denying it. And Hobbes claimed he can explain all the political actions in terms of denial of freedom: simply, punishment and reward, blame and praise, are the things which determine men to act, and if a man in a given case acts badly then in this particular case the pull of desire for the thing which he wanted, say money, was greater than the opposite pull exerted by fear of punishment or fear of blame. And Hobbes claimed that the whole social order can be understood in deterministic terms; and that there is a certain determinism implied in the very notion of reward and punishment because of counting on the necessary effect of punishment and reward. But this, to come to a special point which Mr. mentioned -- there can no longer be from Hobbes' point of view -- this is what Hobbes admits -- moral indignation. This fellow had to act in the way he did given the circumstances. It does not follow, as you seem to imply, pity, because -- you know, this is a modern, sentimental solution. You can also draw the tough solution: we treat him -- how does Locke call it? -- as a tiger or a lion or any other savage animal. Do you remember the passage? Yes, we just hit him over the head. He threatens us; you know, by shooting all the time or trying to shoot he is a nuisance and we extirpate him for that. That's all. We don't have to have pity. Our concern with our self-preservation prevents us from having pity. But still, in the overall Western development the pitiful solution prevailed.

O: (Inaudible.)

S: Yes, well, that is another story because Aristotle speaks on the basis of freedom and then he says when we are confronted with a man where we cannot possibly say he did it freely, then we have pity with him or at least indulgence for him. Yes, that's a different story. But I mean the view that because the criminal is compelled by social circumstance and so on to act in the way in which he acts -- does not necessarily lead to compassion, of course. It can as well lead to the opposite conclusion. We, by necessity, extirpate him because we want to have order in society: follows as naturally as pity, and it would be an interesting question, why the present day determinists take the pitying side and not the harsh side. That would be an interesting question which is not yet quite clear. The difficulty which Aristotle has, of course, is this: the grown-up man, virtuous or vicious, is responsible for his acts and therefore properly rewarded or punished. But in one way he cannot help anymore; the virtuous man cannot help but acting virtuously and the vicious man cannot help acting viciously, generally speaking. Yes?

Q: This bothers me very much, Mr. Strauss. Is Aristotle here indirectly attacking the freedom of the will by saying it is determined once the habit of virtue is into the soul? It seems to do this.

S: Yes, it is a great difficulty.

Q: Because modern behaviorism does the same thing. I can remember as an undergraduate years ago when they talked about how a person could not help but act in the way they did when they kill somebody --



S: No, no. I mean, whatever he may teach about the grown-up man he would say, let us say, the inclination, the powerful inclination which the virtuous man has to act virtuously and which the vicious man has to act viciously is no longer under his control. That has become his second nature. Nevertheless, he is responsible because he is made responsible for that inclination which he acquired voluntarily. Yes, but the question is this: let us take the famous case of a child from a slum area, broken home, you know the whole story which you read daily in the papers. What can this poor fellow when he is 20 -- to what extent can he be held responsible? He never heard anything other. Now Aristotle would question the fact. He heard of the other thing without any question, but he didn't hear it in its proper authority. The people who were authoritative for him, his parents and his surroundings, used the words "the squares" only in quotation marks, you know, and this is evident. This is surely a grave question: to what extent can such a human being be made fully responsible for what he does? Aristotle has roughly this in mind. The child -- yes, sure -- the child can listen to his parents, his betters, or cannot listen. Now the child, of course, is not fully responsible. Aristotle makes this clear. And the child is guided in one or the other direction by punishment and reward; but then there is a certain moment when the childhood instruction becomes what they now call, I believe, internalized, and that is at the period of adolescence, generally speaking, where people -- you know this from people of both sexes: a certain idealism of youth which comes to sight where children, the grown-up children, begin to criticize the parents on moral grounds, on the grounds of the principles in the name of which the parents have hitherto spanked, morally or physically, the children. That is the moment where it has become the property of the grown-up child himself and this is a key moment, of course, because here it will be seen whether the child will become truly virtuous and not merely on the basis of external sanctions or not. This is surely a grave question on the basis of Aristotle's presentation, which you pointed out: that the responsibility is located at a relatively early stage in life. That's the difficulty. A solution could be that we may have to take children or education or growing up in a larger sense; so that some people are children even when they are in their forties, fifties, and sixties. That is a possibility and not a very fanciful one. No, no. Good.

Only one last point regarding Lasswell because that is so typical for a certain lack of reflection in much of present day political science. Lasswell says, if I understood you correctly (but I will not be held responsible for this quotation), that the question of the best polity is no longer necessary. We have rather to be concerned with alleviating tensions. Is this not what you said? "The ideal of a politics of prevention is to obviate conflict by the definite reduction of the tension level of society by effective methods." Yes, but where is the rejection of the best polity. I see. Oh. "The political methods of coercion, exhortation, and discussion assume that the role of politics is to solve conflicts when they have happened. The ideal of a politics of prevention is to obviate conflict by the definite reduction of the tension level of society." Yes, very well; to which I would say this: these politics of tension require, of course, a specific set up. The politics of alleviation would be impossible in any Aristotelian or Platonic scheme. It would be impossible in any Hobbian scheme. It would be impossible in any traditional constitutional democracy scheme. So a certain polity is a presupposition of the alleviation of conflict; let us say something approaching the welfare state. Yes? Good. But that is a best polity. What these people do not see is -- I mean, just as some people don't see, to use a colloquial phrase, that whatever you will do you will have some kind of metaphysics. If you say metaphysics is something terrible that doesn't solve the problem. You will have it nevertheless. In the same way, whatever position you take you will have a certain view of the best polity, only

sometimes you don't see it because there is so much of it; you know, it's like air, of which you don't have to become aware. And this notion, a certain welfaristic set up, is tacitly assumed to be the best polity, just as the people who say there is no common good -- that's a metaphysical concept. Yes, but then they speak in the same breath of the open society and the open society is, of course, one which is the common good. The open society is that form of society in which you don't have to think of the common good because it is the common good. . . . (a few inaudible words). This cannot be done. It is simply a form of thoughtlessness. Yes, Mr. Butterworth?

Q: In regard to the discussion of responsibility and determinism, Aristotle, in the first book of the Ethics, mentioned how important breeding and education is. Now what would his answer be ultimately to this question which you posed in our own times about the slum youth without any good breeding or proper education?

S: Well, you know Aristotle's answer. It is harsh, but perfectly consistent: that people thus bred should not have any say in the political community. They should not have any say in the political community because they simply lack -- I mean, whether they are ultimately responsible for that or not is not the question -- but they lack the minimum of citizen qualification. That's it. That he would say, and to that extent he is absolutely consistent. And the modern view is, of course, that society, an anonymous thing -- society owes to them the conditions of that so that they can become good citizens. That is all right, but Aristotle faced that question; that I wanted to make clear. Aristotle's opposition to democracy is this: that a sufficient education, i.e. formation of character, is not possible for all inhabitants of a city. That's very simple. Now I have discussed this so frequently, but I would like to repeat it again: that our modern solution is based on the progress of science and technology, which makes it possible to give, at least in theory, everyone the required intellectual and moral education. To that extent there is a necessary commitment of modern democracy to supply every member of the society, every potential citizen, with a proper education; moral education too. And from that point of view, of course, all these measures demanded for decent education of every member of society are perfectly legitimate. The question which comes in here is only this: whether the advantages of science and technology in the modern sense are simply advantages, whether they also are not at the root of grave defects, of grave dangers, which modern society has. That's a long story.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Doesn't Aristotle also say that for happiness there have to be some external circumstances so how can he place the responsibility on him for not being virtuous if he doesn't have these external --

S: Yes, it all depends what. I mean, for example, if it is such a simple matter like not killing, or murdering, stealing, and so on, Aristotle would say the conditions for abstaining from these things are universally given. No one is compelled to murder or steal and in the few cases where men are compelled to steal because the immediate alternative is starvation the legislator in his wisdom does not regard this as punishable theft, as you know. I mean, if you stagger into a shop on 57th Street and cannot go on, to Stineway's, let us say, and take something away nothing will happen to you, as you know, and especially if you don't use a gun. That is clear. And as for the finer virtues, the more sophisticated virtues, that's another matter. They, of course, indeed. But, on the other hand, if someone has very bad table manners or is very rude to other people this is, indeed, blamed -- but, on the other hand, this also cannot be expected from everyone.

what kind of a breeding, upbringing, does this man have? But we must always distinguish between the kind of actions required,



and the massive ones like killing and so on -- no one is compelled. That's what Aristotle would say. But I think we have first to return to the general issue because of this interruption which was, in a way, compulsory and for which I therefore do not apologize. The last class had been two weeks ago.

Now let us remind us of the overall context. Aristotle establishes first that there is a single highest end, and he establishes this on the basis of the hierarchy of the arts. There is a highest art or science, the political one, and its object is moral virtue. Morality and politics are coextensive. But his own inquiry is not the political art, but some kind of political art, so there is a cleavage from the very beginning; and the political art itself, as an art of sorts, is not moral virtue. It may require moral virtue but it is not identical with moral virtue. Are, then, both his inquiry and the political art proper in the service of moral virtue? Now the highest is not moral virtue but happiness. Yet the core of happiness is moral virtue and moral virtue is accessible to every normal human being. This is one part of the argument, but the other part is that happiness is venerable whereas moral virtue is only praiseworthy. Differently stated, moral virtue is said to be accessible to every normal human being, but then we have also heard that moral virtue is accessible to every normal human being of good family who is not repulsively ugly. That's a very different proposition. And moral virtue; in some places, seems to be accessible only to men of great delicacy and tact, which definitely excludes many people. So it is not clear, then, what precisely is the end, the end toward which the statesman or moral man has to aim. Now for moral men the end is morality itself. That is to say, he regards the moral things, the noble and just things, as choiceworthy for their own sake or as the things which are by nature most pleasant. There is no cleavage here between the pleasant and the noble because the virtuous action is for the moral man the most pleasant thing. But does the moral man know that this is so? And Aristotle's answer is he knows the "that," but he does not necessarily know the "why." He knows that this and this is base but he doesn't know why it is base; and this is one reason why the whole inquiry is of questionable, of limited, exactness. There are, however, quite a few difficulties here. The moral man knows of certain things. For example, murder, adultery, envy: that they are simply bad. But again the question: why? We have not had an answer to this question.

Everything has to be done with a view to the situation, to the circumstances here, now. And therefore great variety. The same action which may be virtuous in this set of circumstances may be vicious in another set of circumstances. Does this lead to the point that nothing in morality is simply stable, as it is said in one case? But this makes it all the more urgent to repeat the fundamental question: with a view to what do we make the distinction, that we say this action is in that set of circumstances virtuous and in that set of circumstances vicious? How do we do that? This question we have to take up now and see what we can learn for it from the first half of Book III.

Virtue has been defined as a habit of choosing or preferring. We must therefore raise the question, what is choice? But this is not the way in which Aristotle begins the investigation. Choice is a species of the spontaneous. We must first, therefore, discuss the spontaneous in general and then choice in particular. But both when he takes up spontaneity and when he takes up choice Aristotle fails to link up these subjects with the definition of virtue as a habit of choosing. The question: is there not something -- is there a fundamental difficulty regarding this part of the definition as there was one regarding virtue as a mean and as there was one regarding the subject matter of moral virtue, actions and sentiments, actions and passions? Now let us begin at the be-



ginning in 1109b30. "Since virtue," meaning moral virtue, "has to do with passions (affects) as well as actions. . . ." Here Aristotle reminds us again of the difficulty which we know already. What is it which keeps together, which explains the unity of, passions or affects and actions? There must be some unitary point of view; otherwise it couldn't be a single science. Differently stated, why does moral virtue have these two objects, the passions and actions? This is not yet clear. Now let us read the first few lines, Mr. Reinkin.

O: Virtue however is concerned with passions and actions, and it is only spontaneous actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are non-spontaneous are condoned, and sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to define the difference --

S: Those who reflect about virtue. Ethics makes it too much an academic affair. That's already an established discipline. Good.

O: . . . those who reflect about virtue to define the difference between the spontaneous and the non-spontaneous; and this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments.

S: Now let us stop here for the moment. Virtue is praiseworthy and vice is blameworthy. Hence, they are spontaneous. We wouldn't blame or praise if they were not spontaneous. Mr. mentioned the birth-mark as an example; and, well, you can also -- you don't blame a blind man for his blindness and so on. The subject is necessary for two reasons: for those who reflect about virtue and for the legislators. Here we have again the distinction between the political art, the legislators, and some kind of political art, what Aristotle is doing here. Now in the immediate sequel Aristotle asserts that all inspontaneous things -- does he always translate spontaneous, Rackham?

O: No, he's been using voluntary, involuntary.

S: I see. Oh, I'm surprised. Yes, that was very good of you to change it. Now Aristotle makes here in the sequel clear that the involuntary things are due either to force or to ignorance, and he speaks therefore first of force and then of ignorance. Let us begin at 1110a4 and read a few lines there.

O: But there is some doubt about actions done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble object -- as for instance if a tyrant having a man's parents and children in his power commands him to do something base, when if he complies their lives will be spared but if he refuses they will be put to death. It is open to question whether such actions are spontaneous or inspontaneous.

S: Yes. Now are cases where a man does something out of fear of greater evils or with a view to something noble voluntary? And the example here is clear: the tyrant has his wife and children in his power. In other words, he does not physically force his hand. Is this so? And the answer? We have to read that: the immediate sequel.

O: A somewhat similar case is when cargo is jettisoned in a storm; apart from circumstances, no one voluntarily throws away his property, but to save his own life and that of his shipmates any sane man would do so. Acts of this kind, then, are 'mixed' or composite; but they approximate rather to the spontaneous class. For at the actual time when they are done they are chosen or willed; and the end or motive of an act

varies with the occasion, so that the terms spontaneous and inspontaneous should be used with reference to the time of action; now the actual deed in the cases in question is done spontaneously, for the origin of the movement of the parts of the body instrumental to the act lies in the agent; and when the origin of an action is in oneself, it is one's own power to do it or not. Such acts therefore are spontaneous, though perhaps inspontaneous apart from circumstances -- for no one would choose to do any such action in and for itself.

S: Yes. I think the case of throwing that cargo in order to save one's life is a simple case and every man of sense, i.e. everyone here, would say one should of course do it. But it is not an involuntary act although the circumstances are not chosen; but in the circumstances it is chosen voluntarily, deliberately. And now the question is what about the tyrant. What about the tyrant who has the children? You know, this is no longer a historical example. We have seen so many cases of this kind in our age; we probably know people who were in such a situation. The question is this: is there anything which a man may not do in order not indeed to save his life -- that is another thing -- but to save his family. That's the point here: to save his family. And this is what Aristotle means: for the sake of something noble, not merely for the sake of preserving his life. To save these poor children, for example. So that he will not deserve mere indulgence, but compassion: that he went through that anguish. The infinite variety of noble things which can be done or omitted, can be done and must be done, is due, we see here, not to the nomos, not to the fact that the legislator stipulates differently in different countries in different times, but to the variety of circumstances. It's not one artificially introduced by human, arbitrary fiat. So what a man does by fear -- this key point -- is to some extent voluntary. It depends what kind of fear. That is crucial for Hobbes, by the way. Covenants extracted by fear--you promise a gangster to bring him the ten dollars which you do not have -- are valid, according to Hobbes, in the state of nature. If the legislator forbids it then you don't have to do it; but in the state of nature. And why? Because the fundamental contract, the social contract, is extracted by fear. You would never give up these terrific rights to everything you have in the state of nature unless you had fear of what is going to happen to you if there is no civil government, civil society, no police. That is impossible. But we must keep to Aristotle's question: is there a line somewhere? May a man do everything in order, for example, to save his children, his wife? Yes, Mr. Glenn?

Q: I'm wondering whether asking this fundamental question dealing with the distinction between the virtuous and the vicious -- is this a legitimate question for the subject matter of the Ethics because ethics, it seems, is a practical science, not a theoretical science, and if we're asking why aren't we asking a theoretical question?

S: This poor fellow asks, shall he betray, say, his brother to the Gestapo.

Q: This is a very practical question.

S: Yes, very practical.

Q: Yes, but I'm dealing more with the underlying question that we are trying to ask you. Why do we say that a thing is just, vicious, or virtuous.

S: Yes, we do not know this.

Q: Is it a metaphysical question or what is it?

S: Yes; well, that is exactly the question. What does Aristotle -- he assumes here in a rough way we all know that if someone -- I mean, that such things as robbing, snatching purses, and so, are unjust actions, to say nothing of killing a man. We know that. I mean, Aristotle is very practical. He knows that he does not address people who have never heard of these things. Everyone, surely even here in this class, everyone has heard of these things, of things which are proper to do and things which are improper to do, and wherever you go you will always find people who have always already heard it. The moral teacher never addresses people who have never heard of these things. He never addresses men in Hobbes' state of nature. That's impossible; because he couldn't address because anyone will kill him and no one of you would sit here; you would all sit in some trenches with sticks and stones. So it's impossible; that is always presupposed. Yes? Very practical.

Q: I understand this.

S: Yes. But this question is also a practical question. Is there literally no action which may not be done under compulsion, as defined? Good.

Q<sub>2</sub>: All actions are spontaneous, although he seems to say --

S: Yes, he didn't say it yet. He decided it in some kind of cases like throwing the luggage into the lake in order to save your life. This is, he says, a voluntary action although the circumstances are not of your choosing, but the action was your choice.

Q<sub>2</sub>: That would be the same in all acts of compulsion. Wouldn't it?

S: He never said that. I mean, he raised the question regarding the man whose children and wife are in the hands of a vicious tyrant. He raised the question. He didn't answer it yet. We must come to that. Now let us go on, Mr. Reinkin.

O: Sometimes indeed men are actually praised. . . .

S: Are even praised for such acts done under compulsion. I mean, done under some compulsion -- where the circumstances -- yes?

O: . . . for deeds of this mixed class, namely when they submit to some disgrace or pain as the price of some great and noble object; though if they do so without any such motive they are blamed, since it is contemptible to submit to a great disgrace with no advantage or only a trifling one in view.

S: Yes, with nothing noble. Yes?

O: In some cases again, such submission though not praised is condoned, when a man does something wrong through fear of penalties that impose too great a strain on human nature, and that no one could endure.

S: Extreme torture would, of course, be an example. Yes?

O: Yet there seem to be some acts which a man cannot be compelled to do, and rather than do them he ought to submit to the most terrible death: for instance, we think it ridiculous that Alcmaeon in Euripides' play is com-



pelled by certain threats to murder his mother!

S: Yes, so here Aristotle raises now the question, is there a line or is there no line, and the key sentence is this -- this is not quite literally translated -- perhaps there are some things where no compulsion may be accepted as an excuse. In other words, there are certain actions which cannot be excused by any compulsion whatever, unless it is mere physical compulsion. Then, of course, you are not responsible. I mean, if someone grips your hand and -- well, how shall I say? -- let us not use -- say, the grandmother, as an example -- and compels, uses your hand as a mere organ to kill your grandmother, then, of course, no one in his senses would say that you had killed your grandmother. But the question is when the compulsion is "psychological," threats of a tyrant. Is there anything which may not be done under any circumstances? May one do the most base things in order to avoid the most painful things? Now Thomas Aquinas gives this answer: someone is threatened with being set on fire on a pyre if he does not tell a jocular lie or if he does not commit an act unbecoming his dignity: say to milk an ass, a she-ass. And then, of course, in these cases Thomas, as a sensible man, says naturally he will tell a jocular lie or he will milk -- I mean, a very great dignitary will milk the she-ass under these circumstances. He would be a fool if he didn't do it. Thomas regards this "perhaps" as merely rhetorical. Aristotle frequently says of very unqualifiedly true things, "perhaps." That's a kind of urbanity and Thomas believes this is here the case; and he omits in his rendering the Latin equivalent -- I mean, this "perhaps" occurs also in the Latin translation. He omits this in his paraphrase. His example of such things is the following one: St. Laurence, who sustained fire rather than to sacrifice to idols. There are things which may not be done under any circumstances. Now it is, of course, very interesting that he chooses this example because this would not be an example which Aristotle would admit. That is divine law, not natural law. Now Euripides' Alcmaeon may not have had a good excuse for matricide in that play, but someone else might. You know, the reason there may be very poor. For example, when killing the mother was the only way of preventing her from committing high treason, which is theoretically possible. Now this is an absolutely crucial point. According to an 11th century Jewish author, Yehuda Halevi, in his book, Cuzari -- this is the clearest case which I know where Book IV, paragraph 19, speaks of the difference between the philosophers and the religious law regarding this point: namely, that according to the philosophers there is no limit. That any action might become justifiable or excusable, whereas the religious law says no; and he, of course, speaks of the Jewish law and mentions three points: idolatry, murder, and incest, which are not justifiable under any circumstances. Rather, death is to be preferred. This is, indeed, a key question. You see, everything depends here on how to interpret that *isos*, that perhaps. Is this to be taken literally, "perhaps," or is it Aristotle's urbane use of perhaps, which means of course. This is hard to say. Thomas, in his commentary, by the way, notes that Aristotle uses frequently "perhaps" in this book, in the *Ethics*, because of the uncertainty of moral matter. So he knew this difficulty very well. Now the point, I think, is this: if we limit ourselves to natural or rational morality we must say self-subsistent morality must demand universal validity of the most fundamental rules, for otherwise we are in need of a trans-moral principle which justifies occasional deviations from the rules. Now let us read the sequel and then I will give you some other medieval commentaries: where we left off.

O: But it is sometimes difficult to decide how far we ought to go in choosing to do a given act rather than suffer a given penalty, or in enduring a given penalty rather than commit a given action; and it is still more difficult to abide by our decision when made, since in most of such dilemmas the penalty threatened is painful and the deed forced upon us dishonor-

able, which is why praise and blame are bestowed according as we do or do not yield to such compulsion.

S: Yes, let us stop here. Now here Averroes says -- the famous Islamic commentator -- from this it follows that praise or blame -- that man is praised or blamed because of his bowing to compulsion or not bowing to it. "I mean that in some place he is praised for bowing to compulsion and in another place he is blamed for that." So, in other words, there is no absolute line and it depends very much on the positive law where the line is drawn. Thomas Aquinas says, "since these things to which someone is compelled are base it is proper that regarding those men who are compelled to such actions by fear are blamed and those who are not compelled, who cannot be compelled, are praised." In other words, here is a clear difference between Thomas and Averroes, Thomas drawing definitely a line (there are certain things which may not be done under any circumstances), and Averroes saying that there are no such lines. This is, indeed, a key question, and I think that Yehuda Halevi, by this remark to which I referred, has drawn our attention to a key problem which depends, as far as interpretation of Aristotle goes, on this single "perhaps." Is this to be taken literally or is this the urbane use of the term where it means only a polite way of saying "absolutely." That's the point.

Q: In any case there is no possibility of deliberating about this matter.

S: Yes, this he takes up later on. This he takes up later on because a virtuous man, confronted with subtle situations by virtue of his habit has, as it were, anticipated the subtlety arising in these situations. I mean, that is, he knows -- well, how shall I say? -- do you ever deliberate whether you should kill a passer-by? Do you ever deliberate? I mean, if you are attacked by a man that's another matter, but you never deliberate because that has become a settled thing for you. You don't do it. And the same applies to everything. Good. Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Am I right in saying that this is the same question as whether there are some things which are evil in themselves.

S: Yes, but he doesn't deny now that there are evils in themselves, but whether there are evils in the circumstances, actions. It ultimately depends not only on whether an action is intrinsically good or bad, but whether it is good or bad in the circumstances. For example, beating one's father is intrinsically bad but it can be, under certain circumstances, good; for example, if the father is drunk, beats up the mother and the whole rest of the family in a savage way. In such a situation it may be good. It is never a pleasant situation. We always would have compassion with that son but it is strictly speaking a good action. Is this not clear?

Q<sub>2</sub>: It is clear, but who said it? Is this Averroes' interpretation?

S: No, this is what Aristotle himself obviously says. But the question is now, of course, is there any -- is there a single action which may not become good in the circumstances? That's the question; and now I would say that the religious teachers, generally speaking, would say there are such actions, such things like blasphemy and denying one's religion and this kind of thing. You know that. Martyrdom is, in a way, to be demanded. That's what all religious teaching means, and maybe indulgence for we people but it can never be said it was the right thing to do. It can be extremely excusable. And the example Thomas Aquinas gives is, of course, of a martyr who preferred death to becoming an idolator,

if only for the occasion. But the question is this other action. I mean, if we disregard divine law altogether and limit ourselves to natural law, and then the question would then be, for example, killing -- you know -- and there it would be the question. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Thomas' example presupposes the idea that this will in so doing look forward to another life as a martyr. He would go to heaven, whereas Aristotle's man -- S: Doesn't know that. -- would not and consequently this would seem to affect the circumstances in which both would act.

S: Yes, sure. I'm sure that would have to be considered, but Thomas doesn't speak of it. He gives only this example. Whatever the further reasoning was, he only gives this as an example of -- that bowing to idols is such a thing which is unqualifiedly bad. But it is unqualifiedly bad, obviously, on the basis of divine law (Second Commandment), and not for natural reason. Aristotle himself was an idolator. You know? And whether now it is easier for a man believing in Christianity to undergo martyrdom for the sake of Christianity than a corresponding action would be for a pagan is another matter. I mean, it must surely be considered but it doesn't have to be considered.

Q<sub>4</sub>: This question of "perhaps" seems to be quite different from the discussion of moral virtues in a simple sense.

S: Yes, but how, since moral virtue is a question ultimately of virtuous actions?

Q<sub>4</sub>: What I'm saying is that when we discussed the relationship of knowledge and moral virtues we really said that knowledge isn't that important for moral virtues.

S: That's what Aristotle says. Yes, but you know, this has to be qualified.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Indeed. But we really talked about habituation and upbringing, etc., instead of really emphasizing knowledge. Now it seems that the question, once you talk about this "perhaps" and the discussion we have entered here of the problem that is created in the history of philosophy from the opinions on this "perhaps" then it seems more we have to rely on knowledge and one could justify under what occasions it would be just to act one way or just to act another way.

S: Yes, but knowledge is, of course, important. I mean, Aristotle says to begin with it is less important. In one sense, that's, of course, true. It is extremely easy to know, say, to take a very innocent example, I hope -- that it is very easy to know that one shouldn't smoke. But for a habitual smoker it is terribly difficult. It is infinitely easier to say to myself, "Don't smoke," than to do it; and Aristotle wisely says the knowledge here is trivial and the action is everything. But this is not the whole story. There are cases in which it is difficult to say what is the right thing to do. In the immediate sequel, when we will turn to b7 to 9, Mr. Reinkin --

O: What kind of actions then are to be called compulsory? Used without qualification, perhaps this term applies to any case where the cause of the action lies in things outside the agent, and when the agent contributes nothing. But when actions intrinsically involuntary are yet in given circumstances deliberately chosen in preference to a given alternative, and when their origin lies in the agent, these actions are to be pronounced intrinsically involuntary but voluntary in the circumstances,



and in preference to the alternative. They approximate however rather to the voluntary class, since conduct consists of particular things done, and the particular things done in the cases in question are voluntary. But it is not easy to lay down rules for deciding which of two alternatives is to be chosen, for particular cases differ widely.

S: You see how difficult it is to know. I mean, to say you shouldn't kill an innocent man and to understand that is very easy, but there are delicate questions and there, obviously, great discernment and tact -- however you call it -- is required.

Q<sub>1</sub>: Again the same question: if moral virtues in a certain sense are actions resulting from states of character --

S: Yes, but there is always intelligence involved in that. There is always intelligence involved in it, discernment, what Aristotle calls prudence, which he will discuss at great length in the sixth book. That's also involved. . . . (The next few minutes of the tape is defective and not always audible.) We may not be every day confronted with a grave moral question. I hope not. In an orderly society one is not. But they are the measure of a man and is determined, one can say, by the series of grave questions, grave moral questions, which he has decided in his life. . . .

Q<sub>1</sub>: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, well, you have been too impressed by this one remark that knowledge is not important in action; unduly. And as I say, it has a certain meaning. To some extent it is true that the payoff is never the knowledge. It's always the action. But that doesn't mean that knowledge is not very important. Now in the immediate sequel he says one cannot possibly make the pleasures and pains, the attractions and repulsions going on from the object, responsible and say that they compel a man, because then, of course, all responsibility would be dropped. In the compulsory actions proper the individual is not, strictly speaking, the agent. This is clear. Take the extreme case where your hand is literally forced. Now in the sequel he turns to the second cause which makes actions unspontaneous and that is ignorance. Let us turn to 1110b18; the next chapter. [Actually, it was not the next chapter, but still chapter one.]

O: An act done through ignorance is in every case not spontaneous, but it is unspontaneous only when it causes the agent pain and regret: since a man who has acted through ignorance and feels no compunction at all for what he has done, cannot indeed be said to have acted spontaneously, as he was not aware of his action, yet cannot be said to have acted unspontaneously, as he is not sorry for it. Acts done through ignorance therefore fall into two classes: if the agent regrets the act, we think that he has acted unspontaneously; if he does not regret it, to mark the distinction we may call him a non-spontaneous agent. . . .

S: Yes, well, it is not -- what would be a simple example? Someone has eaten another man's delicious meal, but he has in fact stolen it. It belonged to someone else. But he is innocent because he didn't know it. He thought it was his meal, and then he hears that it was another man's meal. If he is genuinely sorry for that, if he regrets it and he is disturbed by that involuntary eating, then he is not responsible for it. Then he is not morally responsible, as we would say. That is not so difficult to understand. Now then come some other more subtle distinctions. Let us drop the next sentence and then go on.

O: Now it is true that all wicked men are ignorant of what they ought to do and refrain from doing, and that this error is the cause of injustice and of vice in general. But the term unspontaneous does not really apply to an action when the agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an act blameworthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choice (that sort of ignorance constitutes vice) -- that is to say, it is not general ignorance (because that is held to be blameworthy), but particular ignorance, ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things affected by it; for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven. . . .

S: Yes. Now even all wicked people or vicious people act from ignorance. They are ignorant regarding the useful, as he says. They are ignorant regarding the good. They don't really know. Well, take the simple criminal who thinks the squares are fools. A fool is a man who doesn't know what is good for him. The crooks know what is good for them. They are mistaken in this respect, in our opinion. They are ignorant regarding what is useful for them; a very simple thing. It's not metaphysical; very practical. Do you agree with the view of the crooks that the squares are fools? Well? Then you admit what Aristotle said. Aristotle says the crooks are ignorant regarding the good. They believe it is good -- what they do.

Q: It seems to me that redefines every known difference that I grew up with --

S: Wait. Aristotle says --

Q: Ignorance is the absence of knowledge.

S: Yes, or the opposite. Yes, yes, sure. They do not know what is good. That this ignorance has been caused by bad breeding and so on by other defects, Aristotle doesn't deny, but he's sticking to the phenomenon. I think it is simply empirically true. I repeat the simple thing: the crook says the squares are fools. They pay their taxes and they do all kinds of other things which can be so easily avoided if you employ a shyster; and you don't have to work so hard. You simply make a bank robbery, case a building properly. You know, they don't know how foolish they are, what kind of trouble they take. I also believe they are fools but they believe we are fools really. I mean, you have apparently never heard any --

Q: It sounds like Hobbesian determinism.

S: No. That is so remote from any theory and they have never heard the name of one. But from time to time you should really read some account of these people. There is a book which was brought out by a Chicago sociologist twenty or thirty years ago. I forgot the title; one of you gave it to me. And it was quite amazing, and in addition, of course, we have, I'm sorry to say, through TV -- we have a very easy access to these people. Aristotle says here literally this ignorance regarding the general things, say that cheating regarding taxes is bad or murder is bad, is the cause of their wickedness and it is not to be excused or pitied. They ought to know it but they don't know it. What is excusable or pitiable is only ignorance regarding particulars. Very simply, to take an example, someone enters his bedroom and he believes to find there his wife and it is another woman. (Laughter). No, no, I'm sorry for that but it is a very simple example. He is naturally excusable. Yes? Good. But he must deplore it. (Laughter). I'm sorry; that is what he says. I didn't wish to take the case of someone killing his father believing honestly he is a burglar. It could happen. It would also be excusable. That's not so comical as the first.

Q: Would St. Thomas agree with this definition?

S: Yes, sure. No, I believe everyone would. I tried to --

Q: When I read this yesterday I thought it was a misprint.

S: No. There is some knowledge involved in all morality, whatever you and Mr. Vari may say. Or do you i.e. Mr. Vari agree in this point?

O: Yes.

S: Now, good. Good. Morality is based on some knowledge. This knowledge must be available to all if morality is to be expected from all. Yes, that's clear. It is general knowledge, regarding principles, as we say, like murder etc. are always bad. The bad man does not know these things, but through his fault. He could have known and he should have known. He did not listen. He would have listened if he had feared punishment or other disciplinary action including simple exhortation in his childhood. More generally stated, this knowledge, this general knowledge, is ordinarily supplied by the law, of course. The law everywhere forbids murder and so on and so on. Now let us go on where we left off, lllla3.

O: Perhaps then it will be as well to specify the nature and number of these circumstances. They are (1) the agent, (2) the act, (3) the thing that is affected by or is the sphere of the act; and sometimes also (4) the instrument, for instance, a tool with which the act is done, (5) the effect; for instance, saving a man's life, and (6) the manner, for instance, gently or violently.

Now no one, unless mad, could be ignorant of all these circumstances together; nor yet, obviously, of the agent -- for a man must know who he is himself.

S: Yes, he could not possibly say "I didn't do it because I didn't know that I was I." This kind of schizophrenia, of claimed schizophrenia, is not an excuse. Yes?

O: But a man may be ignorant of what he is doing, as for instance when people say 'it slipped out while they were speaking,' or 'they were not aware that the matter was a secret,' as Aeschylus said of the Mysteries; or that 'they let it off when they only meant to show how it worked' as the prisoner pleaded. . . . (Laughter.)

S: Yes. No, that can happen. Well, you read it every day. Yes. Good. Yes?

O: Again a person might mistake his son for an enemy, as Merope does; or mistake a sharp spear for one with a button on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice-stone; or one might kill a man by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life; or in loose wrestling hit him a blow when meaning only to grip his hand. Ignorance therefore being possible in respect of all these circumstances of the act, one who has acted in ignorance of any of them is held to have acted unspontaneously, and especially so if ignorant of the most important of them; and the most important of the circumstances seem to be the nature of the act itself and the effect it will produce.

Such then is the nature of the ignorance that justifies our speaking of an act as unspontaneous, given the further condition that the



agent feels sorrow and regret for having committed it.

S: I hope I have made this clear enough: this qualification of ignorance -- I mean, why this is a test -- the repentance. Good. But may I remind you of the simple phrase, "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." That you know. A man may really be ignorant about the fact that there are tax laws altogether. It is a genuine ignorance, but it is inexcusable because he is obliged to know the law, and what is true of taxes is also true of murder and other things. That is a very simple thing. Aristotle wants to make clear which ignorance is excused: only ignorance regarding particular circumstances. Such ignorance is possible. A man can be honestly deceived about the character of the weapon he uses, about other things, and then he is, of course, excusable. The simple example here is that Merope kills her son thinking that he is an enemy. This is matricide, a very grave thing. Parricide is possible in the same way; and the whole story of Oedipus comes in here. Of course, Oedipus is naturally absolutely innocent from Aristotle's point of view because he acted in complete ignorance of the fact that Laius was his father -- that this man was his father and this woman was his mother; and that is it for Aristotle. You know, he does not believe that man can be responsible beyond his knowledge, beyond knowledge regarding particulars. I mean, Oedipus never said "I am willing to kill my father." He never said -- found it terrible when he found out. It's a good example of what Aristotle means by ignorance. Yes, Mr. Weissberger.

Q: Well, would he have killed his father if he wasn't the kind of man who would get into a fight with a man over the right of way in the road?

S: Yes, but this was not in itself -- that was not a premise of the situation, that this was in itself a criminal act. It became criminal only because it was the father. If this had been somebody else, anyone can get into a fight and this fight may get out of hand and it may culminate in a killing. That is not supposed to be criminal. The criminality consists only in the fact that it was the father. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: But Aristotle would say that Oedipus was at least in part responsible and blameworthy because he should have somehow, by entreating the gods, found out what the truth was.

S: No. No, no. He becomes guilty only because he refuses to listen to Teiresias, only because of this reason; and then if he had obeyed the divine law as it was then understood, namely, had listened to Teiresias, then Teiresias would have told him, "Don't try to find out your past," and then he would have lived happily ever after and the sin in the play is that his foolish curiosity prevents him from being simply pious in the sense of Teiresias. That was the point. But for the action he was not responsible, surely not from Aristotle's point of view. But I suppose quite a few involuntary actions have happened. Someone might have killed his father involuntarily and with perfect innocence as far as any law court is concerned and simply become crazy about it when he became aware of it. That's another matter. But one can also say he was unreasonable. Aristotle would say that. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Is the law the standard of this general knowledge?

S: Roughly and generally speaking, yes. But you know the law is extremely -- if you are rude to a fellow, he asks you for the time and you give him a rude reply, you are not punishable by the law and still someone would say that's a boorish action.

Q3: I mean, you get bad laws too.

S: Yes, sure, naturally. This leads to a great difficulty, but crudely speaking we can leave it at the law. So in the next chapter Aristotle turns then to the subject of choice. Choice is a special kind of the spontaneous, the kind of spontaneous which is limited to men who are no longer children. Now Aristotle makes, then, clear that choice is not the same as desire. Choice is not the same as desire. Obviously, if you desire something you don't necessarily choose it. You may desire it and reject it: easy. The more important distinction is that between choice and will. Now the principle is this: will goes to the end, toward the end. You will or wish. You wish to be healthy. And choice has to do with the means. Then choice is distinguished from opinion. That, I think, is also not difficult to understand. We may opine about everything. We may have opinions about Laos and we cannot say to have any choice regarding Laos -- actions there. The chosen is that voluntary which is, has been, an object of previous deliberation. If you desire something and go toward it simply, as it were, without reflecting that's one thing. But if you have deliberated about it -- should I do it? -- is it wise to do it? -- and then decide to do it then it is an object of choice and no longer any more of mere desire. Now what we have to read now is 1112a18, following; a new chapter begins there. "Do men deliberate about everything?" You see, after he has made clear that choice is based on deliberation he must make clear what deliberation is. Now this will be where we begin.

O: As for deliberation, do people deliberate about everything -- are all things possible objects of deliberation --, or are there some things about which deliberation is impossible? The term 'object of deliberation' presumably must not be taken to include things about which a fool or a madman might deliberate, but to mean what a sensible person would deliberate about.

S: Yes, in other words, a fool might deliberate about anything but Aristotle says, well, we naturally exclude that because we are speaking to sensible people and we are not interested in the strange things which fools do. I have been attacked recently because, when speaking of common sense, I had said, had spoken of, enlightened and informed citizens as representative of common sense. And I was attacked -- why I arbitrarily excluded unenlightened and unintelligent ones. Well, Aristotle has the answer. What can we learn from these people? We can learn something from enlightened and sensible people. Yes?

O: Well then, nobody deliberates about things eternal, such as the order of the universe, or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. Nor yet about things that change but follow a regular process, whether from necessity or by nature or through some other cause: such phenomena for instance as the solstices and the sunrise.

S: For instance, we cannot deliberate about the weather. We can reflect about it. We can deliberate about whether we should take a ride tomorrow and take the weather into consideration, but we cannot deliberate about the weather because we have no influence on the weather. Yes?

O: Nor about irregular occurrences, such as droughts and rains. Nor about the results of chance, such as finding a hidden treasure.

S: Obviously not, because, by definition, it's something which comes to sight suddenly and unexpectedly. Yes?

O: The reason why we do not deliberate about these things is that none of them can be effected by our agency.

S: You omitted something: "nor about all human things, for example, how the Scythians would. . . ."

O: (Oh, there's a transposition.)

S: I see. All right. All right.

O: (I'll go back.) But we do not deliberate about all human affairs without exception either: for example, no Lacedaemonian deliberates about the best form of government for Scythia. . . .

S: Yes, some commentator whom I read said this shows the narrow-mindedness of Aristotle; because he didn't go in for global politics. We deliberate here about Venezuela and Laos, which, of course, is not quite true. We do not, strictly speaking, deliberate. They deliberate there and when we do it we do it from the point of view that it is very relevant for this country. It is a kind of deliberation about American matters. Sure. So there is nothing narrow-minded here. Good. Yes?

Q: (Regarding constitutions for foreign countries.)

S: Yes, that is a different case. He is asked -- Aristotle too would. Some barbaric nation would come to him and he has the time and the necessary knowledge. He would, I believe, as a humane man, do it, but it is not, strictly speaking, deliberation. One deliberates about one's own things. You must have a point of reference from which you start. . . . Yes. Good. Go on.

O: The reason why we do not deliberate about these things is that none of them can be effected by our agency. We deliberate about things that are in our control and are attainable by action (which are in fact the only things that still remain to be considered; for nature, necessity, and chance, with the addition of intelligence and human agency generally, exhaust the generally accepted list of causes). Also there is no room for deliberation about matters fully ascertained and completely formulated as sciences; such for instance as orthography. . . .

S: Yes, it is clear. No one deliberates, shall I write the "h" this way or that way? I have never seen that. I've never seen anyone do that because that is absolutely fixed. That's the "h" and that is not a letter in the Latin alphabet. Good.

O: . . . for we have no uncertainty as to how a word ought to be spelt. We deliberate about things in which our agency operates but does not always produce the same results; for instance about questions of medicine and of business; and we deliberate about navigation more than about athletic training, because it has been less completely reduced to a science; and similarly with other pursuits also. And we deliberate more about the arts than about the sciences because we are more uncertain about them.

Deliberation then is employed in matters which, though subject to rules that generally hold good, are uncertain in their issue; or where the issue is indeterminate, and where, when the matter is important, we take others into our deliberations, distrusting our own capacity to decide.



And we deliberate not about ends, but about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether he is to cure his patient, nor an orator whether he is to convince his audience, nor a statesman whether he is to secure good government, nor does anyone else debate about the end of his profession or calling. . . .

S: This solves the problem of Herbert Simon to a large extent of the infinite alternatives which everyone has to consider. Some of you will have read Mr. Storing's analysis of Simon's teaching on this point. For Aristotle it's clear: the end is always established prior to the deliberation and then you deliberate about the means. And he describes deliberation in the sequel; and that is really important for the modern discussions of what is now characteristically called decision-making; where the element of deliberation is not so visible but simply, only the last, final stage, and the emphasis has shifted from the rational process of deliberation to the mere act of the will: the decision. Yes?

O: . . . they take some end for granted, and consider how and by what means it can be achieved. If they find that there are several means of achieving it, they proceed to consider which of these will attain it most easily and best. If there is only one means by which it can be accomplished, they ask how it is to be accomplished by that means, and by what means that means can itself be achieved, until they reach the first link in the chain of causes, which is the last in the order of discovery. (For when deliberating one seems in the procedure described to be pursuing an investigation or analysis that resembles the analysis of a figure in geometry -- indeed it appears that though not all investigation is deliberation, for example, mathematical investigation is not, yet all deliberation is investigation -- and the last step in the analysis seems to be the first step in the execution of the design.)

S: Is this clear? You deliberate from the end. Say, the end is health, and in this particular case of this particular patient suffering from this disease, and then you find out it is this and this disease. This means is ordinarily helpful in most cases. There is no reason to assume that this is an atypical case and then you decide on this and this. And now the first step; and the first step, let's say roughly -- let us assume it's an operation -- the first step would probably be, according to the present means, to give him anaesthetics. That is probably no longer spelled out because it's a matter of course and therefore the end of the deliberation, give him anaesthetics so that he can be safely operated on, and this is the first step in the action. Then you go down from the end to the last step in the analysis and then you ascend again from that to the end, hopefully that he will be healthy after the operation. This is the classic statement about deliberation. Now one point which is very important here to consider is that in this whole analysis here there is no difference between moral deliberation and medical deliberation; no difference. The example is throughout the same, and, of course, that doesn't mean that there is no difference whatever but it forces us to raise the question, all the more, which Aristotle doesn't answer here: what is the difference between moral and medical deliberation? Well, you can, of course, also replace the physicians by the pilot or by any other deliberator. That doesn't make any fundamental difference. Now what would be the difference?

O: Couldn't we say the difference was what we found to be the difference between art and moral virtue before? /S: Namely?/ That the artisan could deliberate on the end opposite the right end. He could deliberate on it if he were working with some animal and he wanted to test something. Let me make him sick

in a certain way so that I will test a new serum. Well, how do I do that? In other words, he won't deliberate, he doesn't have to deliberate, on health if in the name of health he deliberates --

S: Aristotle makes it perfectly clear that the physician takes the end for granted: health. I mean, he doesn't think of that physician who is considering should he not poison him or destroy him because his relatives would give the physician money, you know, from the inheritance. These things have happened, and this Aristotle excludes. He takes here for granted the non-criminal physician. It is true: the physician as physician is not necessarily a non-criminal. The virtuous man is necessarily non-criminal. Is that what you mean? That is true.

O: That was what I meant, but --

S: Yes, but this is not here a matter of consideration. We must never forget that. Mr. Burnham.

Q: I think it has something to do with the fact, just the simple fact, that bodily health is much more obvious than mental health.

S: Yes, that is one good point but it doesn't go far enough. I would go a step further. I mean, not only is mental health -- because mental health is, of course, here not understood in the sense of psychiatry. It's understood in the sense of virtue and this is the point. Yes, but more generally stated, in the case of medical deliberation the end is clearly defined: health. What is the end in moral deliberation? The end in moral deliberation is the moral action itself. You see, you want to act virtuously and therefore you consider all the circumstances properly, but with a view to what? To moral action. It is an entirely circular procedure. With a view to what do you determine the action? Do you see that, the difficulty? I mean, the difference between morality and arts is that the artisan's act has an end outside of the act itself: the shoe, health, or whatever it may be. The moral act does not have an end outside of itself. It is to be done for its own sake. It is in this sense an end in itself. That is very difficult. Now Thomas Aquinas in his commentary somewhere to this passage says generally speaking the ends (and he means here also the ends of moral action) are given by nature. Yes? Are given by nature. Then it would be clear. We would then have this situation: the moral man acts with a view to natural ends, but not the natural character of the ends but the wise choice of the means to these ends makes him moral. But this is not what Aristotle says. In a way Aristotle must imply it, but only in a way. Mr. Dry.

Q<sub>2</sub>: This might be going ahead a little but it is confusing because in talking about courage and another virtue Aristotle says that the end is not the moral virtue but the honor that we derive. The end of moral virtue is not moral virtue, but honor. The courageous man does the right thing for honors --

S: Then there must be something wrong with the translation. One should not translate tokalon by honor; tokalon is the noble and that may be identical, may be used synonymously with honor. But Aristotle makes it explicitly clear: the man who acts courageously for the sake of honor, the honors given by the city, is not the courageous man proper. On the contrary, to anticipate that, I think the example of courage is beautiful because in this whole discussion of courage where courage is defined as a virtue to be shown on the field of honor, field of battle, there is not a single reference to the fatherland, to the polis: the end. Thomas Aquinas in his commentary insists on that, but Aristotle does not speak of it. That is exactly the great difficulty of the Ethics: that the end

of moral action is not defined. It is only indicated by that word happiness and that is a kind of -- in one sense, a question mark because it is not elaborated, what it means. Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>2</sub>: What does Aristotle mean when he says that we do not deliberate about those things which we cannot bring about by our own efforts? My problem is this: the political scientist in the classroom can deliberate about things like the goals of American foreign policy. He deliberates about this in a real sense and yet he doesn't have much influence.

S: Yes, but he has some. The position is that he's a citizen of a democracy, a voter, and perhaps he will become a Congressman in the future. There is no difficulty.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Well, my problem is this: when Aristotle says this sort of absolutely, that we do not deliberate about things which we cannot bring about by our own efforts--

S: Yes, by our own means. Yes, of course you cannot bring about by your, Mr. Glenn's, own efforts, but you can very well be the community. The American people deliberate about what they can bring about. Now not all American people deliberate for various reasons; but those who are politically interested do, and this deliberation is, in a way, of course going on all the time in newspapers and in debates in Congress and every other place. That is no difficulty. That is a famous difficulty: that if you have one hundred-eighty-millionth of power of decision can this be called the power of decision? You know, that's a famous difficulty in this large democracy, but this doesn't affect the Aristotelian point. Modern democracy stands and falls by the fact that this voting power, in spite of its littleness in numerical terms, is something important, and I believe if they would take away that right from you you wouldn't like it.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Would you say, then, that you have to interpret this "by our own efforts" to mean our own, collectively --

S: Yes, sure, necessarily; individually or collectively. It depends. If it is a political matter it is, of course, collective. If it is a private matter it is, of course, the individual's own.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Should we, then, also understand it to mean -- "our own efforts" to mean our own efforts no matter how little effect --

S: Yes, yes, sure. Sure. Sure. The simple Athenian member of the assembly also had very little to say. You know, he had just one vote; and the speeches, the political speeches, were called deliberative speeches. Speeches about laws, about war and peace, were called deliberative speeches. That is deliberation. Deliberation is, of course, political deliberation as well as private. That goes without saying. Yes. But it's good you bring it up since it wasn't quite clear.

Q<sub>4</sub>: I think it's still not solved because if you had a dictatorship then by definition what goes on in a political science class would not be deliberation.

S: No, well, what is going on in political science classes could at best be called an imitation of deliberation, training in deliberation. Yes, sure, just as many things which are going on in medical schools are not medication but an imitation of medication so that they can become medicators.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Then this is a special usage.



S: Yes, but this is not difficult to understand. Is it? Just as the shoes made by an apprentice in the first year are not shoes, strictly speaking, because no one can use them, but by having made these shoes he will be able, next year or the year thereafter, to make a shoe which a human being can wear. There is no difficulty in that. You see? I mean, if one uses one's head -- I mean, and if one thinks of the subject matter in the proper terms and does not go off into irrelevant abstractions, this is clear. Is it not? I mean, that there can be and must be imitations for the purpose of instruction and learning and habituation in all fields of human endeavor.

Q<sub>4</sub>: I'm not completely satisfied but I'll let it go.

S: Think a bit about it and draw on your experience.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Of how much brunt is the objection that a physician might want to deliberate about the end: euthenasia, for example?

S: About the end?

Q<sub>5</sub>: About the end, health. He might decide that it might be for the better if a patient --

S: You know what will happen to him. He will be punished for murder. He is not a physician in order to reach a decision whether this man should live or die. That doesn't fall within his competence. He has to heal, if possible, and if not to make the rest of the case, of the patient, reasonably comfortable. That's all that he is for and according to the ordinary understanding no man has the right to decide whether it is good for another man to live or to die. Strictly speaking, no man is supposed to make such a decision. That is not a question. But it is, indeed, true that the physician or any other artisan may misuse his art and in misusing it may be very able as an artisan. That is true. That is the point which Mr. Dry brought up. But I think the more urgent question for us is that in the case of the arts the end which the art serves is well defined. For example, the pilot who says now all the baggage must be thrown into the sea; otherwise I can't save the boat. It is perfectly clear, the end: he wants to bring the ship and the human beings on it to port. That is the clear end with a view to which he decides taking into consideration the circumstances: the tempest, time of day, and so on. But what is that with a view to which you decide that this degree of anger is proper in the circumstances and that degree improper? As I put it last time, the degrees of anger don't run around with tags: proper degree. But you have to find out in each case and this is exactly the point. Now a few more points I would briefly like to mention. Let us see only one passage, 1114b16. That is toward the end of that chapter, however it is called: 1114b16, where he summarizes the statement about the end.

Q<sub>6</sub>: Your last comment seemed to tie back to the dual nature of virtue because when you first raised this business -- and people were bothered -- that the end of moral action is not defined, there were strange looks. And you illustrate it now and it is much less arguable that as virtue as concerned with passions --

S: For example?

Q<sub>6</sub>: You just gave the business of the degree of anger felt.

S: Yes, but with a view to what?

Q<sub>6</sub>: That the end is the thing itself.

S: The end is the right degree of anger in the circumstances. That is what you already established. But with a view to what do we establish the right degree? The right degree is not universally the same. It depends on the circumstances. But you must have something outside of the circumstances in order to determine what is the right degree of anger in the circumstances. Is this clear? Now the right degree of anger is the end, but you cannot determine the right degree of anger with a view to the supposedly known right degree of anger. Now let us take another case: let us take the virtue of temperance, how much to eat and so on -- how much to eat and also how to eat, slow, fast, and so on and so on. There -- Aristotle refers to that; we will take this up next time -- with a view to health, in the first place. There you have an end different from the right degree of indulgence. But what do you have in the other cases? That is the question. Now in a way this is taken up in this passage; then we will conclude. In the preceding passage, 1114a31 to b16, Aristotle puts the difficulty in this form: either we are responsible for the end which comes to sight to us or we are not. Then the end is not chosen by us but imposed by nature and then everything depends on what nature has given to him. You must be well-born. Then you will have the right kind of end, and if you are ill-born you have the wrong kind of end. And then the evil man simply doesn't know the true end. He is by nature blind to it. That's one thing. Aristotle is not quite satisfied and therefore he goes on in this passage, the few lines which I would like us to read, 1114b16.

O: Whether then a man's view of his end, whatever it may be, is not given by nature but is partly due to himself, or whether, although his end is determined by nature, yet virtue is spontaneous because the good man's actions to gain his end are spontaneous, in either case vice will be just as much spontaneous as virtue; for the bad man equally with the good possesses spontaneity in his actions. . . .

S: Yes, this is the point -- now let us see what this means. Either we are, to some extent at least, responsible for the end which comes to sight to us. Then freedom is no question. Or we are not responsible, but even in the latter case we are at least responsible for what we do with regard to the end and the things done with regard to ends -- they are the locus of virtue and vice and therefore freedom is saved. What Aristotle seems to drive at is this: (and this is, of course, no possible solution), that knowledge or ignorance of the end is irrelevant for moral virtue. He cannot possibly mean that and yet some of the statements sound as if they were that. But he cannot leave it -- he retracts, surely, this implication in the immediate sequel, in b21.

O: If then, as is said, our virtues are spontaneous (and in fact we are in a sense ourselves partly the cause of our moral dispositions, and it is our having a certain character that makes us set up an end of a certain kind), it follows that our vices are spontaneous also; they are spontaneous in the same manner as our virtues.

S: Yes. In other words, here he seems to say the ends are established on the basis of the good or bad habit which we have acquired. Since we are responsible for the good or bad habit which we acquired we are also responsible for the end which comes to sight. This is still very dark and I think the difficulty is this, is always this: how do we know the right ends? The definition of virtue given in the second book, that it is a mean, is connected with that because the definition of the mean -- of virtue in terms of mean -- of course blurs that. With a view to what is the mean determined? That's always the question. But

that we can say on the basis of general observation that virtuous actions are always in between acts which do too much and acts which do too little: that is plausible. We can say the right attitude to anger will always lead to degrees of anger short of apoplexy, on the one hand, and stupid insensitivity to insult, on the other. That's safe to say. But what about the exact determination? With a view to what? If we assume -- in many cases we do that -- assume as an end the polis, the political society, and this affects, of course, many virtues and many virtuous actions. Then we have a standard outside; and things would be, in a way, much simpler if we could always refer ourselves to, as we say now, society. But Aristotle does not regard this as sufficient. Why? That's a long question. We must follow that. Aristotle does not regard this as sufficient, although he's fully aware, of course -- after all, the book is called politiketus, a kind of political inquiry. So he is the last man in the world who could have forgotten about the polis, but he does not regard the polis and its interests and what is required for it as sufficient for determining our action, and the simplest explanation is that he had the feeling there is something in man which transcends the polis and therefore the polis would not be good enough. In addition, there is also this difficulty: when you speak of the polis you leave undetermined whether it is a good or bad polis. Now how do you make a distinction between the good and bad polis? There you will bring in virtue. This is the most natural distinction there, most natural term for distinguishing between the good and bad polis. And therefore you come into Machiavellianism if you take the polis undefined, without any regard to goodness or badness, the mere self-preservation of the polis by hook and by crook, as the standard. This can be done. Machiavelli has shown that it can be done. But it is not good enough, obviously. We all know that, see from time to time at least. Yes, but if we reject that, the polis as a sufficient criterion, what other criterion can we find? And I believe -- I repeat this again -- that the only clear statement about a specific end which Aristotle gives is the contemplative life, and it is clear that the contemplative life, the life of the mind, determines well enough how one should act towards others as well as towards the sub-rational part of man. But this is obviously insufficient because very few people lead the contemplative life, and Aristotle has to find somehow a mean between the polis, undefined -- I mean, only taken as a society of men living together in peace -- and the contemplative life, on the other, and to see somehow, see some conversions between the two. This is the standard, the possible standard, for non-philosophic men; and that is, I think, what he means by moral virtue.

Whatever ends you may take, whatever natural ends you may take, will not cover the whole ground. I mean, if you say, for example, self-preservation -- is, of course, impossible. Then there cannot be courage, as Hobbes has clearly seen. It is clear. I mean, if self-preservation is the end then courage is a vice, naturally. I mean, unless in those circumstances which also may happen where courage might be conducive to self-preservation. There are such cases. For example, the jumping on a chair when some dangerous animal like a mouse or a rat enters may be helpful. Well, we will discuss that when we come to the particular virtues, but what we have to expect from the analysis of the particular virtues is whether this question of the end with a view to which moral man determines what is the right action here now, whether that question is answered. It will surely be made more specific by the analysis of the virtues.



7th Meeting: May 2, 1963

S: It was a good paper and quite a few things are correct. You make, in my opinion, only one great slip. It was casual, but still we should clear it up. You said, when you spoke about the remark about immortality or life after death, that Aristotle leaves this open because this is a theological and not a philosophic question. Can you tell me what Aristotle understands by theology?

O: I thought he meant by religion revealed religion.

S: Yes, but did Aristotle have any notion of revealed religion?

O: I don't know. Doesn't revealed religion reveal such things as he omits?

S: Yes, but, well, what does the term, theology, mean in Aristotle? That is always the best beginning.

O: Yes. He didn't even use the term.

S: Oh yes; not here, but he does, and it is the same as what came to be called later on metaphysics. So it is a part, the highest part, of philosophy. So there is no theology for Aristotle outside of philosophy. There is no revealed theology in Aristotle.

O: Yes, well that's what I meant by theology.

S: Yes, but you could have chosen a better way to say it. No, this is not possible: that Aristotle omits something because it belongs to the province of theology. That's impossible. Yes, there is no such outside field from his point of view. Now as for the more special point, you had some difficulties in understanding why Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that courage refers to the danger of dying in battle as distinguished, for example, from a shipwreck, and it seemed to you first that Aristotle was, as it were, guided by the legislators who praised the brave soldiers and not the men who behave bravely in shipwrecks, unless they are the same so that they would also be soldiers, of course. But then you said no, the legislators are irrelevant. It is intelligible in itself because the enemy you can resist. You have a fighting chance, so to speak. You cannot do anything against the ocean. But is this sufficient? Take another case: a physician who exposes his life in an epidemic. And don't say that this didn't exist in Greece because we know from Thucydides' description of the plague that there were quite a few physicians who exposed their lives in order to save the city. Now why should the physician who exposes his life not be as brave as the soldier? I mean, what is the Aristotelian answer as far as you could discern it in this section which you discussed?

O: (Inaudible).

S: But it is perfectly clear that they went into an infected house. That was as dangerous as to go in a mine field. So? Well, the legislator didn't honor these physicians as they honor the soldiers so you have to come back to the legislator. And the question is whether that is a mere convention or whether there is not a substantive reason for taking one's bearings by what the legislators say. Perhaps it is not an accident that there are always legislators around. Perhaps it has something to do with the fact that man is a political being. Good. So these are the two points.

I read Miss Goldschmidt's paper about the first half of Book III and there is only one point which I would like to mention here in class. Miss Goldschmidt has seen the difficulties but here is one point where I believe she went wrong. She says, "men who see the golden mean through something that could be called genius. These men may be the freest for even though they know what the good course of action is they are not bound by good character to follow that course of action and can still choose either. Perhaps these men are the only ones who can truly do evil for the virtuous man is bound by his good character -- he cannot do evil -- and the vicious man is bound by his bad character. The vicious man cannot but do evil." Do you see that? This doesn't stand. That is a contradiction.

Now let us now turn to a discussion of our assignment. I hope we can cover more of the ground today than we did last time. Now Aristotle turns now, from the middle of the third book toward at least the end of the fifth, to the particular virtues: courage, moderation, and so on. Now it is important to realize this: Aristotle has defined before virtue in general, the genus, and now he comes to the species. But the definition of the genus was not complete. It was not precise. It was given , in a general outline. It somewhat was left in a certain vagueness. Therefore we must count with the possibility that when we study the particular virtues we will learn something about virtue in general which we have not yet learned before. In other words, the procedure of Aristotle is not simply from here, from the more universal, to the particular. There is also a way back. More generally stated, the genus is a whole which comprises the species and the species is a part of the genus. The way from the whole to the part is accompanied also by a way from the part to the whole. We do not understand the whole except by understanding the parts. But, of course, we also can never understand a part unless we understand it as part of a whole, i.e. unless we have some understanding of the whole. This is a great misfortune, but this is the fate of human knowledge: that we always have some inkling of the whole. Otherwise we couldn't begin to think. But we have to go to the parts in order to get more specific knowledge and this more specific knowledge is bound to affect our previous opinions about the whole. This is surely Plato's view, but to some extent, at least in the Ethics, this applies to Aristotle as well. I give you a simple example. Man is a rational animal. You cannot understand man, therefore, if you do not know what animal is, what living being is, but when you understand man, this particular being who possesses reason, this throws light again on animal: namely, that animal is compatible with rationality. This does not become sufficiently clear from the general understanding of animality.

Now the greatest difficulty which we had, I believe, was this (in the general analysis of virtue): virtue has to do with choice of means but the habit of choosing the mean or the means is itself the end. I mean, excuse me: the slip was very bad. I didn't mean now the mean; I meant the means for an end. The habit of choosing the means is itself the end. In the arts it is different. The physician chooses, say, the operation, the means, for the end, health. The end is health, not the operation. But in moral life the action which we choose, which is meant to be a means, is at the same time the end. Do we not need knowledge of the end, of a different end, in order to choose rightly the means? But what is that end with a view to which we determine that this is the right thing to do now? What do we learn from the analysis of courage or manliness regarding the end? First the question, why does he begin in the analysis of the virtues, already in this enumeration of the virtues in Book II, with courage, with manliness? Why does he do that? After all, unless we have proven that Aristotle used a coin, tossed a coin, we must assume that he had a reason for beginning with courage. He surely doesn't tell us. We have to find out. Now when we

read the first few lines of this passage -- Mr. Reinkin.

O: But to resume, let us now discuss the virtues severally, defining the nature of each, the class of objects to which it is related, and the way in which it is related to them. In so doing we shall also make it clear how many virtues there are.

S: Yes, how many there are. See, Aristotle seems to be interested in that purely statistical question: how many virtues there are. Yes. Well, but why is Aristotle interested? Why is the question of how many virtues there are important?

O: By contrast to Plato?

S: Perhaps. Yes, that would be one thing, but you can also say if you know these and these are virtues, only these and these discussed by Aristotle are virtues, there may be others. People speak of those. You count. You make a list for yourself. You compare your list with Aristotle's list. The number will play a certain role. You will see which are excluded by Aristotle. That's not unimportant. Let us keep in mind this question: why does he begin with courage or manliness? Do you know another writer, whom Aristotle knew, who also begins, in a way, with courage? It's one of these nasty examples, as you seem to have gathered. Yes. Well, in the Laws, the first book of the Laws. He begins with courage and goes along into the others; and I think the first book of the Laws will also supply the answer as to why Aristotle begins with courage. Now when he goes on, then, there, and he speaks -- courage has to do with fear and confidence, the opposite of fear, sense of security. But he shifts immediately to fear, as distinguished from a sense of confidence, because courage is primarily the right posture toward fears and not toward feelings of security, and this is connected with the fact that fear has always to do with evil, with impending evil or possible future evil, painful things. You don't need a particular attitude toward confidence. That doesn't create a difficulty for your life if you are confident, but if you are fearful of evil that disturbs you and you have to do something about it. And this is the difference between courage and its related virtue, moderation. Here we have to do with pleasant things, the attractions of pleasures which also disturb. Now let us turn to a10 to 12 only to give you some specimens of Aristotle's procedure. So that courage has to do with fears is not a difficult assertion. Everyone would admit that. But which kind of fears. Let us turn to a10.

O: It is true then that we fear all evil things, for example, disgrace, poverty, disease, lack of friends, death; but it is not thought that courage is related to all these things. . . .

S: Yes, let us stop here. You see, so there are many fear inspiring things. Aristotle gives some striking examples, but how does he make his selection? On the basis of what? The translator says "it is thought." It is supposed to be. It seems. It is generally assumed. No one would call a man who is -- can control his fear regarding disgrace a brave or courageous man. The same applies to the other things like poverty and so on. Now let us make a jump to 24. Aristotle gives other examples: which kinds of fears are not the matter of courage. Now there he raises the question about what kind of things, kind of fear inspiring things, then, is -- yes?

O: What then are the fearful things in respect of which courage is displayed? I suppose those which are the greatest, since there is no one



more brave in enduring danger than the courageous man.

S: More literally -- "not the one who is concerned with the greatest things?" -- meaning the greatest fear-inspiring things (question mark.) Yes. "For no one is more sustaining of the terrible things than the courageous man." Now, and what is this most fear inspiring thing?

O: . . . the most terrible thing of all is death; for it is the end, and when a man is dead, nothing, we think, either good or evil can befall him any more.

S: Yes, "we think" is again "it seems." You see the interesting point: before he had discussed in the first book -- that's your point, Mr. Burnham. What do you want to say?

Q: He makes clear, what he said in the first book was a concession to opinion.

S: Yes, but it was not a very strong point in the first book either. But here it comes quite clear. Yes. But Aristotle, of course -- yes, so what we suspected there, that this is not such a grave problem for him, becomes now perfectly clear.

Q: Yes, the only question is why he mentions it here.

S: You see, the question of -- that was mentioned last time, I believe by Mr. Kirwan -- if there is a certainty of life after death the status of courage is affected by it. I mean, courage, as Aristotle understands it, is displayed with a certainty on the part of the courageous man that he risks everything for his whole future. There is no future beyond his death. That is a point -- why he must make it here. And this may have something to do with the question of the difference between the virtue in the strict sense and virtue of the citizen. Perhaps he spoke before, in the first book, of the citizen point of view. That we do not know. But the main point is again here that he doesn't assert definitely that to the dead man nothing good or bad ever occurs. He only says it is thought to be; thought to be in certain circles like those circles which he addresses here. So we know this much then: courage has to do with the fear-inspiring death and not with other fear-inspiring things, at least not primarily; secondarily it might. Good. This is, however, not sufficient.

O: But even death, we should hold, does not in all circumstances give an opportunity for Courage: for instance, we do not call a man courageous for facing death by drowning or disease. What form of death then is a test of courage? Presumably that which is the noblest.

S: Yes. Also here he uses a question: "not that in the most noble things?" He doesn't assert it. He raises the question, no contradiction, then he goes on. Now the most noble fearful dangers are those in war. Yes.

O: . . . for it is encountered in the midst of the greatest and most noble of dangers. And this conclusion is borne out by the principle on which public honors are bestowed in republics and under monarchies.

The courageous man, therefore, in the proper sense of the term, will be he who fearlessly confronts a noble death, or some sudden peril that threatens death; and the perils of war answer this description most fully.

S: Yes, now let us see here. So the locus of courage is, then, war, facing

death in battle. Now that this is not a peculiarity of Greeks is also, I have been told, not indeed by anthropologists but I know it from much less respectable sources which I decline to identify, that the Red Indians called their warriors "the braves." And this is it. The brave man, the courageous man, is a warrior. So this is not a peculiarity. For those interested in minor subtleties, when he says here in 31, in agreement or corresponding to that are also the honors both in the cities and with the rulers; Averroes makes this remark: men have already agreed in this, convened in this, that those who sustain death in battles are to be praised and . In other words -- that is the line which Mr. Weissberger took -- there is a kind of convention to do that; praising the warriors, in particular. Aristotle does not say this here. This is interpretation given by Averroes. Good. But I think the thesis in itself that courage has its locus in the field of honor -- the clinic, the hospital, where the diseased people are, is not called the field of honor. The field of honor is battle. This is not surprising, although one can say perhaps the philosopher should take a somewhat broader view and one can deplore Aristotle's sticking to the phenomena and we will take this up at the end. Now I suggest we turn to the next chapter, 1115b7, because we cannot read everything.

- O: Now although the same things are not fearful to everybody, there are some terrors which we pronounce beyond human endurance, and these of course are fearful to everyone in his senses.
- S: In other words, there cannot be bravery there or courage there. Yes?
- O: And the terrors that man can endure differ in magnitude and degree; as also do the situations inspiring confidence. But the courageous man is proof against fear so far as man may be. Hence although he will sometimes fear even terrors not beyond man's endurance, he will do so in the right way, and he will endure them as principle dictates, for the sake of that which is noble; for that is the end at which virtue aims.
- S: Here he speaks of the end of virtue. We will take this up again. Let us go on.
- O: On the other hand it is possible to fear such terrors too much, and too little; and also to fear things that are not fearful as if they were fearful. Error arises either from fearing what one ought not to fear, or from fearing in the wrong manner, or at the wrong time, or the like; and similarly with regard to occasions for confidence.
- The courageous man then is he that endures or fears the right things and for the right purpose and in the right manner and at the right time, and who shows confidence in a similar way. (For the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit, and as principle may dictate. And every activity aims at the end that corresponds to the disposition of which it is the manifestation. So it is therefore with the activity of the courageous man: his courage is noble; therefore its end is nobility, for a thing is defined by its end; therefore the courageous man endures the terrors and dares the deeds that manifest courage, for the sake of that which is noble.)
- S: Yes, let us stop here and let us try to understand it. Facing death in battle is the act of the courageous man. Now what does this mean? Must he not run away under any circumstances? May he not surrender under any circumstances? And it would be simple, but it is not so simple. There are situations in which it

is right for him to run away and right for him to surrender, but where to draw the line? You see, if the rule were universally valid, no question. But has the same line to be drawn by everyone? For example, whether a man is wounded or not wounded; whether he has still ammunition; whether he is on a reconnoitering party or whether it is a decisive battle on which everything depends. These are obviously circumstances which are very relevant. Again, this only shows how to draw the line. Now Aristotle speaks first of the fact that different things are fear-inspiring for different human beings. Now of course he doesn't mention that here but he thinks here, of course, also of the difference between men and women although that is not very relevant here immediately because we have already excluded women because courage, the locus of courage, is war. But let us look even for a moment at women. There are some stories about women who jump on a chair when a mouse appears and this is generally regarded as a misplaced fear, not a rational one. But I think we would all say in fairness to everyone that if it is not a mouse but a rat it would be a somewhat different situation, because a rat is a more fear-inspiring animal than a mouse. I think if it is a black panther even men would be excused if we were to jump not only on chairs but to the ceiling. So there is a variety of fearful things for different human beings. Yet there are certain limits to that. There are certain things which are too fear-inspiring for every human being and where no human being can be expected to stand. That is one point. One thing could, of course, be entirely new weapons, entirely new, absolutely unexpected weapons, wholly surprising. Think: elephants coming up against a great army who have never been confronted by elephants, as the Romans did. This cannot be simply regarded as cowardice if the Romans don't know them. Next time they will know and they will change their tactics, of course. Mr. Weissberger.

Q: (As to whether the case of Macabeus confronting the elephants in the Apocrapha was one of courage.)

S: Yes, that would be extraordinary courage. Good. Yes, sure, that would be extraordinary courage, but he might have heard of elephants already before. (Laughter). No, that would not detract from his courage but would make it more intelligible that in such a situation -- good. Now the second consideration is this: courage is the right posture not merely toward death in battle, but also toward other fear-inspiring things and this makes the question of how to draw the line, i.e. of the telos, of the end, still more urgent. Now when we take the example of the woman confronted by the mouse or by the rat, why is it more reasonable if it is a rat than if it is a mouse? Why is it more reasonable?

O: The fear of danger is more.

S: Yes, but danger; danger of what?

O: The rat can kill them.

S: Can kill them. Yes, what is then the point of view? Very simple: life and limbs, yes. Life and limbs. Very good. Yes, but clearly this is of no help because the courageous man precisely exposes life and limb in the proper situation, not when confronted with a black panther but when confronted by an enemy. But how does he draw the line? I mean, the line cannot be drawn with a view to self-preservation. That's impossible. Then there would never be any brave man. Yes? Is it not clear?

O: If the battlefield is the main field of courage, we sacrifice our lives or we put our lives in jeopardy there for the polis, for the state.



S: Yes, but still, did Aristotle say anything about the polis? What did Aristotle say about the end, the end at which the courageous, the brave man, the manly man, aims?

O: The noble.

S: The noble. Period. You must admit, that is not very enlightening. Somehow we have in mind -- we all know a certain bit about these things -- we have in mind something like the polis. That's not stated. And what about you, Mr. Boyan?

Q: Yes, we're not going to emphasize simply the relationship of fears to things that may cause death. There are other things that can cause fear and that can be another reason why the question of self-preservation cannot be the standard.

S: I mean, what is that other reason why self-preservation cannot be the standard?

Q: Well, because you fear other things that have nothing to do with self-preservation.

S: Yes, for instance?

Q: You may fear you're going to flunk an exam.

S: Yes, Aristotle -- he has excluded. No one is regarded as a courageous man in Aristotle's sense because he has no fear of flunking an examination. It may be either that he has a just estimate of his powers and it may also be a man of extraordinary levity, but it is not the sphere of courage or cowardice. I mean, we may take up later on the question, why Aristotle excludes so rigorously the other fields of apprehensions and how to fight them from the sphere of courage. We may do that, but let us first --

Q: He does mention other things: pain, when he's talking about the coward, page 161. "But to seek death in order to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or from pain or sorrow. . . ." Okay, those are three other things.

S: Yes. May I suggest this very humdrum procedure: that we wait until we come to that passage. Good. So Aristotle has now made reasonably clear what courage is, i.e. what its matter, its field, is, but he has not yet made clear what the end is except for saying it is the noble, and he distinguishes, then, in the sequel the two defects belonging to courage: the excess and the defect. The excess is rashness, boldness, however you call it, and the defect proper is cowardice, of course. Yes, Mr. Burnham.

Q<sub>2</sub>: What I don't understand: is that a mis-translation or what is the structure of that argument there? He says the courage of the courageous man is noble. Therefore its end is nobility. In the passage we just read.

S: The end of every activity is that which corresponds to the habit in question and for the courageous man courage is noble. That is what we had. The editors don't like that. They have all kinds of remarks. But this is what we have.

Q<sub>2</sub>: But then he goes on: he says, "therefore its end is nobility."

S: Yes, well, "such like, then, is also the end." I suppose he means that noble is then also the end. That he means here.

Q<sub>2</sub>: You take out "therefore."

S: Yes, well, something like the therefore is there. In Greek, gei.

Q<sub>3</sub>: On the artisan: it seems the major premise was that every activity aims at the end that corresponds to the habit of which it is the manifestation. The major premise is that for activities the telos, the thing to which it tends, is of like character with the actual practice.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, you could say his courage is just. Therefore its end is justice. But that doesn't help; does it?

S: Now let us see. "The end of every activity (of every energeias) is that which corresponds to the heixas." So the end of a just action is that which corresponds to the habit of justice. The end of the courageous action is that which corresponds to the habit of courage. And how they are related: that is not taken up here. The point is this: the transition is here, then, this: "so the courageous man aims at being courageous" and he does everything that he does with the ultimate view to being courageous. And courage, his being courageous, has the character of being noble. That it shares with justice, temperance, and so on. He acts courageously because he is concerned with acting nobly and concerned with nothing else. That, I think, is the meaning of that passage. Mr. Butterworth.

Q<sub>1</sub>: In lines 17, following, where our translator says "the courageous man then is he that endures or fears the right things" etc. etc., how would you reply to the question that this seems to be tautological?

S: That is not tautological because it indicates the various considerations which have to be considered, the various circumstances. For example, one action -- say, running away from the enemy -- maybe is base sometimes and not base on other occasions. So you cannot give here a complete list of the occasions on which it is wise or unwise because it depends on so many different circumstances: whether it is a small group reconnoitering only or whether it is a large army, and how large and how small. That depends on the circumstances. You know, that you cannot say. And also let me see what are the other points. Yes, and does he do it -- how one should -- for example, it may be the right thing in these circumstances to withdraw but not to run away throwing away one's guns or whatever you have. That depends.

Q<sub>1</sub>: Well we have in our translation, "The right things," "the right purpose," "the right manner," and "the right time."

S: Yes, let us see: "what one should do and in the right manner, the right time (right occasion) and many other considerations." The circumstances: we have spoken of that before. There always is a variety of circumstances and they all must be considered. And that is in itself something very simple. The difficulty is, however, as I have stated before: towards what do you look in order to adjust the right thing to the circumstances? There must be some principle. This he calls the noble and that is, of course, too general. I mean, with a view to what do you draw the line? You draw the line not merely with a view to the circumstances but also with a view to something else, because if you would

say the end is self-preservation the same circumstances would recommend in all these cases perhaps running away, as Hobbes said. But if the end is not self-preservation what is it? Aristotle has told us hitherto only the noble and the noble means negatively not self-preservation. This much we know, but that is too general. Why don't we first finish this section and then see what we can learn? Now he makes, then, clear in the sequel that to brave death or to choose death in order to avoid poverty, erotic troubles, and pain is not courage but cowardice, because, in the first place, it is softness to run away from toilsome things. Softness is almost the same as cowardice. And second: why does he do that -- who commits suicide because he is about to become poor and he is not loved by his girl or he has to expect great pain? He does this not for the sake of something noble, but in order to escape merely from an evil without an outlook of something noble. So this noble must be present if there is to be courage. I think you can understand that. You can understand it, although we would like to hear from such a master like Aristotle something more specific than just the noble in general. But I believe he will give it to us to some extent. Good. Now then in the sequel, in 1116a15, he does something which he doesn't do elsewhere in his discussion of the virtues: namely, he presents the sham forms of the virtue, (here courage), five sham forms. No such variety exists elsewhere and this throws light on courage: that it has so many false imitations whereas the other virtues don't seem to have that. Now the first of which he speaks is political courage, the courage of the citizen, and he is prompted in the best case by the desire for honor, meaning for being himself honored by badges or by any special distinction: you know, external signs of honor. Or in the worst case, fear of punishment. He doesn't run away because he knows that he will be shot as a deserter, whatever the case may be. Good. Then we have the second case: the courage of mercenaries. Political courage is the courage of the citizens who fight. The courage of the mercenaries -- and this is due, is a lower case. It is not strictly speaking courage because it is due merely to experience. They know that there is no serious danger. They can lick everyone. They can shoot better, or whatever the weapons at the time may be. There is no real danger. What is dangerous to the inexperienced or less experienced is not a danger to them. Therefore there is nothing particularly admirable. And then three -- let us read here b15 to 23, 1116b, 15 to 23. "The mercenaries become cowards. . . ."

O: . . . professional soldiers prove cowards when the danger imposes too great a strain, and when they are at a disadvantage in numbers and equipment; for they are the first to run away, while citizen troops stand their ground and die fighting, as happened in the battle at the temple of Hermes. This is because citizens think it disgraceful to run away, and prefer death to safety so procured; whereas professional soldiers were relying from the outset on superior strength, and when they discover they are outnumbered they take to flight, fearing death more than disgrace. But this is not true courage.

S: Yes. You see, this is one form in which Aristotle illustrates it. Now then he turns to the three other cases of sham courage: mere animal spirits, we may say: the lion, the boar, and there are also human beings who can act this way. The fourth case: those who are, to use a present day expression, the optimists; people who have good hopes from being accustomed to win. They always lick them. Think of a colonial nation surrounded by subject people, and, you know, they make some police raids from time to time. There is no risk involved. They always know that they are better armed. This is also not true courage. And the last one is from ignorance, from sheer ignorance: that they don't know how dangerous it is. I remember a case of Bob Hope stroking a tiger or a lion. He didn't know that it was; he thought it was a dog. But this is, of course, not --



no one would call him -- at the moment he became aware of what he had done he was properly apprehensive. Yes. Now we have now -- I mean, we cannot read all these things, but at the end of this passage we have all the data required for giving an answer, some answer, to the question of the end. Aristotle does not say a word about the fact that the courageous man as defined by him faces death for the polis, for the fatherland; for the common good; not a word. Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary, does this, but we know that Thomas Aquinas is always anxious to see the rationale of the various virtues. Aristotle does not do that, not even when he speaks of the citizen courage, which is not true courage, does he mention that they do not run away, whereas the mercenaries run away, because they think of their wives and children and the city; not even there. How can we explain that? And, of course, when we start from the fact of the polis we see that a polis cannot exist if it does not have a considerable number of courageous men. Courage is absolutely necessary for the existence of the city. That's clear. I mean, to that extent courage is rationally praised, because it is needed for the polis. Aristotle does not even allude to that, and not because it is completely a matter of course. He mentions quite a few things which are merely a matter of course. Why does he not do it? But before I go on, Mr. McAtee.

Q: Is a possible answer to your question that he explained earlier the fact that all men recognize that military courage is to be rewarded and lack of military courage punished?

S: Yes, yes, sure. That would seem to follow from that. Yes, this is the reason why I took issue with Mr. Weissberger's statement. Good. Someone else wanted to say something. Oh, Mr. Kirwan.

Q<sub>2</sub>: It is hard for me to conceive in a practical situation of how the end of battle would not be related significantly to a particular polis, whether a good one or a bad one.

S: Sure. Of course not. Of course also, the salvation of the polis would naturally be the point of view with a view to which you draw the line. I mean, for example, in some cases it is no serious danger if the army is defeated. It may be an outlying district of no strategic importance. But then if the enemy approached the city where really the future of the city is at stake, strictly speaking, then the situation is different, obviously. In other words, to repeat, we must draw the line. The sentiments of fear do not come around with tags around them, as I said last time. Here this degree of fear in this circumstance is bad and this is good. We have to determine that and we must determine it with a view to something. If we say with a view to the noble that is not sufficient because we want to find out precisely what the noble now is. And when we say the salvation of the fatherland then we say something. Of course that doesn't mean that the individual soldier will necessarily determine that. That may be impossible for military reasons. Maybe it will have to be done by the commanding officer and the courage of the soldier will then be simply that he resists where he is commanded to resist and withdraws where he is commanded to withdraw and doesn't think of his survival. But still (rest of this sentence barely audible because of defective tape) -- (to the effect that the soldier is dependent for his survival on the polis.) Mr. Boyan.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Does Aristotle rest courage on the basis of the polis or does he rather base it on the fact that courage is a virtue and virtue is the core of happiness?

S: Yes, sure. In other words, what do you mean? He talks to people who have no doubt that courage is a praiseworthy thing and who also would admit to him

that courage is to be shown above all in war. . . . All right, but these other people to whom he talks would, of course, always say, well, courage is a virtue of war and war is necessary for the good of the polis, of course. They would all add that. Aristotle here says less than the gentlemen, than the good citizens. He says less than them. He does not refer to that. That's the striking thing. And we have to wonder why he does not mention that.

Q4: Does it belong to justice rather than to courage?

S: Perhaps. Perhaps but even here the question simply is so manifest in belonging to war. It means that he avoids the question.

Q5: Isn't the reason that the polis is the means for the noble life, that you cannot have the good man without the city --

S: Yes, but on the other hand, in what does the good life consist except -- the good life in the sense of moral virtue -- except in being a good citizen or ruler? You see? I mean, what is the highest activity of the citizen?

Q5: If courage is for the sake of the noble it would seem that the polis is also for the sake of the noble.

S: In other words, this silence about the polis, you mean, is inspired by the fact that Aristotle from the very beginning looks beyond the polis to that to which the polis is dedicated. Is that what you mean? Yes. One could also say that as follows: this question of the polis is inseparable, for Aristotle, from the question of the politeia. The fatherland is for Aristotle the mere matter and it receives its form from the order, from the social and political order. . . . Now if the fatherland has a bad regime then it is nothing so wonderful, I mean so praiseworthy, if someone defends this bad thing. Or differently stated, the polis itself can be good or bad and therefore we would have to say, strictly speaking, that courage should be displayed in the cause of a good polis. So what is it that makes the polis good? And then we come again back to moral virtue. Yes. Now Mr. Kirwan.

Q2: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, this would only say that Aristotle probably had some reason for leaving that in the dark. It would only amount to that. But the relation of courage to the polis is obvious, but this relation is not free from ambiguity because of the ambiguity of the polis. What is the end of this particular polis? If this polis is dedicated to something evil so that it is a bad regime then this courage is perhaps not so -- it is misplaced. I mean, you know, the man may still be, in the ordinary sense of the word, very courageous, but that is not the perfect form of courage because we have to consider that. But once you raise this difficult question of the end of the polis then you come into deep waters and then it is, perhaps, wise to stop, to stop the question here.

Q6: (To the effect that in battle hope doesn't play the part that fear plays, so that one is already dealing with a different emotion.)

S: No, no, what you now call hope is what Aristotle calls confidence or sense of the . . . That is fear. And whenever there is fear in contra-distinction to desperation there always is some hope. This doesn't affect the question.

Q<sub>6</sub>: Fear is not the same as desperation?

S: Yes, desperation is an extreme of fear. No hope is anymore left. . . . (Inaudible exchange.) In all forms except this extreme hope and fear are still present, but we speak of fear when the element of hope is very small or relatively small. When you have hope you have invariably fear. I mean, when you hope that this will come to pass you are not sure that it will come to pass. You also have an expectation of evil. An expectation of evil is fear. To that extent, they are not identical but they are indistinguishable. Mr. McAtee, you have been neglected.

Q<sub>7</sub>: (Refers to the discussion in the first book of the Laws.)

S: You can put it this way but this statement is a very harsh one and you can state it much more simply as follows. If you say polis you say, in modern language, a sovereign state and then you say, of course, a variety of sovereign states, and then you say the possibility of war. To that extent, polis and war are inseparable and therefore, when you say this then you say the polis must sell (?) the virtue of courage. That's clear. I mean, that is very simple. The strange thing is that Aristotle doesn't even allude to it. When he speaks of the kind of virtue which is obviously related to the polis, namely the citizen courage, as a sham form even if it is the best sham form, even there he doesn't speak of the polis. . . . and above all this citizen courage is not the true courage. I believe that settles it. Now we must go on now. Let us turn to 1117a29. We have a new chapter again.

O: Courage is displayed with respect to confidence and fear, but not with respect to both equally: it is more particularly displayed in regard to objects of fear; for one who is unperturbed in the presence of terrors and comports himself rightly towards these is courageous in a fuller sense than one who does so in situations that inspire confidence.

S: In other words, someone in a situation of perfect security is not tinged by any fear where you can call him courageous. So the bombs must be known to be near to give him an opportunity for showing courage now.

O: In fact, as has been said, men are sometimes called courageous for enduring pain. Hence courage itself is attended by pain; and it is justly praised, because it is harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure. Not but what it would appear that the end corresponding to the virtue of courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the attendant circumstances. This is illustrated by the case of athletic contests: to boxers, for example, their end -- the object they box for, the wreath and the honors of victory -- is pleasant, but the blows they receive must hurt them, being men of flesh and blood, and also all the labor they undergo is painful; and these painful incidentals are so numerous that the final object, being a small thing, appears not to contain any pleasure at all.

S: In other words, Aristotle would never have become a boxer. Yes?

O: If then the same is true of courage, the death or wounds that it may bring will be painful to the courageous man, and he will suffer them unwillingly; but he will endure them because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so. And the more a man possesses all virtue, and the more happy he is, the more pain will death cause him; for



to such a man life is worth most, and he stands to lose the greatest goods, and knows that this is so, and this must be painful. But he is none the less courageous on that account, perhaps indeed he is more so, because he prefers glory in war to the greatest prizes of life.

It is not true therefore of every virtue that its active exercise is essentially pleasant, save in so far as it attains its end.

S: No, "as it touches on the end." It touches on the end in the case of courage why? Because he does it for the sake of the noble. And to that extent it is pleasant, but from every point of view it is most unpleasant. So the famous words of Horace: it is sweet and noble to die for the fatherland. Aristotle would question the sweet to some extent; not entirely but to some extent. Yes?

O: No doubt it is possible that such men as these do not make the best professional soldiers, but men who are less courageous, and have nothing of value besides life to lose; for these face danger readily, and will barter their lives for trifling gains.

S: Yes, let us stop here. So this is a general reflection about the peculiar status of courage as distinguished from all the other virtues, from all other virtues. In all other virtues the activity, the full activity, is pleasant. In the case of courage the full activity is not pleasant. Courage is a virtue apart. That is what you meant. This is perhaps not -- you don't insist on the expression. But something of this kind is stated if you look that up in Plato's Laws, Book XII, 963e, where this is made very clear. The highest act of courage cannot be simply gratified, whereas the highest acts of the other virtues can be simply gratified. This means courage is the lowest virtue and this is the reason why Aristotle begins with courage and ascends to the other virtues. There are some remarks, for example, in the Rhetoric and other places where he says -- yes, in the Rhetoric, in the fifth chapter of the first book -- moderation and courage are virtues of a young man, i.e. they do not require maturity as the more sophisticated virtues to which he turns later on. There is an ascent in intellectuality. Justice is a much more intellectual virtue, as you see if you think of the highest act of virtue: what a judge has to do: assigning to the jurisprudential. That requires much more intellectual activity than the act of courage. The general also has to be courageous, but the general is not general exclusively because he is courageous. That is only a condition for his being general. What distinguishes him as general from the simple soldier is that he has a kind of intellect regarding war which the simple soldier does not necessarily possess. So this is, I think, the reason for this order. Yes, but we have to raise quite a few questions. Yes, Mr. Weissberger.

Q: In order for the courageous man to know what to fear or not to fear he has to have some sort of wisdom and this is not found in everybody -- like a man might look at a mine field or something like that and not know it's a mine field--

S: Yes, but the question is this: who makes the decision whether to stay or to leave, ultimately?

Q: The general.

S: Ultimately, yes. That the key point of courage of war is not so much these decisions as whether to suppress his fear and to stick to his guns. That is what courage is. And that a certain difference of judgment is needed, surely. But you know that, because there are all kinds of echelons. Sometimes the leader of a small group, of a platoon, must make certain decisions. But these are not the

greatest decisions. Yes?

Q2: In his analysis of courage do you think he comes closest to Kant's analysis of moral virtue?

S: Yes, you mean the almost, so to speak, complete absence of pleasure. Yes. Indeed. But since we must go on, I have made a remark about that in What Is Political Philosophy?, page 280, if you would look that up, and surely it is of some importance but I cannot now go into it. I must only first repeat something and not go into that now because we will take it up when we come to moderation.

The question of the end is so unclear. But something else: at the end of this section on courage Aristotle says this much should be said about courage -- what courage is is not difficult to grasp in outline from what has been said. This is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of courage. Quite a few things of which we think are not even alluded to. Think of Antigone's courage against Creon, courage against tyrants, and also against tyrannical mobs: no allusion to it. But why does Aristotle not speak of that, doesn't allude to it, to this kind of thing, this kind of courage? It would fall under another virtue, justice. I mean, that is what Antigone believes to act for. Or take political courage, risking not merely unpopularity but even deciding in favor of a cause which might lead to disaster, and to have to do it. We also speak of intellectual courage; not here. How would Aristotle call that? Did not Aristotle speak somewhere of what we would call intellectual courage in this book? Yes?

O: In regard to Plato.

S: Yes, how did he call it?

O: Truth is higher than friendship.

S: Higher? He uses another expression than higher. Friendship for wisdom is to be preferred to friendship for Plato. So, in other words, he wouldn't call this courage; he would only say to break with a revered teacher like Plato doesn't require courage. It requires love of wisdom. This is improperly called courage. Now in order to understand our meaning of courage -- and I think many people must be disappointed with this few pages on courage -- is due to the fact that we call many things courage which were not regarded as courage in former times. There is a term which reminds you of that, a term which we have found in such different writers as Xenophon and Rousseau so they are probably not affected by the difference between the moderns and ancients, and that is strength of soul. We call courage frequently what would formerly have been called strength of soul, and, of course, all virtues as Aristotle understands them are forms of strength of soul, strength of soul regarding death, strength of soul regarding desires, strength of soul regarding love of possessions and honors and whatever else it may be. Why has courage taken the place of strength of soul? Perhaps people don't want to speak anymore of soul, which is a good reason in many cases. That could be one reason, but I do not know. It would be a worthy subject of inquiry for a better understanding of ourselves. Yes?

Q3: Wouldn't the death of Socrates involve a certain amount of courage?

S: Yes, because it has clearly to do with death, directly. That is true, but Socrates is not credited, at least by Xenophon, with courage, with manliness.

Q3: He's credited with temperance.

S: Yes, well, I think it is, of course, connected with the strength of soul. Socrates didn't flinch. But whether it would be properly called courage is another matter. Of course, everyone speaking today from our present outlook would say Socrates was a courageous man. He braved quite a few things: not only death but also, you know, in the trial of the generals he braved the multitude. But this I do not know. I have not made a study, but it would be worth making. Since what time does courage have this broad meaning which it has now? And I believe that this might lead to interesting results. I do not know. The simplest thing in all such cases is to take the Oxford dictionary and look up courage: what it meant as long as there is any record. And then one can, perhaps, find something, sometimes already in the Oxford dictionary but usually one needs more. Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>1</sub>: What does Aristotle mean when he talks about the imperfect kinds of courage?

S: Because they are not guided by the noble, these brave men. The man who doesn't run away because there is an M.P. behind him is not generally courageous. Wouldn't you admit that? Q<sub>1</sub>: Yes, certainly. Good. And the man who is courageous in the sense of Bob Hope? You would also not call him courageous. Yes, but the question is -- there may be such sham forms also in the case of the other virtues but Aristotle does not go out of his way in any other case except in the case of courage to show these sham forms; and I think that is meant to be an indication of the questionable character of courage.

Q<sub>1</sub>: In other words, courage in general is defined by its end, but the particular kinds of courage are defined by the motive.

S: Yes, also by their ends, but the best kind of citizen, as described here, of citizen courageous man, is guided by the hope to be mentioned in the daily report of his division, and Aristotle would say that is not true courage because this is not the end for which a man should be courageous. But the interesting thing is that Aristotle doesn't say he must be swayed by the dedication to his country and therefore he will be disinterested in such distinction. Well, he will enjoy it when he will get it but it is not his main consideration. The main consideration is to win the war for the sake of his country, and the extraordinary thing is that Aristotle leaves it at the noble without indicating specifically which form the noble takes in the case of this virtue.

Q<sub>1</sub>: To me at least this shows the conventional character of courage, because if you do away with real war then you've done away with most forms of courage.

S: Yes, but is this not an "unrealistic" premise. You must admit, Aristotle has in his favor the whole evidence up to the year 1953 and if you don't believe me then think of Laos and other places. So, I mean, this other is a promise: that there will never be war. But even if there will never be war there might very well be civil wars in this world state. Then you still have to send people there to put down the civil war and then you can say there is only a police force there, but then this police force would, then, be the locus of courage in Aristotle's sense. No, we cannot jump over the facts of life on the basis of a promise. We don't know whether that check is not -- you know, whether it's not an over-draft.

Q<sub>1</sub>: What brought this to my mind was that the papers recently have been referring to Arnold Maremont's stand as courageous. S: Who was that? Mr. Maremont. Note: the reference is to the then Chairman of the Illinois Public Aid Commission who was being sharply attacked for (1) persuading the commission to provide



contraceptive tablets to unmarried mothers of children being supported by the state, with the intention of limiting the financial burden on Illinois of supporting the increasing number of such children, and (2) attacking members of the State Legislature who advocated the placing of ceilings on relief recipients and specifically accusing some of the southern Illinois members of being racists on grounds that probably were not entirely devoid of merit.

S: Yes, well, that is what they call -- how is it called -- civilian courage. Yes, yes, sure, let us disregard that, but there is surely the case that some people -- there are many remarks about that: Bismarck, who felt that the Germans' military courage is very common but civilian courage, very rare. You know, we can call it that; that someone, when he sees his superior officer commit a gross act of injustice, tells him "I refuse to obey your order" and there is no danger of his being shot for that but only the authority. You can call that courage. Aristotle would not call it courage. He would say this fellow lacked the strength of soul and he would probably say that belongs to the sphere of justice rather than of courage. But these are not mere names, as some people say. We would simply say why this military virtue has become so universalized that you call all these things, Mr. Maremont and Socrates and so on and so on -- that you call all this courage. Why? How come? And not strength of soul. When you speak of strength of soul you do not necessarily think of matters military, but when we speak of courage we still think primarily of it.

Q5: You said earlier that courage requires an element of hope. Is courage possible where the certainty of death is sure if you don't run away, say? I mean, it would seem to me it would be possible to do something noble that would result surely in death where the alternative would be running away.

S: Yes. Very good. Why is the brave man in such a situation not in a state of despair? Because he sees something apart from his death; namely, the noble. So that from Aristotle's point of view only the coward would despair because he sees nothing except his life and doesn't see that noble which enables him to transcend life.

Q5: But that means that the noble is something beyond death in a sense. Is it?

S: In a sense, yes. And that is, of course, the peculiar character of courage, not of other virtues. Q5: Inaudible. I mean, this may be a paradoxical statement, but it may still be true to the facts. You know, this is the minimum of intellectual courage: that one must admit things which are paradoxical but true. Now we must really go on if you don't mind and there will be another occasion.

Now we turn now to moderation. Now in the case of moderation; what Aristotle calls sophrosyne. This has a much broader meaning in other writers like Plato; in Thucydides, much broader, and it is something like sensible being -- yes, moderation -- well, when we call a man moderate we do not think merely of his moderation regarding food and drink. Aristotle reduces, uses sophrosyne only in relation to the sensual pleasures. Only. This was not completely impossible. There are such traces of that; moderation is very narrowly limited also in Plato and probably in other writers, general usage. But I mention this only. Just as he limits courage strictly to war he limits moderation strictly to the sensual pleasures, and therefore they are the lowest, the most obvious virtues and the most urgent virtues. The most obvious and most urgent and therefore the lowest.

Q6: Rackham uses the word temperance. Now is that more accurate?

S: You can do it. It would in one way be correct in the case of Aristotle because when you speak now in English of temperance, thinking of temperance leagues and other things, naturally that's true. But since I have made, on the basis of broader considerations, the habit to translate sophrosyne by moderation, I would like to cling to that.

Q7: Is this the same virtue which is discussed in the beginning of Book VII?

S: No, no, no. No, no, that is continence, the ordinary translation. We come to that. That is a very special case. Now Thomas Aquinas explains the relation of the two virtues as follows: courage has to do with the fear-inspiring things which destroy human life, especially death, of course; moderation has to do with the pleasant things by which human life is preserved, food, drink, and so on. And therefore he takes a broad view of human nature, of the parts of the human soul, and sees how these two virtues are related to these parts. The interesting thing again is that Aristotle does not do that. Aristotle does not make any deduction of the virtues from a higher principle. That is his peculiarity. Now what Aristotle states here, then, is that temperance, or moderation let me say, is concerned with bodily pleasures. It has to do with the irrational part of a man; and let us read 1118a9. No we cannot; we cannot read this whole thing. And then he says but not all pleasures of all senses -- for example, not the pleasure of seeing. If a man had an excessive desire for hearing music he is not called immoderate. It is another defect but it doesn't fall under this heading. And he limits it to touch and taste. And let us see: there are very beautiful remarks about that. For example, the dogs. The dogs do not enjoy the smell of hares or rabbits except because the smells announce the meat, the food, and some people also enjoy the smell of the impending meal but this is not strictly an enjoyment of smells but an enjoyment of food, of sense of touch. Now let us begin at 1118a26.

O: These are the pleasures of touch and taste. But even taste appears to play but a small part, if any, in moderation. For taste is concerned with discriminating flavors, as is done by wine-tasters, and cooks preparing savory dishes. . . .

S: In other words, not yet the enjoyment. Yes?

O: . . . but it is not exactly the flavors that give pleasure, or at all events not to the profligate: it is actually enjoying the object that is pleasant, and this is done solely through the sense of touch, alike in eating and drinking and in what are called the pleasures of sex. This is why a certain gourmand wished that his throat might be longer than a crane's, showing that his pleasure lay in the sensation of contact.

S: In other words, he did not wish an extension of his tongue. That's the point -- but of that part of the body which is directly concerned with enjoyment. Yes?

O: I think also we should mention the pleasures of the teeth.

S: Yes, Aristotle would be very practical and say that is only just like smell, a kind of anticipation.

O: No, it's part of the pleasure of touch. . . . /S: Good. Now let us go on. /

- O: Hence the sense to which profligacy is related is the most universal of the senses; and there appears to be good ground for the disrepute in which it is held, because it belongs to us not as human beings but as animals.
- S: Well, "it" -- what is that "it"?
- O: The sense of touch.
- S: Yes, this is the way in which it was understood by Averroes and in the Islamic tradition, I believe, in general. But in the Western tradition it was always understood to refer not to the sense of touch but to the vice here; the vice, intemperance or profligacy, is disgraceful, because from Aristotle's point of view a sense, a natural sense, cannot be in itself disgraceful. This I mention in passing. Go on.
- O: Therefore it is bestial to revel in such pleasures, and to like them better than any others. We do not refer to the most refined of the pleasures of touch, such as the enjoyment of friction and warm baths in the gymnasia; the tactual pleasures of the profligate have to do with certain parts only, not with the whole of the body.
- S: Yes, in other words the pleasure deriving from massage, even the excessive pleasure, is not that of a profligate. They have only to do with parts of the body; and Aristotle does not develop that. He is very delicate. He speaks much more of food and drink than of the pleasures of sex; of course, he has them also in mind. Now then he speaks in the sequel of the variability of the pleasures in question. So, in other words, all men need food and drink, but there is also a desire of this man for this kind of food, or in the case of sex a love for this woman, not for all women. But to some extent Aristotle says these specifications too are natural and not merely due to training and habituation. It is quite interesting that Aristotle does not for one moment consider here heterosexuality. /Preceding sentence is clearly a slip of the tongue as indicated by what follows. / See, Aristotle takes the naturalness very literally. The love in question, sex, is heterosexual. I mention this in passing. Let us turn to b15.
- O: Not but what there is also something natural in such tastes; for different things are pleasant to different people, and there are some special delicacies which all men like better than ordinary food.  
In the case of the natural desires, then, few men err, and in one way only, that of excess in quantity. . . .
- S: In other words, for food as such or drink as such few men err and the error is invariably in the direction of too much. I mean, this can be disregarded: the people who don't have any desire for food and drink. Yes?
- O: . . . for to eat or drink in repletion of ordinary food and drink is to exceed what is natural in amount, since the natural desire is only to satisfy one's wants. Hence people who over-eat are called 'mad-bellies,' meaning that they fill that organ beyond the right measure; it is persons of especially slavish nature that are liable to this form of excess.  
But in regard to the pleasures peculiar to particular people, many men err, and err in many ways. For it is either because they like things that it is not right to like, or like them more than most people do, or like them in a wrong manner; and the profligate exceed in all these ways. For they like some things that are wrong, and indeed abominable, and any



such things that it is right to like they like more than is right, and more than most people.

It is clear then that excess in relation to pleasures is profligacy and that it is blameworthy.

S: Let us stop here then. In the natural desires few men go wrong and those who do do it in the direction of excess. Errors are frequent regarding the particular kinds of pleasure; meaning things which one should not enjoy or more than one should enjoy them and in a manner one should not do it. For example, things not good for them and deriving too great enjoyment from them; instead of enjoying them reasonably to be taken up completely by the enjoyment. These would be examples; yes. Now in the immediate sequel he makes clear that the brave man, the courageous man, is praised because he does not flinch or suffer because of the evil involved, the present danger of death. The moderate man is not praised because he does not flinch or suffer because of the evil involved, the absence of these things, but because of his conduct in the presence of the pleasant things. Then he speaks in the sequel of the excess as such, the profligacy, as he translates, and here is the paradoxical situation that he suffers because of pleasure. He is pained because of a pleasure. There seems to be a difficulty which Aristotle doesn't develop here which plays a great role in Plato's argument. The defect, however, insensitivity to these pleasures, occurs very rarely, very rarely. Now let us turn to 1119a11 because this has, then, to do with the question of the end.

O: The moderate man keeps a middle course in these matters. He takes no pleasure at all in the things that the profligate enjoys most, on the contrary, he positively dislikes them; nor in general does he find pleasure in wrong things, nor excessive pleasure in anything of this sort; nor does he feel pain or desire when they are lacking, or only in a moderate degree, not more than is right, nor at the wrong time, *et cetera*. But such pleasures as conduce to health and fitness he will try to obtain in a moderate and right degree; as also other pleasures so far as they are not detrimental to health and fitness, and not ignoble, nor beyond his means. The man who exceeds these limits cares more for such pleasures than they are worth. Not so the moderate man; he only cares for them as right principle enjoins.

S: Yes. Now here we have a much more specific statement about the ends with a view to which the virtuous man orders his life: health and fitness of the body and the means, what you can afford. In other words, there is nothing wrong if you would eat particular delicacies at the wrong time of the year if you can afford it. Why not? But if you cannot afford it then you are a profligate man because you cannot control yourself. Now these two parts of the story are strictly calculating. Think of a calculating fellow who would, of course, be guided by that: he would never eat or drink too much, naturally, because -- you know, unnecessary complications; nor would he get into financial troubles because he would eat too much. These are sheer calculating considerations. What distinguishes the virtuous man from the calculator? What is it? Because there were three things mentioned here and the central one is the most important. It must not be against the noble. So the noble is the third consideration, which, of course, would not affect in any way the calculator, the man who merely calculates, the valitudinarian -- however you might call it. What is that which is not noble? Well, let us look at food. Good. For example, how he eats. Well, we all know these simple things. We would eat the right portion, just as the calculator would. To that extent there is no difference. And also the kind of food which he can afford. But what is the difference between the mere calculator

and the virtuous man regarding eating or drinking? I think something which you all know: how he eats. The calculator as calculator is not in the least interested in good table manners. The virtuous man would not eat too hastily nor too slowly, because too hastily is a sign which reveals lack of self-control and too slowly might reveal affectation -- you know, super-dainty. Not too much at one bite and not too little at one bite and not too audible: the whole sphere which we may call don't permit the other or force the other to participate in your digestive process is, of course, here a very important consideration. And also the right time: for example, not during a lecture or so. But, on the other hand, in certain times these strict manners may have to be relaxed. For example, sudden alarm; the enemy is coming. Then you will not insist on ceremony, as we say. I think we all understand that. Now, to repeat, the two considerations of health and of means are useful, utilitarian we can say. The noble is concentrated in the third point mentioned. Now what is that if we look at these manners of eating? And, of course, there are infinite varieties and some are purely irrelevant: whether you should eat a potato -- should cut it with a knife -- or fish -- or may not do it -- you know, there are great variations, n. But something is, of course, everywhere the case. Certain ways of eating are decent and others are indecent. The noble is, of course, the decent. Only decent is now in our language a somewhat lower word than the noble, but the primary meaning is the same. Now what is it? First, we would say how one's eating and drinking looks or sounds to others. One doesn't wish to offend others. Out of some kind of fear of others or in order to faun upon the others: that, of course, is not virtue. If someone eats decently when he is invited with the president of his university or corporation but on no other occasion then he is not a well-mannered man, you know, because his motivation is sheer calculation. But if it is his second nature that he would eat decently with whomever he eats and even if he is alone then he is well-mannered. So there must be no servile motivation. But what is behind that? Living together would be impossible if each were not concerned with a decent opinion of others and of any others. With the opinion of some others everybody is concerned; but of any others, of any others. But it is also, I think, important: this motivation, that we must be concerned with the decent opinion of any others, must somehow have disappeared if we are to be truly decent. If we still have to think of it -- why we behave decently -- then we are not yet truly decent. Does it not make sense? And here you see why the end rightly disappears. If the end is still in sight you still have to train yourself. If your training is completed you do not have to think of that. Decency must have become a matter of course; a matter of course: something where you don't have to give any logos, any reason. The virtuous action, in this case decent eating, must be performed for its own sake. That's the way in which one does it. Period. That is surely something which Aristotle has in mind. Whether that is philosophically satisfactory is another question, but it is surely true to the phenomena as they appear in ordinary life. Well, there are some more points which we have to consider, but does this satisfy you? Yes?

Q: This is the same difference also as between citizen courage and true courage in that true courage, even if you are alone and no one is around to see your cowardice --

S: Yes, sure. That is clear. Yes, yes. And that is, of course, the touchstone of true virtue. It is not sufficient: someone may do it even then in a self-deceptive way because some others might hear of it, but strictly speaking, of course, at the moment the consideration of others is in it is no longer purely moral. Mr. Lyons.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I think there is at least one problem here and that is in relation to the

formation of the virtue. (Rest of question inaudible.)

S: You mean the children cannot possibly help that.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Oh, I wouldn't question that for a moment, but I mean as far as defining what moderation can be we have to know the decent opinion, precisely the character of the --

S: Yes, but is this not here sufficiently clear? You must not eat like a ravenous beast and on the other hand you must not pretend that you don't need any food; you know, take minimal pieces and so on and take only a drop of water -- there are people who have such pretenses. You must admit that you are a human being who has needs, food and drink, and not be ashamed of it: number one. But yet you must not surrender to it in a way in which a dog may gracefully surrender.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, still, that defines the extremes, but if that wasn't necessary -- to refer to that early training in which you have conscious regard for the decent opinion of others in order to set forth those extremes --

S: Yes, but does it not help in this case: for example, if this is a young man of 20 and six feet high and 190 pounds and on the other hand you have a tiny girl, that the portions, both the whole meal and also the bulks, will legitimately differ in the two cases? Yes? And this you know. This is easy to figure out. I mean, if you would see a very tiny girl eating enormous steaks then you would at least be surprised, but if you would see a Marine sergeant eating them you would not be surprised. Is it not clear? Mr. Boyan.

Q<sub>3</sub>: I have a sort of an amusing question. What is the interpretation of this with regard to sex, that it must be decently done?

S: No, that is so -- you see, I compared Aristotle to Jane Austin which is, of course, not a statement which I would ever make in print because it would completely destroy my already destroyed reputation, but nevertheless there is something to that. Aristotle is very delicate about the examples. He speaks much more frequently of food and drink than of sex. Yes, but Mr. Boyan, what would be your answer? I mean, you must not draw me out. (Laughter.) Well, there are things which are, I believe, elementary to most grown-up people and which therefore don't have to be said, but it doesn't do any harm if one makes them clear to oneself once in one's life.

Q<sub>4</sub>: May I answer Mr. Boyan?

S: Yes, you have courage Mr. McAtee.

Q<sub>4</sub>: I ask you to save your judgment; I have a Victorian example. /S: Very good./ My grandmother, who was a Victorian lady, told me that certain things should not be mentioned. /S: Yes, yes, that's part of it; sure./ For example, instead of saying a breast of chicken to refer to it as some other thing; or a leg of chicken --

S: Yes, sure. No, that is it can be overdone but it is surely -- (Laughter.) No, but the principle is, of course, also universally recognized. Well, may I draw your attention to a very simple thing: that ordinarily we eat and drink in the presence of people who are not our legitimate wives or husbands and in the



case of venereal pleasures, they are very private and therefore the consideration of how things look to others is less relevant. Must I spell this out in a graduate course? Good. And there are some other things --

Q<sub>3</sub>: No, I raised it in a different sense, in the sense of Mr. Lyons' question as to what in any given society is the decent opinion of others.

S: Oh, well, this depends. Surely some things are purely conventional. Why should you not use a knife for dividing fish and you may do it in the case of meat? I mean, that depends. Even fork and knife are, of course, purely conventional things. There are societies in which people don't use forks and knives. They are conveniences. Once they have been introduced it is regarded as proper to use them because the non-use of them seems to reveal such an eagerness to eat that you don't use this convenience. I mean, in other words, the reason, the moral reason, is not the technical reason. Forks and knives are technical conveniences, and then otherwise a man would be morally guilty if he didn't use a steak knife and only an ordinary knife. We would only say it's more practical for such things to use a steak knife, but the moral reason has, of course, to do with this: not to behave like a pig. Yes? That is clear. And I think this, some equivalent of this, exists everywhere. I have not made these trips which Margaret Mead has made; she would probably violently protest. But I still would assume that some distinction is made everywhere, and, of course, there are certain occasions, festivals, celebrations; where it is thought to be right to eat maxima and drink maxima. Well, this is, of course, the exception and the formal character, festivals, only confirms the rule. The principle would not be affected by these variations. Yes, now let us first go on and read the immediate sequel, 1119a21, following.

O: Profligacy seems to be more voluntary than cowardice. For the former is caused by pleasure, the latter by pain, and pleasure is a thing we choose, pain a thing we avoid. Also pain makes us beside ourselves: it destroys the sufferer's nature whereas pleasure has no such effect. Therefore profligacy is the more voluntary vice. And consequently it is the more reprehensible; since moreover it is easier to train oneself to resist the temptations of pleasure, because these occur frequently in life. . . .

S: In other words, you have, say, three meals a day. Then you can train yourself. Yes?

O: . . . and to practice resistance to them involves no danger. . . .

S: Is it not clear? No explosions, as it were; use the knife and so on. Yes?

O: . . . whereas the reverse is the case with the objects of fear.

S: Yes.

O: On the other hand, the possession of a cowardly character would seem to be more voluntary than particular manifestations of cowardice: for cowardliness in itself is not painful, but particular accesses of cowardice are so painful as to make a man beside himself, and cause him to throw away his arms or otherwise behave in an unseemly manner; so that cowardly actions actually seem to be done under compulsion. But with the profligate on the contrary the particular acts are voluntary, for they are done with desire and appetite, but the character in

general is less so, since no one desires to be a profligate.

S: Yes, let us stop here. That is not easy. Well, one part of the argument is clear. Cowardly actions are more excusable than profligate ones. That is very interesting: that Aristotle says so. Fear of death exerts a compulsion which no objects of desire can exert, and if someone doesn't believe it I remind him of an example which Rousseau occasionally gives. If someone is in love with a woman with whom he shouldn't be in love and says he cannot resist her attraction and he has an arrangement with her to ascend the window. You know, in former times this was a common practice, as you know from the literature. So Rousseau suggests only erect a gallows in front of the window and he knows when he will come out of that chamber he will be hanged. The desire will have gone; so the desire can be controlled, whereas fear of death -- to control that is a much tougher thing. Everyone desires to be in a state where he does not have to risk his life. To that extent there is a natural inclination toward cowardice. But no one wants to be in a state in which he is filled with all kinds of desire. I think that is what Aristotle means: with all kinds of desire. I mean, a man might wish in general that he could indulge all his desires, but then he really doesn't make clear to himself what he means and if you give him an enumeration of all kinds of desire he would say, "Oh no: delete that, delete that, delete that." You can easily do that for yourself. The coward fails to fight his fear. The intemperate man fails to fight his desire. The coward desires a state in which he did not have to fight his fear. He desires a state in which there is nothing to fear. The profligate man, on the other hand, desires a state in which he does not have to fight his desire. This is roughly what he means. Then in the sequel he speaks of the relation, the special relevance, of intemperance to children. Now this cannot be brought out clearly in English. It can be brought out clearly in German, apart from Greek. The word which Aristotle uses for profligacy, akolasia, corresponds exactly to the German word, Ungezogenheit, and this is applied, of course, ordinarily to children. It corresponds to naughtiness in the sense of naughty children. There is no English equivalent. In Greek it was clear. In brief, intemperance is the vice of childhood and this determines, of course, also the rank of moderation because it has to do with things which are strongest in childhood or in early youth.

Yes, now I believe we see now a bit more clearly, from the example of moderation, what Aristotle means about this end business. I will try to restate it, but I think you will also see, we have not solved the difficulty. In the arts the end is the work, say the shoe and not the shoemaking or rather the end which the shoe serves; to protect us when walking. In action, in moral action, the end is the activity, the moral act itself, but with a view to what is the proper act to be determined? With a view to which ends is the act which in itself is the end to be determined? Now we have seen in the case of moderation that the ends with a view to which the moderate man determines what is the proper act in the circumstances are health, his finances, and decency (how it looks). The act thus determined is done for its own sake; that is to say, as decent, because of its decency. The universal end, decent, makes the peculiar end of this act the end of this act. Now I will explain it to you. The surgeon's operation: with a view to the health of this patient, determined in general by health, human health. But human health in general is never the end of any surgeon. It is always the end of this or that human being. Now let us look, then, at moderation. This moderate man's act tends toward this act of moderation: this decent behavior at the dinner table on this occasion. And this is to be determined by moderation in general, but moderation in general is not the end of this moderate act. This moderate act has no end beyond itself. This is all very well. There is only one difficulty which we have not solved in any way. How is this reconcilable with the fact that

moral action has to do with things related to ends? Food is surely related to the end of health or sustenance of life. But is, then, this relatedness to the end of sustenance of life ultimately irrelevant for determining the act of moderation? It enters it to some extent, as we have seen. We consider health in determining what is a moderate act for me here now. But this consideration of the end of sustenance of the body is not the peculiarly moral thing because the calculator, the valitudinarian, does the same thing and he is not the truly moderate man. I believe we have clarified the situation a bit, but we cannot claim to have full clarity about it and we should also not expect it. I mean, one thing which Plato called -- or I think he called it -- love of toil is an important part of learning. Learning is toilsome, as Aristotle says, and we must not flinch and look out whether perhaps the next book or the next two books will make it somewhat more clear. I believe full clarity is not to be expected because for Aristotle the end is the theoretical life and therefore there must be some difficulties and darkneses regarding the life which is not theoretical. That must be in one way or the other. Please, Mr. Seltzer.

Q: Could decency be regarded as the means to living together?

S: Yes, we could say that, but people live together also rather indecently. After all let us think of it. I spoke of this as a simple rule: no participation in other people's digestive processes. But there are quite a few people who I have seen -- well, in armies it is quite obvious but also certain boorish people don't mind that and regard certain things which we wouldn't regard as desirable -- they can live with them. You know? So living together is possible in a pigish manner. We include non-piggish in living together. On the basis of what? On the basis of what consideration? It is not proper to human beings. Therefore we speak of piggish.

Q: And then it would be necessarily a deduction from the theoretical understanding of a human being. What is the good human being?

S: Yes, but perhaps here we must consider whether these very general remarks which Aristotle makes about man as distinguished from the brutes here -- namely that he is a rational and political animal -- would not be sufficient without a deeper study of what rationality and sociality mean. The question -- yes, one would have to go -- for example, when you speak -- the sense of decency, of propriety, of fittingness, proportion. That has something to do with rationality. Whether the consideration of decency is not, decency even in this sense, regarding the matters we discussed today, is not a reflection of man's rationality. That would, I suppose, be Aristotle's ultimate answer but he does not elaborate that. He presents it, these virtues, as it were like statues, like goddesses' statues -- presents them to us, and what he says about them is easily recognizable. I mean, we may have some difficulties at this or that point, but on the whole courage, as he hammers it out, and moderation, liberality, are known to us as such. You know; in other words, he doesn't speak about things of which we have never heard before. We know them; and he leaves it at that. There is somehow the desire to understand more. For example, the simple question: why these ten or eleven virtues and not others? Therefore the question of number points to your problem. Aristotle does not do that. He takes the structure as this: obviously there are bodily evils and bodily goods, and there must be a proper posture to the bodily evils, courage, to the bodily goods, moderation. Then there are other things which are not strictly bodily, sensual, like property, although that is mostly tangible, and yet it is not sensual. Then there is honor and therefore we have virtues regarding property and regarding honor. And then there are other more subtle things: people living together, being together, for no business pur-



poses; just to enjoy their being together. There are virtues related to that. This is roughly the list of virtues which Aristotle has. And then, of course, justice, which occupies a very special place. But Aristotle does not -- I mean, Plato in the Republic says there are three parts of the soul. There can be a perfection of each part. Since these parts are the whole there must be virtue of the whole. There must be four virtues. This is a deduction of the virtues. Aristotle takes the virtues as he sees them. He molds them, omits certain things. This is sufficient for all practical purposes, but theoretically insufficient. We cannot help looking for the theoretical basis.

(Note: At line 4 above the tape ran out and the rest of the paragraph as well as what follows is an almost literal paraphrase of the remainder of the session, taken from stenographic notes.)

Q: Is Aristotle really interested in common ordinary people as moral agents?

S: The gentlemen whom he addresses are not philosophers. He addresses only gentlemen, but he has also in mind other people. Virtue is something of which all non-very-defective men are capable. Aristotle believes that the full realm of the virtues is not accessible to all, but only to a minority. That is a very great problem. Every man is supposed to be capable of all virtues, and yet according to Aristotle a man without the proper breeding cannot be virtuous, but only the few who have this breeding; for example, economic independence. That is something which must be faced.

One can say there is a kind of pyramid. At the bottom, crude rules with which all men can comply. Otherwise they will be punished. In the example of courage: citizen courage, which appeals to the desire for distinction or to fear is common; true courage is very rare. More refined, a small group of people is capable of moral virtue, strictly understood. Still rarer are the theoretical virtues. And Aristotle says this is according to nature. The whole political doctrine is based on this premise. If all men were capable of full moral virtue democracy would be a requirement of justice. Only because this is not possible is Aristotle opposed to democracy. Therefore, great practical consequences. Aristotle could have been satisfied with lesser demands, taking that of which practically all are capable, but he was not satisfied with that. Society can do better than that. If it does, it is better than that.

8th Meeting: May 7, 1963

... it was not always easy to understand. You mentioned one point which I did not understand regarding a clear deviation of Thomas from Aristotle regarding liberality. I did not understand what that was.

O: A distinction, not a deviation.

S: Which distinction?

O: (Inaudible.)

S: Yes, I think that is an explanation given by Thomas, not by Aristotle, but it is not a deviation. But you said on another occasion that there was such a difference and I don't remember it now. Now you made very clear, partly on the basis of Thomas' remarks in the Summa, that liberality is, as you put it, beyond the call of duty and that is the reason why the liberal action calls for gratitude. The merely just action -- if the employer pays his employee -- does not call for gratitude on the part of the employee. So beyond the call of duty; and that is what Aristotle means by the noble in contra-distinction to the just. That you understood very well. You mentioned also the ambiguity of prodigality. Aristotle, when he speaks of prodigality proper, means that which is not the consequence of another vice; namely, that if someone is concerned with sensual pleasures and wastes his money on food and drink and so on this is not the prodigal man proper. The prodigal man proper is the man who is -- enjoys easy spending irrationally, regardless of the purpose. I mean, when prodigality is in the service of sensual desire then it is lack of self-control, intemperance, but not prodigality. Everyone was pleased, I observed, and you too, about Aristotle's nice remarks about the subtleties of meanness. You know, it is a very amusing vice although it can be ugly too. But the stingy and the greedy: you know, these are two very different things. Sometimes they come together but sometimes they are also separate from each other. Now prodigality -- Aristotle has a certain liking for the prodigal compared to the mean. Aristotle has a certain liking for the prodigal. Yes. Now what is the parallel in the case of the other virtues? You know, the old story: every virtue is a mean between an excess and a defect and here prodigality is the excess and is nicer than the defect, meanness. Now what is the case in the other virtues which we have discussed before?

O: Courage and moderation?

S: Yes, which is here the preferred vice, in the case of courage?

O: Audacity would be preferred.

S: Yes, let us say audacity and the worse vice is cowardice. And in the case of temperance or moderation? Which is worse, insensitivity to sensual pleasures or complete indulgence, from Aristotle's point of view? Yes?

O<sub>2</sub>: Indulgence is worse.

S: Worse. Sure. You also can say intemperance. Yes, but insensitivity is, of course, a defect. But there is a principle underlying all these preferences for the excess or the defect, whatever the case may be. What's the principle?

O: (Inaudible. Refers to extremes.)

S: No, they are all extremes. No, not being enslaved. The prodigal man is not enslaved to wealth. The mean man is. I mean, it is not sufficient not to be enslaved. You must also have -- be reasonable, which he is not. Similarly, the audacious man is not enslaved by fear; on the contrary. And the insensitive man, if he exists which Aristotle doubts, the purely insensitive man, is not enslaved by sensual pleasures. That's the principle. Therefore they are more curable. So let us now turn to our discussion of these virtues and next time, of course, we will take the rest of Book IV. And I would like today to discuss liberality and munificence and at least a part of the discussion of magnanimity. Otherwise we have too much next time.

Now let us remind ourselves again of the overall question, of the broadest question. Now Aristotle starts, you recall, observing the infinite variety of human pursuits or human ends. If we see that we can easily arrive at the view that all noble and just things are merely conventional and that the good things also are bad, as he states it at the beginning; in other words, the view which is now called relativism. But again there is one key distinction between the relativism with which Aristotle is faced and present-day relativism and that is the distinction between nature and convention. Present-day relativism treats all values as of equal status and ancient relativism, with which Aristotle is confronted, is based on the distinction between what is by nature good, on the one hand, and the noble and just on the other. There is nothing by nature good according to present-day relativism. This is, of course, always the difference. Yet in spite of this enormous variety there is some underlying agreement as to a single comprehensive good and that there is such an agreement is based on two considerations. First, they all are human beings -- as human nature -- same human nature in all men. And second, which to begin with is merely a word, happiness; they all wish to be happy and this is somewhat more than a mere word, a divination of a desirable state. However there is great variety of opinion as to what constitutes happiness, but it is now a limited variety and an ordered variety. And this is Aristotle's ordering of the three ways of life: the life of pleasure, of mere enjoyment, the political life, and the theoretical life. And Aristotle says show me a third one. [Apparent slip of the tongue.] So however great the variety within the three may be this is the choice with which every human being is confronted sooner or later. Does he want to lead a life of what is now called fun or does he wish to lead the political life or the theoretical life?

Now the political life is primarily concerned with honor, but Aristotle shows in a few easy steps that it doesn't make sense to make honor one's end because honor is always given for something and that for which honor is given is virtue. Therefore the aim of the political life is virtue in the sense of moral virtue. Differently stated, moral virtue, with which we are still concerned, is on the one hand, of course, only the choice of one kind of people, the people of the political life. But on the other hand it is expected of everyone and therefore it has a kind of universality which the two others do not have. No one is expected to lead a life of fun. No one is expected to lead the theoretical life. But everyone is expected to be decent and this is a kind of universality which is of great importance.

Now there is some agreement, then, regarding what constitutes virtue and also regarding what constitutes the particular virtues. All men at all times speak of good men or bad men and there is also some distinction made and perhaps the Greeks made this more clearly than others. That is, of course, purely accidental. For example, a good man must be temperate; a good man must be just, (and these are not exactly the same things); a good man must not be a coward; a good



man must be reasonable; a good man must be liberal, and whatever you have. These things are intelligible to everyone even if he has not heard of them in these terms. With a few examples he will understand it even if there are no such words in his language; but he will recognize the phenomena. Therefore, the Ethics has a great evidence. I mean, we all know the things which he is talking about and no one can say that thing doesn't exist. No one can say that. He can disagree with a particular statement of Aristotle about liberality but he cannot deny that there is such a thing and that at least on the face of it it is a nice thing, and this is all we need in order to begin to understand.

The difficulty is this: on the one hand virtue is the core of happiness. On the other hand virtue is praiseworthy whereas happiness is worthy of reverence. The first statement puts all the emphasis on moral virtue. It's the core of happiness. The second statement puts all the emphasis on happiness as distinguished from moral virtue. These two statements of the first book indicate the difficulty from the very beginning. One can also say virtue is the core of happiness. Therefore virtue is choiceworthy for its own sake. But if virtue is praiseworthy while happiness alone is worthy of reverence then virtue does not seem to be the end, the end, but rather happiness. Now this is a difficulty which has attracted us all the time. In what sense is moral virtue the end, as Aristotle doesn't tire of saying?

Now we have discussed the virtues of courage and of moderation. Now if we look at moderation; take eating. We eat for the purpose of health and fitness, but we are also concerned with decency in eating and this decency is not meant to be for any other purpose, for the purpose of health or fitness, but it is chosen or supposed to be chosen for its own sake. In the case of courage, braving death in battle: for the purpose of defending the city. Is then bravery not for its own sake? Must it be constituted by this end, defending the city? Well, we have seen that Aristotle does not say that bravery is essentially for the purpose of defending the city. He is silent about the purpose. This is an indication of the difficulty, of the overall difficulty.

Now let us turn to the virtue of liberality. This follows immediately on moderation. And this may very well have this reason: because it was possible, as we know from Xenophon, for example, to speak of moderation primarily dealing with the sensual pleasures but also of moderation in regard to wealth; and quite naturally, because we need wealth for getting food and so on. The Greek word, eleutheriotos, which is reasonably well translated by liberality, means of course primarily not that very narrow thing which Aristotle has in mind and which we have in mind when we speak of liberality, dealing with wealth, but means literally the character becoming a free man; eleutheriotos is free and eleutherios, free-like: the man who behaves like a free man in opposition to a slave. And Aristotle narrows it down, perhaps more than any other classical writer, to the free man's conduct regarding wealth. How can this be understood? Perhaps one can say that the most frequent opportunity which a man has in showing that he is a free man is his dealing with wealth. You know, peace is more frequent than war and the most common public and visible thing of a man is how he behaves toward wealth. This may be sufficient as a reason for this narrowing down which Aristotle does.

Now what is the purpose of liberality? To help others, from one's own possessions, of course. It presupposes, therefore, that one does not squander one's possessions. If you do that you have nothing to help others. Liberality is a mean between prodigality and stinginess or meanness. Now let us first read 1119b22. That's the beginning of the book.

O: Next let us speak of liberality. This virtue seems to be the observance of the mean in relation to wealth: we praise a man as liberal not in war, nor in matters in which we praise him as temperate, nor in judicial decisions, but in relation to giving and getting wealth, and especially in giving; wealth meaning all those things whose value is measured by money.

S: In other words, wealth is not everything which we possess. If someone is attached to something, an heirloom for example, which he would not give to any other man under any circumstances this would not be a proof of illiberality because what he cherishes is not something which can be expressed in money. It may be something which wouldn't fetch more than a cent and yet it is for him very valuable, but in a value not to be expressed by money. That he means by this remark. Yes?

Q: I was very surprised in reading this and when you just gave your statement that Aristotle narrows this word more than the Greeks did.

S: In general.

Q: In general. Did the Greeks in general refer to liberality as being temperate in judicial decisions?

S: No, it has primarily this broad meaning: conduct becoming a free man in contra-distinction to a slave and this becomes internalized; not the freedom in the political sense, merely in the civil sense, but freedom from the low things in man. Very common.

Q: Yes, this word has, it seems to me, a history.

S: Yes; I mean, the narrowing to money is in this emphatic sense Aristotle's innovation. Good. Now go on, Mr. Reinkin.

O: Prodigality and meanness on the other hand are both of them modes of excess and of deficiency in relation to wealth. Meanness is always applied to those who care more than is proper about wealth, but prodigality is sometimes used with a wider connotation, since we call the unrestrained and those who squander money on debauchery prodigal; and therefore prodigality is thought to be extremely wicked, because it is a combination of vices. But this is not the proper application of the word: really it denotes the possessor of one particular vice, that of wasting one's substance; for he who is ruined by his own agency is a hopeless case indeed, and to waste one's substance seems to be in a way to ruin oneself, inasmuch as wealth is the means of life. This then is the sense in which the term prodigality is here understood.

S: Yes, now one second. So prodigality is destruction of one's substance. You know, it is strange that the English language has preserved substance. The Greek word is ousias which is the metaphysical term, substance, and that we still say in everyday life a man of substance is quite interesting. I cannot go into that now. The prodigal man destroys that through which life is possible. Prodigality is bad because it ruins oneself. This seems to be a narrow utilitarian consideration, just as in the case of the temperate man it is unhealthy to be intemperate. But the temperate man is not the valitudinarian. So we must wait -- where the peculiar end of the liberal man will be. Now read on where you left off.

O: Now riches are an article of use; but articles of use can be used either well or ill, and he who uses a thing best is he who possesses the virtue related to that thing; therefore that man will use riches best who possesses the virtue related to wealth; and this is the liberal man.

S: Yes. So you see here again a kinship between moral virtue and art. Of everything, say of wealth as well as of a shoe or of a table, there is a right use and a wrong use. One could say there is an art regarding the right use of money: now private economics, I suppose. How to invest your money properly is an art. And to that extent there is a similarity between moral virtue and an art. For example, how to use best a car. This is, however, a kind of art: the art of driving a car or using a car. But the moral virtue is something different from such forms of using a thing well, and he will develop this in the immediate sequel. Let us read the next sentence.

O: But the use of wealth seems to consist in spending and in giving; getting wealth and keeping it are modes of acquisition rather than of use.

S: Yes. So now he makes it clear. Liberality is not such an art. The use of wealth is not the sake of an art because it consists in spending and giving and if you apply it in the case of the art, of a car for example, the use of the car is driving it. It is not giving it away. This is not the matter of an art proper. Spending and giving; yet the emphasis is on giving, as we have seen. The emphasis is on giving. Now what is the purpose of giving? I mean, obviously, liberality cannot be a virtue -- liberality, the virtue controlling giving, cannot be a virtue -- if giving is not as such something good. Why is giving good? Let us read lines 21 to 23. That's the end of this chapter. Yes?

O: And of all virtuous people the liberal are perhaps the most beloved, because they are beneficial to others; and they are so in that they give.

S: Yes. So that's it. So why is giving good? Why is it good?

O: It benefits.

S: It benefits others. It is useful to others. The givers are loved because they give. That reminds of a statement we discussed in an earlier seminar about people who are loved or why people love others.

O: Men believe to love those they believe to benefit them.

S: Yes, it happens to be in the *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon. You know, it deals with giving. Yes, men believe to love what they believe is useful to them. You see, that is a slightly spurious reason and Aristotle probably doesn't leave it at that as we shall see in the sequel. Liberality is, of course, useful to the liberal too because the liberal man is useful to others and the others, to some extent at least, will look at him with a friendly eye and that may come in handy at some future occasion. But this is a strictly utilitarian account of why liberality is good. Let us read the immediate sequel.

O: Acts of virtue are noble, and are performed for the sake of their nobility; the liberal man therefore will give for the nobility of giving. And he will give rightly, for he will give to the right people, and the right amount, and at the right time, and fulfill all the other conditions of right giving. Also he will give with pleasure, or at all events without pain; for virtuous action is pleasant, or painless -- it certainly



cannot be painful. One who gives to the wrong people, or not for the nobility of giving but from some other motive, will not be called liberal, but by some different title; nor will he who gives with pain, for he would prefer the money to the noble deed, which is not the mark of a liberal man.

S: Yes. So the liberal man does not act with a view to the usefulness of liberality. He acts liberally for the sake of acting liberally. This nobility of the act is the cause why he acts. The word cause occurs in line 29. He does it for the sake of no other cause except because it is noble. He gives his money gladly. Otherwise he must be compelled by something. To act by compulsion or even by self-compulsion -- self-compulsion is Kant's formula -- is not good enough for Aristotle because what you do under self-compulsion you don't do gladly. You force yourself to do it. Aristotle demands that it is done gladly or at least without pain. And why does he give it gladly? Because he does not cling to his money. The nobility consists, it would seem, in the inner freedom from money, from his possessions. His heart is not in his possessions. Therefore, the nobility doesn't show itself merely in giving to others, but also in his spending in general. After all, we spend money not only on others but also on ourselves and there too we can recognize, to some extent, the liberal man. Take as an example one of the best presentations I know of the stingy and greedy man in Balzac's novel, *Le Père Goriot*. There is an old peasant who has become a millionaire by the full activity of stinginess and greediness and there is a single candle in the house so when he wants to go down to the cellar everyone else must sit in the dark . . . and this is, of course, also a sign of an illiberal man: that he doesn't spend enough on himself. He could easily have had two candles. The liberal man is a man who, knowing the worth of money, uses it nobly because if he wouldn't know the work of money he couldn't be liberal, of course. The noble use consists in inner freedom from money. This inner freedom, this perfection of his soul, that he is not a slave of money, is the end, the noble. He exercises his nobility in regard to money; that is to say, in regard to something which is not the end but for ends. You remember that. We read this already before: that moral virtue is immediately concerned with things which are related to an end, for an end, and not the end. Money is for an end and this is the thing with which the liberal man has to do. But the end is that inner freedom which he shows in application to these things for an end. Similarly in the case of moderation the inner freedom from the desires, or in the case of courage the inner freedom from fear of death. Generally speaking, the virtuous man's heart is not in the desires, the fear, and possessions. His heart is in the freedom from them. This makes the noble but the question is whether this is sufficient and we must see what we find more about it. Yes?

Q: Is there a particular significance to the virtue of courage as distinguished from the others? Liberality is concerned with pleasure, virtue in general with pleasure. But not courage. Now why?

S: Yes, that is difficult. You know, that is a special difficulty in the case of courage: that all the circumstances are unpleasant, but when you think for what he does -- he gives the example of the boxer. Receiving these blows all the time is most unpleasant, but when he thinks of the *glory* that's pleasant. Now here only the courageous man doesn't think of an external praise or a badge or whatever he might get, but he thinks of the intrinsic nobility of the action. That is crucial for Aristotle. He said earlier that for the virtuous man the noble and just things are the things by nature pleasant, more pleasant than what is ordinarily understood by pleasant, pleasures of the senses. Whether this is so simple as it seems to be said is another matter. Q<sub>2</sub>: May I ask a question?

Yes, Mr. McAtee.

Q<sub>2</sub>: This inner freedom is a little bit confusing to me. I know a story by Shakespeare about a man who was very liberal. He gave away all his money and then no one showed any gratitude. He was very angry at that.

S: Yes, but could one not say that his liberality was somewhat spurious because it was regarded by him as a kind of investment?

Q<sub>2</sub>: That is one point. A second point would be didn't they owe him some gratitude?

S: Yes, but you cannot -- they behaved ignobly by being ungrateful, but to some extent a man who counts on gratitude also is not quite noble. If someone goes around and says you must help me. You are under an obligation to be grateful to me. That's an awkward position for any man, which doesn't mean that some people might not do it. I mean, if he has done it gladly and freely then there were no strings attached to it. But you cannot make from the relation of liberality a relation of justice. If you give something to someone and you say, well, when I need money you will help me too and that's understood, then there is at least a moral obligation on the other side to do that. I mean, an obligation of this kind: that you can claim it. You see, sometimes there are moral obligations which cannot be properly claimed by one and are, in this sense, one-sided. That happens.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Inaudible.)

S: No, that is the worst kind of historicism. But you would have to say this: Aristotle claims to be the natural morality and the Bible, in the light of Greek philosophy, has to be described as super-natural morality. That's another matter and if you use, then, these convenient terms, Greeks and Bible, all right.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, but as I say, that is quite natural for someone who has obliged others. If he has obliged others the others are obliged to him, but in the case of free gifts this is not true. There is no such obligation. Mr. Fleming.

Q<sub>3</sub>: (To the effect that a liberal man may not expect or demand gratitude, but may be surprised if he doesn't get it, and that this wouldn't violate the virtue of liberality unless he were merely "doing it to grandstand.")

S: No, that is, of course, also not genuine virtue, but the difficulty in general for Aristotle I believe is this (I thought of it when Brother read his paper) -- when he said one can doubt whether there is a single liberal man, you know, in the strict sense. It is so hard. Aristotle would admit that, but Aristotle would say this distinguishes him radically from the Biblical tradition. The intentions are immanifest. You cannot judge men on the basis of intentions and when Aristotle speaks of virtues and virtuous actions he takes it for granted that there are virtuous men and virtuous actions although it is impossible to look into any heart. And Aristotle takes this simple view: you look at a whole life and where you see a man in all kinds of situations, not only on grandstands but, so to say, when he is surprised, when he is, as it were, not dressed, and then of course you have to know a man very well, very intimately, to judge of him. That's clear. But if you know such a man intimately -- that is to say,

also when you have seen him not on the grandstand and you know him for a long period of time -- then you can judge him and say, as Aristotle doesn't have any hesitation, he is a virtuous man. That there are all kinds of dark things going on in the underground: that's clear. That every man has and this cannot be changed, but the main point is what he makes of them.

Q<sub>2</sub>: But my query was there is nothing inconsistent, is there, in the definition of liberality by the liberal man being surprised at the lack of gratitude to the point where he might comment on it. That is, this wouldn't prove the lack of liberality: that it surprised him.

S: No, no, surely not. Yes, well, one could only say if he were a very experienced man he would not be surprised. That is clear, although I believe -- I'm now an old man and have some right to speak about these things -- I must say I think one exaggerates the amount of ingratitude in the world. I think that is unfair. But there is some, naturally, and some people regard gratitude as a mere burden and hate their benefactors. That can happen and it is not a very noble thing, but you come across it from time to time. Good. Now in the sequel -- we must now limit ourselves to a few key passages. The liberal man does not honor money. He honors virtue. Liberality consists chiefly in helping others, i.e. in not regarding oneself. Now this, helping others, not regarding oneself, is also a crude sign of nobility. The calculating man is a rather base man and the man or woman who can't forget himself in the proper way. Therefore, eros is something noble because it makes those who are in love less self-regarding than men otherwise are. Let us turn to 1120b14.

O: But it is not easy for a liberal man to be rich, since he is not good either at getting money or at keeping it, while he is profuse in spending it and values wealth not for its own sake but as a means of giving.

S: For the sake of giving. Good. Yes?

O: Hence people blame fortune because the most deserving men are the least wealthy. But this is really perfectly natural: you cannot have money, any more than anything else, without taking pains to have it.

S: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. The liberal man honors money only for the sake of giving. His heart is then in the giving. Therefore he must honor money as a means, surely. Now if we generalize from the remarks about liberality we have, then, a twofold end of moral virtue: first, the inner freedom from, in this case, money, and a freedom for something, for giving. Inner freedom from money so that he can be free for giving. Both things are required in the case of liberality. Nietzsche's famous formula, political formula: what people ordinarily understand by freedom today (in the 19th century) is freedom from something, but this is not sufficient. We must also know that for which the freedom is required. The other is a formal or empty freedom. Both things are needed, and I think Aristotle implies this. He doesn't say so. The freedom from is clear in all these cases, but a freedom also for something. Now let us turn to 1121a, at the beginning.

O: If the liberal man should happen to spend in a manner contrary to what is right and noble, he will feel pain, though in a moderate degree and in the right manner; for it is a mark of virtue to feel both pleasure and pain on the right occasions and in the right manner. Also the liberal man is an easy person to deal with in money matters; he can be cheated, because he does not value money. . . .



S: Yes, not honor money.

O: . . . honor money, and is more distressed if he has paid less than he ought than he is annoyed if he has paid more: he does not agree with the saying of Simonides.

S: Yes, Simonides was a poet, you know, a famous poet, famous for his greed; the only wise man of Greece who was notorious for his greed. Now whether this is literally true or was a joke because he had written a poem which could be interpreted in that way we do not know because we know too little about him. The liberal man has inner freedom from money, but is concerned, of course, with spending it properly. He is annoyed with himself if he did not spend money where he ought to have spent it. For example, if he had given it to some man who will go to the next tavern and do some mischief there and not to a poor widow who would use it properly for her poor children. Yet -- and this is also important -- he is only rationally annoyed, moderately annoyed. He will not beat his breast. You know, that is also the casual remark but not unimportant. Yes. Now in the sequel Aristotle develops that the prodigal is to be preferred to the stingy. Prodigality is not base, but foolish. It defeats its own purpose. In a27 you may go on.

O: The prodigal of this type therefore. . . .

S: In other words, who is only a prodigal because he is an easy spender. He doesn't waste it in getting drunk and so on and ruining himself, which is another problem. Yes?

O: We may say the prodigal strictly considered seems to be much superior to the mean man, both for the reasons stated, and because the former benefits many people, but the latter benefits nobody, not even himself.

S: So, in other words, what we can call loosely the utilitarian consideration -- his own utility and utility of others -- is very important, at least in the case of liberality, but it is not the only consideration. So the truth which utilitarianism has is always recognized by Aristotle, but it is always clear, utilitarianism is never enough because of its calculating character and also because it omits some virtues which cannot well be understood from the point of view of utility. Yes, the prodigal is better than the stingy for they help many whereas the stingy does not help anyone -- that's clear -- but not even himself. Why does he not even help himself? Yes?

O: He is enslaved.

S: Yes, the greater narrowness of his horizon which comes from that. In "b," 1121b, 3 to 7.

O: Hence even their giving is not really liberal: their gifts are not noble, nor given for the nobility of giving, nor in the right way; on the contrary, sometimes they make men rich who ought to be poor, and will not give anything to the worthy, while heaping gifts on flatterers and others who minister to their pleasures.

S: Yes, the common run of prodigals. Yes? The common run of prodigals. The liberal man gives to those who deserve to have; that is to say, to the potentially liberal because only the potentially liberal deserve to have and there is, from this point of view, a common interest of the virtuous. This, in a nasty ex-

pression, is, of course, what you find in Polemarchus' definition of justice: helping the friends and hurting the enemies or at least not helping the enemies means then helping the virtuous and not helping the vicious. Yes? In the first book of Plato's Republic. You know that. Now a little bit later on, in b12.

O: This then is what the prodigal comes to if he is not brought under discipline; but if he is taken in hand, he may attain the due mean and the right scale of liberality. Meanness on the contrary is incurable; for we see that it can be caused by old age or any form of weakness. Also it is more ingrained in man's nature than prodigality; the mass of mankind are avaricious rather than open-handed.

S: Yes. Now let us stop. So stinginess and greediness are, in a way, more natural than liberality and prodigality. Thomas, in his commentary on the passage, speaks therefore, very strange as it may sound, of a natural inclination toward money. There is no such natural inclination toward giving. Now we have seen something similar in the case of cowardice. This recoiling from death is more natural than the facing of it. That is an interesting point. But, of course, this doesn't make them better. It is simply on a lower level of man's nature which must be controlled by the higher level. So a natural inclination is, indeed, never bad as a natural inclination, but since man is a being consisting of many levels he is a good man if the upper levels control the lower levels. Now then he gives a long discussion which is very interesting to read but we cannot afford reading it, about the distinction between the stingy and the greedy man. Let us read only one passage of this section, in b31.

O: The other sort of people are those who exceed in respect of getting, taking from every source and all they can; such are those who follow degrading trades, brothel-keepers. . . .

S: In other words, these are the greedy, not the stingy. Yes?

O: . . . and petty usurers who lend money in small sums at a high rate of interest; all these take from wrong sources, and more than their due. The common characteristic of all these seems to be sordid greed, since they all endure reproach for gain, and for a small gain. Those who make improper gains from improper sources on a great scale, for instance princes who sack cities and rob temples. . . .

S: Yes, tyrants, tyrants. Yes.

O: . . . tyrants who sack cities and rob temples, are not termed mean, but rather wicked or impious or unjust. But the dicer and the footpad or brigand are to be classed as mean, as showing sordid greed. . . .

S: Yes, that is quite interesting. Aristotle sees that there is a certain grandeur in the tyrant which pickpocket and other criminals do not have. One cannot strictly speaking call tyrants of this kind mean in the sense used here because the grandness of the scale distinguishes him from the mean proper. Yes, now Mr. Glenn.

Q: Is it legitimate to ask here why he says that meanness is more base than prodigality?

S: That is an absolutely necessary question. . . . (several inaudible words because of defective tape.)

Q: (Pursues the distinction further.)

S: Now even granting for the moment that prodigals are free from enslavement to money and therefore able and willing to give . . . this defect is unreasonable. He does not give reasonably and therefore he is a vicious man. (Indicates inaudibly that he means vicious in the sense of possessed with vices.) No virtue can be without reason and he is an indiscriminate spender and giver. He makes one mistake after another. He gives the money to the wrong people all the time and this is not living. That is the point. Just as the over-bold man is not enslaved by fear of death, but he risks his life for unreasonable purposes, for purposes which are not worth risking. You see, Aristotle, as he made clear at the beginning when he spoke of the mean between an excess and defect -- this is not schematic, you know, that it doesn't make any difference whether you err on this side or that side. It makes a great difference. It depends. In the case of liberality it is better, if you have to err, to err on the side of excess, whereas in the case of sensual desire it is better to err on the side of defect. You have always to look at the specific matter of the virtue in consideration to see which is so. There is no general formula which would cover infinitely all cases. What Aristotle ventures to say is that in all cases, with the exception of justice, there will be an excess and defect. This we can say in general, but whether the excess is worse or the defect is worse: that depends on the matter of the virtue in question. Yes, Mr. Vari.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (As to whether a man can be called liberal if he spends the early part of his life amassing wealth and then becomes a benefactor of educational activities.)

S: It is good that Professor Friedman and others are not here. They would strongly disagree with your analysis of these great benefactors. But I don't know the facts sufficiently and therefore I cannot say anything about it. From Aristotle's point of view that's impossible. I state this moral problem very simply as follows. Happiness equals virtue plus equipment. Now at the beginning, say, a young man of 20 will say, well, I want to be happy and I know virtue is needed but for the time being I need the equipment . . . the equipment first by all means, fair or foul, and getting the virtue afterward. This is not -- Aristotle would say, you know why? He would say, look, because the habits you acquire while you acquire the equipment by fair means or foul will not cease to be effective when you say, now I want to be absolutely just and fair. This doesn't stop overnight.

Q<sub>2</sub>: May I mention a specific case? Julius Rosenwald.

S: I do not know him. I know the name. I know there is a building called Rosenwald Hall.

Q<sub>2</sub>: He was also the boss of Sears, Roebuck.

S: Yes, that I know.

Q<sub>2</sub>: We know in those days at Sears, Roebuck the workers were really not treated too well. But I believe that the money he made out of his workers he gave to this university and this university thinks of him as a virtuous man really and the workers think of him as another sort.

S: I can reply to you by a quotation from Xenophon. Most men mistake their benefactor for a good man and I don't see why this university should be under



very special obligation of being stricter in these matters than other institutions. There was a Roman emperor -- who was it? -- , I believe -- who did something which was not immoral. He instituted a tax for men's rooms or the equivalent of that they had in ancient Rome and there was great shock about such a tax, whereupon the emperor said, "It doesn't stink." He meant the money. So I am not responsible for that. If I were the president and you would tell me that, then I would go into the facts and if they are true I might change this. I might say, all right, there will no longer be such a founder's day if that is true. But fortunately I don't have any say in that. But, as I say, we don't go into the question of the truth of the facts. We would have to make some long study. And in addition in such matters we have to consider another point. In such matters of so-called social justice one must judge the people according to what is regarded as the right thing at the time. You know that social justice was not as strictly understood in the 19th century generally as it is now. You know, quite a few practices which were then regarded as commanded by a kind of natural law of the economic sphere. You know that. This is no longer generally held although there are still people who believe it is so. . . . This one would, in fairness, also have to consider. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: How accurate must we regard Aristotle's statement that among morally virtuous people the liberal are the most beloved? If meanness is more prevalent than liberality --

S: (Several inaudible words followed by the following.) Most people are mean and therefore it means most people love money. Therefore they love to receive money. Therefore they love the givers. That is no contradiction.

Q<sub>4</sub>: (Inaudible.)

S: No, that is a distinction which he will prove. Meanness is to be divided into stinginess and greediness and it is very interesting to see both sides. I mean, there are people who are absolutely stingy and in no way greedy and then you have people who are very greedy and in no way stingy. So that happens. Now this point is regarding the, strictly speaking, stingy man who. . . . /says/ I don't want anything from you but I want to -- that exists. That's not Aristotle's responsibility. There are such great varieties. On the contrary, it's his duty to bring them out. Good.

Now let us turn to the much more interesting virtue of munificence; magnificence in Latin and megaloprepeia in Greek. This is concern with expense alone, not with giving. From this it follows that every munificent man is liberal but not every liberal man is munificent. The liberal man is free from money and shows it above all in giving; to some extent also in spending, but not on a large scale. For example, there are two candles instead of one. This would be the difference between a liberal man as distinguished from a stingy or mean man, but these are, of course, minor items. The munificent man spends on a large scale. Now let us read in 1122a, 34 to 35, when he says, "The munificent man --

O: . . . is an artist in expenditure. . . .

S: Well, literally, "resembles a knower." Yes, go on.

O: The munificent man resembles a knower in expenditure: he can discern what is suitable, and spend great sums with good taste.

S: Yes, also more literally: "for he can contemplate (theoresai)" -- "he can

contemplate with sureness and spends large sums in a proper manner. So it is interesting here and an indication of things to come: the munificent man alone is called resembling a knower. He did not use such a strong phrase when he spoke of the liberal man, the moderate, and the courageous man. Why is this so? Let us read the immediate sequel.

O: (For as we said at the outset; a disposition is defined by the activities in which it is displayed, and by the objects to which it is related.) So the munificent man's expenditure is suitable as well as great. And consequently the objects he produces must also be great and suitable; for so only will a great expenditure be suitable to the result. . . .

S: Yes, now let us stop here. The munificent man resembles a knower because he alone has to do with the great or grand or big. This is the first reason. Now what is the connection between the grand and knowledge?

O: It covers the whole expanse.

S: When Plato speaks of the philosopher in the sixth book of the Republic he says the philosopher is munificent. He doesn't mean it here literally in the narrow sense in which Aristotle means it, namely regarding spending, but he means it -- literally, the munificent man is the man who does becoming things on a grand scale or becoming things becoming a great man. This is implied and he says of the philosopher that since he looks at being as a whole and at time as a whole he cannot be petty. That is the point, but it will become clearer in the sequel. Let us turn to b, 6 to 8.

O: Hence, as the object produced must be worthy of the expenditure, so also must the expenditure be worthy of or even exceed the object produced. Again, the motive of the munificent man in such expenditure will be the nobility of the action, this motive being characteristic of all the virtues. Moreover he will spend gladly and lavishly, since nice calculation is shabby. . . .

S: Yes what he calls "nice calculation" is in Greek "akribologia," exact calculation. You know, exactness, this great virtue of theoretical understanding, is something very low in practice: penny pinchers. If we make calculations as theoreticians we must be penny pinchers, as it were, but penny pinchers proper are very bad. The end is the noble, as always. Now let us go on where you left off.

O: The magnificent man will therefore necessarily be also a liberal man. For the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; and it is in the amount and manner of his expenditure that the element "great" in the magnificent or "greatly splendid" man, that is to say his greatness, is shown, these being the things in which liberality is displayed. And the magnificent man from an equal outlay will achieve a more magnificent result; for the same standard of excellence does not apply to an achievement as to a possession. . . .

S: So, in other words, conceivably a liberal man as liberal might spend the same amount of money in a given case as the munificent does, but the element of grandeur is absent in the case of the liberal. The liberal may give somewhere in secret. It will not show in any way. But what the munificent man does must show. That doesn't mean that it is done for showmanship. Then it would be a vice; but it must show. Now let us go on. First we must read this sequel.

O: . . . with possessions the thing worth the highest price is the most honored, for instance gold, but the achievement most honored is one that is great and noble (since a great achievement arouses the admiration of the spectator, and the quality of causing admiration belongs to munificence). . . .

S: Yes, this is important. It must cause admiration. It must be an object of beholding, of contemplating. Otherwise it is not a munificent act. It might be a liberal act. Yes?

Q: I'm sorry, but I don't see -- well, maybe we're not through. I don't see why this is a finer --

S: Yes, but wait, wait. Aristotle is working his way and he shows first the similarities and also the differences of the two kindred virtues by harping only on one theme: magnificence, magnum, great man. And what it is comes out in the sequel. Go on, Mr. Reinkin.

O: . . . and excellence in an achievement involves greatness. Now there are some forms of expenditure definitely entitled honorable, for instance expenditure on the service of the gods -- votive offerings, public buildings, sacrifices -- and the offices of religion generally; and those public benefactions which are favorite objects of ambition, for instance the duty, as it is esteemed in certain states, of equipping a chorus splendidly or fitting out a ship of war, or even of giving a banquet to the public. But in all these matters, as has been said, the scale of expenditure must be judged with reference to the person spending, that is, to his position and his resources; for expenditure should be proportionate to means, and suitable not only to the occasion but to the giver. Hence a poor man cannot be munificent, since he has not the means to make a great outlay suitably; the poor man who attempts munificence is foolish, for he spends out of proportion to his means, and beyond what he ought, whereas an act displays virtue only when it is done in the right way.

S: Yes, this is universal. A foolish action cannot be a virtuous action; absolutely. No Don Quixotes. It can be nice, in a way; I mean, touching, but it cannot be good. Yes. Now go on.

O: But great public benefactions are suitable for those who have adequate resources derived from their own exertions or from their ancestors or connections, and for the high-born and famous and the like, since birth, fame and so on all have an element of greatness and distinction.

S: In other words, there must be greatness not only in the deed. There must also be greatness in the doer and this may be due to nobility of discernment; it may be due to other things. Yes.

O: The munificent man, therefore, is especially of this sort, and munificence mostly finds its outlet in these public benefactions, as we have said. . . .

S: Let us stop here. So now we have the answer to your question, Mr. Boyan. The expense corresponding to the greatness of the beings with a view to which the expenses are made: that makes the munificent man munificent. Now these beings are first, the gods; second, other super-human beings (in Greek, daimon); and



and third, the city, public things. Of course, public buildings erected by a private man would naturally also form that. Now this is, I think, the solution to this riddle. Only in this part of the discussion of moral virtues does Aristotle speak of the gods. Only. A commentator of the 17th century not on Aristotle exactly but he knew his Aristotle very well, Gronobius, who wrote comments on Grotius' War and Peace, says: "one must forgive Aristotle that he has not mentioned among the moral virtues, religion, for to him as well as to all other ancients outside of the church the place of divine worship falls under the heading of munificence." I do not know what evidence he has for saying this of all ancients but in the case of Aristotle it is surely true. What religion as a virtue is for Aristotle: munificence. Well, look at it. For example, sacrificing, worship. Are the sacrifices which a poor fellow makes -- such a gross disproportion between the smallness of the gifts and the grandeur of the gods -- that's not fitting. Only a very powerful and wealthy man can sacrifice. That this is in a deep sense ironical on the part of Aristotle I have no doubt, but he states the facts as they are. No poor man or no obscure man can be munificent. We have read it. No poor man and no obscure man can honor the gods properly because his poverty and his obscurity make it impossible for him to honor the gods properly. Now here we see, of course, a difference between Aristotle and the Bible in the clearest way. In the Bible sometimes in the psalms and elsewhere the pious are called the poor ones. Here, by definition -- I mean if we make a legitimate substitution -- the pious, those who worship the gods properly, can only be the rich: a great subject of attack already in classical antiquity, but Aristotle follows this line. Now first Mr. Lyons.

Q: Where is the irony for Aristotle?

S: Yes, well, because is there not also something fishy about that? . . . But he sticks to what quite a few of his contemporaries would have admitted. A hundred oxen is a much greater honoring than a pigeon, a dove, to say nothing of smaller things. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Does this matter of obscurity mean that a tasteful and magnificent gift should not or cannot be anonymous?

S: No, I meant an obscure man. You know, a man of obscure origin. You know, just a nobody, as they say. If a nobody should approach an altar of Zeus there is a certain disproportion. If it is a very great man in the city, very great -- you know, could present Zeus with the image of Pericles; but to take some sausage seller: that would have been a blasphemy. Yes? Do you see that? Good. Mr. Butterworth.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Who is the 17th century commentator?

S: Gronobius, probably Gromus in German or Dutch but Gronobius in Latin. Good. Gronobius' remarks on Grotius' critique of Aristotle are very sound. He understood Aristotle much better than Grotius did. Mr. Boyan.

Q<sub>4</sub>: By comparing the munificent man to a knower it seems to me he's putting this man higher than, say, the liberal man and that's the thing that I'm questioning as reasonable. I don't know whether a man quietly who gives some money to charity or something, you know, with the welfare situation in Illinois --

S: Yes, that's liberal. That's liberal.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Yes, I think that might be higher than some guy who makes quite. . . .

S: No, but you have to take into consideration the object too in the case of the three others we have discussed hitherto, the courageous, the moderate, and the liberal. There is no reference whatever to the gods. In the case of munificence there is a reference. Therefore when he says know and uses the word, contemplation, this fine word here -- they foreshadow -- to repeat, in Aristotle's Ethics the moral virtue regarding the gods is munificence; none other. There is no virtue called piety. The word piety existed in Greece. Plato has written a dialogue on piety with the understanding that this is a virtue and all the more striking is Aristotle's refusal to do that. For Aristotle the place of piety is taken by two different virtues: (a) munificence, and (b) theoretical wisdom; theoretical wisdom, which deals with the true gods: the stars, the rulers of the whole, but not with Zeus and Athena or Hera. This he regarded as necessary for the polis but the virtue most becoming to these gods as popularly understood is honoring on a grand scale and this honoring on a grand scale means, of course, expenditure on a grand scale. I mean, the inner reverence in prayer or whatever have you: not a word is said about that. I mean, I think that is, if only from the point of view of understanding the cleavage between the two elements of our Western tradition, of utmost importance, obviously. But Aristotle's statements are, of course, cannot be called, the Greek view because most Greeks would have absolutely disagreed with him. But among these few Greeks who we remember there would have been quite a few who would have agreed. Thucydides, I'm sure, would have taken a similar view.

Q<sub>6</sub>: The medieval counterpart of ancient munificence would be the medieval church builders.

S: Yes, yes, sure. Yes, but no Christian would say that a man who can afford to build a cathedral is more decent to God than a simple man who is absolutely poor.

Q<sub>6</sub>: I don't know.

S: Well, then, the famous distinction between the administration and the non-administration would come in. That's another matter. But you are very cynical, Brother Chrysostom. But that is probably true. I'm sure the temptation to honor greater --

Q<sub>6</sub>: (Inaudible.)

S: Yes, but is this deed in itself more meritorious?

Q<sub>6</sub>: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, that I believe is -- I mean, you must know Christian charity much better than I do, but it doesn't sound right to me. I mean, that sometimes prelates will, of course, just as university presidents, be greatly concerned with this kind of founders and honor them particularly, more perhaps than they deserve: that I grant you.

Q<sub>6</sub>: I think I am aware of what you are saying, but on the other hand I don't know whether those medieval church leaders who built them, really edifices of grandeur, were not meritorious; on the contrary.

S: Yes, but the question is however whether that makes them more pleasing in the eyes of God than a simple fellow who can never even give a mite to a poor man but reveres God properly in his heart.

Q6: Oh, I would never say that.

S: Ah ha. But Aristotle says it! Aristotle says it. Good. Let us reflect for one moment about what we learn regarding the general question of the end. Now what is the end of the munificent man? Let us disregard the gods and say the end of munificence is adorning the city in various ways. This is not sufficient, of course, because it depends also on the situation of the individual who does the adorning. I mean, if this money comes from unsavory sources then it is not a munificent act. The end as the noble includes a variety of considerations, of which the adorning of the city is only one and this virtue of munificence too -- its matter is that which is related to the end; the means, not the end, namely it deals with money or rather large scale spending. Let us read 1123a, 4 to 5. "That the munificent man does not spend for himself. . . ."

O: . . . the munificent man does not spend money on himself but on public objects, and his gifts have some resemblance to votive offerings.

S: Yes, you see again the religious element in munificence which is absent from the three other virtues. A little bit later: a9.

O: . . . and to prefer spending on permanent objects, because these are the most noble; and to spend an amount that is appropriate to the particular occasion, for the same gifts are not suitable for the gods and for men, and the same expenditure is not appropriate to a sacrifice and a funeral.

S: Yes, you see again this reference. Later there will be some more. Again; munificence is the virtue which takes the place of piety. And then at the end, the last sentence, a31 to 33.

O: These dispositions then are vices, but they do not bring serious discredit, since they are not injurious to others, nor are they excessively unseemly.

S: So the vices corresponding to munificence are -- (how do you call it? -- not boasting) --

O: Paltriness --

S: Ostentation. And the other is, of course -- what is the vice corresponding--

O: Paltriness.

S: Vulgarity.

O: He calls it paltriness.

S: Yes, . . . , lack of experience in things beautiful, literally translated. Yes, vulgarity, one can say. These vices are not particularly -- they are vices but men are not disgraced by them, and for two reasons. The first is these vices are not harmful to others; and the other, they are not unbecoming, grossly unbecoming to the actor. Positively stated, there are two overall ends involving other virtues: utility to others and becoming to the doer, or we can state the latter one, perfection of the doer; the perfection of the doer and the utility to others. In the utilitarian morality, narrowly conceived, only the utility to others is considered and perhaps also the utility of the individual, narrowly conceived, but not the perfection of the individual. That's



the point. Now let us turn to the beginning of the section on magnanimity.

Q: Isn't what the magnificent man knows what is good of his kind?

S: No, it is knowledge -- as a kind of foreshadowing of the grandeur and the rank of the objects of munificence, the gods. I do not believe you can give any other reason. You can say it requires a greater discrimination, at least on the face of it, to know what is becoming to the gods in contra-distinction to what is becoming for a man, than any intra-human discrimination. . . . Now, Mr. Butterworth,

Q<sub>2</sub>: (As to the view of Thomas Aquinas and Averroes.)

S: Averroes agrees with Aristotle, of course. He agrees with him. I mean, after all, the Muslims built mosques. Don't you know that? So? They had a great opportunity for displaying nobly on a grand scale there too.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I'm thinking -- you said that this is a foreshadowing of knowing, in this case, the God --

S: Yes, this is there, surely. Well, simply stated, I believe that through the discussion of moral virtue in Books III to V there shines through somehow what Aristotle regards as the simply good life, the theoretical life, and the gods, even as they are popularly understood, and the reverence for them, are, as it were, a divination of the truly super-human. But it becomes visible most clearly hitherto in the section on munificence, and let us see whether we can find anything in the sequel. Mr. Mueller.

Q<sub>3</sub>: (As to whether King Solomon was especially honored for splendid buildings.)

S: King Solomon. Yes, sure. But the main point, of course, is that he is a king of peace. His father, David, was not permitted to build the temple. Good. Yes, sure. No, the Bible doesn't say that possession of wealth and power is evil. That is what some modern people say, but not the Bible. That there are dangers: sure. But in themselves they are not necessarily evil. Yes, Mr. Glenn, you are the last one.

Q<sub>4</sub>: What is this perfection of the doer that seems to be part of moral virtue?

S: What I called formerly by such an expression as the freedom, the inner freedom from these depressing things.

Now Aristotle turns from magnificence to another grand virtue, magnanimity, and the names could have been the opposite but Aristotle set it down in these particular names. Now this is, of course, a particularly famous and grand section for reasons which will appear later. Now the magnanimous man has to do not with money or possessions, but with honors and with great honors. Aristotle will later on speak of a virtue which has to do with not great honors: medium size or small. But here we deal with great honors, and the magnanimous man is a man who claims for himself great honors while deserving them. And we have, of course, when we read Greek books, especially Thucydides -- you find quite a few. Alcibiades is, of course, such a man; in another way, Pericles. I mean, when you read Alcibiades' speech before the Sicilian expedition after he had been attacked by Nicias; then he says, look what I did, how I won this race in Olympia and how I almost licked the Spartans at Mantinea. The Spartans won that battle but they almost lost it and therefore he can say it is almost a victory; and so. But the

way in which he speaks there: I am this man and I can rightly claim the honor to be sent as the commander-in-chief to Sicily. And, of course, Aristotle does not agree with this; he starts from this Alcibiadean or Periclean view but he rises much higher. But the starting point is this common view. Now there are a number of rises here, more than one, more than two. First men may claim great honors for themselves without deserving them, and then he is -- how do they translate that? What is a man who claims great honors for himself and does not deserve them?

O: Small souled?

S: No, no, no.

O: Vain, vainglorious.

S: Vain, vainglorious. And the small souled man is the man who could claim great honors for himself but doesn't have the courage to do that; small souled. And then there is another type who is much more frequent and quite nice: namely, a man who does not claim great honors knowing that he does not deserve them. Aristotle says that's a sensible man, but not a magnanimous man. This I find always very enjoyable, this remark. Good. Yes?

Q: Would this mean that Aristotle would say that George Washington, for refusing the crown and returning to his plantation, would be a small souled man?

S: That depends very much on the circumstances. But if he would do it on the ground of unworthiness -- there could be other reasons. There could be reasons of another kind. But if he would regard himself as unworthy while in fact he was worthy, he would say it was small souled; you could say in opposite to magnanimous.

O: It was clearly magnanimous.

S: Yes, Aristotle makes clear later on that this is, you could say, the contradiction in the magnanimous man: that he is also not attached to honors and looks down on them. Therefore that is complicated. But we are speaking first of the surface phenomenon. . . . (about 5 inaudible words.) Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Now in the case of George Washington aren't we judging his motives. . . .

S: That I didn't say, but Aristotle simply says the motives, to the extent to which they do not become manifest in deed or speech. Good. /The questioner, during the inaudible portion, appears to have asserted that Dr. Strauss' said one cannot judge a man's motives. Now let us read 1123b15.

O: Though therefore in regard to the greatness of his claim the magnanimous man is an extreme, by reason of its rightness he stands at the mean point, for he claims what he deserves; while the vain and the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively.

If then the magnanimous man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the greatest things, magnanimity must be concerned with some one object especially. "Worthy" is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds; and such a thing is honor, for

honor is clearly the greatest of external goods. Therefore the magnanimous man is he who has the right disposition in relation to honors and disgraces. And even without argument it is evident that honor is the object with which the magnanimous are concerned, since it is honor above all else which great men claim and deserve.

S: Yes, now let us stop here for one moment. You see, we see here now the deeper kinship between these two virtues, munificence and magnanimity, which are discussed in the immediate sequel. Both are concerned with grandness. Now the munificent man is the only one who can honor the gods properly, as we have seen, according to their greatness. The magnanimous man goes beyond the munificent man. He behaves, in a way, like the gods. He claims great honors for himself. To that extent he is a peak of the whole moral part. Now let us continue where we left off.

O: The small-souled man falls short both as judged by his own deserts and in comparison with the claim of the magnanimous man; the vain man on the other hand exceeds as judged by his own standard, but does not however exceed the magnanimous man.

S: In other words, the vainglorious man can never claim higher honors than the magnanimous man does because the magnanimous man claims the highest honors. The mistake of the vainglorious man is only that he believes that he is worthy of them, whereas the magnanimous man is worthy of them. Yes?

O: And inasmuch as the magnanimous man deserves most, he must be the best of men; for the better a man is the more he deserves, and he that is best deserves most. Therefore the truly magnanimous man must be a good man. Indeed greatness in each of the virtues would seem to go with magnanimity. For instance, one cannot imagine the magnanimous man running at full speed when retreating in battle, nor acting dishonestly; since what motive for base conduct has a man to whom nothing is great? Considering all the virtues in turn, we shall feel it quite ridiculous to picture the magnanimous man as other than a good man. Moreover, if he were bad he would not be worthy of honor, since honor is the prize of virtue, and the tribute that we pay to the good. Magnanimity seems therefore to be, as it were, a crowning ornament of the virtues; it enhances their greatness, and it cannot exist without them. Hence it is hard to be truly magnanimous, for magnanimity is impossible without moral nobility.

S: Yes; "without perfect gentlemanship" would be a somewhat better translation. So magnanimity comprises all virtues, presupposes them, and it adorns them. I mean, a man may have all virtues but if he is not conscious of having them he is less perfect than if he is conscious of them. And why? Because it shows a lack of intelligence if he does not know that he has them. And this consciousness and the acting on this consciousness is an ornament of all the virtues. Magnanimity is the peak; I must add immediately it is one peak. The other peak is justice, to which we will turn here in Book V. And this is characteristic of Aristotle's Ethics: that it has two peaks, magnanimity and justice. Magnanimity is concerned with the perfection of the individual. Justice is the social virtue; (society). These two different considerations are co-present in the Ethics. If justice were simply the highest virtue from every point of view then magnanimity could not occupy the place. And it would be interesting to follow the history of these two virtues through the ages. It is very clear in Hobbes and Descartes. I mean, you laughed because you have read that somewhere? No. Well, I



described it somewhere. The Hobbian tradition which ends, then, in utilitarianism reduces all virtue to justice. It is not concerned with the perfection of the individual. And the other line, which was presented in the 17th century especially by Descartes, tries to understand all perfection as the perfection of the individual. Descartes' key virtue is called generosity but this is wholly, so to speak, the Latin translation of magnanimity. Next Mr. Kirwan and then you.

Q: The language you used regarding magnanimity and justice are different and I wonder how you mean that. In regard to justice, it's the perfection of all the virtues whereas magnanimity is the crown of all virtues --

S: I'm speaking now, of course, of general virtue. The difference will be made clear by Mr. Dry when we come to it. Both magnanimity and general virtue presuppose all other virtues, but from a different point of view. From the point of view of the individual and his consciousness of his worth: that's magnanimity. From the point of view of what the city demands: general justice. Mr. Boyan.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Yes, I was going to save this for my paper, but it might be of interest to point out that if you take Book IV and you divide the book by the center of the book you come right into the center of this discussion of magnanimity.

S: Oh, that is very interesting. I didn't do it. Did you take an edition without footnotes so that you --

Q<sub>2</sub>: I took this edition. I'm sorry.

S: Yes, there are footnotes. Yes, you would have to do the boring job of counting lines to make clear where the arithmetic center is. I wouldn't be surprised; I wouldn't be surprised because that is a clear descent afterward. But as I say, justice also comes in. But in the immediate sequel on a few cases, in 1124a8-9 and 28 to 29, the virtue of the magnanimous man is called pantelous -- has an overall perfection. You will have to see, Mr. Dry, whether anything of this kind is said of general justice. It is genuinely a question which of these two peaks is the higher in Aristotle's sense, and that is very important. Now Aristotle develops that in the sequel: the thought that of course being a reasonable man he chooses, claims, the honors only from the right kind of people. He's not concerned with the acclaim of fools. What's the use of that? If the men who are competent to judge honor him: that he is concerned with. But he will not even be concerned with these honors -- that would mean to be enslaved by honors -- and because he is not concerned with them he accepts them as deserving them. It's hard for us to imagine such a man because we are all brought up in the Biblical tradition, but for Aristotle there was no difficulty of that. He accepts them as due to him. . . . (several inaudible words) -- and he has no sense of gratitude. Yes, I deserve them and I accept them. And therefore it is thought to be supercilious, a contemner, but Aristotle insists that he is a perfectly rational man.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Did Aristotle make a distinction between vaingloriousness and pride?

S: No, you can say magnanimity is noble pride. You can call it pride, noble pride.

Q<sub>3</sub>: But is there a distinction between vanity or vaingloriousness and ignoble pride?

S: Yes, well, there are all kinds of things. I mean, there are kinds of self-

complacency, which we also call vanity from time to time. Aristotle speaks of forms of this when he comes to speak of the narrowly understood social virtues. I mean, you know, the lines are difficult to draw. You know, there are people who are like hungry dogs in regard to small honors. You know, whenever they can get a badge they are very occupied, and all kinds of empty titles are very relevant. We also call such people vain. Or men who regard everything which belongs to them and which they did or suffered as just wonderful because it happened to them. This is also a form of vanity. One should think about it surely, but Aristotle defines here this kind of thing translated by vanity as that someone regards himself worthy of high honors without deserving them.

Q<sub>3</sub>: (Elaborates his understanding of ignoble pride as claiming honors that are usually reserved for the gods.)

S: No. I mean, well, say Pericles, Alcibiades, did not claim the honor that there should be sacrifices to them. They never did. There were kings and potentates who claimed that, but this is not what Aristotle means.

Now what struck me for the first time in reading this section which I have read before was this very simple thing: honor, high honor, and not a word is said here about immortal glory, glory after death. You noticed that, Mr. Kirwan. You noticed that. Yes. That is very remarkable. In Alcibiades' speech in Athens in Thucydides' Book VI, chapter 16, sections 5 to 6, there it is mentioned. Alcibiades is very much concerned, thinks about what will they say about him after his death. Here Aristotle is absolutely silent about it and that is strange. After all, if you think of the greatest honors you would think of immortal glory. Now I believe we have to bring this together with another very strange silence which we observed in the section on courage: bravery in battle, not a word said about the fatherland for the sake of which this death is faced. In both cases there is no thought of what survives: either the fatherland which survives the death of the brave man or glory. The whole sphere of moral virtue is in the perishable and with a view to the perishable. This, I think, is what Aristotle means by that, and this is, I think, important for the understanding of the overall message. You see, what Aristotle does is, of course, this. There was a lot of reflection on the virtues going on before him, in the poets, in the historians, and in the philosophers, and in addition by thoughtful people all over Greece throughout the centuries who did not write, in a kind of wisdom which became embodied in proverbs or what have you. Aristotle takes that and recognizes the wisdom there, but he does not merely codify it in his Ethics. He changes it. He modifies it. As every true codifier of customs does not simply put it down but he perfects the customs by the way in which he puts it down, that is much more true, I think, of Aristotle and, of course, one would have to find out from which point of view does Aristotle modify what is called traditional Greek morality and I think the general answer is obvious -- from which point of view he would do it; from what was for him the highest point of view, the theoretical life.

Q<sub>4</sub>: I was wondering if justice is also perishable --

S: Yes, what does it mean, justice perishable? No man's moderate action and no man's virtuous action is imperishable. I mean, he dies. Now the question of immortality is here completely ruled out, in this passage which occurred earlier. I have the reference to it here: 1111b, 22 to 23, when he speaks of the difference between deliberating and wishing; and then he says in passing men wish immortality. They cannot deliberate how to get immortality; but they wish; and with the understanding -- no, men wish for the impossible, "for instance, immor-

talities." Now this could, of course, merely mean literally understood, that they will never die. . . . (about 7 inaudible words to the same effect). But it can, of course, also mean there is no immortality of the individual. That is entirely left open here and I think it is characteristic for the morality of the Ethics. Well, that has been said n times and Thomas Aquinas points it out in his commentary on more than one occasion. Aristotle is concerned in this book only with the felicity of this life. That is clear. No one would deny that. But I would go a step further and say it deals with the felicity of this life as the only felicity.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Yes, but in a sense Aristotle himself is immortal through his writings. . . .

S: Yes, but Aristotle would never admit that. . . . It has happened to Aristotle's books -- you know, they were buried in cellars somewhere in Asia Minor for some time and they were not found and quite a few of them are lost; and that fate was so kind to Aristotle's writings that so much of them survived but much less than was with Plato. . . . I believe that all these men wrote their works which we call immortal with the perfect understanding that literally they are not immortal. No, no, they cannot be. You can say they deserve to be immortal, but that they should be in fact what we call immortal. . . . (all of this difficult to hear -- off-microphone.)

Q<sub>4</sub>: Would Aristotle say that it is possible for thought to be imperishable not in terms of whether it is remembered altogether, but --

S: But its truth; you mean, but its inner truth; that whenever men think sufficiently they would eventually arrive at it. Surely that is clear. But that doesn't mean that any books are literally speaking what we would call immortal . . . and even, of course . . . if and when the world perishes all glory belonging to the world perishes. That is clear; and I think we modern people through our belief in progress -- that was very characteristic. You know, the original emergence of the belief in progress . . . in the 18th century . . . was, in this respect, much more thoughtful. It said the world must have a beginning . . . and it must be infinite in the future. There must be no end of human life on Earth ever. Then, of course, you can say it can be immortal because you have a guarantee that somehow there will always be men on Earth who may remember the brave deeds of earlier men. But this belief has no basis, neither in Revelation nor in reason. . . . A couple of billion years or even a hundred billion years is not eternity.

Q<sub>4</sub>: If this is true, then the whole sphere of intellectual virtue as well as moral virtue would also be perishable.

S: Yes, but it is concern with the imperishable, whereas moral virtue is concern -- this act of liberality, this act now done by one perishable being to another perishable being. . . . That's the difference. The major consideration of philosophy . . . always said that philosophy or contemplation is higher than action. Every polis, however great, perishes. The peak of Athens, Pericles himself, perished. What has come into being and has become great will also perish; and I think the modern belief in progress has simply led to some facile belief in the immortality of what is essentially mortal. And when you read in the 19th century some of the greatest men there, the concern, for example, of men like Jakob Burckhardt, a famous historian, as you know, with museums and the preservation of every beautiful painting and sculpture: involved in that concern is if these things are not preserved the highest perishes, which no wise man of old



would have thought because that cannot be the highest, this kind of thing. They may be very useful, very wonderful; they can never be the highest. The highest cannot be something made by man, whether they are books. . . . I mean, from the Biblical point of view, of course, it is simply idolotry. But the Greek philosophers wouldn't have spoken of idolotry. They would say it is a great error of judgment to believe that the perishable can be as such imperishable.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Isn't Marx's philosophy of history closer to what you are saying than other philosophies of history?

S: Well Marx, to my knowledge, never speaks about that, but Engels speaks about it in his pamphlet on Feuerbach, where he says, well, the natural scientists tell us that there will also be a decay of the world and therefore a decay of the perfect communist society, mind you, but that's a long way off. That's a very practical answer but one must also say it's an answer wholly unworthy of a man who claims to be a philosopher. No, if anyone was taken in completely by what men can do it was Marx. He was not the only one but he was surely one of them. Yes?

Q<sub>6</sub>: How would this fit in with the concern that you expressed at the end of the last hour regarding what the end of moral action is?

S: The end of moral action as Aristotle understands it I think is clear: to be a good man, i.e. while you live. That is it. You know, a very simple example: whether a man's life is longer or shorter doesn't depend on and yet a man can lead a short life well and a long life badly. So only as long as we live do we have a responsibility.

Q<sub>6</sub>: If I'm not mistaken, however, you phrased your question as being a little bit more difficult to answer.

S: Yes, otherwise we would say the best man is the man who lives longest, which no one in his senses will say because it is empirically wrong. We see people sometimes who are in their high 90's although not very frequently, and in most cases we have nothing but compassion for them because of the decay of their mental powers and so on. Mr. Winiarski.

Q<sub>7</sub>: Could you not say, however, that the peak of moral virtue is also concern with the eternal because the magnanimous man claims for himself those honors which are also claimed for the gods.

S: Yes, but as given to him they perish with him. I mean, even if they are remembered for some time, for a century or so, but what does it mean? I mean, really sic transit gloria mentus (?), a wise word.

Q<sub>7</sub>: Yes, but doesn't Aristotle really transform the horizon within which the man of moral virtue looks at this --

S: Yes, in a very indirect way. I believe I understand what you mean. Since Aristotle's understanding of moral virtue is, according to its claim, that understanding which is in agreement with the eternal truth to that extent it participates in a very indirect way, but in a very indirect way, in eternity. So to say, that Aristotle's teaching -- I mean, to overstate it -- Aristotle's moral teaching is from this point of view the eternal moral teaching: is that what you mean?

Q<sub>7</sub>: That would be part of it. Yes --

S: Yes, but that doesn't mean, of course, that it will be eternal as his teaching, as the teaching connected with this individual, Aristotle from Stagelirus. They might be long forgotten -- his books might be destroyed. It would always deserve to be destroyed because it is a true teaching.

Q7: (To the effect that eventually Aristotle transcends the horizon of morality.)

S: Yes, yes, sure. Very good. In other words, Aristotle, you can say, takes a variety of understandings of morality and one of them, and perhaps the most respectable, is the one which you sketch but then he shows; not by argument -- the argument we would have to find out -- but by indications, that this is wrong, this understanding, because -- one can put it this way -- because it regards as eternal what is not eternal. Simply spoken, it is somehow based on the belief in such beings as Zeus and Hera and so on; and if they are not, then the morality based on them is as such untenable. That indeed. But I think the basic thought: we have, not in any way by the Biblical tradition, but by the modern philosophies of history especially, forgotten the thought which was so familiar to earlier generations of men: that while societies are much more long lasting than individuals . . . they are still as perishable as individuals -- is for us not so simply present although it is not -- because the Biblical thought is entirely different. Every eternity of which the Bible speaks insofar as it refers to human beings is eternity by virtue of a free act of God, of a divine promise, not an inherent one. The eternity of Israel, the eternity of the church: this is not meant to be a natural eternity, as you know. That's the difference. And Aristotle, of course, does not know anything of a revealed religion. That is perfectly clear.

9th Meeting: May 9th, 1963

... I apologize. I think it is necessary for us to face this seeming difficulty which you have presented to us; and as for the names you mentioned I can only quote a famous philosopher, Leibniz, who used to say ... (gives original and then translates) "I despise almost nothing." I mean, there are some things which are simply despicable, of course, but I have seen very simple and unpretentious articles, God knows where, by young people from which one could learn something, and why should one not learn from Mr. Mills and Mr. Fromm? That's of course clear and that is all right. But this is not the substantive question which you raised. Regarding Freud in general one must not forget Freud is, of course, not responsible for the relaxation of sexual manners in our age. I think he himself was rather strict, a rather strict man in his life and also in what he thought was good for human beings. Therefore he has been accused ... of Victorianism, and I would have to go into the particular examples. To do that you would laugh very much but I must suppress that. Now Mills, of course -- you showed me that article. Well, this is clear. You have today the tendency in certain circles, some of whom call themselves liberals, others call themselves conservatives -- you know, these lines are not so simple to draw -- and what is characteristic of both is everything is just fine. We don't need any recourse to principles because our American method of trial and error and so on has led to much better results than any intellectual efforts ever did. I read once in a fashionable journal a review of such a book which was entitled -- which has the sub-title, "Thought: Down With Thought." In other words, that's just a dig and they have clarified it and that will more or less settle all questions. And then, of course, everyone who is concerned with principles as I suppose Mr. Mills was -- to that extent I would agree with him, of course.

Now what is your error? You were right when you said that, generally speaking, the order in Book IV, second half of Book IV, is one of descent because no virtue as highly praised as magnanimity ever occurred again and the last one is not even a virtue, sense of shame. But this is no criticism of what you said, but just to make it quite clear: the structure of Books III to IV -- I mean, where he begins with the particular virtues in the middle of Book III -- ascent followed by a descent. And there is, by the way, a proof of which I never thought before. When he speaks of the sense of shame he contrasts the shaming man who blushes with the fearing man who gets pain, and courage has to do with this cold feet. But one must add one thing: then there begins something here which is, in a way, higher: justice. Sure. This you know, but I only didn't wish to make -- .

Now to come to your specific point: what you told us about Fromm. Fromm agrees in a broad way with Aristotle. So there is a human nature and therefore there is also a pointer toward the perfection or the goodness of human nature. To that extent, of course, there must indeed be agreement. But what has he got that Aristotle ain't got? What was your point there?

O: I made the point that  $\sqrt{S}$ : Because of the psychology, / because of the psychology one comes up with certain other dimensions of why people behave the way they do and then the consequences of that would be different than simply to make a moral discourse about the goodness or badness of. . . .

S: Yes, but Aristotle's Ethics is, in the first place, not meant to be condemnatory. / O: No, I say it may. / This is accidental: that, for example, you have greater indulgence for cowards than, say, for people who eat and drink too much.



You know, that's one example. That is not the point. But what is the precise difficulty? Do we know more about the vices, to use the simple Aristotelian term, by virtue of this kind of psychology than we did before?

O: I would argue that we know more about why they occur than we did before and that may make a difference. In other words, we don't know more about what is good and what is bad, but we do have a better understanding of why someone is good and someone is bad.

S: All right. That is a reasonable statement. In other words, we know more about the conditions favorable to vice and therefore indirectly, of course; also about the conditions favorable to virtue. Yes? Good. Perhaps that is so, but what is the difference? I mean, what is the key difference between Aristotle and these people? If you put the emphasis on the conditions you imply men can be made good by right conditioning and the people who are bad have become bad by virtue of wrong conditioning. Now for Aristotle, however, the most important characteristic is -- while he's not blind to that; you know -- Aristotle's not blind to the conditions -- but for him, Aristotle, the decisive thing in upbringing is hearing, what you are told. You can also call it exhortation and dehortation. This was where the whole thing started in the 17th century when men like Hobbes came and said this teaching of the moralists like Aristotle and Cicero is of no use. They exhort and dehort. People don't become good by exhortation and dehortation. Those are mere words. What you have to do is something of sterner stuff than mere speeches and this could be a good police force, which was Hobbes' major increment of virtue, and you could also eventually arrive at the psychoanalyst's couch, but the principle is the same. The principle is the same: the distrust in exhortation and dehortation, the distrust in logos; because, you know, logos means every speech, not only the demonstrative speech but also the exhortive and dehortive speeches.

O: I don't think I'd draw that conclusion. . . . He does talk about character as resulting from this sort of thing, this canalization of energy --

S: But habituation, as Aristotle means it, is not exactly the same as canalization of energy. Canalization of energy can also take place in inanimate things, like electricity or what have you. Habituation is here meant to be something which can be done, to some extent, with the higher animals (you can make a dog housebroken) but which in a fuller and a more emphatic sense is specifically human. Now furthermore I would like to state the points which one would have -- I don't say that you are wrong -- but which would have to be established before I would accept your thesis. The second point is this. A psychology you need. Aristotle has said it very clearly in Book I. But the question is what kind of psychology. Now Aristotle's first assertion is a crude psychology will do for this purpose. You remember? A crude psychology; you don't need a refined psychology as he gave it, to some extent, in his book On The Soul. You don't have to know these subtleties about memory and about the difference between seeing and hearing. This is unimportant for the purpose of educating oneself for citizenship or for humanity and anything else. But the second point is this: you used the terms sadism and masochism. It's very interesting. I mean, in other words; certain kinds of bestiality, to put it very simply, are called by these terms, i.e. one believes that certain sexual perversions are the key to these particular kinds of inhuman conduct. More generally stated, and I think that is of course connected with Freud as a whole, that the whole life of man has to be understood ultimately in terms of sex.

O: Fromm takes strong exception to Freud; in fact he has a reputation for that.

S: Yes, but I mean this point has nothing to do with Fromm. You read in the daily papers and in journals of very conservative men who are opposed to Freud in all its senses -- they still use these terms sadism and masochism, therewith tacitly accepting the whole view. Now that sex is very important is a statement which one can safely make, but that it should be the key to everything is, of course, an entirely different assertion. I mean, in other words, the river can never rise higher than the source. If the premises from which the psychologists start are too narrow, then however demonstrated all the detailed results may be by research projects and questionnaires and so the narrowness will still show in the results. I mean, that is, I think, what in a different way is, of course, also true of Marx: the narrowness of the premise. You cannot later get in. Freud says much more; so does Marx. But the question is whether he can get it in legitimately by having started this way. This is the question with Marx which is fundamental, the same as with Freud, only the emphasis is on the needs and production for the sake of needs and not on sex. What is the situation? At a certain moment man appears and this creature, as distinguished from all other ones, must produce in order to live. Producing is a form of cooperation also. And out of the modes of production imposed on them by their environments, say fishermen or whatever it may be; or hunters, this leads then to the rest of their life: their laws, their beliefs, all have to be understood in terms of the mode of production. But why? That's a mere dogmatic assertion. Why should these first men who were somehow distinguished from non-men by some "x" and this "x" shows itself in a peculiar kind of foresight connected with production, leading to production -- why should they not all have, however stupid and untrained they may be, have had some thoughts about this in which they live. They wouldn't call it world surely. I don't know how they would call it, but somehow they also thought about matters other than production. Why should these thoughts be secondary compared with the modes of production? Marx never proved this assumption. But his proof, he believed, is that he alone can give an account of history, but which meant in practice of what has happened in Europe in the modern centuries. That was the point. This is not a good enough proof.

There is another point which you mentioned which I found very interesting: insecurity, terms of insecurity. This implies a healthy, normal human being is secure. What does this mean? The whole problem is involved in this context. You can't talk of insecurity without having already settled what security means. What does it mean? A negative thing I can say. It does not mean strength of soul. I believe security -- that would be my first guess -- security is a substitute for strength of soul, and I think you only have to say that to see that there is something not quite clear. What does security mean? It is very interesting: the accusation made against the 19th century by some leading critics of the 19th century, and a fortiori, of the 20th century, is the security, the over-riding concern with security. Well, of course; first of all, external security; I mean, we don't have that security. You know, think of /Chicago Police Commissioner/ Orlando Wilson. But still, we are very anxious for security. But then there is economic security and all the guarantees. The very notion of insurance: you know, insurances are a very recent invention, 200 years old. Insurance: to make us sure, where former people lived all throughout their lives in insecurity, more or less. But they had their certainties but they were of a different kind. So here in this question of insecurity I believe there is buried a very great problem and the ultimate reason, if I'm not surprised, is this: the older people probably thought that the situation of man as man is essentially insecure. I mean, there can be islands of security but fundamentally the situation of man is insecure; whereas I would not be surprised if the ultimate premise of these modern people is the situation of man ought to be secure and we have the tool, conquest of nature. These forces making for insecurity can be controlled. So, in

other words, to repeat, I'm perfectly willing to accept everything you have said as soon as these questions are answered, but to be frank, straightforward, I believe that most of these people who write about these matters today do not think about these implications. The words we use all the time. All these words are really loaded; I mean, the intellectuals -- I have mentioned this before -- the image, the image of America which plays such a great role now. And it occurred to me that when you should look at the TV you would see that a major element of the commercials have to do with cosmetics, i.e. with the image a man and a woman wish to present to the world: you know, that if he is hairless that he is hairy and so on and so on. And is this kind of image of America not a kind of political cosmetics, if I may say so, and just as cosmetics was described by Plato in the Gorgias very nicely as a sham art because the right way for looking well and healthy is to be without this but only have a healthy front, and what about this health? So what I'm driving at is only this: I may be wrong in my political judgment. I don't care for that. But all these words which we use and which we take for granted as if we understood them as well as we understand when I say table. The latter is no question: that we all understand each other and if there is the slightest misunderstanding it can be explained immediately. But the concepts, as they say: there the problems are buried and by accepting these terms we accept the whole world which goes with them. We are, of course, more immediately intelligible because these are the terms generally used. Insecurity: we have it all the time. He or she is insecure; which can be an absolutely good and nice character trait too. Sure. I mean, if you compare a rash --

O: (To the effect that insecurity in the psychoanalytic sense is incompatible with the maximum unfolding of the potentialities of man.)

S: Yes, that is true. Someone is too much ashamed: he will not learn. That is quite true. But, on the other hand, if he doesn't have a certain docility and deference he will also not learn. So, I mean, it is too general. And strength of soul sounds to me clearer and less ambiguous than security. Good. But I liked your paper and it was very good that you read a paper. Yes, Mr. Reinkin.

Q: May I go back to a point where you mentioned that with Hobbes there was a break from logos to the police force and you extended this to the modern psychiatrist. I would like to defend the notion that this couch is an instrument of logos and even more so than the habituation. You have the neurotic. . . . He drinks and he knows he really drinks too much. He knows he ought not to do it so he goes and sees somebody several times a week. They talk and they talk and they talk. And they build up a reasoned discourse about the Oedipus complex and he comes to understand it and with luck after two years he stops drinking. Now this surely may be the use of logos --

S: The best psychologist I know -- I know nothing of that but I know a first rate psychologist. His name is Irving Strauss. Some of his books I read in English. I mean, he is absolutely distrustful of the theoretical basis of psychoanalysis. But I asked him, what about the therapeutic results? And he said, it all depends on what you understand by a result. And I understood this for my own private purposes as follows. One of my former students gave a course in the College here and he had a student who had one of these things, you know, personality problems, and he couldn't work and was very miserable and then he went, naturally, to the psychiatrist. And two or three years later my friend met him again and this young man was perfectly happy, was working downtown and drew a regular salary, probably was married and so on. But then my young friend said to me, was he not better off when he was miserable than when he is so completely adjusted now? All his "ambitions," good or bad, which made him miserable, had gone. So



you see, then you have to open it a bit. Surely it is not good to be an alcoholic, by all means. It's very bad. There is no question about that and if they can do that perhaps it's all right. But I would say, generally speaking, when the responsibility of a man is greatly impaired, very greatly impaired, then it is, of course, a matter for people other than exhorters.

Q: I got the sort of answer I wanted to hear. It is closer to the weaknesses--

S: Yes. And in addition, of course, the logos which comes out on the couch, on the psychiatrist's couch, is, of course, already loaded in the direction of the Oedipus complex. You know what I mean? Yes. So therefore that is not a proof that this man suffered from this Oedipal desire. Yes. Good. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: I wanted to ask about two things. Just in passing about this instance you mentioned: wouldn't one have to ask this young man's psychiatrist if this was a good choice of life or a satisfactory result? Perhaps the alternative to this complacency was too disastrous to contemplate. Perhaps this was as far as this young man could go.

S: Could be. Well, I do not know the case. I couldn't say.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I wanted to mention about what you said about sadism. There it might be very interesting to consider briefly what -- something about the Marquis deSade himself. The great point there -- one must read that detestable man -- is that there is nothing natural and when you use the expression "denaturing nature" you might think of the Marquis deSade because there is no -- perhaps that which is sexual is indeed not fundamental but it is in some way underlying --

S: Yes, well I have never read him. I know there was a big fight for him in France after the Second World War and that brought out his books and all this kind of thing. But I don't know; I don't go into the pre-history. It's now customary to call certain aberrations sadism. Whether they fully agree with those from which that Marquis deSade suffered or not is --

Q<sub>2</sub>: By sadism fundamentally they mean or can be said to mean that which is really against nature in the most violent way, in the most perverse way, in the most vicious way, overturning any standard whatsoever, even the minimal standard.

S: Yes, well, Aristotle does not go into these refinements of psychology -- I mean, this kind of question -- because he doesn't believe they are politically relevant. I know that Lasswell once had a hope that no one would be elected to Congress or even to the Presidency unless he had a clean bill of health from a psychoanalyst. But this would be, of course, highly unrealistic. And the very simple thing: if this were to be made you can be sure that very subtle methods of bribing psychoanalysts would be deduced, given the enormous -- so that is not practical.

Q<sub>3</sub>: That is one of the points that I've heard argued: that it may have political relevance. I gave the change in the definition of insanity. That, of course, is going to have to be resolved as a question of law and law is a political thing.

S: Yes, yes, sure. Yes, but even here, I mean, one would have to go into the question whether the law is necessarily -- well, the sharpest case against law from such a psychological point of view, we can say: that law embodies, to some extent, the desire of revenge from the injured party. That is the point. One

cannot settle the issue without raising the question, whether some desire for this satisfaction, although not on the highest level, has not to be considered in order to have a minimum satisfaction of the people as a whole. [O: Inaudible.] Even that. Even that would have to be discussed and not swept under the rug. This is the only thing which we must always oppose: sweeping things under the rug. But this must be the last question.

Q<sub>4</sub>: When you spoke of security -- I would like to raise one objection, perhaps a trivial one. Commercial insurance wasn't known before the 19th century, but life insurance [S: Was older.] and burial insurance -- doesn't this have to be considered?

S: Yes, yes, sure. 18th century.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Well commercial insurance surely goes back to the 17th century.

S: Which kind of commercial?

Q<sub>4</sub>: The so-called sea insurance --

S: Sea insurance. Yes, well, I'm sure if you trace it a bit you will probably find also other kinds of insurances which creditors and debtors --

Q<sub>4</sub>: Well, I realize that you weren't going this far, but when one speaks of this desire for security which is particularly manifest in life insurance, burial insurance, doesn't this have to do with the fragmentation, alienation --

S: Yes, but still, it is not uninteresting that perhaps the greatest man who was involved in the mathematical problems of insuring and therewith also with insurance was Leibniz, one of the leaders of European rationalism. That's not uninteresting. I mean, there is some connection. Well, I only wanted to mention this only to make clear that security is not such a simple term. When Plato, Aristotle, or Thucydides speak of asphalia which you can translate security they mean, of course, not this kind of thing. They mean that, say, the Athenian empire is secure and so that they can make an expedition to Sicily without fearing the conquest of the city of Athens by the Spartans: this kind of thing. And walls of a city: I mean, men were always concerned with their security and they wore shoes for the security of their feet, surely, but there is obviously something different by what is meant now by security.

Now first I have here some questions. Mr. Butterworth: to what extent does Aristotle's admission in Book I that this inquiry does not admit of scientific precision lend support to the positivist's statement that values cannot be deduced from facts? None at all, I would say. After all, as has been said often enough, there are quite a few parts of social science which don't permit exactness. Meteorology is the most common example. The uncertainty or the inexactness of morality has nothing to do with the fact-value distinction at all. That arises from entirely different considerations, as is proven by the very simple thing: the men who were the opposite numbers in classical antiquity of our relativism and said all noble and just things are merely posited by societies but the good things are not. I mean, that health is good or having good children is good: this is not a thing posited. It has nothing to do with that. Mr. Burnham.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Does this mean that Aristotle would say that lack of scientific precision in ethics doesn't imply that there is no genuine knowledge?

S: Yes, you can also -- yes, sure. I mean, in other words, that to be brave is good and to be a coward is bad is not affected by it. That's what you mean. Yes. In other words, you cannot make as good a case for cowardice as for bravery, whereas the consistent relativist would say you can do that.

Now this is Brother Chrysostom; he would like to rectify any damage he may have caused. "The two great churchmen of the 12th century, St. Bernard of Abbot Sugare of both were distinguished in their fear of God, of life and statesmanship but one difference was that Bernard was a fanatic puritan in matters of art, while Sugare, despite the severe criticism of Bernard, built a church which became the Gothic landmark in beauty and grandeur." Yes, but here you compare -- I mean if I re-translate it in Aristotelian terms -- a man lacking munificence with a man who was munificent. Naturally, the man posing it would be higher. But, on the other hand, the question is not here munificence, but the question is here the importance of art in the building of churches. You cannot say that Sugare was not munificent because he held this view. For example, someone might say we should have buildings here on the campus which look more like barracks than like the Center for Continuing Education. This does not necessarily mean that this man opposes munificence because, come to think of it, this might be as expensive as the other.

O: It might be better looking.

S: Well, I can't say. It's still too young, the Center for Continuing Education, to say anything like that. "The rest being equal, Sugare's munificence is that much more meritorious in the sight of God because it was votive and in a way which pertained to human excellence. Munificence was within their means because Bernard and Sugare represented. . . ." Yes. No, there is no question whether -- I mean, I think I really misunderstand you. A munificent deed as a virtuous deed is surely more meritorious than not doing it, but if a man is prevented by poverty from being munificent that cannot be held against him.

O<sub>2</sub>: No!

S: Sure. That's all that I said; whereas Aristotle says, in effect, the poor man, by being deprived of the possibility of being munificent, is morally his inferior. That's the hypothesis. Now let us turn to our text. We have a lot of things to do. Let us see; we begin roughly where we left off. We don't read it.

We were involved in the discussion of magnanimity. Now what Aristotle does here (and this is a particular difficulty of this section more than of any other section) -- that Aristotle moves back and forth between two concepts of magnanimity without stating; and one is what we can call the vulgar notion of the magnanimous man, the vulgar notion. Think of Alcibiades as a great example. And then the sophisticated notion, which is his notion. Now according to the vulgar notion the magnanimous man does not have to be a man of perfect virtue. No one ever said that Alcibiades -- not even Alcibiades himself said that he was a man of perfect virtue. But a man who is very -- well, from a noble family, very handsome, very effected, very brave, and very clever. He could manage the affairs of the city better than anybody else. Yes. This man would have been regarded as magnanimous. He believes he is worthy of the greatest honors and deserves them because the key qualities, courage or energy, on the one hand, and political judgment he possesses to a high degree. But that his private life -- that he is not virtuous there, has all kinds of debts to say nothing of other things. Yes, and other things: for example, this story: when he fled to Sparta -- that is quite an example -- when he fled to Sparta, having betrayed Athens but



under considerable provocation we must say, then he had a love affair with the Queen of Sparta and only because there was a fire in the palace was it discovered, Alcibiades appearing, so to speak, in his pajamas. Good. But the point was this -- this is, of course, not in Thucydides, who would not write such things, but in a later writer -- that Alcibiades had these illicit relations not out of sexual desire but because he wanted that his offspring should be the kings in Sparta. You see that even in this crime a certain magnanimity shows itself. (Laughter). A grand object: I mean, not satisfaction of desire but, you know, the founder, as it were, of a royal line. Good. So Aristotle indicates here -- and that is very characteristic -- in 1124b2, that the vulgarly magnanimous man imitates the truly magnanimous. Now this is meant in a Platonic sense of the term. Alcibiades didn't think to imitate the truly magnanimous man who is also truly virtuous, but without knowing it, without wishing it, he was a copy, and from the strict sense a poor copy, of the truly magnanimous man. Every defective thing is an imitation of something good. That's a Platonic thought which Aristotle here surely adopts. Now as for the question of the ends which we have taken up time and again, where does the usefulness of magnanimity appear? I mean, it is quite good to look around in one's own age; you know, people one sees or reads about. Montgomery of El Alemain is, in a way, an example. He regards himself as worthy of great honors -- he leaves no doubt about that -- and, in a way, he deserves great honors. After all, he was the victor at El Alemain: the famous story. Now some writers said about him he walked around as a man who was born to command by a more than human dispensation. Yes, you see, but look at it from the point of view of the polis. The city needs men born to command. I mean, otherwise it couldn't be governed. And these people born to command are almost inevitably aware of that and this awareness will show itself, of course. This is, I mean, the utilitarian basis; so to speak, of magnanimity as Aristotle understands it. And Aristotle develops, then, the further characteristics of the magnanimous man. He is high minded. He will look down even on mere life and therefore he will not cling to life. He will sacrifice it when it is proper.

Q: (Refers to Churchill's remark that democracies are notoriously ungrateful on being defeated in an election and suggests that this also applies to its heroes.)

S: Yes, but Winston Churchill didn't say this merely as a criticism. No, he did not mean -- well, the feeling of oppression by such an outstanding man. He had enough. Let's have some other people. Let us have some less exacting figures like Atlee and so. And Churchill, of course, was not sound enough in the view of the Labour Party regarding social security, the welfare state. That was another reason. And Churchill would, of course, have never have gotten this position except for the extreme peril which England was in. He was out of the running otherwise, since the twenties, and he had changed parties twice. Good.

Now he faces dangers but only dangers which are worth facing, great dangers. Thomas in his commentary says, "for example for the common good, for justice, for divine worship and other things described." Now it's interesting again that Aristotle does not define what great dangers are. Thomas spells this out. Good. Now let us turn to 1124b9. This we must read.

O: He is fond of conferring benefits, but ashamed to receive them, because the former is a mark of superiority and the latter of inferiority.

S: You see. I mean, that has also to do with the vulgar phenomenon, in the first place. He doesn't want to be dependent on anyone else but he enjoys the others inferior to him. I mean, that is a somewhat ambiguous statement but it, nevertheless, in a different way, in a more subtle and sophisticated way, will

also show in the truly magnanimous. But first let us listen to what Aristotle has to say. Yes?

O: He returns a service done to him with interest, since this will put the original benefactor into his debt in turn, and make him the party benefited.

S: You see, so he wipes out the unpleasant situation that he has been benefited. Yes?

Q: Did we not study an example in such a man as Cyrus?

S: Yes. Very good, but what's the difference between Cyrus and the magnanimous man?

Q: Well, Cyrus, evidently, was not doing it for the best of reasons.

S: Ah ha. The calculations: these people who get these gifts will love him in this ambiguous way of loving and that makes him a popular ruler. Yes.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Cyrus gets more than he gives.

S: In addition. Yes, yes, sure. We have seen that when we read the Education of Cyrus. This human kindness is an excellent image which he projects on persons. Mr. Mueller.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Is this still the vulgar view of magnanimity because this is the only thing in the description of the magnanimous man that really seems to bother me. There seems to be, in a way, a kind of pettiness. /S: Yes, yes./ President Kennedy is continually being given presents by well wishers --

S: No, but that may well be due to the office. That's an entirely different matter.

Q<sub>3</sub>: But there does seem to be a kind of pettiness in this not wanting to be beholden to anybody.

S: Yes, sure. No, I see your point. This is what I say: that some interpreters -- Burnet felt that this whole thing was shot through with irony. I can understand that, but it is not precise enough. It is more precise to say Aristotle always starts from the facts as everyone knows them. I mean, even the non-sophisticated people: what they regard as a high-minded, proud man, and then he says, yes, but that doesn't possess all virtue and this affects everything; and Aristotle doesn't spell out in each case how it would look, but he would still say in a refined way this will also show on the highest level. Perhaps we find some examples. Let us first continue to read. Yes?

O: The magnanimous are thought to have a good memory for any benefit they have conferred. . . .

S: You see also, "they are thought." This is the common view.

O: . . . but a bad memory for those which they have received (since the recipient of the benefit is the inferior of his benefactor, whereas they desire to be superior); and to enjoy being reminded of the former but to dislike being reminded of the latter. . . .

S: Does this need any comment, that it is pleasant to be reminded that one has been a benefactor and it is very unpleasant to be reminded that one has been the recipient of benefactions, commonly, crudely speaking? Yes?

O: . . . this is why the poet makes Thetis not specify her services to Zeus; nor did the Spartans treating with the Athenians recall the occasions when Sparta had aided Athens, but those on which Athens had aided Sparta.

It is also characteristic of the magnanimous never to ask help from others, or only with reluctance, but to render aid willingly; and to be haughty towards men of position and fortune, but courteous towards those of moderate station; because it is difficult and distinguished to be superior to the great, but easy to outdo the lowly, and to adopt a high manner with the former is not ill-bred, but it is vulgar to lord it over humble people; it is like putting forth one's strength against the weak. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition, or go where other people take the first place; and he will be idle and slow to act, except when pursuing some high honor or achievement; and will not engage in many undertakings, but only in such as are important and distinguished.

S: Yes, "which are great and spoken about." Spoken about, we can say. This is a remarkable piece. You see here also that Zeus is, of course, a magnanimous being. Thetis treats him as one has to treat a magnanimous being. So, in other words, the similarity between the magnanimous and the gods, of which I spoke last time, shines through here too. Yes, one could not say better what pride is, as Aristotle does it in all these points; true pride; I mean, not low-class. And I think this phenomenon we all know: the fellow who is extremely devout to his superiors and extremely nasty to his inferiors. The Germans call them the cyclists because they use their feet, down, and bow their head lower. It is still used, Mr. , Radfahrer?

O: Not too much.

S: I see. But you get the idea. Good. Yes, this remark, he will not go in where others occupy already the first rank: Caesar said that. "Better first in a village in the Alps than the second in Rome." Now naturally he will also be frank because of his sense of security, as Mr. Boyan would say. Because of his certainty of superiority he doesn't have to conceal it. He will show his likes and dislikes frankly because of his position. But on the other hand -- which is mentioned in passing -- he will be ironical when he speaks to the many, but this is due to his magnanimity because ironical means to dissemble one's superiority. That's the primary meaning. And of course he will not spread it thick when talking to the many, but there he will simply say, as Pericles does -- just an Athenian citizen who happens to be more competent than most others. Yes. Good.

1125a5: "He will not talk about human beings; he will not engage in gossip."

O: He is no gossip, for he will not talk either about himself or about another, as he neither wants to receive compliments nor to hear other people run down (nor is he lavish of praise either); and so he is not given to speaking evil himself, even of his enemies, except when he deliberately intends to give offense.

S: Yes, well, "except for the sake of hybris," whatever that means. Yes, hybris: hurling defiance. That he does. Well, Achilles in the first book of the Iliad saying to his Lord, Agamemnon -- how does he say? -- "you have the eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer" -- no, "heavy of wine, having the eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer," which, I believe, is the most perfect insult against a



warrior which can be invented. It's really perfect. You see, the deer, of course, runs away and this the warrior should never do under any circumstances. The heart of a deer is very bad but, on the other hand, a deer is a nice looking creature and therefore to compensate for that he says the look, the eyes, of a dog; because the dog, on the other hand, is a courageous animal. So he has to combine these two animals. That is the art of simile making; to put together from various things and then you get his characteristics. I remember from our time a famous example: when Churchill once in a speech, I think in the House of Commons, called Hitler a gutter snipe. I believe that Churchill never has called a man in ordinary life a gutter snipe, you know, although he may have deserved the epithet, but in this case in a speech when the whole Europe lay at the feet of Hitler. That is what he means: through hybris. Good. Now let us read al6.

O: Such then being the magnanimous man, the corresponding character on the side of deficiency is the small-souled man, and on that of excess the vain man. These also are not thought to be actually vicious, since they do no harm, but rather mistaken. The small-souled man deprives himself of the good things that he deserves; and his failure to claim good things makes it seem that he has something bad about him and also that he does not know himself, for (people argue), if he deserved any good, he would try to obtain it. Not that such persons are considered foolish, but rather too retiring; yet this estimate of them is thought to make them still worse, for men's ambitions show what they are worth, and if they hold aloof from noble enterprises and pursuits, and forego the good things of life, presumably they think they are not worthy of them.

S: In other words, the defect of what now would be called modesty; that a man does not achieve his highest by a misplaced modesty; what Aristotle calls small-souledness. Here we see: the end is self-perfection, and the small-souled man does not reach the perfection of which he is capable because of this lack. The outstanding man knows that he is outstanding. If he should not know it he lacks somehow in intelligence. That is what Aristotle means. And now let us read only the last three lines of this chapter.

O: Smallness of soul is more opposed than vanity to greatness of soul, being both more prevalent and worse.

S: Yes, now is this not strange? Would we not say that the man who underestimates his worth is better than the man who overestimates his worth? Is this not paradoxical? How would you explain it?

O: The vain man has an excellent chance of being corrected by experience.

S: Yes, or as Aristotle said before, that the small-souledness, pusillanimity, makes men worse than they could be. The other doesn't make them worse. It may not make them better. That is one thing; and the other thing --

O<sub>2</sub>: Social science talks about self-fulfilling and -denying prophecies.

S: Yes, I know, but what has this to do with --

O<sub>2</sub>: Like the small-souled man, by considering himself inferior, really may fail to fulfill his potentialities.

S: Yes, yes. That's what Aristotle means. He doesn't give himself a chance,

The vain man will make himself ridiculous when he tries for but at least he doesn't miss a chance of doing something greater if by some circumstances he might be able to do it. The other point we must also consider: the greater vice is the more common vice. Here I quote again Thomas: "that which happened because of a greater inclination of human nature." In other words, more men are small-souled than vain, but it is manifest that it happens more frequently that some are pusillanimous, namely who omit to do good things which they could, than by over-reaching themselves to do good things which they cannot do. It is fundamentally the same consideration. Yes, Mr. Kirwan.

Q: It would seem to me that the small-souled man -- I think of the Western hero. He's a taciturn man; he's very quiet. He never brags about how well he can shoot and fight and do the things that he does and yet everyone knows how good he is and he doesn't have to say anything. If he says something he may tarnish the image.

S: Yes, I know. These men have a particular charm. I remember one example which has to do not with the man himself, but with something belonging to him, in Tolstoi's War and Peace. There is a very poor relative and there is a big hunting party; and by far the best dog is that poor uncle's dog and, of course, the dog is also not conspicuous by beauty or breeding and so, but he just does the work. And then the embarrassed pride which he has when his dog proves to be the best and all admire him is very charmingly and touchingly told. Of course, I see the point which you make, but Aristotle takes a broader view and says would this man, if he had greater confidence and spoke up on some occasion -- after all, why does he not speak up? Is this not due to the fact that he is unduly impressed by the others? And this is lack of judgment. We must also see this now. We generally prefer the most unassuming people to the more assuming.

Q<sub>2</sub>: This may be tied in with the lack of confidence which is tied in with cowardice.

S: Yes, or also lack of judgment. In other words, self-consciousness, as we call it characteristically, which is self-consciousness in the negative sense. After all, self-consciousness could also mean consciousness of one's worth. Somehow we prefer self-conscious people in the present use of the term.

Q<sub>3</sub>: You keep your mouth shut.

S: Yes, not only that. We think also it is good mannered, and the famous British understatement, I think, are connected with that.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Is this partly a religious influence?

S: Yes, that has often been said. It is connected with Puritanism. After Max Weber there is nothing which has not been traced to Puritanism. Yes, that has something to do -- I believe Weber speaks even about it somewhere in his essay. I forgot it. [Q<sub>4</sub>: Inaudible.] No, no, I mean, the Biblical critique of pride could, under certain conditions, take this form. I mean, for example, is it not the usage in the House of Commons when the Speaker is elected that he must play a show by his conduct, the sense of his unworthiness and of his unwillingness to become Speaker? Those who have taken courses in comparative government should know. I believe that is so. I think that is even a part of the British Constitution: you know, the sense of . The Athenians wouldn't have done that.

Q<sub>5</sub>: (Refers to some statesman in Britain who was very influential behind the

scenes and says he isn't an example of a small-souled man.)

S: That is very true. I thought of another example which is more famous, perhaps, and that is Richelieu, the gray eminence. Gray eminence. And that was not the choice (?) of classical antiquity: the wire puller. But they had in Germany a poor repetition of that in a man called Holstein around 1900. He also was called the gray eminence. No, the traditional imagination was fired by Scipio, the conquerer of Carthage and of Hannibal. This is an interesting thing: it has to do with the fact that people talk today so much about power and not much about glory. Power you can have as a wire puller. You cannot have glory as a wire puller. But, of course, I didn't mean to say that Richelieu was nothing but a wire puller, but comparatively speaking. And the famous traditional fault of historiography, the praising of the captain over against the inventor of useful machines -- that is the great theme of 19th century criticism -- has something to do with that. Now power is not as such resplendent. Glory is. And a certain kind of sobriety: solid comfort versus ostentation, and this kind of thing. Comfortable self-preservation is one of the most beautiful expressions coined; I believe it was coined by Locke, for indicating a very powerful thing. In other words, not being clad in purple but in the best Scotch wool. Wool will be better: lasting and more useful and so on and so on. That is part of this moral story. I think one can trace that in Hobbes: the substitution of power for glory. You see, the point is also this: power has many other recommendations for a number of reasons, but this is part of our story. I think if you would read all the textbooks in American government, comparative government, whatever it may be, you would find hardly any references to glory, but plenty to power and this is only the end-product of a long story, if it is the end.

Now in the immediate sequel Aristotle discusses another virtue regarding honors. He has nothing much to say about it. It is nameless, but it exists, of course. He uses a proportion: liberality to munificence equal to "x" to magnanimity. Liberality has to do with small or medium expenses; munificence with large ones. Magnanimity has to do with large honors. There must be some virtue governing our conduct regarding small and medium honors, and he speaks about that briefly and, of course, the principle is obvious: there must also be a right conduct regarding small honors because you can surely make mistakes about them and both ways, to be much concerned with them and too little concerned with them. Yes?

Q: This would demonstrate that there was a descent in order because if he were going to be consistent he would have put this in the order earlier than munificence: put "x" first, but he didn't.

S: Yes, very good. Very good. Someone said in addition -- I forgot who he was -- that magnanimity -- oh, last time, but did you count in the meantime?

O: I haven't counted now. I'll count for next time.

O<sub>2</sub>: It did come up in the middle. Here there are no footnotes.

S: Where? In which edition?

O<sub>2</sub>: The Ross translation.

S: Ah ha. But it would roughly correspond to the proportions of the Greek text. Yes. Magnanimity in the center of Books III, second half, to--



O: No, Book IV by itself.

S: Oh no. That is not good enough. Good. Now let us turn to the next, which is in Greek praotes, and translated how?

O: Gentleness.

S: Gentleness, mildness, in Latin. Yes. Now let us read about that.

O: Gentleness is the observance of the mean in relation to anger. There is as a matter of fact no recognized name for the mean in this respect -- indeed there can hardly be said to be names for the extremes either --, so we apply the word gentleness to the mean though really it inclines to the side of the defect.

S: Meaning, what people ordinarily understand by a gentle or mild man is not the right meaning because he is too mild. That he means by it. Yes.

O: This has no name, but the excess may be called a sort of irascibility, for the emotion concerned is anger, though the causes producing it are many and various.

Now we praise a man who feels anger on the right grounds and against the right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time.

S: That is something which he didn't say of the other virtues. Here in the case of anger it is important for how long we have the anger. It is irrational to be angry beyond a certain moment. Yes?

Q: Do you think that the introduction of the consideration of duration shows how much less important this thing is?

S: No, that it does not.

Q: But it's a transitory characteristic.

S: No, no, no, no. Because it has to do with insults -- anger has to do with insults and with revenging the insult, and therefore the revenge does not necessarily take place immediately. I mean, you must eat every day but you do not have to take your revenge on the same day. In most cases you can't do it and therefore the time element is here very important, but since it is important it is also important in this way: for how long should you feel it? If someone has insulted you twenty years ago, should you still be angry with him twenty years later? Good.

O: He may then be called gentle-tempered, if we take gentleness to be a praiseworthy quality (for "gentle" really denotes a calm temper, not led by emotion but only becoming angry in such a manner, for such causes and for such a length of time as principle may ordain; although the quality is thought rather to err on the side of defect, since the gentle-tempered man is not prompt to seek redress for injuries, but rather inclined to forgive them.)

S: That's the same point. You see, what people ordinarily mean by a gentle man: he is too gentle. He seems to make a mistake. Yes?

O: The defect, on the other hand, call it a sort of lack of spirit or what not, is blamed; since those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the right time, and with the right people. It is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry he will not stand up for himself; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult to oneself or to suffer one's friends to be insulted.

S: Yes. You see, here is the end: the concern with one's honor and the well-being at least of those near and dear to one. If one didn't have that concern one wouldn't have anger. That is a function. Then Aristotle speaks of two kinds of excesses here -- I mean, of the excesses -- the defect is the same, incapable of being angry, but the excess, those who fly off the handle easily and on every slight occasion and cease very soon -- you know these: get easily angry and then it's finished. And then those, the vindictive ones, who do not get angry easily but when they get angry it lasts for years and years. Good.

Q: In the passage you just read is it significant that he says that "it is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury" and that "it is considered servile"?

S: Yes, yes, sure. In all these cases he defers to what is generally thought. One must discuss each by itself. If Aristotle may agree with them and he may disagree with them, just as in Thucydides. When Thucydides says of the Spartan king in the first book, "he was thought to be intelligent and moderate," that doesn't mean that Thucydides thought he was intelligent and moderate, but you have to read what Thucydides says about his deeds, whether Thucydides is likely to have called him intelligent and moderate.

Q: Is there an indication of what Aristotle's true view is in this particular--

S: I think we find something in the sequel. Let us read. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Excuse me, but I'd just like to bring out something that we just discussed. You said smallness of soul is more prominent than vanity. Isn't it the belief of a lot of people, a lot of philosophers too, some philosophers, that most people are vainer and are most likely to over-estimate themselves? I just wanted you to comment on this.

S: Well, I think -- yes. I mean, if you isolate them and put them under a very close scrutiny you might find that. But have you been. . . . (inaudibly asks him a question and gets affirmative reply). Well, there you could see that the vanity is rare because there was only one particularly clear instance at times exhibited in public. I mean, it is really rare. I mean, when you take a kind of X-ray you may perhaps say most men are vain, but when you use it also in a loose sense, that they want to make a good impression and this may be due to perfectly virtuous motives. After all, it is also an insult to people not to put one's best foot forward, you can say. This is not vanity if someone tries to put his best foot forward. But if you take it in a conspicuous case, then I believe one can say it's rare. People who are filled with a sense of self-importance -- I mean, they strike you. Not every human being has that; not every human being. I mean, they will be very conspicuous. They make themselves conspicuous.

Q<sub>3</sub>: A great deal of the primping, especially the vanities which are sometimes

held to make up vanity proceed rather more from small souls. People are so much afraid that their best friend wouldn't tell them that they devote countless hours to Listerine.

S: Yes, but still they have small souls.

Q<sub>3</sub>: They have small souls. They are not vain; quite the opposite.

S: Yes, yes. No, I think that is defensible. Let us turn to a26.

O: Bitterness. . . .

S: Yes, well literally, that would be difficult, difficult people, people who are burdened among us, heavy; literally translated; (chalepoui). Or which do you translate? 26. /As will appear immediately, Dr. Strauss was referring to the sentence following the one that had been begun./

O: Yes, I can't get the word you're saying.

S: Chalepoui: heavy, difficult, burdened.

O: Heaviness. . . .

S: Yes, but we cannot use this in English. How do you say -- in German you can speak of difficult people but in English you don't do it, I believe. Yes, go on. Well, let us not waste time.

O: . . . is the most troublesome form of bad temper both to a man himself and to his nearest friends.

S: No, these are others. These are the bitter ones. No, next one.

O: Those who lose their temper at the wrong things, and more and longer than they ought, and who refuse to be reconciled without obtaining redress or retaliating, we call harsh-tempered.

S: Yes, all right. That is what I tried to -- literally, it would be heavy, difficult. Literally, yes. Go on.

O: We consider the excess to be more opposed to gentleness than the defect, because it occurs more frequently, human nature being more prone to seek redress than to forgive; and because the harsh-tempered are worse to live with than the unduly placable.

S: Yes, obviously. Obviously. I mean, a man who is a real menace to society. Now Aristotle says here first that the desire for revenge is more human, but almost in the sense in which Nietzsche used his book title, Human, All Too Human, what he called in another connection more natural. So this is more natural but it is less good for living together. So man is not simply and unqualifiedly by nature meant for living together. He has also by nature certain things in himself which make living together difficult. We must see how this is worked out. Thomas makes this remark to this point: that what is so natural is the desire for revenge after one has been hurt, of course. Otherwise, man is by nature more inclined -- by nature inclined -- toward gentleness. You know, there are beasts who are not gentle under any circumstances, but man is by nature a gentle being. But if hurt then he can be very nasty, as we all know. Read the immediate sequel.



O: But what was said above is also clear from what we are now saying; it is not easy to define in what manner and with whom and on what grounds and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point one does right in so doing and where error begins. For he who transgresses the limit only a little is not held blameworthy, whether he errs on the side of excess or defect; in fact, we sometimes praise those deficient in anger and call them gentle-tempered, and we sometimes praise those who are harsh-tempered as manly, and fitted to command.

S: Let us stop here. Here we get, incidentally, an answer: why this inclination to anger and toward excessive anger even is compatible with man's natural sociality. Because man is by nature social means, for Aristotle, man is by nature a political animal, a member of political society, a society which consists of rulers and ruled and it consists of generals and soldiers; it consists of sergeants, drill sergeants, and recruits. And here is where these faculties difficult for living together fulfill a social function. It is not to speak against a man drilling soldiers if the recruits say it is hard to live with him. Obviously, because that's not his function: that they should live with him. They should be trained by him. Good. So, in other words, there is no contradiction between the naturalness of anger and the natural sociality.

Now there are, of course, in all these points many things of great importance, but we still have to cover quite a bit of ground. Then Aristotle turns to three virtues -- yes, Mr. Butterworth.

Q: I didn't follow the connection when you said there is no tension between this natural -- tension to harshness and --

S: Not to harshness; to anger and desire for revenge. The harsh are a small minority of men. That's one thing. Aristotle doesn't go into what makes people harsh. Aristotle apparently took this view: that the human race produces all kinds of people at all times. It's a kind of big zoo. And just as it produces gentle people and nice people and also over-quiet people, it also produces people who are irascible and some who are even really downright nasty to hell. That is so and this has always been the case and will be the case. Yes, here I have it. The tacit premise of these people, of your people, /i.e. referring again to this meeting's seminar paper/ is that babies could be made and if some people have undesirable characteristics, for example they are too quiet or too loud, too soft or too harsh, this can only be due to their environment; their environment, including now the mother's womb, according to more recent researches, but it is still environment. And that is the point.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I think it's not quite accurate and when you go into this question of anger, particularly. I mean, quickness of the reaction: that would be natural. You know, whether a man would be quick or melancholic: that would be according to nature. The other thing would be according to environment to some extent.

S: What's the evidence for that? Are there not people who are by nature sour and, as it were, too rugged for ordinary human relations?

Q<sub>2</sub>: No, that would be admitted. There would probably be further observations, though, of this particular gentleman, that society will provide outlets for him. For example, the army serves this function.

S: Yes, sure, sure. And other places too. There are other places; examiners. What is the dilemma?

Q: My dilemma isn't solved.

S: What is the dilemma?

Q: I don't see how Aristotle answers this tension by saying, well, this means that one should display his anger then on right occasions --

S: Is this not sensible?

Q: It's sensible, but it doesn't answer --

S: But Mr. Butterworth, you walk the street with your aged grandfather and someone insults him and the next time you walk there with the heavyweight boxing champion. In which case would your anger be proper and improper? I would say, in the case of the aged grandfather because he cannot defend himself and you, somehow aware of it, develop in you the mood to defend him. You know this other boy, the heavyweight champion, he can take care of himself. You don't have to invest any emotional energy in that issue. That's a very simple case. There are other cases where the point is -- one would have to develop that. But this is really not -- we only go into a case where you were angry last time and consider all the circumstances, or perhaps in a case which you might remember where you were angry wrongly and see why it was wrong to be so angry. Perhaps the thing was not worth while. I suppose if someone is trying to cheat you of a cent you have less reason to be angry than if someone cheats you of a thousand dollars. That's another consideration: the triviality of the object plays a great role.

Q: Is it being too difficult to say that this, more or less, shows the underlying difficulty as to whether a man is inadequate (?) for society, the fact that you do need an anger impulse to fight off other people with whom you're supposed to live?

S: Yes, but you need it, surely, in war, number one, which was always present to Aristotle, but apart from that there may be civil war. There is crime and these police systems as we know them did not always exist. It was, to some extent, a matter also of the citizen's duty. So anger is always needed. It is always needed.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Raising of children.

S: Yes, well, this famous story of the people who didn't spank the children at all and then finally strangled their brats because they became unbearable. Or this question from piracy (?) which I heard: what is nobler, to spank a child in anger or to put down a certain day of the week in advance, say Saturday afternoon, for the spanking in cold blood? Which is more human? Good.

We come now to these three virtues which we may loosely call the social virtues which have to do with living together not for the purpose of doing any business, just for the sake of one's enjoyment. And the first virtue which he mentions we can call friendliness; and there are obviously two extremes, the unfriendly man, the nasty man in this sense (I mean, not nasty in the sense of the man who can never forgive insults but who doesn't wish to please anyone -- you know, an ogre) and on the other extreme we have, then, the super-friendly man, you know, who is unbearable and who may be -- you know, he may do that for gain like an advertiser or salesman or he may do it without any ulterior motives simply because he is such a prodigal fellow that he has to be always super-nice. This, I think, is clear. Let us read only 1126b, 11 to -- oh, that's the begin-

ning of the chapter.

O: In society and the common life and intercourse of conversation and business, some men are considered to be obsequious; these are people who complaisantly approve of everything and never raise objections, but think it a duty to avoid giving pain to those with whom they come in contact. Those on the contrary who object to everything and do not care in the least what pain they cause, are called surly or quarrelsome. Now it is clear that the dispositions described are blameworthy, and that the middle disposition between them is praiseworthy -- that is, the tendency to acquiesce in the right things, and likewise to disapprove of the right things in the right manner.

S: Now let us stop here. Now why does Aristotle say here so simply as an absolute shock to the value-free social scientist, "It is not immanifest that these two habits are blameworthy and the median habit is praiseworthy"? Why can he say that?

O: Experience?

S: Yes, he would ask that man: what do you like? Which kind of people do you like and do you think is nice, is praiseworthy, and the other is blameworthy? It is so. It hasn't changed. The forms in which this is shown, whether you should always show it to the accompaniment of a smile or whether the smile is rejected as somewhat undignified, that depends on different countries, but a friendly man and an unfriendly man you can easily distinguish, and also, of course, the super-friendly man. Let us read, just as a specimen of Aristotle's example, in b28.

O: We have said then in general terms that he will behave in the right manner in society. We mean that in designing either to give pain or to contribute pleasure he will be guided by considerations of honor and of expediency. For he seems to be concerned with pleasure and pain in social intercourse. He will disapprove of pleasures in which it is dishonorable or harmful to himself for him to join, preferring to give pain; and he will also disapprove of and refuse to acquiesce in a pleasure that brings any considerable discredit or harm to the agent, if his opposition will not cause much pain. And he will comport himself. . . .

S: Yes, and so on. That's clear. Do you see that point? I mean, the super-friendly man who never raises opposition, who always wants to be a good boy like everybody else regardless of what the others plan or do, and the man who does not do that always, says no, I don't go along with that, and if it is a nasty practical joke he might say no, that I won't do. I mean, I appeal to the experience of everyone of you. You know this as well as I do, that these are facts of life, and Aristotle records them, I think, clearly enough. Yes?

Q: Isn't there a contradiction between the way in which the man who has this virtue treats those in high position and the magnanimous man? In the sense that we would have read if we continued: it says that he gives proper deference to each class and so it would seem to me he is somewhat deferential to the men of high position in contrast to the magnanimous man.

S: But the question is -- no, there is no contrast because the questions are so very different. I think Churchill is a beautiful contemporary example of the magnanimous man. Churchill would, of course, behave with the utmost deference if he would meet socially, say, the President of the United States or, for that



matter, the king of Afghanistan if there is still a king of Afghanistan. That's the point. That doesn't mean that Churchill would for one moment believe that he is inferior in human rank to the king of Afghanistan, but he would surely treat him with a peculiar sign of external respect which he would not show to a very young man, for example. And that he would treat older people more politely than younger people -- these are the kinds of things. There is no difficulty. Here it is not a matter of rank and honor, but it's a matter of friendliness. Now the magnanimous man -- Inaudible remark from student. Yes, but in this case where the magnanimous man -- what exactly did he say about him that creates your difficulty? I forgot it now.

Q: That he is haughty toward the great. He is haughty towards men of position.

S: I mean, there is something to that. Yes, but the question of honors is not involved here at all. It's in no way involved here at all. Here it's a question of courtesy and that is not a matter of -- you can also put it this way.

O: He says later, "getting along with other people."

S: Yes, yes, sure: courteous. You can almost say what Aristotle calls here -- which he calls friendship but making it clear, the friendship without affection, what we call friendliness, because friendliness --

O: Straight-forwardness.

S: No, no, that's something else. Friendliness is friendship without affection. Is it not true? It is not Biblical charity. It's something different. It doesn't mean that it is spurious, but it is not with affection and the reason it is not with affection is shown by the fact that it shows itself to all human beings.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Is affability considered --

S: That was also used as a translation.

Q: But as I understood it here, when the magnanimous man is described he isn't haughty with respect to honor. Honor is referred to when he mentions that he is haughty toward men of position.

S: Yes, as I say, here the end is being together without business and in the case of magnanimous the end is honor. It's an entirely different situation. So can you not see a man who is magnanimous, who acts magnanimously, in the Senate and who acts courteously in a social gathering? There's no difficulty. I mean, if he would behave with all his sense of the dignity of his rank all the time he would be an unbearable bore. He can unbend and that is his courtesy. Yes.

Now then he speaks of another of these social virtues. (Let us first finish that) -- social virtue, which he calls -- what is that? We can call it straight-forwardness. It's not the best translation.

O: It says here it is without an exact name, but Rackham calls it "sincerity as regards one's merits."

S: Yes, but here the question is the kind of straight-forwardness and veracity which has nothing to do with any business, because then veracity falls under the heading of justice, of course. If you say the untruth about yourself and your

merchandise you are a dishonest man, but here he is only concerned -- the opinion which you have about yourself: whether you show yourself as what you are or conceal what you are. Of this concealment there are two kinds. You can show yourself as better than you are and you can show yourself as worse than you are; I mean, deliberately show yourself; you know, purposely. That's the point. I mean, a man may show himself worse than he is unintentionally. For example, someone may write a paper and he could have written a better one. But a man wishes to show himself inferior to what he truly is. Now how does he translate the excess -- who shows himself more than he is?

O: He says first, "The observance of the mean in relation to boastfulness. . ."

S: Boastful. Yes, the boaster. And yes, he makes it very clear. The boaster is not a fellow like an advertiser on a fair who boasts, because this is not a boaster. He simply boosts his merchandise and all boasting is only in the service of gain. But the boaster is a man who enjoys exaggerating, saying the untruth about himself in a too favorable direction; he enjoys that for its own sake. And the opposite man, whom Aristotle calls the ironical man, is the man who enjoys showing himself as lesser than he is. There are extreme forms of the latter; for example what we would now call, I believe, snobs, people who walk around, say in particular clothing, in order to show that they are distinguished from the others on the negative side: say, poorer, more backward, looking as if they had come straight from the 19th century. That exists now and there were similar things, of course, in Greece too. Mr. Mueller.

Q: This is certainly related to the section where he mentions Socrates having a contempt for qualities that people upheld, at the end of this chapter. "These also mostly disown qualities held in high esteem; as Socrates used to do." Is this the conclusion of all this business about irony, an ironical attitude.

S: Yes, sure. No, when Socrates says -- for example, some Sophists ask him something or assert something and he says, well, you are so much cleverer than I am. I have not yet the foggiest notion about this matter of which you talk. And then it is irony because Socrates knows quite well that he knows as much as, say, Protagoras, about it. He makes himself lesser than he is. Now, that irony is a gracious vice Aristotle doesn't deny, but strictly speaking it is a vice. It may be redeemed, as it were, by very important positive functions which it fulfills, but in itself it is a vice. A man should show himself as what he is.

Q: Well, when he says, I know much less about this than you do, that may be a manifestation of a gracious vice, but when Aristotle says that he is -- among the other qualities which Socrates disowns that are commonly held in high esteem this quality is -- knowing about what's good and bad, I guess, with Socrates.

S: Oh, that is a long story. For example, Socrates was not particularly proud of being an Athenian citizen from the father's and mother's side, which was highly esteemed. No, generally things which he lacked, say money -- Socrates was poor and wealth is generally respected, and he says, well, I don't respect it and this is also slightly discourteous because most people think wealth is not so despicable. And this kind of thing. Yes, but Aristotle doesn't go into the subtleties of Socratic irony at all. He leaves it at this nice gentleman's view. A gentleman wouldn't do that -- what Socrates does. But he would probably not even go to where Protagoras is, in the first place. Higher considerations led Socrates to go to such infamous places. That's another matter. But still, these are, then, higher considerations going much beyond the level on which we are here. But generally speaking. For example, young Hippocrates at

the beginning of the Protagoras, a future gentleman, a really nice boy who is full of enthusiasm for culture, having heard that Protagoras has arrived in Athens -- and, of course, he must be introduced and the only man he knows who might introduce him is Socrates so he wakes Socrates in the very early morning. And he was really a gentleman because he came back in a hurry from chasing a fugitive slave, which is also part of the gentleman. That's the other side of the matter. Socrates didn't chase fugitive slaves and not only for the reason that he didn't have any, but I think even if he had some he wouldn't have done it. So then Socrates tells him, why do you want to go there? Do you want to exercise Protagoras' profession, i.e. to teach for money (something utterly unbecoming a gentleman)? And then Hippocrates, of course, is shocked and says of course not. I want to learn something so that I can play a leading role in Athens. That's the point. Here you have it. I mean, well, later, Hippocrates at 40 years old or 50 years old and making somewhat better than he probably was, then you have the difference between Socrates and a gentleman. But what do I talk? We read last quarter the Oeconomicus, Socrates and Ischomachus. Ischomachus, of course, would never be ironical. If someone would ask him about anything he would say straight-forwardly, this I know and this I do not know. He would not do what Socrates does: that he says I do not know in cases where he knows very well or where at least he knows quite well that the other man does not know but only claims to know. Irony is not a gentleman's virtue, which does not mean that it doesn't have high functions but the gentleman is not the top for -- of course not for Aristotle too.

Now let us see. In 1128b, 3 to 4 -- we cannot read it -- what the basis of this virtue is. Relaxation and play seem to be necessary in life: seems, is thought to be, but we know also from other places that Aristotle thought that this thought was a sound thought. We do need that. Yes, but if we need relaxation, if we need gatherings for no purpose other than to speak and to communicate then there must be a virtue controlling that because whatever men do they may do well and badly and the proper behavior here, in this respect, as far as speaking about oneself is concerned, is veracity: not a boaster nor a dissembler of your virtues. This makes absolute sense, I think. Of course, one must be concerned surely also -- not hurting the feelings of others. That is, in other words, the social purpose and also it is an affection of the individual because it presupposes intelligence of some sort.

Now the last one which he mentions here of these virtues is -- (oh, I'm sorry, I had anticipated). The third virtue is the virtue relating to enjoyment and amusement in society, to jokes in the widest sense of the term, practical or theoretical. And here the right kind is called eutrapelia. How does one translate that?

O: Wittiness?

S: Yes, urbane wittiness, and the opposite poles are sour-pusses --

O: Buffoonery and boorishness.

S: Yes, boorish, boorish fellow, and buffoonery. You know, the man who cannot -- who says or does any joke whether it is fitting and appropriate for the situation or not. And the boorish man would probably sit there and say nothing and never laugh too. He is only, then, a burden of his society. And the obvious solution is, well, some jokes are proper and others are not and simply to refuse to make jokes in a society which has assembled for that purpose is, of course, wholly improper too. So it makes sense. Yes. Good. (Someone raised his hand? No.) Then we come to the last virtue in Book IV and that is sense of shame.



The chief assertion of Aristotle is sense of shame is not a virtue. Sense of shame is a praiseworthy passion in the case of young people, but for a grown-up man, a gentleman, sense of shame is not a virtue. Let us read 1128b, 23 to 25. One little point. "For the gentleman -- "

O: For indeed the virtuous man does not feel shame, if shame is the feeling caused by base actions; since one ought not to do base actions. . . .

S: In other words, he won't do this kind of thing. The mere fact that this is not the thing to do induces him not to do it. Therefore he has never a reason for shame. Yes?

O: . . . (the distinction between acts really shameful and those reputed to be so is immaterial, since one ought not to do either), and so one never ought to feel shame.

S: Yes, what he calls here "the things shameful in truth and shameful according to opinion" corresponds, of course, to the distinction between nature and convention. In every society there are things which are not done because it is conventional, the conventions there; and this is very characteristic of Aristotle. The gentleman will not make here an ambiguous distinction and follow what is intrinsically noble as well as the customs and not deviate from that. Yes, Mr. Erikson?

Q: (Refers to the fact that Christ never laughed.)

S: Yes, but Sir Thomas More, who had given much thought to these matters, said I would not -- / Interruption: request to speak louder. S: Yes, but this is true both ways. I also have difficulties in hearing you. Now Sir Thomas More, who tells this story, makes this remark: I will not swear that he never laughed, but at least he left us no example of his laughing. You know, after all, the Gospels do not supply us with every detail.

Q: . . . . Is it not true that within laughter itself there is an element of cruelty?

S: That was Hobbes' misanthropic remark: that laughing comes always from a feeling of superiority to others. You know, and he gives such a simple example: laughing when someone else falls. We laugh, but that is not the whole story. Protagoras, if I remember well, said laughing or smiling is a becoming resplendence of the soul. Have you never heard of an angelic smile?

Q: Yes, a smile, but that's not laughter. But what about when people laugh at a ridiculous machine? People do this. An absurd object. It's very hard to see the element of cruelty there.

S: I believe that this kind of psychology really doesn't work because it takes an accident for the essence of the thing. The old definition of the laughable in Aristotle is the harmlessly evil. I mean, we don't laugh about an act of murder, a harmful evil, but we laugh about a harmless evil on all kinds of levels. Very uneducated young children laugh about everybody they affect, as we know. Well, when we become older we don't do that. That depends on the degree of our sophistication. We laugh heartily about extremely stupid utterances, whether by students or professors. Yes, but do we do it in order to feel ourselves superior or do we do it because it is a harmless evil? That's a question. That Hobbes had this nasty grimace and sees only this side of it: that is his business. And I suppose there may be on many occasions an element of malice, but it is not neces-

sary. You see how many occasions on which we laugh where no individual human beings are involved, where we tell stories about some man, "x." What does the feeling of superiority mean? We laugh about ourselves from time to time. And so I don't believe that this is true. I mean, you can say laughing: that is ultimately the few relaxations of the deep fears which grip us all the time. There were people who have said this. I don't believe that's necessary; and why not leave it at that phenomenal thing, something like Aristotle said: harmless evils. For example, if people would build up an institute of research with big foundation money in order to breed sheep without wool we all would laugh. We all would laugh because it is really, in a way, a harmless evil. You see, I mean, nothing bad could come out of it: the sheep can also be eaten, although one would say you can have the same thing by shearing sheep. You see, you can do that. The joke is unfortunately not from me but from Jonathan Swift in the third book of Gulliver's Travels, a must for everyone who wants to understand present day life. Good. (Laughter.) No, honestly. Swift has seen what was coming but he didn't see yet the social science research. He saw only what kind of thing natural science if left to itself might try to do. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: I wondered whether the last thing under the distinction between the things really shameful and those reputed to be so . . . the alternative is that if one does something which is conventionally held shameful, but you feel it is right anyway, you wouldn't feel pain, but it seems to me that this is kind of a harsh statement, that one ought not to do either --

S: Yes, yes, that is what I called the Jane Austin element of Aristotle: be decent. Decent has all kinds of levels and there are levels where it is really conventional, but even there be decent.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I mean, if you were a Southerner who entertained guests and you happened to invite a Negro, and this might be quite shameful but you might feel that this is surely right.

S: Yes, but what would you say in this case? In this case there would be a conflict between what is intrinsically decent and conventional decency, but Aristotle is under no obligation to discuss all other cases. He states only the general principle, namely the principle that the conventionally decent has also to be respected. If there is a conflict between the two then you have to think for yourself and it depends how important it is. If it is merely--your insisting on what is intrinsically decent is merely an empty manifestation it might be unwise because you only --how shall I say? -- make troubles without any cause of that. In other situations, that depends. I knew a man who went so far in this view that he said if he had to go to a cannibal society to decannibalize them he would, of course, have to live with them for a long time and he would naturally in the first part of his sojourn with them be a cannibal, you know, just to become a normal member of the society. This goes probably too far. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Do I understand that regarding the virtue of small-souledness which we were speaking about earlier you suggested small-souledness can be linked up with modesty?

S: No, what we call modesty. No, Aristotle's view of modesty can be stated very simply: a man not worthy of great honors, not claiming for himself great honors. That's a modest man and it is not a high virtue but it is, of course, virtue.

Q<sub>3</sub>: So then for Aristotle modesty would not be able to go hand in hand with mag-

nanimity?

S: No, no. Yes, well, for example, if you look at a man who at least impresses me so much as Churchill does -- but I think if I were to give a brief description in terms of adjectives of Churchill the word modest wouldn't come up, not because he is immodest, but it's not a characteristic virtue.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Would it be fair to say that modesty for Aristotle is related to what later was called humility? Is it the same?

S: No, no, because the motivation is entirely different. Modesty -- Aristotle calls it sophron which I ordinarily translate by moderate but in this connection it means simply a reasonable man. No, the humility, tainotes (?) in Greek, has invariably a negative meaning: abject. I wanted to bring up this very point in a different form: namely this section on sense of shame on which I would like to say a word.

Now Aristotle has spoken here very little about sense of shame; only to make clear that sense of shame is not a virtue. But the detailed discussion you would find in the Rhetoric, Book II, chapter six, and there he mentions, among other things, that men feel shame in front of good men, for example. I mean, say, if you are in a -- I mean, if a man behaves improperly in a group of men who all behave improperly you would not be ashamed of them. But if there is one silent member there who behaves decently you would be ashamed of him. [Note: in these remarks of Dr Strauss there is implicit that he means by "ashamed of" the expression "ashamed in front of" aidoustai. Now of which beings are men particularly ashamed? Now the Greek word aidoustai is applied from Homer on until Plato, inclusive, and probably beyond, to the gods. Men should be ashamed of the gods. Now we would probably translate this in English -- the expression in English -- differently, but it is the same word in Greek. I mean, for example, that someone should oppress weak human beings or commit another gross injustice which is not punished by the human law: fear of the gods. But the Greeks can as well say be ashamed of the gods, hold the gods in reverence; same word.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Not "ashamed before" but "ashamed of"?

S: No, with a view to. Well, how would you express it? My English is poor. What do you say of a child?

Q<sub>5</sub>: He is ashamed of himself before his parents.

S: Before the gods. So the highest beings before which man can be ashamed are the gods. Plato, in the Laws 671d, calls sense of shame a divine fear to distinguish it from ordinary fears. Now what is so extraordinarily interesting in Aristotle is that there is not a single allusion to this rich and old meaning of sense of shame, where it has the meaning of reverence and awe: all these things. Nothing. Just as in other cases we have seen: liberality narrowed down and sophrosyne narrowed down and so on and so on. This is completely absent from Aristotle. But, of course, the Greeks, and that means naturally also Aristotle, knew that. Now what is implied in this notion of being ashamed of the gods or what can be implied? [Inaudible reply]. Yes, perhaps the gods know more about what is going on in men than men do; the omniscience of the gods. The word occurs in Greece. I mean, omniscient: the gods know everything. What I'm driving at is this -- Mr. Burnham.

O: I just wanted to say inferiority of some sort is implied.



(Note: At this point the tape ran out. What follows is an almost literal paraphrase of the remainder of the session taken from stenographic notes.)

S: I think of a very simple statement of Aristotle: a gentleman does not make mistakes, does not sin. (In Greek it's the same word.) In other words, the denial that shame is a virtue means that men can be unimpeachably virtuous. That is the key: that someone can be so justly satisfied with his virtue that he says I have nothing to be ashamed of -- not in the common understanding but in a deeper sense. This does not occur in Plato. It is a peculiarity of Aristotle. Plato did not throw out sense of shame as much as Aristotle. For the grown-up gentleman everything can be perfect. Man is not necessarily sinful.

Q: Is this connected from the other side: that the gods in their perfection are unconcerned with men?

S: Yes.

Q: Also, why is religion reduced to munificence?

S: That is clear. Aristotle re-writes so-called Greek morality from a new point of view, which was prepared by some philosophers but in a way which had never been done before. His was a defense of morality, but he takes it from the traditional context. This partly explains the fact that he can be accepted by Christians, Jews, and Muslims. He is not specifically Greek.

Q: Would Biblical meekness be akin to Aristotle's smallness of soul?

S: From Aristotle's point of view, not the Biblical.

Q: Not necessarily: if smallness of soul is not being worthy of great enterprises, Moses, who was small and humble, certainly regarded himself as worthy of great enterprises.

S: (Refers to Machiavelli's Prince, chapter six.) Those who win their principality by their own virtue. . . . Clearly stated, that to possess something, believe to possess it by one's own virtue, not by the grace of God. That is the big point. According to Machiavelli, Moses was a most outstanding man who owed greatness to his own virtue. Also the example in Spinoza's Ethics: what is important is to think well about oneself, meaning justifiably. This is exactly what the Bible questions, that man should think well about himself. Xenophon has some of the clearest statements. He has Socrates say, I admire myself tremendously. That was common. That was what the theoretical tradition meant by pride: not silly pride but a deeper thing which applies to all men in the decisive respect. Superba. The most obvious difference is not Greeks/Jews, but philosophers/Biblical tradition. Even in Thucydides, Nicias shows us that the Greeks in general have as many pious men, according to their notion of piety, as in any nation. Aristotle is the most obvious. In the list of the virtues piety does not occur. There is the social side of piety, munificence. The other, the true virtue regarding the gods, is knowledge of the gods, of the cosmos.

Q: (Regarding humility.)

S: Humility for the Greeks was always associated with vice, abjectness. It is never used in a positive sense in Aristotle. In Plato it is twice and in Xenophon once, in both in the context of speaking of Sparta. Sparta was much more old fashioned.

10th Meeting: May 14, 1963

... but there is this legal question or question of justice: did you not trespass on Mr. Dry's ground. You had an agreement. Of course, you did this section (and you will not be punished for that) which in my reckoning belongs to the second half which I ought to take up next time, but it is perfectly all right. But I have to take up, of course, today the first part and I believe your neglect, relative neglect, of the first half of Book V had some consequences for your understanding of Aristotle. I come to that later. Now only a few points.

First, regarding the general thing as to the interpretation of Book V and in particular the section on natural right. I mean, I do not claim that what I said in Natural Right and History is the solution to the difficulty. It was only the best I could do at the time. I believe I made it somewhat clearer in a later statement which is not yet published but of which some of you have copies: an article I wrote for the second edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. I didn't have enough copies, but some of you, I believe, did get copies. Do you have one, Mr. Butterworth? But some got, some of them did. Well, I'm sorry; I have no longer any copies. Perhaps -- Miss Perkins, is there still something from which it could be -- perhaps we do that.

Q: Was the substance of that article in your lectures last fall?

S: Yes, yes. Yes, but still I went over it again.

Q: I see.

S: And if Miss Perkins would be so kind, because it is a mere act of kindness and not of duty, to reproduce it. How many people are there roughly? Forty? Fifty? And -- reproduce it. Then you could all have a copy. But I'm still not satisfied. There are quite a few difficulties there.

Now there is only one point where I am sure you are wrong. You referred to Aristotle's distinction between the man who commits an unjust action and the unjust man. The distinction is very simple. Someone may commit an unjust action without being an unjust man. The example which Aristotle gives is the adulterer overcome by passion and he didn't commit the action in cold blood, if this is not a somewhat peculiar expression. No, but after all, there can be mitigating circumstances. This woman can have seduced him; I mean, can have put a kind of pressure on him that is very hard to resist. That could happen and you cannot call such a man an unjust man although he committed an unjust action. That's clear. But you say a man can be a tyrant without being unjust and yet only committing an unjust action. I believe this Aristotle would not admit.

O: In a sense. In the sense that if justice be seen as a quality that since there's no law in tyranny this would be outside of the realm of legal justice.

S: Oh, but it is not the legal. No, no. We have to go over this passage about legal justice to which you referred in order to make this clear. But a tyrant is a man, of course, who habitually acts unjustly.

Now before we turn to the assignment I would like to say a word about the paper of Miss Kirley, which I liked very much. I'll read you a brief point. That concerns the second half of Book IV. She raises the question -- there are the two peaks, magnanimity and justice, and in between are the social virtues

and why are they in between? That's a necessary question. "Aristotle is left with the task of finding the mean between the contemplative life and the polis," Aristotle doesn't use the word mean here but it is very apt. It's a very Aristotelian term, a mean, and this mean is to be found in these social graces, as we might say. There was one more point. Yes, and then she has some interesting reflections about the transition from the sphere of the individual, by which she means from the peak, magnanimity, to the sphere of society, by which she means the peak, justice -- "is important to Aristotle's thought in still another way, namely in connection with the problem of friendship," which is also a very good point, friendship being a kind of society, association, which is not the political association but which is as such closer, in its highest form, to the philosophic association. That's the general philosophy. This was also very sound. And I think there was one more point. No, this is all.

I would like to mention one point: when we discussed courage and we wondered how does it come that we use the word courage today in a much broader sense than Aristotle uses it in the Ethics. You know, Profiles of Courage is the title of a book by President Kennedy by which he did not mean -- I haven't read the book but from what I have heard about it he did not mean there courage on the field of battle. Is this correct? Good. Now this broader use where we can also speak of intellectual courage: this occurs, I was reminded, in Averroes' paraphrase of the Republic where he speaks of the courage of the philosophers over against certain opinions. By the way, this commentary of Averroes which is not available at present -- it is lost in the original. A Hebrew translation is the closest we have and this Hebrew translation has been edited, but in a very poor manner, and has been translated into English in a still poorer manner. Therefore, it is as good as if it didn't exist, but Mr. Mahdi and I hope that one day some man or body of men will bring out a decent edition and a decent English translation. Now this is quite interesting for the following reason: because Averroes wrote this commentary on the Republic because he didn't have access to Aristotle's Politics which was not available in Arabia. He had the Ethics, the Aristotelian Ethics, and he wrote a comment on that, but he didn't have the Politics and so he took Plato's Republic. But he interprets the Republic from this point of view (which is quite interesting): he says the purpose of the virtues is not presented in the Ethics and in order to understand the purpose of the virtues one has to engage in the political considerations for which he takes Plato's Republic in the absence of Aristotle's Politics.

Q: I don't understand that. Would you mind repeating it? Would you mind repeating what Averroes' point is?

S: The virtues must be understood in terms of the polis and this is not done in the Ethics but is done in the Politics. Now let me see.

I would like to mention -- I believe I mentioned it but I would like to emphasize it again. In the 15th chapter of Machiavelli's Prince, one of the most important utterances in the history of political philosophy -- (the chapter is exactly one and a third quarters of a page long, so you see sometimes something can be very important without being very long, a great comfort for those who fear they cannot write a 60 page Master's thesis or a 200 page Doctor's thesis). Here this passage requires very careful reading. Machiavelli gives here an enumeration of the virtues and vices in which justice does not occur, very interestingly, but there is always one vice opposed to a virtue. In other words, virtue is not understood as a mean; and I have tried to interpret the passage but I think I did not do justice to this passage and it deserves your serious study. The number of virtues is the same as in Aristotle, but the individual virtues men-



tioned are not the same. Good. Now let us turn to our assignment. Yes, Mr. Butterworth?

Q: Just one question regarding courage. When we were dealing with the virtue of courage in Book IV you mentioned that if one were to read in the Laws -- if one were to understand why Aristotle dealt with courage --

S: Oh yes, that is simple; because in the Laws courage is presented as the lowest virtue.

Q: The one thing I'm wondering: what would be the importance of the fact that in Plato courage seems to be an intellectual virtue whereas for Aristotle --

S: Yes, is it an intellectual virtue? I mean, Averroes in his commentary says so, but is it an intellectual virtue in Plato? That's a long question.

Q: The reason I thought it was is because it's associated with three other very prominently intellectual virtues. /S: Which?/ Justice, what we call prudence, and then intelligence. /S: By whom?/ In the Laws.

S: But not courage. Courage is the lowest.

Q: Those are four and courage is in the fourth rank of those.

S: The lowest; yes. And the intellectual virtues are the highest. I mean, you cannot make a mechanical identification of the Ethics with the teaching of the first two books of the Laws, but only this particular point: courage at the bottom. That is the same and this is usually not considered when one studies the structure, the plan, of the Ethics.

I would like to mention one point regarding the character of the teaching of the Ethics as a whole. We have been always concerned with the question of the purpose or the end. Now what is that end? The end of moral virtue is said to be moral virtue. Now how can we understand that? When Plato speaks of the various virtues he presents them as imitations of ideas. Crudely stated, there is moderation: men are moderate, more or less; none is perfectly moderate but there is an idea of moderation, moderation itself, by which he takes his bearings. Now this doctrine of ideas is, of course, also Aristotelian although Aristotle reinterprets it very radically, changes it very radically, but one point is, I believe important. Aristotle distinguishes the idea and the end, the eidos, the form, and the end. Very simply, the form of a shoe is not the purpose of a shoe and you can understand the form of a shoe only in the light of the purpose. When you know that the shoe serves the purpose of protecting the feet then you understand the form of the shoe. It must be somehow modelled on the foot. But in the case of natural beings the distinction between form and end ceases to be decisive. The form is the end; meaning, simply stated, the procreation of animals has no other purpose except to preserve the being of the species. The end of that action is the permanence of the being of the species, of the form. Now if you apply this to Aristotle -- I mean, this Aristotelian principle to his Ethics -- then you see: there is an identification of the eidos, of the form, and the end. This, I believe, we have not mentioned and it should also be considered.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I think we discussed before the end of the moral virtues and we had the ambiguity that it may also be happiness.

S: Well, happiness: that is no question, that this is the end. There's no

difficulty there. A perfectly satisfactory state in accordance with the nature of man: that cannot have another end. That is obviously the end. But the difficulty concerns the relation of happiness to moral virtue. They are not identical. Now Aristotle says, on the one hand, that virtuous activity is the core of happiness. To that extent it would seem to be practically the same as happiness, but he does not simply identify them and that indicates the difficulty. We will take up this question on more than one occasion.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Where did you say it was that Aristotle identifies formal and final?

S: Second book of the Physics, as far as natural things are concerned. Yes, not artifacts. In the case of artifacts the distinction obtains throughout. Good. Mr. Burnham.

Q<sub>4</sub>: How are the form and the end identified in the Ethics?

S: Not explicitly. That's the difficulty: this whole question is not discussed very clearly here and we have to look around everywhere else to find our bearings. And one, I think if we realize that this identification of the end and the form is characteristic of the natural things as Aristotle understands them; (dogs do not fulfill any other function but to be dogs; dogs are not there in order to watch our houses; this is something for which we may use them but this is not the reason why they are dogs). In other words the usual word for that is Aristotle admits only an intrinsic teleology, not an extrinsic one. Good. Now let us now begin and turn to the fifth book, the book on justice.

Now Aristotle makes first a distinction between two kinds of justice: the just in the sense of the legal and the just in the sense of the equal, as Aristotle puts it. And Aristotle arrives at this view that there are two kinds of justice by starting from the two meanings of injustice. When we call a man unjust we mean either a law breaker or we mean a grasping man. Now these are not the same things. A man may be grasping without being a law breaker and a man may be a law breaker without grasping. Now if the vices differ it is to be assumed that the virtues differ: that if there are two kinds of injustice there are likely to be two kinds of justice. This is the way in which Aristotle begins the argument. First, then, what is the unjust man in the sense of the unequal? Now unequal means here the man who wants to have more, the grasping. He seeks -- what is his error? Aristotle says in 1129b, at the beginning, he seeks the things which are simply good and yet they are not good for him. Now the things which are simply good are health, a reasonable amount of things (of property), and the other goods which we all naturally regard as goods. This kind of justice and injustice which is unequal is directly concerned with the simply good things for oneself. Is this point clear? We may perhaps read it: 1129b, 1 to 11.

O: Again, as the unjust man is one who takes the larger share, he will be unjust in respect of good things; not all good things, but those on which good and bad fortune depend. These though always good in the absolute sense, are not always good for a particular person.

S: It's clear. For example, for a certain individual it is better if he is poor than if he is rich because he would ruin himself by the wealth. Disease, illness, may be good for a certain individual because it keeps him from mischief, although disease is an evil. That is what Aristotle means by that. Good. Yes?

O: Yet these are the goods men pray for and pursue, although they ought not to do so; they ought, while choosing the things that are good for them, to pray that what is good absolutely may also be good for them.

S: In other words, they should wish to be such beings that health and property would be good for them. Then they would be healthy human beings in the first place, morally healthy. Yes?

O: The unjust man does not however always choose the larger share: of things that, speaking absolutely, are bad he chooses the smaller share. . . .

S: Is this not clear? For example, he chooses more as far as his salary is concerned but he chooses less as far as taxes are concerned. Aristotle is very specific about that. Yes?

O: . . . but nevertheless he is thought to take more than his due, because the lesser of two evils seems in a sense to be a good, and taking more than one's due means taking more than one's due of good.

S: You see, Aristotle can be very explicit as he is here. Good.

O: Let us call him "unfair," for that is a comprehensive term, and includes both taking too much of good things and too little of bad things.

S: Yes. Now what he says, "unfair," is literally translated, "unequal." He takes more or less, not the equal, what is in the middle. Good. Now this kind of just or unjust man is directly concerned with the simply good things for himself. For himself: that's the only consideration. Now we come to the second meaning of justice and injustice in the sequel, the immediate sequel. Yes?

O: There some manuscripts add, "Also a law breaker. . . ." S: Yes, let us--  
Skip that? S: Yes.

Again, we saw that the law breaker is unjust and the law abiding man just. It is therefore clear that all lawful things are just in one sense of the word. . . .

*ἐπει*  
S: "Somehow." Let us be literal: "somehow"; because it is absurd to say that all laws are just unqualifiedly. There are customs which are most unjust, but in a sense even these unjust laws are just; in a sense. But the reason is clear: because any law, any restraint, is better than the complete absence of restraint. Even a very poor legal order is better than anarchy. That is what Aristotle means. Yes? Go on.

O: . . . for what is lawful is decided by legislature. . . .

S: No, "by the legislative." Supply? Not assembly but art or knowledge.

O: . . . by the legislative, and the several decisions of the legislative we call rules of justice.

S: "We call just." Why rules? The word does not occur. Yes?

O: Now all the various pronouncements of the law aim either at the common interest of all, or at the interest of a ruling class. . . .



S: No, "the laws speak or pronounce about everything"; about all things; of course, not about astronomy (that goes without saying), but everything which can possibly be subject to law. Yes?

O: . . . or at the interest of a ruling class determined either by excellence or in some other similar way; so that in one of its senses the term "just" is applied to anything that produces and preserves the happiness, or the component parts of the happiness, of the political community.

S: Yes, let us stop here. The just and unjust in the second sense is directly concerned with the common good; the unjust man by disregarding the common good, the just man by considering it, -- with the happiness of the political community -- whereas the just or unjust in the first case is concerned with the simply good things with a view to himself. Justice in this sense, in the sense of the common good, depends on the legislative art: breaking the law and the law is a product of the legislative art. This justice is questionable. The products of this art are somehow just. If this is a poor legislative then it will make poor laws and yet even those poor laws are to be obeyed, unless in certain extreme cases.

Q: What about the interest of the ruling class? In the passage we just read: "the interest of a ruling class." Is that a good translation?

S: Yes, "the common good for all or the best or the authoritative or in any other way." In other words, Aristotle speaks here indeed very succinctly and he develops this much more fully in the Politics. All laws depend on the legislator and the legislator -- let us use a simple modern term -- is the sovereign. But the sovereign can be one man, a few men, and many or all, and the few men can be the rich, oligarchy, the few men can be the virtuous, aristocracy, and so on. Therefore, the laws depend essentially on the polity, as Aristotle puts it, on the regime; essentially. This enormously important question is here only touched upon because its development would lead here much too far.

Q: But the conclusion is that whatever the regime, or whether the laws aim at the interest of a part or of the whole, they still are somehow just.

S: Yes, somehow. Well, you know what happens: you have heard the famous statement some years ago, I mean when you say the good of a part and the good of the whole, but each ruling part, of course, claims that its ruling is good for the whole. What is good for General Motors: you remember that? Good. So that happens all the time. Aristotle is not here under a compulsion to go into this difficulty. That is the theme of the Politics. Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, the interpretation I got out of this is that they are in some sense good or sometimes good. It may not be the common good.

S: Yes, you can put it this way but I believe -- that is true. It may be the misunderstood common good. That is quite true. But still, there is also the other thing not to be underestimated: this equation which you find in Xenophon or in Plato from time to time, the just is the legal, and this, of course, was not an invention of philosophy. What is the most crude criterion of whether a man is just or not? That he doesn't claim more than what belongs to him by law; that he does not do anything to any man which he is not entitled to do by the law. Legal is just and the unjust is the use of force, violence. That's the most crude distinction and that is not negated because there is something in that notion that any law is better than no law. In a discussion -- I have men-

[Note: At this point the recording head which had been defective throughout this course without the operator becoming aware of it began to make poor contact with the tape. This continued for half an hour, resulting in a barely audible recording. Ellipses will be used below to denote the inaudible portions.]

[page 6 continued] tioned this in another class -- in the Harvard Law Review some years ago . . . the question was raised -- this question was raised and the point was rightly made that if the Nazis had stuck to the Nazi laws some of the more dastardly things could not have been done because there is a strange transformation which takes place when people pronounce laws. There are things which are not as such as sayable as they are doable; and especially publicly sayable in a law. There is something to that. I mean, that is not negated. It is surely not sufficient. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: (Asks whether there is a distinction between laws just in the sense that they aim at the common good and laws just in the sense that law is better than no law.)

S: Yes, this is a long story. This has something to do with the mere fact that a law is in general just. I mean, a law cannot be made as easily the vehicle of revenge of the ruler on this particular individual. Somehow, it must have a more general formula. . . . This is underlying the separation of powers later on, this notion: the generality of law as a kind of being general -- that is more rational than a non-general statement. . . . Mr. Boyan.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Is a bill of attainder a law, a bill that specifically mentions certain persons?

S: Yes, but this is a long question. According to the more recent theory developed by Montesquieu and taken over . . . it could not be a legislative act. It is necessarily a judicial act. . . . A bill of attainder would mean the subsumption of this particular case, whoever this is, under the general law of high treason. Now whether this can be done by the same organ, say the legislative, which also gives the law: that's the question, and separation of powers means it cannot be done by the same organ. It must be done by the judicial body as distinguished from the legislative body. But the distinction between the bodies, between the powers -- the separation of powers -- and the distinction of the function itself are two very different things. A legislative act is not a judicial act and every judicial act presupposes a legislative, a law. . . . [The same point is repeated in a brief exchange.]

Now Aristotle has made clear that there is a kind of justice which is concerned with the common good, however understood, wise or unwise. Now the law prescribes actions of all virtues; Aristotle says in the sequel and he gives some examples: actions of courage, actions of temperance, and so on and so on . . . . Does the law prescribe the actions of all the virtues? It does prescribe the actions of justice in the narrow sense. Yes?

O: It would not prescribe the actions of the majority.

S: Yes. Very good. And more simply, the social virtues. I mean, there is no law anywhere where the boorish man will be punished with a fine because he never laughs at a good joke. [Inaudible question.] What I think is only this: that this is an overstatement of Aristotle. Good. Now let us turn to 1129b25. "This justice which is law abidingness. . . ." Do you have it?

[He begins to read at the wrong place.]

S: "This justice is perfect virtue, but not simply, not without qualification, but perfect virtue with a view toward the others," the perfect social virtue.

O: This is why justice is often thought to be the chief of the virtues, and more sublime "or than the evening or the morning star"; and we have the proverb, "In justice is all virtue found in sum." And justice is perfect virtue because it is the practice of perfect virtue; and perfect in a special degree, because its possessor can practice his virtue towards others and not merely by himself; for there are many who can practice virtue in their own private affairs but cannot do so in their relations with another. This is why we approve the saying of Bias, "Office will show a man"; for in office one is brought into relation with others and becomes a member of a community.

The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, accounts for the view that justice alone of the virtues is "the good of others," because it does what is for the advantage of another. . . .

S: Literally, "another man's good." This has a derogatory meaning. Yes? Another man's good and not your own good. . . . Yes?

O: . . . what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate. As then the worst man is he who practices vice towards his friends as well as in regard to himself, so the best is not he who practices virtue in regard to himself but he who practices it towards others; for that is a difficult task.

Justice in this sense then is not a part of virtue, but the whole of virtue; and its opposite injustice is not a part of vice but the whole of vice (the distinction between virtue and justice in this sense being clear from what has been said: they are the same quality of mind, but their essence is different; what as displayed in relation to others is justice, as being simply a disposition of a certain kind is virtue).

S: Yes. Now this I had, of course, in mind when I spoke of the fact that justice is the peak, but also together with magnanimity. Universal justice, the justice from the point of view of the common good, from the point of view of the law: this is the highest virtue, the perfect virtue, transcends in splendor the most resplendent stars which shine in dusk or dawn. This is an indication of what he means: the rare. Magnanimity is the ornament of the overall concern with complete virtue. . . . altogether perfect, absolutely, so that the term used in the case of magnanimity is stronger than the term used here. This justice is the virtue of the ruler in the highest case; the ruler. I mean, the man who can lead a virtuous life for himself and on the highest level seems to be inferior to the man who can lead a virtuous life in such a way that he can guide whole societies toward virtue. Does this not make sense? From this point of view this kind of justice is the highest virtue. The best man is the perfect ruler. But you can look at him in two ways: namely as the man who serves everybody else by ruling them -- this is the point of view of justice -- but if you would look at him so that the many ruled serve him because he is the model -- they look toward the virtuous man -- that's magnanimity. . . . Now universal justice depends on law, but the law can be bad. The law depends on the regime. Universal justice is, therefore, simply good only if the regime is the best. This would be an Aristotelian assertion. But the best regime is here the law (?). Ordinary universal justice is therefore and from this point of view the status of magnanimity compared with justice is increased. Do you see that



point? Virtue, as required by magnanimity, does not have this relation to others. Yes, Mr. Dry, what did you want to say?

Q: I thought that in this book the just is the lawful.

S: Yes, but this was the case: the lawful things are somehow just. Somehow. It can mean also this: they tend to be just, they wish to be just, but they are not necessarily so.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Refers to the distinction between the good man and the good citizen.)

S: Yes, we come to that. In the Politics. That's a long story. Yes, but we must see here: Aristotle has asserted that morality and politics are coextensive and there would be a perfect harmony between them if the statement regarding universal justice were unqualifiedly correct. If the laws command the actions of all virtues and command them rightly it's wonderful. Then there is perfect harmony between politics and morality. But if the laws are imperfect then human perfection may be found much more among isolated individuals than in society at large. Does it not make sense?

Q<sub>3</sub>: (To the effect that the moving principle is different in each case.)

S: Sure. Well, this will come out in this way: if you had the perfect case, a perfect regime with the best laws, and laws provided for all virtues so that law abidingness is identical with goodness. This is very hard for us to understand on the basis of our very limited modern legal system, but if you take, for example the Old Testament or Jewish tradition, according to this view a man who obeys the law in all its points is a good man. There is nothing else. Something of this kind is in the notion underlying ancient law, which Aristotle, of course, knew. But the difficulty is as you have seen here: there are certain virtues which couldn't find a place in any law, the social graces, which Aristotle regarded as important enough to give them the status of virtues, which we have discussed. Let us go beyond that. In the case of the best regime and the best laws there would be this perfect harmony between law and morality: that to obey the law is identical with being a good citizen as well as a good man. But we don't have the best regime and this is no accident, that it is so hard to find. And this is no accident, i.e. there is an inherent difficulty in getting the best laws, and if you think through this difficulty then you arrive at the view ultimately that the nature of things does not permit it. That point will come out at the end of Book X. Yes, Mr. Boyan and then Mr. Butterworth.

Q<sub>4</sub>: (To the effect that since all the virtues are not provided for by the law, the law deals with the lower virtues.)

S: It could be, but the law omits some parts of virtue. Aristotle says "all." Aristotle wants to point out that question too. I mean, if the law does not cover all forms of goodness then it has a much lower rank, naturally, than if it covered all forms of goodness. And in the identification of highest virtue with legal justice the power of the law has this all comprehensive character.

Q<sub>5</sub>: (Regarding the relationship of magnanimity to perfect virtue.)

S: There are n specific virtues. . . . There are two virtues which are general, which require or include all other virtues, and these are magnanimity and justice, and the praise which Aristotle bestows on each of them is, to say the least,

equal. He praises magnanimity as much, one can say, as he praises justice. Therefore there are two peaks of Aristotle's Ethics. But in the case of magnanimity the relation to the others is not essential. The magnanimous man is concerned with his own perfection and with the consciousness of his perfection. The just man is essentially related to others. Is this not clear? Good. The total virtue as Aristotle sees it is the same as justice. But the being, as he puts it, is not the same. The being is not the same; namely, the point of view of the being is not the same. If you look at it from the point of view of virtue, of the perfection of the individual, that's one thing. If you look at it from the point of view of society or of the polis, that's another point of view. And the whole problem is concentrated in this brief passage and Aristotle goes into this question that the legal virtue prescribes the actions of all the virtues. (Inaudibly indicates that he is about to turn to particular justice when interrupted by a question).

Q: In what sense is justice perfect virtue without qualification?

S: No; he does not say this. He says in 1129b25, "this justice," universal justice, "is perfect virtue, but not simply," i.e. not without an addition, without a qualification; but complete virtue with a view to others. As we state it, in its social function. If virtue were the good simply, i.e. the perfection of the individual, then it is not identical with justice. But if it is understood in its social function then you can say it is perfect virtue. /Q: Inaudible./ But Aristotle does not say that. He says only it is, as it were -- just as in the case of magnanimity, the magnanimous man has all the other virtues and yet then magnanimity brings an ornament to the other virtues. Here it is not an ornament, but it is said to be social. Does he show his virtue also in the political context? If not then he is inferior.

Q: Is he saying that justice is the only social virtue? It seems that a problem with moral virtue is what about the other social virtues that he discussed.

S: No, he says justice alone among the virtues is thought to be another man's good; meaning this: if you are temperate, courageous, and the other virtues; that is your own good. You feel better. . . . But justice, at first glance, benefits more the others than it benefits you. . . . Here the concern with others is in the foreground. The friendly man as friendly man is concerned with himself, being as nice as possible, as decent as possible, as good as possible. But from the point of view of justice you are concerned with the community as a whole. That makes the difference.

Q: Aristotle is speaking here of the law in a universal sense and yet he speaks of rightly framed laws.

S: Yes, sure.

Q: And this is something higher?

S: Naturally. Yes, but who ever believed that Aristotle was a vulgar legal positivist or social conformist? Of course not. I mean, this man was sensitive about that. /Q: Inaudible./ Well, we have seen all these virtues, all with the exception of particular justice to which we come now. These virtues. . . they are the standard. . . . /appears to have said that these virtues are the standard with a view to which the legislator ought to take his bearings./ We come to a passage about it. Let us turn to 1130a, 24, because we must follow the argument. Aristotle is now going to prove that there is a particular jus-

tice, not only universal justice which is identical with law abidingness. . . . Now let us turn to that Mr. Reinkin. In 1130a24, "The man who commits adultery for the sake of gain." Well how do they call him today? (Laughter).

O: Page 263, paragraph four. Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit and gaining by the act, the other from desire, and having to pay. . . .

S: Yes, the point: he pays in addition; the other gains in addition. You know? The other gets richer and the other gets poorer. Good.

O: . . . then the latter would be deemed to be a profligate rather than a man who takes more than his due, while the former would be deemed unjust, but not profligate; clearly therefore it is being done for profit that makes the action unjust.

S: Isn't this a sign . . . that it is a particular justice? Because the law is broken by both, but the one, in addition to being a lawbreaker, is a profligate; the other is, in addition to being a lawbreaker, an unjust man because he is concerned with gain. Yes? Go on.

O: Again, whereas all other unjust acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice -- for example, adultery is put down to profligacy, desertion from the ranks to cowardice, assault to anger -- an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice except injustice.

Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of injustice besides universal injustice, the former being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its definition falls in the same genus, both sorts of injustice being exhibited in a man's relation to others; but whereas injustice in the particular sense is concerned with honor or money or security, or whatever term we may employ to include all these things, its motive being the pleasure of gain, injustice in the universal sense is concerned with all the things that are the sphere of virtue.

S: Yes. Is it clear now why they have the same names, universal justice and particular justice? Because both have to do with the other man, with the others. They are both emphatically social, but nevertheless they are different. Not all acting unjustly is acting greedily, for the sake of gain, and one may act unjustly only for the sake of gain as distinguished from the satisfaction of a specific desire. For example, if someone kills another man out of anger; to satisfy his anger he kills him. Another, a thug, does it for pay. He doesn't satisfy his anger by killing him. He is the unjust man in the sense of particular justice. Averroes gives this example: a man who does not undertake particulars is unjust, i.e. transgresses the law, but is not unjust in the sense of harming other men. That's the point. The man who takes risks by stinginess is not unjust in the second sense because he doesn't take away from another man what belongs to him. He is unjust in the first sense because the law in the broadest sense wants you to be liberal, generous, and if you are not generous you are in this sense a breaker of the law. But he is not unjust in the second sense. Now the immediate sequel is a repetition which emphasizes the fact that particular justice is a part of universal justice, i.e. of universal virtue understood from a special point of view. This means all virtues previously mentioned are part of universal justice and this is repeated in order to emphasize that this is the problem, ultimately. Now let us turn to b20, 1130b20.



O: We have therefore to discuss justice and injustice, and the just and unjust, in the particular sense.

We may then set aside that justice which is coextensive with virtue in general, being the practice of virtue in general towards someone else. It is also clear how we should define what is just and unjust in the corresponding senses. For the actions that spring from virtue in general are in the main identical with the actions that are according to law, since the law enjoins conduct. . . .

S: You see here, by the way, not all laws direct us to virtue. But generally, many of them, the majority of them. The nomos goes beyond virtue, obviously. Right and left driving does not as such direct us toward virtue and all the technical laws have no direct relation to virtue. There are many things of this kind. Yes?

O: . . . conduct displaying the various particular virtues and forbids conduct displaying the various particular vices. Also the regulations laid down for the education that fits a man for social life are the rules productive of virtue in general. As for the education of the individual as such, that makes a man simply a good man, the question whether this is the business of political science or of some other science must be determined later: for it would seem that to be a good man is not in every case the same thing as to be a good citizen.

[Note: With the reversal of the tape at this point, the defect which began on page 7 was corrected. In the opinion of the transcriber, the omitted portions on the 5 $\frac{1}{2}$  pages preceding do not contain any remarks crucial to the argument and were chiefly omissions of scattered inaudible phrases. However, some of Dr. Strauss' remarks, above, should be regarded as slight paraphrasing of what he said rather than as a perfect verbatim transcript.]

S: Yes, now this is discussed in the third book of the Politics and is one of the most important discussions of the Politics. Not all laws are concerned with virtue. The laws which are concerned with virtue are those which have to do with education toward virtue, above all; the education of the citizen. But the education of the citizen is relative to the regime. The education of the citizen in a democracy differs from the education of a citizen in an oligarchy or aristocracy. That's clear. Now since a good man is not a good -- which he doesn't develop here -- a good citizen, say, in a tyranny cannot be a good man because a good citizen in a tyranny means a man who is absolutely loyal to the tyranny and how can a good man be loyal to tyranny? Therefore, the good citizen is relative to the regime. The good man is not relative to any regime. On the contrary: the good man is the standard for establishing the various ranks of the various regimes. Here you have your answer. The good man, the virtuous: that's the standard in the light of which we judge of the regime. This is, by the way, made very beautiful and clearly stated in the first book of Plato's Laws, which you might read. So not all laws, then, direct us to virtue and on the other hand the law does not prescribe the actions of all virtues. We have seen this before. Law and virtue, politics and morality, are not simply coextensive. There are lots of loose ends on both sides and by considering these loose ends we will see the fundamental difficulty. Will you read the immediate sequel?

O: Particular justice on the other hand, and that which is just in the sense corresponding to it, is divided into two kinds. One kind is exercised in the distribution of honor, wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among its members in equal or

or unequal shares. The other kind is that which supplies a corrective principle in private transactions.

S: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. So particular justice, with which alone we will deal in the sequel, consists of two parts which we may call distributive justice and commutative justice. The terms are not so important. Distributive justice means especially the distribution of honors and ruling offices in which case it is essential to consider both the things distributed, honors and offices, and the men. And so you have at least four items in every act of distributive justice: minimum two things and minimum two men to whom they are distributed. It is proportionate justice. As thing "a" is to man "A," thing "b" is to man "B." Let us say that's a dog catcher, president; the man who is to be the dog catcher must be a different man than the man who is to be president. Obviously; I mean, otherwise you could say anyone could be dog catcher and anyone could be president which is excluded by the notion of distributive justice. Distributive justice is the justice which gives unequal things to unequal people and this is the true equality in this field. But there is also a sphere in which simple equality is just and this is what we can call commutative justice. But commutative justice, as Aristotle understands it, includes also penal justice. That's a minor difficulty. I mean, commutative justice, well, is of course primarily that in exchange; in selling and buying and so on. There there should be equality of merchandise, "alpha," and the value paid for it -- let us say an "aleph" (because I have used already the Latin). This is the equality, simple equality. But the same is true of punishments. If someone beats you unjustly he should be punished with another beating. Now this leads to certain difficulties because some things cannot be returned in kind. You cannot punish a man who committed high treason by committing high treason against him; and some other cases. You know, the simple *jus talionis* doesn't work, as Aristotle states in a special satire. Let us see here in the immediate sequel the examples.

O: This corrective justice again has two sub-divisions, corresponding to the two classes of private transactions, those which are voluntary and those which are involuntary. Examples of voluntary transactions are selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, letting for hire; these transactions being termed voluntary because they are voluntarily entered upon. Of involuntary transactions some are furtive, for instance, theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness; others are violent, for instance, assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, maiming, abusive language, contumelious treatment.

S: Yes. If you count you will see that Aristotle enumerates in each case seven -- this number seven which plays such a great role -- and in the center of the whole thing is procuring. Now does this remind you of something? Who was a habitual procurer?

O: Socrates.

S: Socrates. Well, in a somewhat different sense, but still he called it procuring in the Theatetus. Good. Now then he describes first in the sequel distributive justice and here the key point which we have to consider is this, in this section a10 to b24: that he gives here an example -- I think that is in this section.

O: Begins to read at 1131a24.7

S: No, we cannot read that, unfortunately. There is a kind of justice where consideration of the persons is a requirement of justice and there is a kind of justice where consideration of the persons is unjust. Does it make sense? That's what Aristotle means. I mean, someone has killed another man. To consider whether the killer is rich or poor is unjust, but if the office is that of a treasurer it is very important to know how his own family is . This is the simple observation from which Aristotle starts. Now let us read 1131b32 because we cannot cover the whole ground. That is in the next chapter: "the just in exchange. . . ." Yes?

-275 Q: But the just in private transactions, although it is the equal in a sense (and the unjust the unequal), is not the equal according to geometrical but according to arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad one a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery. . . .

S: Yes; now let us stop here. Is it not strange that the good man, the gentleman, can commit crimes? You remember, we read in the end of Book IV when he discussed the sense of shame -- he said that the good man will never commit anything of which he is ashamed. Now we know, of course, if mitigating circumstances -- you know, he is seduced by a singularly seductive woman so it would be almost beyond a man's power to resist her. But still, would he not have to be ashamed if this becomes a matter of public knowledge? That's a strange question. Yes.

Q: Isn't the question of voluntary and involuntary implicit here though?

S: Yes, but this is a long question. One must raise this question: think of present day penal law, which considers the persons very much, much more than it was done in the olden times. Perhaps the gentleman should be punished more severely if he succumbs to such a thing than some non-gentleman; or perhaps less severely because if even he, if such a man, fell on such an occasion then the temptation must have been almost super-human. But still, both are legitimate considerations so that is not easy to understand: why the person should not have to be considered. The whole question of penal law is, of course, here in but it is not fully developed. Plato, in the Laws, is much more specific about it and Plato shows the difficulty very neatly in the following terms. It cannot be the isolated act, the isolated act of murder or theft or whatever it may be, because -- well, you know, there are circumstances which are extenuating and may be extremely extenuating. Now Plato states as a very general principle, is he corrigible or incorrigible. Someone commits a crime and then he goes to a rehabilitation center, whatever the crime was. Now in that center it may prove to be that the man was already completely rehabilitated in the moment he enters it. He committed a murder or a homicide and he will never commit it again. Not that he says it: that wouldn't be sufficient. But the student of his soul sees: this was such a lesson to him that he will never do it. And then there is a petty thief of whom one is absolutely sure that he will do the same thing again and again and again. Now Plato has this rule: the incorrigible ones must be exterminated regardless of the magnitude of the crime and the corrigible ones are to be rehabilitated and this may take, so to say, five minutes in the case of a given murderer. This is the beautiful statement of the problem because then the question: why do we think that's so unjust, to execute the petty thief who will be a petty thief as long as he will be able to steal, and the murderer who will never do it again may be executed? What is that? To what extent is the question of the severity of the damage done to others a true consideration of justice? It's a grave question. Is it not at least as important to consider how corrupt he is in himself? Is the severity of the damage necessarily in a rela-



tion to the corruption of the soul? That's a great question and the whole difficulty of penal justice is involved in this. Aristotle does not develop this here.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Later in Book V it could be said that he covers this. . . . /Inaudibly cites the section he means./

S: Yes, but still I think even we today would not regard an act of homicide as simply excusable. I mean, if he killed a man in anger he will be punished. Will he not?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Oh yes; I was just thinking of how Aristotle would deal with it.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Isn't what you are saying now about commutative justice that we would take the person into consideration, his character and his stature and so forth?

S: Yes. Yes.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Well, then, in what sense did you mean it when you said that in commutative justice the simple equality is the true equality and that to consider the persons would be unjust?

S: This is what Aristotle says, to begin with. We have read the statement. It is irrelevant whether the murderer was a gentleman or a non-gentleman. He murdered. This and this is the punishment for murder. He will be given it.

Q<sub>3</sub>: In other words, is he arguing dialectically here?

S: No, no, no. No, I mean, well, of course it is not a complete statement. Aristotle has a long section on equity later on in the second part and especially in the *Rhetoric*. You know this. But in a very rough way -- you see that is the point -- what Aristotle has in mind is, to begin with, a very crude but important distinction: There are cases in which it is just to give to all men, whoever they may be, the same, and any distinction between persons is unjust. And then there are cases in which to give the same to everyone is unjust. This simple fundamental thing is clear. Isn't it?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Yes, it's very clear. I see.

S: Yes, but the difficulty I believe we have is that penal justice is then treated under the heading, so to speak, of commutative justice. That creates a certain difficulty.

Q<sub>3</sub>: That was my problem. Commutative justice as a whole does not mean the kind of justice in which you disregard people, but just certain divisions --

S: Yes; I mean, the difficulty, I believe, appears most clearly -- and perhaps we read this first -- in the section in the next chapter; this is 1132b21, where Aristotle discusses another notion of justice. Let us first read that.

Q<sub>4</sub>: You meant to say that Plato doesn't put penal justice into this kind of a category.

S: Yes. Yes, of course he makes, naturally, this point -- the fundamental distinction is the same. There is a kind of justice which is simply egalitarian

and there is a kind of justice which cannot be egalitarian. But in the case of penal justice: no, it's different. Will you read that?

O: The view is also held by some that simple reciprocity is justice. This was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, who defined the just simply as "suffering reciprocally with another."

Reciprocity however does not coincide either with distributive or with corrective justice (although people mean to identify it with the latter when they quote the rule of Rhadamanthys, "An a man suffer even that which he did, right justice will be done"). For in many cases reciprocity is at variance with justice: for example, if an officer strikes a man, it is wrong for the man to strike him back; and if a man strikes an officer, it is not enough for the officer to strike him, but he ought to be punished as well. Again, it makes a great difference whether an act was done with or without the consent of the other party. But in the interchange of services justice in the form of reciprocity is the bond that maintains the association: reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on the basis of equality. The very existence of the state depends on proportionate reciprocity; for men demand that they shall be able to requite evil with evil -- if they cannot, they feel they are in the position of slaves, -- and to repay good with good -- failing which, no exchange takes place, and it is exchange that binds them together. This is why we set up a shrine of the Graces in a public place, to remind men to return a kindness; for that is a special characteristic of grace, since it is a duty not only to repay a service done one, but another time to take the initiative in doing a service oneself.

S: Now let us stop -- see here. Yes, what is the meaning of that? Now to understand this I propose this consideration: Aristotle subordinates penal justice under commutative justice and, in addition, he distinguishes between commutative justice and distributive justice. His view is diametrically opposed to the crude view which understands all justice in the light of punitive justice. Now of this view we have some traces; for example, in Plato's Gorgias where the term right, dike in Greek, is identified with punishment. Right is punishment: a tough and barbaric view. Justice is simple equality of reaction to action. Tit not for tat, but for tit, because when you say tit for tat it's obviously something different. Aristotle says such simple equality is in no case just, but a close approximation to it exists in the justice of exchange as distinguished from punitive justice. In punitive justice there is no simple correspondence between deed and suffering for one has to consider whether the deed was done willingly or not, as he indicates. That's one point. And also an example which I used before: one cannot punish high treason with high treason and one can also not punish an eye with an eye, literally understood, jus talionis. This he has in mind. Now here he speaks of this fact, (he comes here now to this narrower view), men cannot stand it if they cannot requite evil with evil. In a way they are treated like slaves: they can't give back. And another consideration: men cannot live comfortably if they do not requite good with good. They know they must even start with doing good, with a kind of doing good, indeed, which pays: commutative justice. Here he mentions the Graces, charitos in Greek, and charis in Greek means both grace and gratitude. It is very interesting that he mentions the goddesses of grace in this book on justice. He does not mention the goddess of right, dike. I believe nothing is more characteristic of Aristotle, of the spirit of the Ethics: that when he discusses justice he mentions the Graces and does not mention the stern goddess of right. That is what I always felt when I compared him in this unforgivable way to Jane Austin: the gracefulness of Aristotle. This is something which is characteristic of the

whole book. Think of his treatment of courage where so many things which we regard as essential to courage are omitted. Now let us read only one more passage: in 1133a21. He develops this at great length: the commutative justice as the bond of society, the needs of all for the service of the others. It is very remarkable that he speaks more, more extensively, about commutative justice proper than about penal justice and about distributive justice. That's very strange.

Q: It is also strange too when he speaks about distributive justice there's so much emphasis on the mathematical part. He doesn't discuss the various criteria of distributive justice.

S: Yes, well first let us read this: 1133a22. Yes?

Q: It is to meet this requirement that men have introduced money; money constitutes in a manner a middle term, for it is a measure of all things, and so of their superior or inferior value, that is to say, how many shoes are equivalent to a house or to a given quantity of food.

S: Well, this is the problem. Isn't it? I mean, if all were shoemakers or all were cultivators of the soil there would be no exchange, no need for exchange. The need for exchange presupposes a kind of inequality, diversity: say, the shoemaker and the physician. Only on this basis is exchange possible, on the basis of diversity. But the products of the two artisans are of different worth: a shoe and a healing from a severe illness or the making of a bed and the building of a house. How can there be a relation of justice? That's the question. And now how does he go on?

Q: As therefore a builder is to a shoemaker, so must such and such a number of shoes be to a house or to a given quantity of food; for without this reciprocal proportion, there can be no exchange and no association; and it cannot be secured unless the commodities in question be equal in a sense.

S: In other words, exchange is obviously necessary but the exchange must be equal. Otherwise the exchange would break down. Is this in need of proof? I mean, because if the exchange were not equal the one side would regard itself as defrauded, as simply losing, and it would no longer exchange. Yes?

Q: It is therefore necessary that all commodities shall be measured by some one standard, as was said before. And this standard is in reality demand, which is what holds everything together. . . .

S: Yes, "need" is the better, more literal translation; "need." The shoemaker needs the physician and the physician needs the shoes and hence the shoemaker. Yes.

Q: . . . since if men cease to have wants or if their wants alter, exchange will go on no longer, or will be on different lines. But need has come to be conventionally represented by money; this is why money is called nomisma (customary currency), because it does not exist by nature but by custom (nomos), and it can be altered and rendered useless at will.

S: Yes. Now you see, Mr. Burnham, the reference is to the question at the top of this page/ the very recondite act to which Aristotle refers in order to explain the mathematical character is money. You know that money is obviously numerical. You know, you find invariably numbers on the bills and the coins. It



is necessary to find a common measure for things which are in themselves incommensurable but become commensurable only with a view to one thing which they have in common. They are objects of needs. On this basis: the basis of exchange. And therefore whether a payment was just means did he pay the right price and this is invariably a kind of number. Even if, as Aristotle points out at the end of the chapter -- when there was not yet money there was still a numerical relation: one house, five beds, for example. They must have been very poor houses and very elegant beds.

Q: I'm not sure that I understand the mechanism that's operating here. Is he saying that justice in this sense requires something like what you might call today a free market mechanism?

S: No! That is a very great difficulty; but Aristotle speaks here of what came to be called later on the just price, the just price. The market price is as such not the just price, but Aristotle does not develop it. Thomas, in his commentary on the passage, says that the just price is determined by labor and expense. I mean, much more labor is needed for building a house and much more material is needed (expense) than for making a bed. Is it not clear? So there is a kind of intrinsic relation between the worth of the things to be exchanged. The exchange is just if the just price is paid and the just price is exactly not the one produced by the market. But Aristotle does not speak explicitly of the just price. That's of some importance.

Q: That poses the question of the thing you hear about a truck driver and a school teacher. There may be more need for a truck driver --

S: Yes, because you also have to consider the danger of being murdered on the road and the very small danger of being murdered in a classroom. Yes, this has also to do with it.

Q: And yet how would you argue from this, then, that the teacher should get more remuneration than the truck driver?

S: Yes, well, they get much less remuneration and I believe one reason is because it is much more dangerous to be a truck driver than to be a teacher. It is not universally true, I know. But in most places, I would say. For example, I have never heard of any assault on a teacher in the University of Chicago in a classroom. Outside? That's another story. Well, why does a physician get more money than a shoemaker, ordinarily? I think one has to take into consideration, as we all do, -- Aristotle doesn't develop it -- that it requires much more expense to become a physician than to become a shoemaker. And therefore this is also taken into consideration. Now what is so striking in this section is, in the first place, one thing: here, regarding commutative justice, the question why it is good is answered by Aristotle. It is obviously necessary for any higher society to have exchange; to have division of labor and therefore to have exchange. And exchange is not possible if there is not fair exchange, because those who are habitually defrauded will not produce. So here the question of the end and purpose of this particular virtue is made massively clear. It is also important that commutative justice does not come fully into its own except through money. These are underdeveloped forms, the barter. Money means nomos, something which is established by the polis and depends entirely on it, as he has stated. But the difficulty -- and this I think is a subject for which I wish we had Mr. Cropsey here because, as you know, he is not only an economist but also a student of the history of economic thought. This was, of course, one of the gravest issues and affecting everyday life in every point in the modern

centuries when modern economics emerged with its rejection of the notion of the just price, of an intrinsic just price, and the just price is simply that which is produced by the market, supply and demand. There is no moral criterion, whereas here Aristotle seems to imply it and Thomas Aquinas clearly states it. The question can perhaps be stated as follows: how is commutative justice affected by compulsion? We have seen that when people act under compulsion they may decently do things which they otherwise may not do; (the example of Aristotle: the family of a man is in the hands of a tyrant; is the man obliged to disobey the tyrant which means, in practical terms, to be responsible for the torturing and killing of his nearest and dearest, a grave question). You know, and the question is are there any actions which may not be done under this kind of compulsion: this question to which Aristotle does not give an answer, or rather only an ambiguous answer. Now for example, the famous case: bad harvests or epidemics -- the need for physicians. If the physicians raise their demands because they have to be up the whole day and night and everyone needs them; everyone is willing to pay any price in order to get the physicians. Similarly in the case of bad harvests and a famine situation where everyone is willing to pay any price in order to get the minimum of food he and his family need. And this was traditionally regarded as an atrocious act: to exploit such compulsory situations. That was underlying this idea of the just price, and therefore the notion of maximum prices as something to be established by the government and a requirement of justice. And then the opposite view is, of course, the only safe and possible thing is to leave everything to the mechanism of the market. That's the opposite view. I cannot give you a discussion of that because I simply do not know enough of it, but this was a crucial thing in the development of the modern economics; you know, that there is a sphere of a self-regulating market and morality cannot enter in any way except in this purely accidental thing: that you can have laws against dilution of food and this kind of thing, in other words preventing fraud. This, of course, is possible but not beyond that. Yes, Miss Huckins?

Q: I'm sorry but I forgot what you said a little while ago. Would you explain again to what extent money can be said to be a measure of artifacts as much as nature is a measure of natural things?

S: Well, take the simple thing -- I suppose if you take a pencil it is not difficult to know or to find out how much it costs. Let us say ten cents; (I haven't bought a pencil in a long time); or five cents. And what would such a table cost? What would such a building cost? All things have some prices which vary from situation to situation, but in every situation there is a reasonable clarity about the range of the prices for any kind of object. Now this means that all things have become commensurable, all things of this kind. Aristotle reminds us of exceptions. For example, if you had an heirloom this is, in a way, priceless because it has its value for you and for no one else. Therefore, it cannot be expressed in monetary terms. But all other things which are in themselves equally usable by everybody else have these prices in money. Money is this equalizer. What's the difficulty here?

Q: Can it be said to be a standard for the worth of things? For example, if they are needed then this is worth. Aristotle also says that nature makes nothing in vain. . . . You can turn it around and say that everything that is is necessary.

S: Thomas, in his commentary, makes a remark, a wise remark, that a little mouse is of much greater dignity and in this sense worth than a barrel of gold, because a mouse is a living being and the gold is inanimate, but you know quite

well what the worth of a mouse in value, in monetary terms, is: zero and probably less than zero. So you cannot start from that. The starting point is human need. Men don't need mice. They do need, indirectly and even directly, gold; for example, for ornaments, for adorning themselves and further . So we must start from human need and not from any broader consideration which is wholly irrelevant as far as human exchange is concerned. In other words, qua exchangers we are not metaphysicians who look at things from the point of view of their rank in the order of beings. That's impossible. But we look at them from their value with a view to our needs alone. Yes, of course, you can say the greatest need is for air because we cannot live without it for a single day, and air is the least expensive thing in the world because there is so much of it, and therefore the further consideration is not only need but also scarcity, the other consideration which, in the economic doctrine, has developed from the days of Aristotle on and certain important modifications in modern times. I mean, what is the precise difficulty which you have?

Q: If you start with need, is money in its best use an intrinsic measure or standard for artifacts the way nature is a standard of the natural things?

S: Yes, this cannot be done. I mean, the most wonderful work of art, if it does not find any interested buyers -- you must have heard something about what people paid for some now famous paintings, say 50 years ago when these painters were still unknown and not yet accepted. You know this kind of thing. That has nothing to do with the intrinsic worth. It has to do with the need or, if you want to say, with the demand; and that is, of course, absolutely necessary because we are not speaking here about anything except the justice in exchange. I mean, the discussions of Marx, for example, in the Kapital: they all are connected with this, with the question of what is just. For example, what is just in the case of wages? Does the laborer get his fair wages? In which way is this to be determined, merely by supply and demand? This could conceivably mean if there is a great over-supply of workers and you can have them for the bare minimum, the lowest subsistence level; this is a fair wage. Or must it take other things into consideration? You know, the great fights regarding social policy in the 19th and 20th centuries. The fair price and the fair wage: these are the key concepts belonging to commutative justice as Aristotle understands it and Aristotle surely did not mean that this is to be established by a simple mechanism. The great fight which took place in England around 1640 between the Old Regime, Charles I, Archbishop Lord, on the one hand, and the Long Parliament, had very much to do with this issue. The parliament was opposed to the constant interference of the Old Regime of Charles and Archbishop Lord with economics and the Long Parliament didn't want to have anything of this kind. That was a great issue. This is clearly and beautifully described in Froude's History of England in the introduction, introductory part. This was the issue. And Tawney in his Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. But, of course, one must not merely assume that Aristotle's view regarding justice in exchange is identical with that of the Christian tradition. I mean, that would need a careful study. Aristotle doesn't say anything about just prices or just wages, of course. I mean, how could there be just wages if there is slavery? No, this we will take up next time, what you discussed in your paper at the beginning: that there cannot be justice proper between the master and the slave or, for that matter, between the father and the children, which doesn't mean, of course, that a master or a father cannot be unjust. Obviously he can, but in a very limited way. If a father takes away money which his child has in a piggy bank he does not rob or steal. He has a right to do it. In the case of a fellow citizen it is theft or robbery, whatever the case may be. The same applies to the slaves. The slave has no property of his own. It doesn't mean that there are no relations, but they are very limited relations.



I will explain it next time.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Did you say Hume's history?

S: Froude. No, no, Hume was -- had no questions about economics, but Froude -- F-r-o-u-d-e.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Who did you say wrote Religion and the Rise of Capitalism?

S: That's Tawney. Tawney, T-a-w-n-e-y. When he discusses the issue of the civil war he speaks of that too. But Froude states it in more detail, this point, than Tawney does. Yes?

Q<sub>4</sub>: I have a more general question. We were speaking earlier of the relation between moral virtue and the polis and you said that it seems that if there were a best regime these two things would be identical, but that it is no accident that the best regime cannot come about.

S: Yes, then we go a bit about Aristotle because Aristotle does never say it cannot come about. All right. Yes, for clarity's sake. Well, if it cannot be then, of course, universal justice will inevitably occupy a lower rank because universal justice will then obey very imperfect laws and this is something much lower than, as Aristotle puts it, to be a law unto oneself in the right manner. To follow the law of reason: let us put it this way -- would then be higher than to be merely obedient to the imperfect laws of society. Would it not?

Q<sub>4</sub>: Isn't it also important that Aristotle doesn't say this. In other words, are there any grounds on which one could say definitely this is no answer?

S: What is no answer?

Q<sub>1</sub>: That the two cannot coincide, do not coincide. It's not accidental that they don't coincide; they cannot coincide.

S: Yes, but this leads, of course, then, to a depreciation of the polis. Doesn't it? And this, however -- Aristotle will do that toward the end of the Ethics. But the point is this is a very grave thing, to depreciate the polis, and Aristotle therefore waits with it, so to speak, until the last moment. It is good for us to act on the premise that the polis can be good because all improvements, all political interest, is based on that.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Yes, but doesn't it go beyond depreciating the polis since our chance to gain any sort of insight into moral virtue depends on the polis?

S: In order to understand the classics one must always contrast them with the modern solutions. The modern solutions are much more simple, theoretically, and simply say that political society has no other function but to guarantee, say, peace (Hobbes' view), self-preservation, or in the highest case -- not in the highest case, only enlarged -- comfortable self-preservation. And all concern with the morality of the citizens is none of the state's business. That is the modern solution. But you can see, this also leads to very great difficulties, this simple solution, because you cannot have any civil society which is worth being called a civil society in which you do not have some of the virtues, surely, in which you do not have a considerable degree of public spiritedness generally. So the virtues come in willy nilly and then you are confronted with the

question, should you regard the virtues only as means in the service of comfortable self-preservation or is this not an injustice done to the virtues, to look at them only from this point of view? This is the point and if you take this into consideration you see that Plato and Aristotle's position was broader, more encompassing, than the modern view is. You know that there are so many difficulties and loose ends and what have you in Aristotle's teaching is undeniable, but the justification for that is exactly the breadth of the consideration. Aristotle gives the polis the greatest chance to be a perfect human society. He is aware of the practical impossibility of its being a perfect human society, but it will never be as good as it can be if the maximum of what it, as it were, tends to be or wishes to be is not clearly visualized. That is, I think, the justification. Mr. McAtee.

Q<sub>5</sub>: To return to the question which you took up at the beginning: the way in which virtue reproduces itself as both the end and the form. Do I state it correctly?

S: No, well, I didn't say it reproduces itself, but the form is the end. Yes. In other words, this is also something easy to understand. To raise the question, why should I be decent, is already being indecent. Therefore, from this point of view it is very easy to say that you cannot raise the question. That is a strong point in Kant's position; Kant, who made this, I believe, clearer than any other man. It was, indeed, easy for Kant, you can say, to do it because the competitor of moral virtue was from the very beginning theoretical perfection. By destroying the possibility of theoretical perfection, by allegedly proving the impossibility of speculative metaphysics, Kant destroyed the competitor of moral virtue. Is this not clear? I mean, is this point clear: that, to use a simple term, if metaphysics is impossible, if knowledge of the thing in itself, as Kant puts it, is impossible, if knowledge of the soul as it is in itself is impossible, then theoretical knowledge can have only a very low rank. It can only be knowledge of the phenomena, as Kant puts it, and then moral virtue necessarily is higher in rank than theoretical perfection.

Q<sub>5</sub>: I tried to answer this on the basis, though, not of the theoretical virtues but just of the moral virtues and the total thing I came up with was this: that I thought about a man, a very decent man, a magnanimous man, who, for example, was walking around in the court yard and then very young men see him and they admire his dignity and the way that he is and they somehow imitate him, his looks and somehow his virtue --

S: Yes, but if it were his intention to act as a model then he would not --

Q<sub>5</sub>: Inaudible. No, then we see the great absurdity that the virtue of everyone is to serve as a guide for the virtue of everybody else. So everyone is there for somebody else and no one is there for himself. This leads to absurdities.

Q<sub>5</sub>: No, but I mean, isn't it true that the fact that he is virtuous is at the same time for himself and that it is -- and this makes it worthy of being imitated?

S: Yes, sure. All right, but if you develop that it will come back to the same problem --

Q<sub>5</sub>: In other words, is there any eros involved?

S: Well, that is not an Aristotelian question. It's difficult enough to understand Aristotle as he is. Let us not bring in something of which he hasn't spoken. But what you say amounts to this: is not magnanimity, then, because it is concerned with the perfection of the individual as such inferior to justice as universal justice? Of course it is inferior, as Aristotle says. But then the difficulty arises: this universal justice is part of the social order. It presupposes the social order. It presupposes the laws. The dignity of universal justice depends on the quality of the laws which it obeys, and then you get into the whole difficulty into which you do not get in the case of a magnanimous man because a magnanimous man is guided by the law in himself and not by the civil law, except accidentally. If there is an aristei politea, a best regime, if it is in existence, then of course the status of justice is definitely higher than that of magnanimity. But if civil society is always imperfect, if it is never the aristei politea, then the status of the individuals rises accordingly. Is it not clear? And simply speaking one can state Aristotle's view as follows: I have seen a number of excellent men, Plato, for example, and some others; I have not seen many excellent cities. As a matter of fact, I haven't seen a single excellent city. Now this can be an accident: it was so hitherto but in the future it might come. Aristotle, I think, shows you, when you study the Politics carefully, that it is not an accident, that the problem which the city has to fulfill is of such a complexity that the chances of its being excellent are extremely small. This doesn't mean that there is not an important difference between a less imperfect and a most imperfect polis. That's terribly important. But still, the decisive question: is the level which the individual can reach not higher than the level which a society can reach? And I believe the answer is, both of Plato and Aristotle, the individual can reach a higher rank and therefore the rank of magnanimity will be higher than that of universal justice; because universal justice is that highest thing only in the case if the laws are all wise and this requires that the legislator, the sovereign, is wise, and this is not to be expected. I mean, relative wisdom, yes, but nothing more than that; not simple wisdom.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Something that only occurred to me when you read it that I wanted to ask you about is the temples of the graces. He says that we establish these statues because we want to show that one should return kindness. That is, equanimity of a kind.

S: Equanimity? Oh no. Equanimity means to have an equal mind whether the going is good or the going is bad.

Q<sub>5</sub>: I stated it badly. My point was simply this: that if we should return kindnesses what do we do in the case of unkindnesses?

S: Yes, Aristotle says so: most people say hit back. But Aristotle says much less about hitting back than about giving back because he is a nice man, because he likes the graces.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Isn't this simply a special case of the old story, helping friends and harming enemies?

S: Sure, but with the emphasis on helping friends and deemphasis on hurting enemies.

Q<sub>5</sub>: So it is definitely a political virtue.

S: Well, in a way all virtues are political. In a way: because man is a social animal, but there is still the difference whether the concern is primarily with the polis or primarily with the perfection of the individual.



11th Meeting: May 16, 1963

. . . . Now you thought almost constantly of Plato's Republic and in one respect that is very good because surely Aristotle knew it and has pondered over it, but on the other hand it is very hard to find direct connections between the particular teachings of the fifth book and those of the Republic. The most striking difference would seem to be, as you stated at the beginning, that the key question in the Republic is, is justice good. Now you said that contrary to appearance Aristotle does take up this question. And where?

O: Well, I said that contrary to appearance he does take up the question of the nature of justice.

S: Yes, sure. Yes, but what about this question, is justice good, which, of course, cannot be answered if you do not know what justice is.

O: Well, that I felt he has to take up or at least in talking about justice he has shown that there are difficulties.

S: Yes, but can one not say that in the dark section of the fifth book he comes very close to taking up the question of whether justice is good, in the last page of it?

O: (As to whether Dr. Strauss means at the point where Aristotle discusses suicide.)

S: In the last chapter. Yes, in this connection: when he discusses suicide. Then he says, is doing injustice worse than suffering injustice or vice versa. That is the way in which Plato talks about justice.

I didn't quite understand what you meant by saying that Aristotle might have said that Thomas Aquinas, if he erred, erred harmlessly. What do you mean by that?

O: Well, I felt that you could use the doctrine of the moral virtues again: that the right would be the mean. There would be two ways of making mistakes. You could misinterpret Aristotle's teaching the way Thomas did, which would not create any harm. But on the other hand, by coming to some doctrine where anything goes --

S: Yes, sure. That one can surely say. I mean, very generally stated, both are on the side of the angels. That I believe is true.

You made another point, if I understood you correctly, that particular justice is natural justice, natural right, and universal justice is not natural right.

O: It would encompass it but it could also be more.

S: Yes, there is something to that. We will take it up. The last point which I would like to take up is this: justice is not a mean as the other virtues are means. This was a subject on which you dwelt for quite some time. How did you interpret it? You tried to solve this question by linking it up with the question of eros. This I didn't understand.

O: Well, I mean, it shows that a man cannot be treated unjustly because we must extend our definition, must we not, and say no one acts contrary to his wish. Then later on the translation uses the same word; wish, to say the incontinent man might do things against his wish. Therefore, there I interpret "wish" as meaning his idea of the good and "contrary to his wish" I interpret as being desire, want. No one suffers injustice unless he wants to. . . .

S: I believe the context is somewhat different. Let us see when we come to that. But let us take this undeniable fact: that Aristotle does not admit that justice is a virtue between two vices whereas all other virtues are between two vices. This is a difficult assertion. Now what is justice, very generally stated? And let us speak of particular justice. Now what does it mean? A man who does not want more than he deserves, more of goods and less of evils. And the man who wants less of the evils and more of the goods is what?

O: He is unjust.

S: And what about the man who wants to have less of the goods and more of the evils?

O: He doesn't exist.

S: Is this so certain? There is a real question here. Let us say the just man is the one who insists on his rights. The unjust man wants to have more than is his rights; and could there not be an excess, the man who does not insist on his rights at all or to a very mild degree?

O: Sure.

S: Yes. Who? There are two forms, at least, of it.

O: Well, the fellow who doesn't know any better.

S: Let us call him with a colloquial expression, the sucker. This is one way. This is one faulty extreme, which is not meant by Aristotle. But then there is something more noble than the sucker who also wouldn't insist on his rights.

O: Socrates.

S: Yes. A man who is not sufficiently concerned with wealth, honors, and the other goods which are exposed to other men. That could also be. That cannot be a vice, surely, and perhaps this is a question which one would have to consider because obviously justice presupposes that one attaches great value to those goods with which justice is concerned, the goods which are subject to interference by others.

O: Aristotle did mention that case when he says some men do seem to take less willingly but he says they really get more of another good.

S: Well, does Socrates not get more of another good?

O: Yes, he does. Therefore he is covered.

S: Yes, sure. Yes, but still it would not fall under justice proper because he does not enter the arena. Yes?

Q: Yes, I would agree that what Socrates does one would not consider to be a vice, but in some circumstances one might consider this sucker type. Take a Negro in the South who doesn't want to vote.

S: No, that would not be the sucker. The sucker would be a man -- because ~~re-~~curs to the Negro/ he simply would be unaware of what is involved, you know, and is too stupid -- but someone who knows quite well what it is about and simply says it is not worth the effort; there are higher things. Well, I believe what you wanted to say, Mr. Boyan, is this: he has to consider the others and he would be a man lacking public spiritedness. In other words, he would not merely defend his own rights. This can always look a bit petty: the concern with one's own rights. But if by standing up for one's own rights one stands up for what is simply right then it is different. Do you see? In other words, the sucker is one possibility. The other man, who is above the sphere, could be said to lack public spiritedness. That you should say from your point of view which is very well known to me. Mr. Reinkin.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I wanted to draw the distinction which might straighten out the matter of the excess corresponding to justice. The amount of things which Socrates takes can be measured as what he takes from exchanges of goods; that is, things which would be good for Socrates and good for Protagoras. And justice has to do with taking your fair share with respect to how much money per head. But there could be a vice of pusillanimity: not taking enough of the things that are good for you as you.

S: Yes; if it is pusillanimity then it is surely a vice, but if it is not pusillanimity, if it is due to a sober consideration that these are not things sufficiently worth it.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I was trying to show the parallel between magnanimity and justice. Magnanimity is taking what you are entitled to of the particular goods suitable to you as you and justice is taking what you are entitled to of the world's things.

S: Yes, but we have seen that there is a subtle shift in the magnanimous man from the man who demands these honors which he truly deserves to the man who is not concerned with honors because he knows his worth above all. You remember: the transition from Alcibiades to Socrates which takes place in the magnanimous man. There is a kind of magnanimity possible which does not claim these honors although, so to say, objectively knowing that he would deserve them; like Socrates, who says, well, you want to show me what I deserve; all right, give me the greatest honor which the city can give: give me that free feeding (whatever the proper expression) in the Prytaneum. But Socrates was never seriously concerned with having the greatest honor which the city of Athens could give. He only says if you want to do something to honor or punish me to give me what I deserve only the highest honor which you can give would be proper, for your sake. Socrates didn't want it. He only said, as it were, you want to act according to your notion of justice: please. Socrates didn't want to have it. Socrates had enough food which he liked without this formal honor by the city. Mr. Weissberger. Oh no, I'm sorry, Mr. Wenger.

Q<sub>3</sub>: This might be moving a little bit ahead. I wonder if <sup>the who</sup> man/does not demand his due even though worthy of highest honors would be equivalent to the man of divine virtue mentioned in Book VII?

S: Let us wait until we come there. Yes. Mr. McAtee.



Q<sub>3</sub>: This question of justice: that there is an extreme of injustice but not the opposite, which you may call the lack of justice. I think of a clear example which I think is close to the thing that Aristotle has in mind. Take the example of someone who is not intentionally just for the sake of justice, but someone who is in love.

S: Why is here justice involved? Do you mean friendship? Well, no, let us then wait until we come to friendship, to the book on friendship. Good.

Now first I would like to begin with this general remark. This section contains Aristotle's utterance on natural right, the sole utterance, because what he says about the subject in the Rhetoric is not Aristotle's doctrine of natural right but is the doctrine of how natural right is to be used in forensic rhetoric; interestingly enough, in forensic rhetoric, not in deliberative rhetoric. That's interesting. So when the question is war and peace or even legislation, deliberative rhetoric, the natural right does not enter. In forensic rhetoric it does. That is important. The Aristotelian teaching regarding natural right we have in this single page of the Ethics or in that single page of the Magna Moralia if the Magna Moralia are Aristotle's work. Mr. Butterworth.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Just one question before we start. I didn't catch the other extreme when you were talking about the sucker and the small souled man.

S: No. That's the same. I mean, the Socrates looks, in a way, like the sucker. He gets less and he gets always less; (beginning of the eighth book of the Republic where this is described in a very impressive scene, how the best regime decays.) Yes, but now I must really go on.

Q<sub>4</sub>: What is the other half of this? If there's a defect is there an excess?

S: Yes, this is my question. There is an obvious excess, or defect rather. The excess is injustice. There's one obvious defect; that's the sucker who doesn't know what he is doing. But the interesting defect is that of Socrates because that cannot possibly be called a vice. Now let us now turn to a coherent discussion and there will be no interruption for some time.

Well, this section on natural right, as I said, is one page and it is very difficult to understand and considering the enormous importance of the subject that's very strange. But this difficulty is not limited to the section on natural right. The whole second half of Book V is the most difficult section of the Ethics hitherto. I mean, we have had quite a few individual passages which were difficult but on the whole the structure and the plan was lucid. In this second half the plan becomes very obscure. Now the first half, we can say, ends at 1134a, 14 to 16. "Regarding justice and injustice, what the nature of each is, this may suffice. Also regarding the just and unjust in general." So we know now what justice is and what the just is and the opposites.

Now what subjects does he take up thereafter? Or rather, what are the main points which we must keep in mind for the rest? We have understood one thing: universal justice is the highest virtue. Universal justice means law abidingness. It is the highest virtue and it is based on the equation of the just and the legal, but the just and the legal are not simply equal. The just is only the legal in a way. Then we have learned about particular justice, commutative and distributive justice. Now the very distinction between particular justice and universal justice implies that particular justice is not legal, which doesn't mean it's illegal. It is natural. I mean, the relations of distributions -- you know,

these famous proportions -- these are intrinsically right relations and not dependent on law. This we must keep in mind. The clearest case of particular justice we had was that of exchange, of peaceful and voluntary exchange, this discussion where the purpose and usefulness of particular justice became perfectly clear. Men cannot live well if they do not exchange goods and services and men won't do that if there is not some fairness in the exchange. Now this, however, we must not forget: this kind of justice, the justice of exchange, while being very important, of course, is not something very high. No great subtlety is required for being just in this sense. Is this clear? I mean, to be an honest drug store man: that is not something terrifically difficult. It's much less difficult than to be brave on the battlefield. In extreme situations it may even be difficult -- that's true -- but only in extreme situations. Now what is the Platonic parallel to this kind of justice, the justice of exchange, of mere exchange of goods and services and nothing else added to it? Where is it discussed in the Republic, in Mr. Dry's source?

O: Book II.

S: Book II. But that's too general because there is so much in Book II.

O: In the first city?

S: Yes. How is that first city called?

O: The city of pigs.

S: The city of pigs. It is also called the true city; the true city: that is usually forgotten. City of pigs is said by Glaukon. The true city is said by Socrates. Now Socrates can be presumed to have been more competent than Glaukon was, especially since Glaukon makes a gross blunder: the city of pigs is in fact a city without pigs. Pigs come in only with the corruption of the city of pigs. So that's quite interesting. Good.

Now the other point we mentioned already before: that there is only one vice opposed to justice, not two. Now when we turn to this second half which begins in 1134a17, what is the key point here? Now the key point is one may act unjustly without being unjust. Well, let us read that.

O: But seeing that a man may commit injustice without actually being unjust, what is it that distinguishes those unjust acts the commission of which renders a man actually unjust under one of the various forms of injustice, for example, a thief or an adulterer or a brigand? Or shall we rather say that the distinction does not lie in the quality of the act? For a man may have intercourse with a woman knowing who she is, yet not from the motive of deliberate choice, but under the influence of passion; in such a case, though he has committed injustice, he is not an unjust man: for instance, he is not a thief, though guilty of theft, not an adulterer, though he has committed adultery, and so forth.

S: Yes. You see, that's an extraordinary assertion: where to draw the line. How often does he have to steal in order to be a thief? Yes, you see, and this is probably very hard: to answer this question in quantitative terms. The distinction between the just and the unjust man is obscured, but on the other hand it is undeniable that, say, a single unjust act does not make a man a simply unjust man. This is a crucial point. Now this doing injustice, the single unjust

act or the number of single unjust acts, rather than injustice, is the overall theme of the second half of the fifth book. What this means is for the time being not very clear. But Aristotle seems to drop that immediately, after a strange reference to one particular kind of justice which has been discussed in the first half: namely, the relation of the just to the antipeponthos. How is this translated?

O: Reciprocity.

S: Reciprocity. What this means is completely unclear for the time being. Let us leave this difficulty open. What does he then say? Then he makes a very emphatic sentence. "But it must not escape us that what we seek is both the simply just and the political just." Now it is intelligible to say the simply just and the politically just are the same. That's the way in which it is understood, for example, by Thomas Aquinas and, I believe, also by all modern commentators, as far as I could see. But I'm not so certain because he says "both." Maybe there is a distinction between the simply just and the politically just, but this we can leave open for the time being, and surely he will speak in the sequel of the political just. Now the political just is that justice which obtains among free and equal men, men who are independent of each other, fellow citizens. So what obtains within the family, say between the master and the slave or the father and the children, is sub-political because they are not independent. There cannot be any possibility of stealing, for example. Well; the child may steal from the father but the father cannot steal from the child, and similar considerations apply to master and slave. So, in other words, that is a rather undeveloped form of justice. Many things which are relevant among fellow citizens are irrelevant in this relation and therefore one can say full grown justice exists only among people who are independent of each other but live together in the same polis. Now there was some difficulty which you had.

Q: No, I just wondered if maybe this distinction was what was meant by justice without qualification. If political justice is the full grown justice, we consider just that and not the other parts.

S: No, no. It could be -- very simply, what I suspect is here implied is this -- is a society of free and equals and this can be a democracy or any other form of republican government, let us say, but what if actual kingship, as Aristotle says somewhere, is the best regime -- you know, superior to it. Now then, of course, this would be not political justice as defined but another one and that might be the simply just; say, the absolutely superior king ruling like a father his society. That might be higher. Now that may seem funny but I'm sorry, Aristotle says repeatedly that kingship, the right kind of kingship, is the best regime in the Ethics and in the Politics. But it would only unnecessarily obscure the issue. Let us forget about this subtlety, about what might be the difference between political justice and absolute justice, and let us concentrate on political justice. To repeat, for all practical purposes the highest form of justice is that obtaining among independent men living together as members of civil society. Obviously there are many more relations of justice among fellow citizens than among people who are not fellow citizens. Obviously. I mean, think of any question of election to office, this whole sphere; or fighting together in a battle, even in war, where they are all united. Now it is in this context that Aristotle takes up the question of natural right. Let us turn, then, to this passage: 1134b18. "Of the political right, one part is natural, the other part is legal, and natural is that which has everywhere the same force," which obtains everywhere, "and not by virtue of having been voted or not, but legal is that where, to begin with, it doesn't make any difference how you settle it but



once they have established it, it does make a difference." For example, right and left driving: that is in itself utterly irrelevant but once it is settled as a law it does make a difference. You go to jail when you do the wrong thing. Good. This distinction is perfectly clear; isn't it? A kind of justice which depends on human arrangements and a kind of justice which does not depend on human arrangements, which is intrinsically right -- intrinsically right or extrinsically right. This is perfectly intelligible, I believe. If not, I would like to hear that. I mean, take the extreme case of left driving and right driving contrasted with such a simple rule like first come, first served. Good. Yes?

Q: What does that mean? It's intrinsically right with the emphasis on right.

S: All right; it is always good when one raises such questions to think of negative cases where it is massively clear. Think of a law which would say everyone whose family name begins with the letters "A" to "C" does not have to pay taxes. Everyone would say that is an unfair law because the beginning of the family name has no possible relation to the requirements of civil society; and, in addition, it is so complicated. You would have to have a rider: no family names can henceforth be changed, because there would be a big flight of all the Browns and so on to other things. But the key point is what Aristotle says is in itself clear, but no examples. Now he gives two examples of merely legal right: that one should ransom people for one mina (which is some Greek coin) and that one should sacrifice a goat but not two sheep. Good. Everyone would agree that this is not intrinsically wrong. To ransom them for half a mina or for two minae wouldn't make any difference and also it would not make any difference whether you sacrifice two sheep or a single goat or one sheep and two goats and so on and so on. At least from the point of view of natural reason it wouldn't make any difference. But still, these are examples of legal right. But what of natural right? I believe what we have to do is to generalize from that. To ransom a prisoner for this and this amount: that is legal. But what about the duty to ransom prisoners? Or more generally stated, is it not right that the polis compensates the members who have suffered in the service of the polis more than others? Is it not fair that they be compensated by the polis? And I think everyone would say yes. If you can help it, why should these fellows stay in Korea -- wherever it was -- for the end of their days as household slaves or working in quarries? You know, this kind of thing happened. Is it not the duty of the polis to compensate them? I mean, if they were traitors, no. But if they were bona fide prisoners of war, sure it's fair to do that. Or also -- now the second case: that is more unfamiliar to us but easy to understand from any earlier point of view. There must be sacrifices to the gods; or still more generally, worship of the gods is by natural right. How to worship them: this depends on positive law, whether of the city or of the Oracle of Delphi it doesn't make any difference because that is, of course, also positive law, what the priestess in Delphi would say. Is this clear? And we can enlarge on that and then we arrive at the notion: natural right is that right without which no polis is possible. Yes? Good. Now let us go on. Yes, and then he gives, then, other examples. For example, special laws, private laws: to sacrifice to Brasidas, as some cities in northern Greece did. (Brasidas was a famous Spartan commander). That's, of course, clearly not natural right. They might have decided not to worship him but only put up a monument to him or what. It would have been perfectly sufficient. And the decrees. Decrees are the individual decisions as distinguished from laws; for example, to wage war or on the basis of a law this man will go to jail. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: This conception of natural right depends on the existence of human beings.

S: Yes, sure. This was no difficulty for Aristotle because he believed in the eternity of the visible universe, and therefore in the eternity of the human species. If there is no eternity then there arises something like the difficulty which you mention. Good. Do you have it, Mr. Reinkin?

O: Some people think that all rules of justice are merely. . . .

S: Yes, "rules of justice," is, of course, a word which never occurs: "that all just things. . . ." Yes?

O: . . . think that all just things are merely conventional, because whereas a law of nature is immutable and has the same validity everywhere. . . .

S: Yes, "what is by nature right." I mean, law never occurs here. Yes, "is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force," as he had said before.

O: . . . same force, as, for instance, a fire burns both here and in Persia, the just things are seen to vary.

S: You see this example: fire burns in Greece as well as in Persia because this is a natural quality of the fire. But if you look, say, at the inheritance laws of Greece and of Persia -- I have never looked at them but I suppose you would find quite a few differences. Why? Because it is not natural that inheritance should be regulated in this way or in that way. That depends on the opinion of the Greeks, on the one hand, and the Persians, on the other. And the just things they see are changed, meaning everywhere. Yes.

O: That the just things vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among the gods indeed it is perhaps not true at all; but in our world, although there is such a thing as natural justice, all the just things are variable. But nevertheless there is such a thing as natural justice as well as justice not ordained by nature; and it is easy to see which just things, though not absolute, are natural, and which are not natural but legal and conventional, both sorts alike being variable. The same distinction will hold good. . . .

S: Yes, now do you see? What is the distinction? I mean, changeable is characteristic of both but if the changeable in question owes its justice to nature then it is natural. If it owes its nature to human legislation, human fiat, then it is legal. More simply stated, there are two differences between the natural and the legal which are generally adduced. The first is unchangeability and the second is dependence on human fiat or not on human fiat. Unchangeability is dropped but depending or not depending on human fiat is retained. Good. Yes, now the next sentence.

O: The same distinction will hold good in all other matters; for instance, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it is possible for all men to be born ambidextrous.

S: No, to become.

O: To become? I thought genesthai was --

S: No; no; genesthai is become, become. Now everyone is born, according to Aristotle, with some exceptions, right handed in some ways but everyone can become ambidextrous. Now let us stop here, considering only this last example. By

nature all men are right handed, or most of them. By human doings all men can become ambidextrous. Now to be ambidextrous -- I believe that's the premise here -- is a better condition than to be only right handed. Plato developed that at length; Aristotle I do not remember. Now ambidexterity is not natural but superior to the natural. Now if we apply this to the natural right question then positive right, the right kind of positive right, is superior to natural right, and this makes sense in connection with what preceded. Aristotle gave examples of legal right and these examples permit us to figure out what he understood by natural right: as I said, those things which every polis must do in order to be a polis, worshipping the gods, compensating citizens for what they did in the service of the polis and so on. Let us call that the minimum conditions of civil society. Natural right describes the, in themselves unchangeable, minimum conditions. In themselves: I come to that later. Now this view I know from Islamic and Jewish interpretations. It does not occur, as far as I know, in the Christian tradition except in Marcellinus of Padua. Marcellinus of Padua's Defender of the Peace has also this view, but he doesn't call it natural right for some reasons. So this is a possible view. Now the Platonic parallel to that is to be found in the first book of the Republic, toward the second half. There are certain minimum conditions which every human association must fulfill. To some extent every human association must be just if it is to last. And now comes the horrible example: the thieves. A bunch of thieves cannot last if they do not exercise some fairness among themselves in the sharing of the booty and also the kind of distributive justice: he who did more, ran greater risks, gets more, and especially he who has proved to be the cleverest and bravest must be the ruler. Now this is, of course, in a way very shocking but we have to consider all kinds of phenomena to understand it. This is, you can say, the minimum condition of any society, however low. This is natural. You know, this doesn't depend on any human establishment: the nature of the case, the nature of society, requires that.

Now why is it changeable, nevertheless? Well, because there may be situations in which the preservation of this thing may be detrimental to society, extreme situations. I think this is in itself a consistent possibility. By the way, on a much more simple level you find it in the Roman law assertion that natural right is that which nature taught all animals and all other right is positive. Now this view does not go so far because this has in mind a human right, a right of human society, but it has, of course, a certain kinship with that. Mr. Berman.

Q: Are you saying that positive right improves on natural right only in extreme conditions?

S: No, no. From this point of view the positive right would always be -- I mean, not always -- the positive right would be in principle an improvement, a sophistication of the natural right.

Q: But that improvement only occurs in extreme situations.

S: No, no, not necessarily. I mean, a civil society is radically distinguished from a gang of robbers. Take the clearest case. Now a positive law of a civil society, by acting on this difference between civil society and a gang of robbers, improves on the natural right. Is this not clear? Or was the sentence too long? If natural right determines the minimum conditions of social life then everything which goes beyond the minimum conditions in the way of improving man is an improvement of natural right.

Q: Does that mean there's no natural right with regard to inheritance laws?



S: Yes, well, I mean, there are really great questions. You know the famous fights about primogeniture and equal division of the inheritance, that the youngest should inherit. These are three possibilities which are well known immediately, but there are many more. You can also have confiscation, i.e. denial of inheritance as you have in some countries now, at least apart from a certain amount of property.

Q: Doesn't natural right eliminate that situation? I mean, to the extent that inheritance laws depend on the regime and Aristotle says one regime is better than another.

S: Yes, this is what Aristotle says in the sequel, in 1135a3. "Similarly, the not natural but human," say, principles of rights, "are not the same everywhere since not even the regimes are the same everywhere." Which kind of inheritance law or maybe no inheritance law at all depends on the regime, as everyone would admit. Yes? Good. But then Aristotle goes on: "but nevertheless there is one regime alone everywhere according to nature the best." He does not say everywhere the justest because it is not everywhere the justest. It is the justest only where the conditions are fulfilled.

Q: (Inaudible.)

S: Let me put it this way. The order of the regimes with a view to human virtue which Aristotle develops in the Politics and in the Ethics: this is not the question of natural right now because this is not a question of right, strictly understood. This is a question of what is good. I mean, if people establish in a given situation an oligarchy or a democracy in a polis this is not necessarily a question of right, surely not of natural right.

Q: It is giving every man his due though.

S: Yes, but that is controversial. The oligarchs say to give every man his due means to give everyone his due with a view to his wealth and the democrats say giving everyone his due means with a view to the fact that he is a free man, and these are surely very conflicting notions of right and Aristotle says they are both insufficient, both inadequate. Therefore, when you establish a democracy or an oligarchy you choose something imperfect and there is no intrinsic necessity to do it. The necessity arises from the fact that in this particular community the wealthy people are so strong and so very entrenched in power and have ruled to the satisfaction of the poor. Leave that alone. In another city the same might apply to a democracy. Now you can say, well, there is one which is intrinsically, simply, just: the rule of the virtuous men, the aristocracy proper. Yes, well then we have to go into the question, is it right in the sense of a duty to establish everywhere an aristocracy. Of course not, because in many cases the conditions are not fulfilled. Then you come into the whole political problem which, to some extent, is avoided here; to some extent. Rabbi Weiss.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Where the conditions could be fulfilled would it be true that the positive laws of the best regime would be always the same?

S: How could they? How could they? They would, of course, have to be changed.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Because of conditions?

S: Yes, sure, the conditions change. For example, there may be anything. For example, inheritance laws. They may have worked up to now reasonably well, but

then there is an abundance of heiresses because of many wars where many men fell, and this Aristotle discusses in the second book of the Politics when he speaks of Sparta, where that happened. Therefore, there was a kind of gynocracy because these heiresses had an enormous power, naturally, because they were -- well, I don't have to labor that. Good. And therefore in such a situation it might be necessary -- you are confronted with the question, should the daughters inherit or should not rather some other regulation be made regarding inheritance, regarding the possession of these lots with a view to this situation: to have always a sufficient supply of soldiers and also of members of the assembly and this kind of thing; any kind of changes of laws. Well, the notion of Plato and Aristotle that one should not change laws easily and one should be very cautious in changing in no way contradicts the undeniable fact that change of laws is necessary from time to time. The laws do not fulfill their function anymore and must be changed. Mr. Butterworth.

Q<sub>3</sub>: In your reply to Mr. Burnham you were saying that whatever goes beyond these basic conditions that are found in natural right would improve natural right --

S: Not whatever; it may also be a foolish law which is worse.

Q<sub>3</sub>: On what grounds would that decision be made as to whether it were foolish or not foolish?

S: Well, very simply, taking it very strictly as I stated it: that the minimum conditions of society are those which apply even to a gang of robbers. A civil society is not a gang of robbers. The "x" which distinguishes a civil society from a gang of robbers: let us call that virtue, if you don't mind. Then the improvement: the laws are the better the more they contribute toward making the citizens virtuous. Now one could say even the lowest regime comes closer to this highest requirement than the gang of robbers. That is surely the case but not enough. I would like to mention one point only in connection with these minimum conditions or let me call it the flooring as distinguished from the ceiling. Now we have seen another flooring of Aristotle apart from what I call the minimum conditions and these are what he said in the section about retribution, the conditions of peaceful exchange, commutative justice in the narrow sense, which I compared to the first city or the city of pigs in the Republic. You see, the city of pigs is not the gang of robbers because the gang of robbers lives unjustly on others whereas the first city, the true city or the city of pigs, is a just society. Therefore this flooring is not identical with the one I mentioned first. This I believe explains, and that is a subtlety, the reference in 1134a, 24 to 25. That's the only way in which I can understand that -- /changes the citation/ -- 23 to 24. Why should he make this reference here to this question of the relation -- how does he translate it? Read it, whoever has it.

O: It was previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the just.

S: Yes. It doesn't make any sense, this casual reference, if it has not something to do with that. That's the best I can think of at least. Mr. Schrock.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Wouldn't it be a compulsion of natural right to achieve the best regime possible in the circumstances. In other words, is the city of pigs just if something better is possible. . . .

S: Is this an obligation of justice strictly understood? /Tape broke -- about a sentence or two lost./ But he denies that this can be called justice or injustice in the proper sense of the term. That is a metaphoric use of justice, as

he says, which should be kept separate if we try to understand justice as such. That's the reason why this question comes up. Not metaphorical: that is always what Aristotle has in mind. Let us speak precisely; let us be empirical. That is Aristotle's point all the time. Of course Plato agrees, but one cannot call this justice. Justice is always what you owe to someone else, including, of course, to the polis, but this does not belong to that. So you see how relevant it was. Now how does he go on from here? Let us turn to 1135a, the immediate sequel. "Of the just and legal things" -- let us disregard the difference between natural just and legal just -- "each of that is related like the universal to the individual cases." Now that's extremely simple to understand. Isn't it? If theft is unjust (that's a universal), this act of theft is an individual to be subsumed under it. Good. Yes?

O: Begins at the wrong place.

S: No, before. "For the deeds," the things done, "are many, but of those each is one because it is a universal." The acts of theft are innumerable, but theft is one, as is proven by the fact that you call all these acts of theft. Yes?

O: There is a difference between that which is unjust and unjust conduct, and between that which is just and just conduct. Nature or ordinance pronounces a thing unjust: when that thing is done, it is unjust conduct; till it is done, it is only unjust.

S: It is not an unjust act, in other words. I mean, theft is in itself unjust, let us say. But it is clearly not an unjust act if you have not committed theft. Now let us go on to -- in the sequel he makes again clear, in a17, a key point for the whole argument: acting unjustly is necessarily a voluntary act. Well, we know that already from the second book -- or third book. I mean, if we are compelled to act in a certain manner either by ignorance or by compulsion proper then we are not responsible for it. The thing itself is bad, is unjust. If you are compelled by a tyrant who has your family under control to do something which is forbidden you do a forbidden thing. The thing in itself is unjust, but your action is not unjust if the assumption is right that this was a compulsion beyond human power. Good. Now in 1135b16 go on.

O: When then the injury happens contrary to reasonable expectations it is a misadventure.

S: I think that is clear perfectly. To give a simple example: well, you live in the country somewhere far from the city. All the members of your family are in and there is no one coming to you except the postman and the milkman in the morning and you throw something out of the window and it so happened that at this moment someone comes in, which never happens, then it is a misfortune. You have not committed a crime. You have not committed an unjust act. This is clear. Yes?

O: When, though not contrary to reasonable expectation, it is done without evil intent, it is a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's ignorance lies in oneself, but only a misadventure when the cause lies outside oneself. When an injury is done knowingly but not deliberately, it is an act of injustice or wrong; such, for instance, are injuries done through anger, or any other unavoidable or natural passion. . . .

S: "And other passions." He doesn't say that. Let us stick to that. So we



have this case mentioned before, that I hate to bring up but I must, of the man who commits adultery out of passion. He doesn't do it out of anger. That he has in mind. He does this and yet it is a forbidden act. It is a wrong act. But he is not guilty, strictly speaking. (Oh I'm sorry, you are right. He was right. In the sequel: "and other passions which happen. . . ." How did you translate that?

O: . . . or any other unavoidable or natural passion. . . .

S: Yes, all right.) But you must admit, that goes very far. That covers a large ground. Doesn't it? Every overpowering passion, we can say. That covers a large territory, as they say. Yes?

303 O: . . . to which men are liable; since in committing these injuries and errors a man acts unjustly, and his action is an act of injustice, but he is not ipso facto unjust or wicked, for the injury was not done out of wickedness. When however an injury is done from choice, the doer is unjust and wicked. Hence acts due to sudden anger are rightly held not to be done of malice aforethought, for it is the man who gave the provocation that began it, not he who does the deed in a fit of passion.

S: Now let us stop here. So let us keep this in mind, this key distinction which is so important for the rest, that acting unjustly is not the same as being unjust and the difficulty is only where to draw the line. I mean, we cannot lay down a hard and fast rule. (If it happens once then he is not an unjust man but if it happens more than once then he becomes an unjust man.) It is not so simple as that; so if there can be many such acts without making him unjust, where to draw the line, because at some point, of course, a line would have to be drawn; because even if you say, well, he does it in each case out of overpowering passion and not of set purpose or malice aforethought, that won't be sufficient for any practical purpose.

Q: Couldn't he be a just man if he gives into his passion frequently without being a virtuous man?

S: Yes, Aristotle says he is. In the earlier passage we read last time he speaks explicitly of the virtuous man who committed adultery.

Q: I'm thinking of the opposite case where a man habitually gives in to his passion. He doesn't have self-control.

S: But Aristotle thinks of such a case. You see, let us say, well, if we take this example, he is not a profligate man but in the particular case he is so strongly in love that it is impossible for him to withstand that. That is what he means. Humanly speaking, impossible: that he has in mind.

Q<sub>2</sub>: But that would be sense of shame, wouldn't it?

S: Yes, but this is a difficulty which we have seen and I must say the more I think about the fifth book the more I believe that this remark about the man who does not have a sense of shame because he never does anything wrong, at the end of the fourth book, is, as it were, planted there to remind us of the grave difficulty which he will bring up in Book V, namely that such a man who never does any wrong doesn't exist. I do not know, but it is surely striking that it occurs there and then we get this great surprise suddenly of the virtuous man who commits adultery, steals, and so on and so on. He only gives us some hint in the

case of adultery: he says by pathos, by passion. He does not give us any hint regarding theft, because clearly if he would steal because he is starving no one would call this theft. I mean, this we cannot think of. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: I wonder if we would understand this distinction correctly by putting it in terms of the distinction between act and what we would call habit or disposition?

S: Yes, yes. Yes, that's correct. I mean, if you take the isolated act; the isolated bad act is compatible with a good habit, as far as justice is concerned. That is what he means.

Q<sub>4</sub>: But an isolated bad act done by choice is always unjust.

S: Yes, yes; sure. Nevertheless, think of it in practical legal terms. If you are to judge of that you see that is not too helpful. Now in order to understand that I suggest this consideration -- I mean, also the context. If all natural right is changeable then the just, what is just, is to some extent indistinguishable from the unjust. Does this make sense? The things do not come, as it were, with a label on themselves: "I am just," "I'm unjust." If the natural just were unchangeable then it would be clear in all cases, but since what is just is changeable that means that some things which under some conditions are unjust are under others just. The just is, to some extent, indistinguishable from the unjust. What is coming now out is a parallel to that: that the just man is not as easily distinguishable from the unjust man as we would like it. He will take up this later on, explicitly. We come to that. In other words, if we could say, well, he stole: an unjust man. He committed adultery, and so on. This man who never committed any unjust act is a just man. It is not so simple. This is what Aristotle is bringing out in this context. Now the range of acting unjustly is limited if the inflictor of the damage does not act voluntarily. Is this clear? If he is -- well; the crude case of completely ignorant or complete compulsion, but even passion, overpowering passion, makes the action involuntary. And now Aristotle goes over to another consideration: the range of acting unjustly is limited, secondly, because the damaged party might will the damage. Now let us turn to that in 1136 -- where is that? -- a10. Oh yes, a new chapter.

O: But it may perhaps be doubted whether our discussion of suffering and doing injustice has been sufficiently definite; and in the first place, whether the matter really is as Euripides has put it in the strange lines, "I killed my mother -- that's the tale in brief!" "Were you both willing, or unwilling both?"

S: In other words, if the son killed the mother at the request of the mother is this still an unjust act? That's the question. Now let us go on.

O: Is it really possible to suffer injustice voluntarily, or on the contrary is suffering injustice always involuntary, just as acting unjustly is always voluntary? And again, is suffering injustice always voluntary, or always involuntary, or sometimes one and sometimes the other?

S: No, we cannot read this whole passage. Let us perhaps turn to 1136b1.

O: Moreover, lack of self-restraint may make a person voluntarily submit to being harmed by another; which again would prove that it is possible to suffer injustice voluntarily. But perhaps this definition of acting unjustly is incorrect, and we should add to the words "to do harm knowing the person affected, the instrument and the manner" the further

qualification "against that person's wish." If so, though a man can be harmed and can have an unjust thing done to him voluntarily, no one can suffer injustice voluntarily, because no one can wish to be harmed: even the unrestrained man does not, but acts contrary to his wish, since no one wishes for a thing that he does not think to be good, and the unrestrained man does what he thinks he ought not to do.

S: Now let us stop here for a moment. So what if the other party requests the forbidden action? What do we have to say about it? Now this will be taken up more fully in the sequel. Let us turn first to b32, a brief passage. What is the overall argument? Well, it is still the whole question of how to recognize just or unjust actions. In this context this passage occurs about a judge in 32 to 34.

O: . . . if a judge has given an unfair judgment in ignorance, he is not guilty of injustice, nor is the judgment unjust, in the legal sense of justice (though the judgment is unjust in one sense, for legal justice is different from justice in the primary sense). . . .

S: Yes, well the justice in the primary sense must mean the natural right. Yes, what does this mean here? A judge passes an unjust judgment. This judgment is intrinsically unjust and yet the judge is not legally guilty because -- take a case of a course of not guilty ignorance -- he could not have known the fact which spoke in favor of the opposite judgment, of the true judgment. That's clear, but thereupon Aristotle says, well, that is a nice situation. The man is legally just and the judgment which he passes is unjust. He surely must leave it at that. I mean, there is no possible alternative to that and yet there is something awkward about it and this awkwardness reminds us of the fact of the importance of the distinction between the legal right and the natural right. Well, legal right abounds with legal presumptions. The legal presumptions are arbitrarily established rules of justice which lead to the consequence that many unjust actions go unpunished and that many unjust judgments are passed because this is the only way in which human beings with their imperfections can do justice. But it is an extremely imperfect justice. This comes out, I think, by this example. In brief, the problem of justice is much more complex than human beings think. "Human beings" can have in Greek a somewhat derogatory meaning, as distinguished from "men," andres. We have seen that. Because what do human beings think? They think that the just is identical with the legal and this is almost unavoidable and yet it is wrong: 1137a4, following.

O: Men think that it is in their power to act unjustly, and therefore that it is easy to be just. But really this is not so. It is easy to lie with one's neighbor's wife or strike a bystander or slip some money into a man's hand, and it is in one's power to do these things or not; but to do them as a result of a certain disposition of mind is not easy, and is not in one's power. Similarly men suppose it requires no special wisdom to know what is just and what is unjust, because it is not difficult to understand the things about which the law pronounces. But the actions prescribed by law are only accidentally just actions.

S: Is it not strange? And Aristotle is supposed to have been a quasi-legal positivist. They are just only by accident, which is a very strong statement meaning they are meant to be just but they almost always remain behind what they are meant to be. Therefore, because the law does not tell us what just is except by accident which can also mean in a given case it may happen -- therefore it is difficult to be a just man or an unjust man; because what you can easily



know is what the law tells you and what the law tells you is not necessarily what is intrinsically just and not just. The conclusion of this argument in a26.

O: Claims of justice exist between persons who share in things generally speaking good, and who can have too large a share or too small a share of them. There are persons who cannot have too large a share of these goods: doubtless, for example, the gods.

S: In other words, because they would always make a good use of them, they cannot have enough of them. Yes?

O: And there are those who can derive no benefit from any share of them: namely, the incurably vicious; to them all the things generally good are harmful. But for others they are beneficial within limits; and this is the case with ordinary mortals.

S: Yes, "this is human," Aristotle says. "Human" has this meaning which it has in Nietzsche's famous book title, Human, All Too Human. On the highest level there is no need for any limitation. They should have everything. That's Plato's thought in the Republic: no private property, the property to be distributed according to the decision of the sages, of the virtuous and sage men. That's one thing and the other thing is people who should not have any property and whom you help by taking away their property because they will buy heroin for it or whatever else it may be. But the average man -- justice belongs, and surely justice as the lawful -- belongs to the average, and therefore that is its essential limitation. And if there are people who are not average -- and that is, of course, the basis of the whole book as we shall see in Book X, the theoretical life -- then justice must be kept in its place, as it were, as something indeed necessary; indeed necessary, but not more. Now Mr. Erickson.

Q: (To the effect of whether or not the previous passage, in arguing that all good things should be taken away from the incurably unjust man, indicates a natural right for the punishment of starvation.)

S: No, I mean, why should one be beastly? Quick execution would be much more human.

Q: No, I'd be wrong anyway because probably they'd be able to use their food well in the sense that they would have dietary tracts. Otherwise they'd not be alive.

S: All right; you can also find other things. If the community is sufficiently wealthy you can have farms where they live, you know, under supervision and kept from mischief. You know; you have read sufficiently, I suppose, about this kind of institution which exists in this country. I have read of it in the daily paper. This is one way of doing it but this is an extremely wealthy society. What about the society which is not wealthy? And Plato, of course, states this in the same way: the incurably bad are only a burden on society. And this raises, of course, a very grave moral question. What if you cannot bring home to them in a legal way that they have committed a crime; that you know that they are crooks and do all kinds of things? You are sure they have murdered people and all this kind of thing. That is, of course, not a legal proof that they committed it. So a man can be absolutely wicked and go through his life and be a pest for society and nothing can be done. But that is the necessary implication of the rule of law and we must insist on it, that it is so, but we must also see that it is a very defective justice which we get through law. That is what Aristotle states.

Q<sub>2</sub>: What is this intrinsic justice or intrinsic injustice of which he is speaking in this passage?

That

S: / a house builder exchanges with a shoemaker a house for shoes -- should not be given a single shoe or a single pair of shoes for the house. That's one example. Or that you should not punish in the same way an act of petty theft as an act of high treason. These crude verities which we all know but which we, nevertheless, must not neglect: that we have a certain sense that there are crimes which are much graver than others and that's a kind of justice which is crucial for punitive justice. But in the justice of exchange, for example if a man uses fraud and says that this tooth paste is superior to all other tooth pastes because there was a research project somewhere: this is, of course, an unjust act, the act of fraud.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, I understand these unjust acts. This isn't the problem that I have here. Perhaps I should state that. How is it that something is intrinsically just and yet changeable? I mean, because if we conceive of the extreme situation in which a pair of gold shoes might be worth more than a rundown house --

S: Of golden shoes. Yes, or shoes worn by a Hollywood star. Surely, that would have to be considered. That would have to be considered, but here is where opinion of a society comes in very much; I mean, as far as legal justice is concerned. But let us take a clearer case: for example, the value of a physician's service in an epidemic where he is much more needed -- I mean, there are many more sick people around and much more depends on his being there at the right time -- than, say, if he has only a few common colds to treat. And this is an entirely different situation where he will be confronted with the kind of question with which he is not confronted elsewhere: whom should he treat first? -- where the lives of people depend on this decision of the physician. Or the same applies also in famine when someone has gathered a sufficient amount of grain. May he charge anything the traffic will bear because people will pay anything they can? They might be willing to give a house for some pounds of meat, or powdered meat. It might happen. What about that? What Aristotle has in mind fundamentally is, of course, that this exploitation of situations of necessity would be unjust. There must be some proportion. But he would probably say that it is legitimate in such a situation, maybe to charge somewhat more. Perhaps. I do not know. I mean, in case he had more troubles in getting this additional grain or whatever it may be. But otherwise, to consider only his profit without considering the proportions between what he gives and what he gets is unjust. I mean, I do not know a clear example in the case of the justice of exchange which would be affected by an emergency situation. The clear cases are the political cases. For example, in a given situation it might be impossible to have proper criminal prosecution of all crimes committed and simply a kind of amnesty must be given for these people, not to have this enormous backlog after the emergency ceased; in a way, the very unjust action. In a way, because these criminals of this period profited indirectly from the emergency situation. There's something unjust about that and yet it is just in the circumstances.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Couldn't we say, then, that the statement of Aristotle that natural right is changeable could be clarified correctly by saying that every natural right in practice is changeable or practically speaking or in concrete circumstances is changeable?

S: Yes, I think he means that. I can give you another example, but this is also more in the sphere of political action than of the individual's action. This

is a statement taken from Montesquieu, who was a very profound thinker on these matters, as you know, and he makes this remark. An Englishman, Sir William Petty, in a way the founder of political economy, had figured out the value of a human being in money. You see, he had something in common with the later economists. He went about it in the right way. He went to the slave market in Algiers and he found out at once, this is the value of a human being, whereupon Montesquieu, who was a deeper thinker, said, "This may be the value of an Englishman but not the value of a man." But there are countries where a human being is worth much less; in some cases the value is zero and even less than zero. When you hear certain descriptions of the situation in India and other places you are reminded of it. What can be the right of an individual -- what can the right of an individual be in cases of extreme over-population and extreme scarcity and so on? That's a very important question. I think Aristotle has this in mind. Some conditions must be given if this is to be fulfilled. Oh, Mr. Weissberger; I'm sorry. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: I got the impression in the beginning that you said Aristotle thinks that the laws should only be brought up against natural justice by the wise man; that most of the people, the average man, should worship the laws.

S: That is surely wise because very generally speaking one can say that the legislator or legislators are, generally speaking, supposed to have given more thought to the question of what would be a good arrangement than most people who are not legislators. This is the idea surely underlying the American constitution: that the House of Representatives, Senate, should as a rule consist of the cream of this society. Now whether this is in fact the case is the subject of empirical studies, but still most of them are trained lawyers whereas the average man is not a trained lawyer. You see the difficulties also from this example. But the habitual dissatisfaction with the laws is not good because it is not good for a habit of law abidingness, and this is a long question not discussed in this book. But the main point is made perfectly clear: legal justice is almost always and for necessary reasons very imperfect justice but the best which human beings can do in this sphere. Good. Yes?

Q<sub>4</sub>: Just one question about the passage we read in 1137a26. You mentioned that somehow it pointed us toward the contemplative life expressed in Book X. I don't understand what that connection was.

S: If the sphere of justice, if the premise of what is understood by justice, is average men, then the question arises, what about the best men, and Aristotle's answer to that question is the contemplative life. Now I think we understand this much now of the sequence of the argument that we see why Aristotle takes up the question of equity in the sequel in 1137a31, following, because we have seen the defects of law, of legal justice, so clearly. And now there is one thing which is meant to be the corrective of legal justice, and this is equity, and therefore he takes up the subject of equity, fundamentally along the lines of Plato's Statesman, but we cannot go into the details. (What did I do? No, I made a big mistake. I'm sorry.) No, in this passage here let us read -- well, we don't have the time to read it. This chapter is relatively clear. There is only one grave question. What does it mean, the correction of positive law, the correction by equity? Is this done with a view to natural law or not? I believe Aristotle himself is not clear about this subject. The simplest solution would, of course, be to say that the judge in each case sees. Say, the law in itself may be according to natural law, but in a given case it works a hardship. Then it is to be corrected in the light of natural law. More simply stated, the law may be in accordance with natural law in the sense that it does not contradict it but in a given case it does contradict natural right and then it is to be



corrected in the light of natural right. But it is also possible that Aristotle means the law must be corrected along the lines intended by the legislator, which is a different proposition. For instance, the law is made by a democratic legislator and in a given case it has anti-democratic implications. Then the legislator, if he were here, Aristotle would say, would say no, this I didn't want and therefore in this case I would deviate from the application of the law and would modify the application. This question is not decided here, which we would have to consider very carefully. Now let us turn to the next and last chapter. I would like to give a brief introduction to that.

The whole argument of the second half of Book V was based on the premise that suffering injustice exists only when it is involuntary so, say, that if the mother says to the son, as in this Euripidean tragedy, "Kill me, I beg you to kill me," then she doesn't suffer injustice and therefore the act is not unjust. Or, which is the same thing, that one cannot do injustice to oneself. As Aristotle puts it occasionally, you can't steal from yourself. This, I believe, is obviously clear. You can't go stealthily into the safe and steal from yourself. Now this would be admitted, I believe, by everyone. I know that you could rob yourself, but you could kill yourself, however. That's the question. But if we leave it in this way we can say, we would be compelled to say, a man may do to himself what he pleases without being unjust. I mean, he may be ignoble from another point of view but he wouldn't commit an act of injustice. And he may do to any other what pleases that other man. Justice is concerned only with what men do to each other against their wish. Differently stated, justice is nothing but the order of peace. But this contradicts flagrantly the notion of universal justice stated at the beginning of the book for if the just is identical with the noble, with the work of all virtues -- that is the meaning of the section on universal justice -- one commits an unjust act by doing anything base to oneself or to others. This is the difficulty and Aristotle faces it in the immediate sequel. Let us read the beginning of that chapter.

O: The foregoing discussion has indicated the answer to the question, Is it possible or not for a man to commit injustice against himself?

S: Now what is the answer, to be quite clear? One cannot commit injustice against oneself. You know the role which this plays in present day discussions about all kinds of crimes by which society is apparently not harmed. You know? Well, homosexuality is one example. You know, of course.

Q: Is this a disguised version of the Golden Rule?

S: No.

Q: Really. I mean, "do unto others what you would have others do." It's the same idea.

S: Yes, that is true, but you could say if you take it literally it could mean to support it, but that is not meant by the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule does not allow such a literal interpretation as you give it. Crudely understood, it is all right, but then it means, of course, no harming and not the mere wishing. Yes?

O: One class of just actions consists of those acts, in accordance with any virtue, which are ordained by law. For instance, the law does not sanction suicide (and what it does not expressly sanction, it forbids).

S: Yes, now let us stop here for one moment. So it seems that it follows that it is just to kill oneself if one doesn't like to live anymore, or, for that matter to kill someone else if that someone else says, "Kill me." Of course, it would be wise in this case to have lots of witnesses around to make it quite sure. I would advise that very strongly if anybody is thinking about that. But here Aristotle brings up again the question of universal justice. You have seen that. About universal justice he makes this strange remark: what the law does not command it forbids. That is totalitarianism in the worst sense; isn't it? Because is not all freedom based somehow on the principle that what the law does not command it permits? Sure, and that's common sense. Now what does Aristotle mean by that? And I read many years ago in a commentator that this is an absurd proposition because where does the law command to breathe. Nowhere is it to be found in any code. Hence the law forbids breathing. But Aristotle doesn't talk nonsense. What does he mean by that?

O: Well, politics and morality are coextensive and therefore the law commands all virtuous acts. Since in committing suicide you take a life and this is contrary to the right rule of reason.

S: Yes, but where does the law command to breathe?

O: But breathing: does that come into the sphere of the moral actions?

S: Well, if you kill yourself you cease to breathe.

O: All right, then it's not the breathing that you're getting at. It's the killing yourself.

S: Also, also. Let us take this example.

O<sub>2</sub>: The law of nature commands us to breathe.

S: Yes, not the law of nature in Aristotle's sense.

O<sub>2</sub>: I think it's in the Physics where he starts from what nature is and brings out quite clearly --

S: Yes, but this you cannot immediately apply here. This is another consideration. Yes?

O<sub>3</sub>: Wouldn't this be a means to doing virtuous acts?

S: Yes, sure. You are supposed to do your duty to the city, which is expressed in n ways: to pay taxes, military service, and what have you, and you don't do that. It will come out in the sequel. This is, of course, the notion of universal justice. The law is all-comprehensive and therefore there is nothing which is permitted. If you do something loosely called permitted you obey the law in this very fact by doing it. Rabbi Weiss, you must understand that because that is, if I understand anything, the spirit of the tradition of Jewish law. What is called a commandment in Hebrew has both meanings: you may do it and you should do it. But we don't have to go into the Jewish understanding. When Socrates says in the Apology, "I am just in defending myself," literally translated, [quotes the Greek] it is impossible to say whether he means "I have the right to defend myself" or "the duty to defend myself." This clear-cut distinction between right and duty which is such a matter of course for us is not a matter of course for ancient law. The right has something in common with performing the duty and vice

versa. It is, as it were, a privilege that you may do a commandment. That is not so simply distinguished. Now let us read the immediate sequel.

O: Further, when a man voluntarily (which means with knowledge of the person affected and the instrument employed) does an injury (not in retaliation) that is against the law, he commits injustice. But he who kills himself in a fit of passion, voluntarily does an injury (against the right principle) which the law does not allow. Therefore the suicide commits injustice; but against whom? It seems to be against the state rather than against himself. . . .

S: Yes, the polis. All right, let us not insist on that. Yes?

O: . . . for he suffers voluntarily, and nobody suffers injustice voluntarily. This is why the city exacts a penalty; suicide is punished by certain marks of dishonor, as being an offense against the city.

S: So the law, in the sense of universal justice, is concerned with the polis and we cannot understand if we disregard that. By harming oneself one may very well harm the polis; even if you like that harming yourself, you wish to be dead, to destroy yourself, you may harm the polis. The law is all-comprehensive because one belongs altogether to the polis. Therefore you cannot run away from the polis by committing suicide. Yes?

Q: I find it hard to believe that there aren't people who suffer injustice voluntarily, who actually wish to die or actually wish to fall down a flight of stairs.

S: Yes. Well, what do you mean by that? Do you mean by that people who are, in one way or the other, sick?

Q: Yes.

S: Oh yes. Well, Aristotle, I think, never speaks of what mad people do. He would never take this as an example. I mean, in other words, this is not a book dealing with psychopathology. This is a book dealing with virtuous and vicious normal human beings. But I know that there is a tendency in modern times, in our time, to say that every vicious man is a lunatic of sorts. This Aristotle didn't share. This view he didn't share. His whole teaching -- a lunatic is not responsible and Aristotle thought vicious people are responsible. This, I believe, is the difference. By the way, I believe that our use of the word responsibility now reflects this change. When we speak of a man today in praise of a man saying he is a responsible man, that's a term of praise. Isn't it? Just as if you say he is irresponsible it is a term of blame. But for Aristotle being responsible cannot be a term of praise because responsibility is the condition for being either virtuous or vicious. Say -- what was this famous man in the Prohibition era here in Chicago -- Al Capone is, of course, a responsible man. It is a very interesting question: why has the term responsible taken the place of the term virtue? I believe part of the reason is our wish that all vice be understood as irresponsible, i.e. as bad. You know, they shouldn't be punished; they should be medically treated. My explanation of it may be wrong but the fact is undeniable that responsibility as such has become a term of praise. I believe the way may have been via political things: that you say responsible government, government responsible to the governed, is fundamentally good, and irresponsible government, absolute government, is bad. And then there may have been a migration of the political meaning of responsibility in terms of goodness to the individual. That



might have taken place.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I would think it is common but it is not necessary that you say that a man is irresponsible for his acts when you desire to treat him medically. Take a drug addict: you might blame him for being a drug addict and still feel that you can cure him by medical treatment.

S: How far does this contradict? What I remember is only that the psychiatrists are in the habit of saying, well, responsible in your sense, in the sense in which the law means it, he is, but implying that is a very poor and crude understanding of responsibility. That I have heard directly.

Q<sub>2</sub>: It's my understanding that some psychiatrists say that they are attempting to find the causes of certain vices without making a moral judgment as to these vices.

S: Yes, yes, but of course virtuous and vicious means moral judgment. There is no question. Good.

Now Aristotle, in this passage which we read, has shown that one cannot do injustice to oneself in the sense of universal justice because in this case here discussed of suicide one does injustice to the polis rather than to oneself. In the sequel he tries to show that one cannot do injustice to oneself in the sense of particular justice. Now here it is clear because particular justice requires always two partners and if there is only one man one cannot speak of justice in the sense of particular justice. Let us read a28.

O: (It is further manifest that, though both to suffer and to do injustice are evils -- for the former is to have less and the latter to have more than the mean, corresponding to what is health-giving in medicine and conducive to fitness in athletic training -- nevertheless to do injustice is the worse evil, for it is reprehensible, implying vice in the agent, and vice utter and absolute -- or nearly so, for it is true that not every wrong act voluntarily committed implies vice -- whereas to suffer injustice does not necessarily imply vice, viz. injustice, in the victim. Thus in itself to suffer injustice is the lesser evil, though accidentally it may be the greater. With this however science is not concerned. . . .)

S: Yes, science or techne rather: art.

O: . . . techne pronounces pleurisy a more serious disorder than a sprain, in spite of the fact that in certain circumstances a sprain may be accidentally worse than pleurisy, as for instance if it should happen that owing to a sprain you fell and in consequence were taken by the enemy and killed.)

S: Yes, that's a wise thought. You see? Now here we have a beautiful example of the parallel between art and virtue, here in the case of justice. Now to do injustice is worse than suffering injustice because -- well, the reasons, I believe are obvious -- because the suffering injustice does not in itself harm your character. Doing injustice harms your character, the argument, well, in Plato frequently, in the first book of the Republic and elsewhere. I read in a recent commentary that Plato could never have said, as Aristotle puts it here, that by accident suffering injustice could be worse than doing injustice. Of course he could. The whole statement occurs in Plato's Gorgias. Suffering

injustice is, of course, an evil from Plato's point of view. It is only the minor evil compared with doing injustice; but this in passing. In itself, doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice but by accident suffering injustice might be worse than doing injustice and here he gives a parallel from medicine. Well, say typhus or tuberculosis is worse than a common cold and yet under certain conditions which I cannot now imagine a common cold might be a greater evil than tuberculosis. Well, Aristotle doesn't take such extreme examples but I tried to make it quite clear. Yes, but is there not a certain inadequacy in these examples, the example from medicine or from the arts generally? Medicine, being an art, is not concerned with accidents as accidents. The medical man says of course pleurisy is worse than spraining an ankle. That this spraining the ankle has in another sphere this bad consequence is of no concern to the medical man. All arts are special, dealing with this or that aspect of human life. Prudence is comprehensive. It deals with all, as we see from the fact that we ask a physician for advice, what shall I do, and the physician tells you you should be operated upon, I don't know what. You have to decide whether you want to be operated upon because you take other things into consideration. Maybe you have an examination and it is much more important for you to pass that examination at the proper time, whatever else it might be. Or you might be absolutely necessary for some other thing. Now what is the application of that to the question that in itself doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice but by accident suffering injustice may be worse than doing injustice? What is the implication of that? The physician can give a simple statement: this is a worse disease than the other. But the acting man who must make a decision now has to consider the accidental situation. Is this not so? Can he be guided entirely by the objective order, super- and subordination, rank, of the various evils? Must he not consider also the urgency or non-urgency of what is required in the situation? Is there someone among you who can state the question more clearly and incisively than I am now able to state it?

Q: I don't see why it would necessarily be unjust if it was urgent. Something which is normally unjust: why would it be unjust in that circumstance? I'm addressing myself to the question he asked, not to the difference between art and--

S: Oh, you had such an example in Defoe. Hadn't you? Of a similar question. This question: you mentioned something to me.

Q: Well, Crusoe rescues some bereft people on a ship at sea but he has to go some place else and so he leaves them there to die. But he says that we had our business to do. We had to go where we were going. But his task wasn't that urgent. In other words, he was doing them an injustice by not taking them back to port even though it would have taken him off his schedule.

S: Yes, what in case he was under another pressing obligation?

Q: Well then I don't think it would be unjust. It's too bad, but why do we have to say that he has offended justice if there were other people who needed his help, more important people, a shipload of pregnant women or something? Why couldn't he go off and take care of them rather than these people who will die but aren't as important?

S: It reminds me of a case -- well, I don't remember it now. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: May I give an example? At least in the mind of Caephus, assuming that he read the political situation right, it is good that one man should die for the people.

S: Was he a just man?

Q<sub>2</sub>: It was certainly an injustice in that case.

S: Yes, but the question would be of a perfectly clear case of a just man. That's the question.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I thought you were taking the fact that it may be a greater evil to suffer injustice than to do an act of injustice: that to do injustice may accidentally not be the greatest evil. Therefore a prudent man may sometimes, as Caephus alleges himself, commit injustice lest there be a greater evil done.

S: Yes, surely, I mean, this point: the example which Aristotle gives from the art of medicine is infinitely more simple because of the simple hierarchy in each art. But prudence has to take into consideration everything. That is the key point. Therefore there cannot be an art of prudence as there can be an art of medicine. The art of medicine can give you a kind of list, as it were, from the greatest disease down to the common cold, or whatever it may be.

Q<sub>2</sub>: And there are things of the same kind.

S: Yes, but overall, what is subject to phronesis, to prudence: there, in a given situation, the greater medical evil may be the lesser evil, obviously. I mean this: that you have to take into consideration everything in prudence whereas an art never takes into consideration everything but only what is subject to the art -- makes prudential decisions infinitely more complicated and difficult. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Would you be willing to expand this to take in the whole question of the theoretical sciences which would tell you about the natural hierarchy of ends --

S: Don't help you in a given case. They are not sufficient. They are only a condition for stating the problem and a partial condition because what may be intrinsically higher may not be the most urgent. For example, it may be intrinsically higher, maybe, to seek the truth, but to undergo an operation may be the most urgent and no one would say that these are morally things. Yes?

Q<sub>4</sub>: They had a famous case which they always use in the Law School of a captain at sea in a lifeboat. This actually occurred before an English court. There was not a chance of being picked up and it appeared that everyone was going to die on the boat. They were on the brink of starvation and the captain and his crew were eventually involved in an act of cannibalism. And then within a short period of time they were picked up and the captain was brought before a court of law.

S: Yes, that's surely a very extreme case where it is impossible to judge.

Q<sub>5</sub>: It would seem to me that in extreme situations the prudent man might have to think of killing himself rather than being captured. For instance, I'm thinking of the Prime Minister of England. In some situations it might be better to kill yourself before you are captured. . . . You have to consider the possibility of killing yourself.

S: Can you explain to me how far this is relevant to our question now?



Q<sub>5</sub>: Because the prudent man has to consider in some situations killing himself as being a right decision, whereas the master of the art, the doctor, would say never to kill himself.

S: Yes, for him as artisan, in this capacity, not as human being, this question, of course, never arises. Yes, but I still don't follow it. Yes?

Q<sub>6</sub>: I want to raise a confusing issue. What about the issue of euthanasia? There is the story of a doctor whose wife was very very sick and she wanted relief of her pain so he killed her. The next day he went into his office and he found a medical journal on his desk that had been there for two weeks and in this journal was the cure for this disease his wife had.

S: Well, I would say that shows the wisdom of abstaining from mercy killing. I could not draw any other conclusion.

12th Meeting: May 21, 1963

(Note: On side one of this tape the recorder heads made defective contact with the tape, resulting in a poor recording. Elipses will be used where necessary.)

... there was only one thing where you surely said the thing that is not. Aristotle does not reject, at the beginning of Book VI, the mean. He only says that it is insufficient.

O: Well, he puts it aside in favor of a deeper inquiry.

S: But, in other words, that's the point. . . . I did not quite understand what you said regarding the difference between the praiseworthy things and the venerable things. That I didn't see. (Inaudible reply). Yes, that one can say but one can also say. . . .

. . . and then toward the end it came out: the end is wisdom. Yes, but what about those not few people who cannot be wise, who cannot be theoretically wise? To what do they look in making ? Put it this way: how does Aristotle answer the question as to where does the prudent man look in order to make his choice of the mean? The end is moral virtue. But how is the end of moral virtue known to the non-theoretically wise man and how does he know that is the right thing? If you take a gentleman, on the one hand, a crook, on the other, how does the gentleman know that the crook's principles are wrong? How does he know that? (Inaudible reply: appears to have mentioned "experience."). . . Is this knowledge? The darkness is here the cognitive status of the ends. That's the big difficulty. You saw it. Virtue is dark.

Before I turn to that I have to say a word about Mr. Seltzer's query. This is a very good query. It is one of the rare cases where someone makes a criticism of what I suggested on the basis of understanding and not on the basis of a parrot-like repetition of Max Weber's methodology, and this has never happened to me in print so I appreciate it very much. I can only say this. It really questions the whole position which I take; nothing less than that; and it does it in a very apt and reasonable way. I cannot discuss it now: impossible. Otherwise I would have to give some lectures. But I suggest -- because you won't be able to read what I wrote. Well, the difficulty -- what is his chief difficulty? Aristotle's political or moral science is somehow linked up, somehow linked up, with his theoretical science, and his theoretical science is much more difficult to ascend to than to his moral science. What Aristotle says, say, about liberality can be said to be as true today as it was in older times, but what he says about heaven and about animals and plants does not have this evidence. This is a famous difficulty. And you do not raise the question in this form; you are very sensibly modest and say we have to accept the possibility that Aristotle's theoretical teaching might be true. Prior to investigation we cannot know that. Must we not therefore study the whole theoretical work of Aristotle, the Logic, Physics, and so on? Absolutely. We must do that. But, you know, so many things which we must do we don't do without becoming guilty because we have to make our choices, our decisions. Life is so short and all these other things. So a political scientist cannot be expected to become a competent student of the Physics and Logic. I mean, I'm sufficiently common-sensical to admit that, against you.

But how does the question come up, the theoretical question come up, in the context of political science? Very briefly this: the Aristotelian thesis is that there is a sphere of prudence, both private and public, which is relatively

closed so that your theoretical knowledge or ignorance does not seriously affect it. This is one side of the matter. But only relatively closed because -- and here we come to the practical issue -- the sphere of prudence is always threatened, at all times, by theoretically wrong opinions; in our time by the positivistic methodology, especially, which is incompatible with prudence, but also by other things. We have also such things like Marxism or Nazism or whatever you take. In brief, it is impossible to be a competent political scientist if one is not able to meet these theoretical issues posed by logical positivism, on the one hand, and by such things as Marxism and Nazism on the other. And there may be some other things of this kind. Do you see? Now this is, however, feasible within political science. It is possible for a political scientist to meet the issue created by logical positivism and it is possible to meet the issues created by, say, Marxism and Nazism. The latter is done, even on the college level sometimes, in the so-called "Isms" course. This is, I think, the practical solution to your question. I refer you to a passage in my "Epilogue" to Storing's book, page 309, bottom, to 310, top. (I made a note here.)

But I have a broader suggestion which I address to the class. I think Mr. Seltzer and I should have a real disputation in the Fall Quarter -- no, honestly -- and in which you elaborate this much more than you do now. It is for your own good. And then we have it out in the political science club. What do you think about that? Mr. Kirwan, would it not be --

O: Mr. Lyons is the President now --

S: Well, is this not surely the same thing? I mean, usually I address this group anyway. I mean, usually I talk to the union anyway during the year. Why don't we do it next time in this form of a disputation. You be the challenger --

O<sub>2</sub>: I really don't feel competent to --

S: Well, do some homework over the summer.

Yes, Mr. Butterworth's question regarding justice: where would one classify justice. Even though Aristotle says that justice is part of the moral virtues or it is one of the moral virtues it is certainly quite distinct from the other moral virtues and yet it is not like the other intellectual virtues. Answer: it is a moral virtue. It is different because, speaking quite externally, there is no wrong extreme. I mean, there is only injustice. There is no -- how shall I say? -- the sucker, as I call it, sucker or Socrates, whomever you take: this is not taken into consideration deliberately by Aristotle. That's a moral virtue and it has to do with the subject matter of justice as distinguished from the other virtues. (Inaudible question.) This is not the definition of the moral virtues. It has something to do with the desires, the inclinations, of the individual, whereas the intellectual virtues are not perfections of the desires. Whether a man is greedy for what belongs to others or he is not: that is a kind of his desire. To that extent it's a moral virtue. Yes, Mr. Reinkin.

Q: I would like to go back to the gentleman and the philosopher and change one word. You speak of the man of prudence looking to habit.

S: The gentleman is a prudent man.

Q: As habit. And you say there's still some darkness and we don't see what the connection is with the philosopher who looks to wisdom, and if you replace habit by the laws --



S: Oh, that's beautiful but if the laws were always good there would be no question. Then it is simply, the knowledge which the prudent man requires is what he gets through the law giver. But unfortunately the legislators are not always good. Therefore this wonderful solution is not sufficient.

Q: You could not have a gentleman in a society that was ignorant of good laws. If the laws were wholly bad then there wouldn't be any gentlemen.

S: No, oh no. That can be. There are people born with good natures. There were gentlemen in Athens, which according to the strict doctrine of Plato was a bad regime. There are regimes which are tolerant. The democracy described in the eighth book of the Republic is very bad, but it is tolerable. Therefore, all kinds of nice people were possible in Athens: Nicias, Demosthenes, Pericles.

Q: (Inaudible.)

S: Yes, well, this is an extremely rare case: that you would have a regime where all laws are preposterous. Some good laws exist everywhere and one can say as long as the family is not entirely destroyed there is a chance that in some families the children will be brought up in a nice way. There can be gentlemen in a bad regime.

Q: (Inaudible.)

S: Yes, but even the settled rules, I mean connected with the notions of honor and fealty, were very bad. Good. But we come to that question. . . . Mr. Burnham.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I was going to say, wouldn't one say that Aristotle's answer about the cognitive status of the moral virtues be that they require prudence and prudence has both reason and --

S: Yes, sure, prudence is a form of reason. But let us now turn to that. Perhaps we clear it up.

Now let us start as simply as we can with the theme of Book VI. In order to do the right thing one must will the right thing because otherwise you do the right thing for the wrong reason. You must will the right thing. And before one can will it one must know it. This seems to be clear. Now the right thing is not made known by the law, positive or natural, for the positive law may be bad and natural right is changeable. The right thing is; of course, always the right thing to do here and now, in the circumstances, and the circumstances may call for a change of the natural right. Aristotle must therefore identify the kind of knowledge which is required for doing the right thing and make clear how that knowledge cooperates with the will. This is, very generally, the subject of Book VI. Now doing the right thing occurs, however, not only in action but also within the arts. Therefore Aristotle must make clear the difference between action and production; production being the arts, but this falls under the heading, kinds of knowledge, because art is also a kind of knowledge. Now we read only a very few passages today because we have now a whole book. I'll say something about 1139a, 22 to 26.

Moral virtue is a habit of preferring or choosing. Choice is desire going with deliberation. I mean, if you desire without deliberating then it is mere desire as the animals too have it. Choice going with deliberation or reasoning or figuring out; the Greek word, logistikai. The logos must be true and the

desire must be correct. Only then is the action virtuous. But in such a way, of course, that the true logos must agree with the correct desire. Otherwise there is a conflict and the action cannot be virtuous. Here there is a difficulty. The correctness of the desire seems to precede the truth of the logos, the logos enabling you to determine what is the right thing here and now. Or is it the other way around? The answer: desire gives you the end, the correct desire the true end, and the reasoning supplies the knowledge of the means. The end, let us say, is determined by nature. That would be the simplest, the correct end; and the means are determined by reason. For example, the end: self-preservation in the simple case. This is not figured out by us. That determines us by nature. But then we figure out, how can I, circumstanced as I am, preserve myself, for example in a tornado or in illness or whatever the case may be. But, of course, here the question arises, how can we distinguish between the correct or natural desire and the incorrect and the unnatural desire? The reason involved here is practical reason which as such is distinguished from theoretical reason.

Previously Aristotle had distinguished between the scientific knowledge and the deliberative figuring out of reason. Well, scientific: we will find out later what Aristotle means by it. Then there is another kind of reasoning which he calls deliberative and/or logistic, which, of course, has nothing to do with logistic as used in military science but logistikai means figuring out, a figuring out kind of reasoning. You figure out how to construct a triangle, how to build a bridge, how to act in these and these circumstances. It will later on become clear.

Now in the first statement both were described in fact as theoretical. The deliberative, the logistic, is not necessarily practical. You will see that this is of some importance. What does he mean by that? Everything, even the objects of action or of art, this shoemaker's material now for making this pair of shoes, can be made the object of theoretical understanding. It can be done. You can take a purely theoretical attitude toward objects of action or art. There is a simple proof of that known at all times: history. A historian studies actions done by particular men in particular cities, but; of course, they have been modified somewhat. They have been actions completed, but it is still not scientific knowledge in the strict sense of the term. The acts, the done things, are not the subject of practical reason anymore, nor are they the objects of theoretical reason. This is a particularly important interesting case. The objects of action, what shall I do now, are not in themselves of any theoretical interest. That is what Aristotle means. They are interesting only to the individual actor: man or individual. One does not, strictly speaking, learn something by the use of practical reason. You learn something from your thoughts so it's easier for you to act the next time, but you do not learn something fundamentally. For example, if you make such a mistake regarding a particular firm you learn never to do it again, but the major premise, don't do business with unreliable firms -- well at a certain moment when you make that clear for the first time you acquire for the first time that major premise, but later on it's too general anymore.

Now in 1139a35, following, Aristotle speaks for the first time of the difference between art and action or production, making, and action. This is so important because the mean, as we remember, is of course as important in the arts as it is in action. The shoemaker wants to make a fitting shoe, a shoe that is neither too large (excess) nor too small (defect). Therefore to that extent art and action are very closely akin. What is the difference? And the answer given first is that the arts are all partial, all partial, deal with a part of the human good. There is no universal art. The whole human good is the concern of

action. Therefore arts have a greater theoretical exactness than the sphere of action. The end is doing well, but not in the sense in which we use the word now: doing well, acting well. This means this particular good act now as part of one's good life. But the end which you propose is not directly the good life. It is this action now, of course understood as part of the good life, and not merely as a means for the good life. If you go to a shoemaker and get shoes these shoes are never an end. They are always a means, always a means. What for the shoemaker is the end, the shoes, is in itself a means. In acting, only in acting, is the action the end. The particular good action is the end. Good.

~~1139a14~~

In 1139b11 we find a second repetition. The first time Aristotle had distinguished between two kinds of contemplating: the scientific, on the one hand, and the deliberative, logistic, on the other. In the second statement, 1139a26, following, he distinguishes between theoretical and practical reasoning. And now what does he do? Oh yes, let us read this characteristic beginning.

O: Let us then discuss these virtues afresh, going more deeply into the matter.

S: Yes, higher up, and let us speak about them again. It is an explicit repetition. This I mention only with a view to the question of Aristotle's procedure. Let us now read the immediate sequel.

O: Let it be assumed that there are five qualities. . . .

S: Now, in other words, what he said hitherto was deliberately incomplete. Now he busts the case wide open and brings in the whole issue. But it would have been much more systematic to open the whole book with the following remark. Read that: the next sentence.

O: . . . that there are five qualities through which the mind achieves truth in affirmation or denial, namely art or technical skill, scientific knowledge, prudence, wisdom, and intelligence.

S: Yes, let us stop here. This should have been said at the beginning. Aristotle does not proceed in this way. He brings it up only in a more advanced stage of the argument because he wanted us to concentrate on some particular points right from the beginning. Now you see that prudence is in the center. Forgive me this pedantic remark but I enjoy finding more and more evidence for my merely empirical rule that the most important is in the center. Now you see again what it means here. Prudence is not the most important in itself. That we learn later. It's wisdom. But it's the most important in the context, naturally. In the context of ethics we must understand prudence above everything else. Now in his treatment he proceeds as follows: he treats first the excellences -- let us call these excellences -- which presuppose knowledge of the principles and then the excellences which consist in knowledge of the principles. First he speaks of science in this chapter and this is explicitly based -- explicitly based (it is a unique case in this whole book) -- on Aristotle's Logic. He calls it the Analytic. But what does this mean? The other intellectual virtues mentioned here are not the objects of analytics. There he cannot refer to that.

Science, we learn here, is a habit of demonstrative knowledge and that means, of course, in the first place mathematical sciences are science. They start from known principles and Mr. Burnham explained that. But how do we get the principles themselves? This is a question which one cannot altogether avoid. Aristotle goes into that here: he says by induction. But induction doesn't mean



in Aristotle what it means in Francis Bacon or today. You just look around. You lead up; epagoge means literally leading up to, look around. For example, how do you proceed when speaking to someone who has never heard of a triangle? You show him: here, that's a triangle. This, this, various kinds of triangles: these all are triangles. Yes, you show him, and perhaps you show him also that there are such things not only on the blackboard but there are also things somewhere which are triangles or circles or lines. You lead up to so that he knows this is something which is there and not merely by virtue of arbitrary invention. I think we leave it at this point.

The next item he discusses -- because we have to concentrate on prudence -- the next is art. Art, production, is not merely knowledge although one can say its core is knowledge. Aristotle speaks here, of course, only of its cognitive element, the knowledge element in art, because clearly, say, a shoemaker who knows how to make shoes must have the know-how and the know-how does not consist merely in knowing certain rules. You know, you wouldn't say a man has the know-how if he is a kind of back seat driver and could never drive himself. So this manual element, if I may say so, is of course also essential to art, but it is not the core. The core is the knowledge. But in art too -- scientific knowledge, art, and prudence are not knowledge of principles. The principles to which the artisan refers are given to him, presupposed by him: protection of feet, human feet. That's the end and with a view to which he looks around for material, leather, wood, or whatever it may be, probably not iron, and he looks around for how to go about, you know, how to do it: how to prepare the material and how to build it, transform it, into a shoe.

Now we come, then, to practical wisdom. You see, also for those who are interested in this trivial thing, while he changes the order in the execution from the order in the initial enumeration prudence remains in the center. So pedantic can Aristotle be and it is, at the same time, also a good lesson for us. Now let us turn to 1140a25, at the beginning of this chapter; yes, at the beginning of the chapter on prudence.

O: We may arrive at a definition of prudence by considering who are the persons whom we call prudent.

S: I don't have to say that Aristotle doesn't speak of a definition of prudence. That makes it all much more school-like than Aristotle is. "Regarding prudence," and so on; not definition. But all right.

O: Now it is held to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, for instance what is good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous as a means to the good life in general.

S: "As a whole." Yes. So this is again clear: the arts are partial. Prudence is not partial. Yes. Now go on.

O: This is proved by the fact that we also speak of people as prudent or wise in some particular thing, when they calculate well with a view to attaining some particular end of value. . . .

S: Can you think of an example? /O: Inaudible./ Or a man may be very good in finding the right wives for the right men, particularly good in that respect and in no other respect. But we call it prudence nevertheless although it is only a partial prudence because there is no techne, no art of it. There is no

art, strictly speaking. But prudence simply, with which alone we are concerned, is distinguished from art by its totality. Yes?

O: . . . (other than those ends which are the object of an art); so that the prudent man in general will be the man who is good at deliberating about the whole.

37 But no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his power to do. Hence inasmuch as scientific knowledge involves demonstration, whereas things whose fundamental principles are variable are not capable of demonstration, because everything about them is variable, and inasmuch as one cannot deliberate about things that are of necessity, it follows that prudence is not the same as science. Nor can it be the same as art. It is not science because matters of conduct admit of variation; and not art, because doing and making are generically different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: . .

S: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. We see, in the first place, that in the sphere of prudence the principles, the archai, are changeable. In the case of science they are not changeable. A triangle always means a triangle. What this means we don't know yet. We have only the statement. But here we may remind ourselves as a minor help of the fact that in the fifth book we have seen that the natural right, which is a principle, is changeable. So this is universalized now. In the sphere of prudence the principles are changeable. And furthermore art has its end outside the activity; obviously. The end of housebuilding is a house there, when it is completed completely divorced from the activity of housebuilding, whereas prudence has as its end the activity, the good act. Now let us go on.

O: It remains therefore that it is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to things that are good and bad for human beings.

Hence, men like Pericles are deemed prudent, because they possess a faculty of discerning what things are good for themselves and for mankind; . . .

S: "For mankind" can give a wrong notion; "for the human beings." In other words, Aristotle does not suggest that Pericles thought of the greatest good of the greatest number of human beings all over the globe, for example in the Spartan, Peloponnesian War, whatever it is. Good.

O: . . . and that is our conception of an expert in domestic economy or political science.

(This also accounts for the word temperance, which signifies 'preserving prudence.'

S: That is a word which I translated moderation, sophrosyne, and Aristotle uses an etymology of dubious value, that sophrosyne is derived from sotsein, preserving prudence. We don't have to go into that because what Aristotle means is independent of that etymology.

O: And moderation does in fact preserve our belief as to our own good; for pleasure and pain do not destroy or pervert all beliefs, for instance, the belief that the three angles of a triangle are, or are not, together equal to two right angles, but only beliefs concerning action. The first principles of action are the end to which our acts are means;

but a man corrupted by a love of pleasure or fear of pain, entirely fails to discern any first principle, and cannot see that he ought to choose and do everything as a means to this end, and for its sake; for vice tends to destroy the sense of principle.)

S: It tends to destroy the principle. There's nothing of the sense of it: In the sphere of prudence or action the principles, that for the sake of which, or the things to be done, do not come to sight at all -- (now let me see, I'm sorry). No, the implication: yes, what do we see? In the case of prudence as distinguished from art and theoretical knowledge the principles are affected by our morality or immorality. A man may be immoral, to use a convenient expression, and can be theoretically perfectly sound in his demonstration. And the same may be true of an artisan; we have discussed this interesting case of the drunk carpenter. But in moral matters, in matters of action, that is not possible. Here the decency or indecency of the man affects his grasp of the principles. Let us see: what does he mean? Yes, what are the principles here which he means, which are destroyed by immorality? Which are they? Inaudible reply. Yes, but is this not again presupposed by the prudent man? I mean, prudence does not supply the principles. Prudence doesn't supply the principles; prudence acts on the basis of knowledge of principles. Now if a man is immoral then his sense of the principles is destroyed or weakened, or is blurred. That is the point which he makes hitherto. Now let us wait until we come -- later on.

Now in the next chapter he turns to the awareness of principles of which he had not spoken hitherto. To repeat again: these first three things which he has mentioned -- these are science, art, and prudence -- they all presuppose knowledge of the principles. They are based on knowledge of the principles. They do not supply knowledge of the principles. Now he turns to the question of knowledge of the principles and he speaks first of the principles of science. What is the faculty or the excellence by virtue of which we know the principles? And this is called by Aristotle nous which we can translate or express by intelligence, intellecting; by intellecting, by grasping with the mind's eye. Well, in modern times this notion of nous has become blurred. The Platonic-Aristotelian view is very briefly this: there are two actions of the mind, let us say, intellecting and reasoning. Reasoning connects. I mean, before you can connect two ideas you must first have grasped each idea by itself. The grasp of the idea is nous. The linking up, connecting, comparing: that's a matter of reasoning -- in Greek, διάνοια. So we have here an answer to the question regarding the faculty by which we have knowledge of the principles of demonstration, the principles of science. The question which is much more important to us is how do we get the principles of action, the principles of action as distinguished from demonstration. In the case of the arts it is not interesting because we all know. Look at the shoemaker, look at the physician: how he has the end, health, protection of feet, victory in the case of the general. That's no particular question. In action it's a great question.

Now this leads to the conclusion in the next chapter, which we read, in 1141a17, following. Now he turns to something else which is wisdom. How is wisdom related to what went before? Now do you have it?

O: Hence it is clear that wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of knowledge. The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of those principles themselves. Hence wisdom must be a combination of intelligence and scientific knowledge. . . .



S: Yes, well; "between intellect and science," between grasping, clear grasp of the principles, and demonstration. Demonstration belongs to the sphere of dianoia. In Latin that is intellectus /something was apparently written on the blackboard to which he referred/ and dianoia is ratio. Wisdom comprises both. Someone may know the principles simply because they are transmitted to them: I tell you so (period) and then he can argue very well on the basis of the principles. That is demonstration. But, of course, if he does not have the grasp of the principles he is, in a way, blind. He acts on authority. On the other hand, if a man has only knowledge of the principles, only nous, and cannot draw conclusions from it, he also is, in a way -- is surely not a wise man because he doesn't know what the principles imply. Both. Let us read on where you left off. Let us first read that.

O: . . . it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.

For it is absurd to think that political science or prudence is the loftiest kind of knowledge, inasmuch as man is not the highest thing in the world.

S: He doesn't say "the loftiest"; "the most serious." Aristotle has a very serious view of seriousness.

O: And as 'wholesome' and 'good' mean one thing for men and another for fishes, whereas 'white' and 'straight' mean the same thing always, so everybody would denote the same thing by 'wise,' but not by 'prudent'; for each kind of beings will describe as prudent, and will entrust itself to, one who can discern its own particular welfare; hence even some of the lower animals are said to be prudent, namely those which display a capacity for forethought as regards their own lives.

It is also clear that wisdom cannot be the same thing as political science; for if we are to call knowledge of our own interests wisdom, there will be a number of different kinds of wisdom, one for each species: there cannot be a single such wisdom dealing with the good of all living things, any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things. It may be argued that man is superior to the other animals, but this makes no difference. . . .

S: No, that is "the best": "that man is the best of the other animals," not merely better. Yes, this makes no difference -- yes?

O: . . . but this makes no difference: since there exist other things far more divine in their nature than man, for instance, to mention the most visible, the things of which the celestial system is composed.

S: Literally, the cosmos, but Aristotle understands indeed primarily by cosmos the heaven. Yes.

O: These considerations therefore show that wisdom (is) both scientific knowledge and intuitive intelligence. . . .

S: Yes, that is one way -- yes, but -- yes, all right.

O: . . . /nous/ as regards the things of the most exalted nature. This is why people say that men like Anaxagoras and Thales 'may be wise but are not prudent,' when they see them display ignorance of their own interests; and while admitting them to possess a knowledge that is rare, marvellous, difficult and even superhuman, they yet declare this knowledge

to be useless, because these sages do not seek to know the things that are good for human beings. { These things }

S: They "do not seek the human good." Let us stop here for one moment. Now this is, of course, a very crucial passage. That is undeniable. Yes.

Q: Because where do we go with wisdom if we haven't been prudent now.

S: Yes, let us first understand what Aristotle explicitly says. He clearly asserts that wisdom, i.e. knowledge, i.e. intellect plus demonstration, combined, is by far superior in dignity to prudence and the reason is prudence has to do with what is good for man. Now the suggestion that there are other animals which can be prudent is, of course, strictly provisional. In the strict sense no animal other than man is prudent. Prudence has to do with the merely human, which is of interest only to human beings for their life, and therefore it is partial, just as medicine is. Aristotle gives an example: there are people doctors and horse doctors. But the people doctors deal only with human health. The horse doctors deal only with horsic health, if we may coin this word, and this is essentially partial. Now there are quite a few other things here to but the relation between political science, as he translates it, and prudence will come up later on. The key point is this: man is only a part of the whole and therefore any knowledge of man and of things relevant to man cannot be the universal, all-comprehensive knowledge; and this is the knowledge of the cosmos, provisionally stated, loosely stated. In a way everything is clear.

/During the last six lines of the transcript, the defect which was mentioned earlier began to interfere with the audibility. Elipses will be used as necessary in what follows./

But there is one point which I cannot (?) understand immediately and which I believe is one obstacle to our understanding now. This is hard for us to understand because we think, of course, when people speak of science -- we think naturally of modern natural science and there the question may very well be raised, why should this be of greater dignity than moral-political science. Indeed, why should it? Because that is as partial as human knowledge. It is only the sub-human. Why should the knowledge of the sub-human be of higher dignity than knowledge of the human? For us this is not immediately intelligible. Now I would like to mention one point. We regard it as possible that knowledge of moral principles or of political principles is of higher dignity than knowledge of nature. What is the condition for the supremacy of morality as it was stated with particular emphasis by Kant? Answer -- what is the answer? Why did Kant reject this whole notion?

O: Impossibility of knowing the whole.

next  
on  
t S: Yes. The most venerable things, as Aristotle calls them, are not knowable. In traditional terms, speculative metaphysics is impossible. If there is no possibility of knowledge, say, of the soul as soul, because what scientific psychology deals with is not the soul, therefore there is no speculative knowledge of any true dignity. I note another point here which has very much to do with the issue raised by Kant. When he speaks of the status of secondary qualities, good or bad means always good for someone, for an individual or for a species but for; white or black does not mean white for or black for. It means white. And the fact -- I don't know whether Aristotle knew that -- that dogs don't see or other animals don't see some of the colors; (the higher animals: that the lower animals, the , don't see, he knew, of course) -- but that, say, the color line as

we know it may be perceptual only by men: that is uninteresting to Aristotle. You know the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as they were stated by Locke: the weight and size, such qualities, are primary qualities, but the sensible qualities, colors, sounds, and so on, are the secondary qualities. One implication was only the primary qualities belong to the thing; the secondary qualities are in us. When the atoms, colorless, soundless things, affect us then they appear as colored, sounding, and what the other qualities are. For Aristotle that doesn't exist. The secondary qualities belong as much to the thing as the primary qualities. But there are qualities which things have which have a relativity to man in themselves because when you say, "This is good," "This thing is good," you mean always a relativity to man or maybe to individuals or you may also say it's good for fishes, but it is always relative to something, which is not true of the sensual (?) qualities. That is of crucial importance and was one of the differences between modern philosophy and Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy in the crucial seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

We note also another point here as is shown by the examples of Anaxagoras and Thales, famous philosophers. A man may be wise without being prudent. Thales was not prudent, as is shown by the fact that looking at the stars he fell into a ditch. He could not take care of his own business. And, of course, since prudence and moral virtue are inseparable there can be a man who is wise without having moral virtue.

Q: What about the time he cornered the market on wine presses?

S: Yes, sure. That is the proof that Thales was not as dumb as that Thracian may have thought. But Aristotle starts here from common views.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Why is it that art is partial and prudence is total?

S: For a man. And that is very good. We reach, then, this proportion: art to prudence equal to prudence to wisdom. Art deals with a part of the human good. Prudence deals with the whole human good. Wisdom deals with the whole, not merely with the whole human good but with the whole. That is immediately clear.

Q<sub>3</sub>: (Appears to have thought that the discussion which mentioned Kant, above, asserted the superiority of morality.)

S: No, I tried to explain one obstacle which we have today in understanding Aristotle because for us -- I suppose for most of us today -- it would make sense to say that knowledge of human things in the widest sense of the word, humanity -- that comes from "man" -- you know? -- that humanity has a higher dignity than natural science: perhaps not from the point of view of simple cognitive standards of exactness, perhaps not, but as subject matter; that these marvelous notions of the stars and of the planets cannot be compared with the most atrocious actions of the worst criminal because he has intelligence. He has intelligence and they lack intelligence. So for us, I believe, it is immediately sensible that the sciences of man should be of higher dignity because their object, man, is of higher dignity. Does it not make sense for us today to say that the sciences of man are of higher dignity because man is of a higher dignity than sub-human nature?

Q<sub>4</sub>: (As to whether this was the Aristotelian view.)

S: No, Aristotle rejects this view. Well, the reason being that the heavenly bodies are for him not soulless beings. That's one point. The heavenly bodies



are for him not soulless beings. I cannot go into that now. But there is another one, a reason which we can immediately understand: because science as Aristotle means it here, or wisdom now, has to do with the whole. Of this whole man is, of course, a part. And if our natural science, insofar as it deals with man, should give only a segment of man or maybe a caricature of man then it is not the true science of man. Then we would be in need of a theoretical science of man which, of course, would not be moral and political philosophy because they are practical sciences. But the understanding of the nature of man would still be a part of a complete natural science even today, regardless of whether our natural science is able to provide that or not, and I believe it is unable to provide it.

Q<sub>5</sub>: How does it follow that we are in need of a theoretical science for our understanding of man?

S: But a theoretical man wishes today, as in the olden times, to have universal knowledge and he would not be satisfied with a knowledge of a part of the whole, namely of other things sub-human. That would not be knowledge of the whole. This theoretical science would surely be higher. . . . By the way, one reason why ethics ceased to be a practical science and became a theoretical science as it is now is because it is meant to supply. . . the theoretical knowledge of man. Never forget: Aristotle is very clear, this is a practical science.

Q<sub>5</sub>: Inaudible.

S: Yes, we come to that later. That is a very important question. But I give you only a provisional answer, but it is a very authentic answer. This book was said to be some kind of political science: politikei tis. That means it is not political science altogether. Differently stated, Aristotle's Ethics is in a sense theoretical. . . .

Q<sub>6</sub>: Does this mean that the proper study of the cosmos would be the concern of natural science?

S: Yes, of course. We must not forget this: we use the term metaphysics, a non-Aristotelian term. Aristotle uses the term the first philosophy, and the first philosophy is all-comprehensive and it deals with the principles of everything. I mean, if you take, for example, such a work as On The Soul, if you want to make a pigeon hole in a way in which Aristotle does not pigeon-hole, that is somehow in between natural science . . . and is really psychology, [reversal of tape, eliminating the defective audibility] where he speaks about the mind, which is, after all, the highest theme of De Anima. What is that? I mean, if you understand by natural science, in a somewhat untraditional sense, the knowledge of everything, meaning of the kinds of everything, of all kinds of beings, then you can call it natural science.

Q<sub>6</sub>: Would this be the distinction between teleological natural science as opposed to --

S: Yes, sure, you can put it this way. Sure. Yes, this is the last question now, at this point.

Q<sub>7</sub>: Would you say that the deepest difficulty of modern scientific psychology is that it's based on human construction?

S: Yes, perhaps. That is true of all modern science in a way. Sure, but this leads very far. Yes, one can say that. But this requires long studies, Mr.

Seltzer, some of which you will do during the summer, as we have seen.

Now let us continue our argument because we have not yet reached the main difficulty. Prudence is concerned, as he explains in the sequel, with universals as well as with particulars or singulars. As was shown by Mr. Burnham, don't do business with an unreliable firm; this is an unreliable firm. Yes, that is good enough. Aristotle adds that knowledge of the singulars is more important than the former. It's much more important to know that you should not deal with this firm, "x," than to have the general notion and be blind regarding the particular case. If a man only in a groping way knows only, "I will never go again to that shop," he is a more prudent man than the man who knows one should not go to bad shops but is unable to subsume properly. Good. Nevertheless, in a sense the highest form of prudence is the most universal one. That is 1141b22, following. That's the next chapter, or it is here in one edition used as a chapter: when he says the relation of prudence and -- yes, political science is not a good translation. Let us say the political art, which is also not a perfect translation but it avoids the grossest error, as if Aristotle were speaking of what is now called political science. Yes? "The political art and prudence is the same habit . . . ." Do you have that? Yes.

14 O: /Our chapter eight./ Prudence is indeed the same quality of mind as the political art; though their essence is different. Of prudence as regards the state, one kind, as supreme and directive, is called legislative science. . . . /Art?/

S: Art; always art.

47 O: . . . art; the other, as dealing with particular occurrences, has the name, political art, that really belongs to both kinds. The latter is concerned with action and deliberation (for a parliamentary enactment is a thing to be done, being the last step in a deliberative process), and this is why it is only those persons who deal with particular facts who are spoken of as 'taking part in politics,' because it is only they who perform actions, like the workmen in an industry. Prudence also 49 is commonly understood to mean especially that kind of wisdom which is concerned with oneself, the individual; and this is given the name, prudence, which really belongs to all the kinds, while the others are distinguished as domestic economy, legislature, and political art, the latter being subdivided into deliberative art and judicial art.

S: Let us stop here and try to understand it. Now we have here first a distinction of things which are the same habit, as Aristotle puts it, but the being or the essence is different and that has to do with a difference of spheres. Now what is that schema? The most architectonic he calls it (like most comparable to what the architect is in relation to the builders, the carpenters) is the legislative. Then we have the political art, which is simply subject to the legislative, because all political action takes place in a framework of a constitution, however you call that, and this is therefore subject to that and it issues, as Aristotle puts it, in decrees, meaning decisions regarding particular cases, as the legislative art lays down the laws, general and permanent rules. And then there is another one: the political is subdivided because there are two kinds of special decisions, those made in Parliament, as this Englishman puts it but let us say in the assembly, war or peace for example, and then those made in law courts. And therefore there is a deliberative, or political in the narrower sense, and the judicial. And of this the legislative is the highest. The legislative art, to speak of that first, is akin to prudence because it is concerned



with good laws for this community. This is what the legislator wants. He's not someone in any classroom. Now these are all forms of prudence, as Thomas Aquinas puts it, insofar as they have their being not merely in reason alone but have also something in the desire. The legislator giving laws for a community must have not only judgment on what the good laws are; he must also be concerned with this community. That's the desire. But insofar as they exist in reason alone they are sometimes called practical sciences like ethics, economics, and political science. So we have now a very interesting thing. There is a possibility -- /false start anticipating a point to be made below/. The legislator has to do with this particular community (period) as much as the prudent man is concerned with his well being or his family's. (That is economic: when he has to do with his family's well being; economic prudence, because economic doesn't mean money-making but means management of the household including the beating of wife and the spanking of children. So one shouldn't translate it by economics because that is today misleading. Good.) Now in a way in the highest case, the legislative case, it is possible -- /again this point is dropped/. If you look at Aristotle, what he is doing here in the Ethics and in the Politics, he doesn't legislate, but he teaches legislators. Aristotle is not concerned with the laws of Corinth or of some other Greek city. He is concerned with something from which every legislator can learn. The concern for the city, which means only for this or that city, is the sake of the legislator. So that is the meaning, where Aristotle said this at the beginning: it is not the political art but it is some kind of political art which he teaches, some kind because he is the teacher of statesmen, legislators, judges, or what have you. These sciences are, as they were called in the medieval literature sometimes, theoretical-practical. They are not simply theoretical -- /a possible slip of the tongue since the point he was driving at seemed to be they are not simply practical; the point which was twice dropped above was apparently that it is possible for the political art as practiced by the teacher of legislators to be universal and not involved with a particular city, hence to be to some extent theoretical./

That is important. That has a very great implication. If this is so then in the true order of things since the individual is, of course, subject to the law, clearly, so that every prudent action depends for its being prudent on its being, generally speaking, law abiding -- /he drops this to elucidate the last clause/. An action may be law abiding without being prudent, obviously. I mean, how many imprudent actions are not felonies of any kind. If you go all the time to that shop where you are cheated you do not commit a punishable offense, obviously. But, on the other hand, if you do something which is illegal, that's imprudent to do, generally speaking. There may also be a situation where the laws are so bad that the prudent action must be illegal. So generally speaking the prudent action is law abiding; the prudent action is subject to the law. And the law, of course, is the work of the legislative art and the legislative art, if it is to be perfect, would have been acquired by sitting at the feet of a teacher of legislators, say of Aristotle or of Plato or perhaps even some others. Good. That would mean, however, that prudence is ultimately subject to an art, to that thing which Aristotle does which is not simply a higher form of prudence. This is an important distinction to keep in mind. Surely this is crucial for the understanding of what Aristotle is doing as a whole in his Politics and his Ethics. Political science as we call it now -- all right, we can say that what Aristotle does in the Ethics and in his Politics is political science, but this is something different from the political art, from what the statesman in a given community does here and now. Action is always action here and now and this, as such, can never be the object of a science, only in a very complicated and derivative sense. Science has to do with the universals and uses the particulars only as examples for illustration, but they are not as such the objects of it. This,



then, has to be said about the relation of Aristotle's work -- of course, if Aristotle didn't know prudence and didn't know prudent men he could never have written the book. But it is not in his capacity as a prudent man but as a man transcending prudence, as a wise man, that he can write the book. Someone raised this difficulty. Were you the man, Mr. Burnham? How did you state your question?

O: I forgot now.

S: Well, at any rate let us keep in mind this strange development: that in a sense prudence being subject to the legislative art is ultimately subject to the quasi-theoretical enterprise of men like Aristotle and Plato. So we would come back from Aristotle to the Platonic point of view. If the philosophers don't rule everything is wrong. It seems to be. But Aristotle does not take this way; we must see why in the immediate sequel. Now, Mr. Butterworth.

Q: I don't follow your reasoning as to why prudence is ultimately subject to an art.

S: Because every prudent act takes place within a polis or within a political community of one kind or another and therefore it is subject to that. The prudent man has always to consider the law and, generally speaking, his action must be law abiding and this law is the work of an art, the legislative art. And if it is good, not by accident but certainly good, then the legislator must have been the pupil of a teacher of the legislative art, of a philosopher.

Q: The difficulty that I have, though, is that it seems that if that's the case then prudence is going to be equated to the legislative art and Aristotle says it isn't.

S: Yes, not equated because prudence proper is the action of the individual. It takes place within that framework, but it is not dictated by the framework. Then men would always be like children who were told by the law in each case what to do, which they aren't. No, that is no difficulty. Mr. Dry.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Why would the teacher of the legislative art have to have knowledge of the things not human?

S: This is not yet said. Or did I say it? Oh yes, I was so imprudent to say that the teacher of legislators is a philosopher, and therefore. All right, I withdraw for the time being, not because it is wrong but because it unnecessarily complicates the argument now; because we have now to find out whether that is true, what I said, that prudence is subject ultimately to the legislative art -- really to the legislative science given here in books like Aristotle's. That I have to do. That is crucial. Why is prudence, so to speak, sovereign and must remain sovereign? That is answered, I believe, in the sequel. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: This relationship between the political art and prudence: the scheme you drew there is the same relationship as between justice in the widest sense and virtue.

S: Yes, but we have to raise this question: can we leave it at that? Can we leave it at this statement in Book V that universal justice is the same as virtue but only with a view to the other? This question will come up again. Now let us turn to 1141b33. "Now a kind of knowledge would then be to know for oneself, for one's own purposes: prudence." Yes?

O: Now knowledge of one's own interest will certainly be one kind of prudence; though it is very different from the other kinds, and people think that the man who knows and minds his own business is prudent, and that politicians are busybodies. . . .

S: In other words, this schema might lead us to the view that the political man, the politically active man, is higher than the private man, and, of course, the legislator still higher and Aristotle still higher. This is now discussed. Yes?

O: . . . thus Euripides writes --

Would that be prudent? when I might have lived

A quiet life, a cipher in the crowd,

Sharing the common fortune. . .

Restless, aspiring, busy men of action. . .

For people seek their own good, and suppose that it is right to do so.

S: In other words, Aristotle reminds us now of the common prejudice which we still understand, especially in this country, against the politician. I mean, this has nothing to do with philosophy. Very non-philosophic men have this prejudice and say a man who is minding his own business is a wiser man, a more prudent man, a more decent man, than these busybodies. Yes?

O: For people seek their own good, and suppose that it is right to do so. Hence this belief has caused the word 'prudent' to mean those who are wise in their own interest. Yet probably as a matter of fact. . . .

S: No, why probably? "Perhaps." This is these dangerous "perhaps-es" of Aristotle where one doesn't know what he means, especially. Yes?

O: . . . as a matter of fact a man cannot pursue his own welfare without domestic economy and even politics. Moreover, even the proper conduct of one's own affairs is a difficult problem, and requires consideration.

S: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. The subordination of prudence proper to the political art, and this whole edifice, this whole hierarchy, is by no means unquestioned. A case can be made for the view that prudence is higher. Why? The question ultimately concerns which way of life a man should choose: the political or the theoretical. From the very beginning we were reminded of it and it will come out -- the answer will be given -- at the end. Now this question can, of course, not be decided by the legislator because the legislator must decide in favor of the political life, in olden times at any rate. That means, however, that the most important choice a man can make can be made only by the individual and therefore prudence is in one sense the highest. This choice is guided by the order of rank of the activities but also by the situation, by the circumstances; the gifts of the individual and the circumstances. And this cannot be foreseen. This can be only seen when you look at the situation and the decision can be made only by the individual. Prudence is the highest because the order of ends, the rank of ends of the intrinsically high, the intrinsically low, is different from the most urgent; and I believe that is the key difficulty of practice. Something may be very low in rank and may be the most urgent. Simple example: appendix operation. That's nothing high. We do not admire anyone because he underwent an appendix operation. No one does that. It is no sign of any human dignity to have undergone or not to have undergone it and yet it may be, in a given situation, the most urgent thing that a man could do. So the priority cannot be established on the basis of the order of rank of the ends. That is the difficulty of human knowledge. It is something very elementary, but it is

usually not theoretically stated properly. This is the reason why ultimately prudence is, in a sense, sovereign: namely, independent of the order of rank. The order of rank does not tell it, but it does not make questionable for one moment the order of rank. But it is not sufficient.

Q: Is this because if a man who was capable chose the theoretical life when the most urgent was more important in the situation, that it would ultimately destroy also the possibility of the theoretical life for him?

S: Yes, sure. Yes, and yet it may be necessary at some time for the philosopher to side, as it were, against the polis. That is the problem of Socrates, by the way, because the simple formula which Socrates suggests, simply one has to obey the laws (period), is not sufficient as a careful study of the Crito would show. Socrates deliberates. That is usually overlooked. Socrates does not simply say one must obey the laws: every citizen must obey the laws, I, Socrates, am a citizen, therefore I have to obey the laws. That's not deliberation. That's a simple subsumption. Socrates deliberates. He takes into account many things, one of them being his old age. So the question is how would Socrates have acted if he were 40 and if the fate of philosophy as far as he knew would depend on his action? It's a very long question. And therefore prudence, meaning the decisions of the individual -- but the word decision has now acquired such an abominable meaning where it means the decision is not guided by any rational consideration. The decision is, of course, guided by rational considerations, by the order of the ends, which is not dependent on the decisions but pre-exists the decisions. But the order of the ends is not sufficient because of the essential difference between the highest and the most urgent. And everyone knows this from his own life: can perhaps find, if this were not indelicate, beautiful examples where he or she came across that conflict between the higher and the most urgent. Mr. Dry.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Would this explain why in Book VII of the Republic Socrates says philosophy has to come down?

S: No, that's not the same question. No. That is a general question, because the philosopher cannot avoid entirely the responsibility for other human beings. That's the reason. It is a general point. Mr. McAtee.

Q<sub>3</sub>: May I give a homely example just to see if I'm following up this point? One objection that one could raise here would be that for the sake of deliberation one should begin with those things which are closest to home.

S: Yes, yes, sure. Yes, yes, you do that, but if --

Q<sub>3</sub>: If you were a very good man and very good at deliberating you might even be interested in your community.

S: Oh sure; that's no question. That is clear. But the difficulty is this: if you always do the most urgent regardless of the order of rank you will never do what is intrinsically best. That is also a matter of discernment. When must I stop being concerned with lower but very urgent things and turn to the higher? Obviously, there cannot be general rules for that but there must be a kind of instinct.

Q<sub>3</sub>: But one would never be interested in these other things which are lower. Let's say foreign policy: at what point does foreign policy become of interest, say, to a man involved in --



S: -- a purely theoretical man. Surely, some are not interested, you know, but a few might be --

Q<sub>3</sub>: But would a man be happy not to be?

S: Well, there is no general answer. There are situations in which theoretical men can afford the luxury not to take any interest in it. There are situations in which it is impossible. That depends.

Q<sub>3</sub>: And there is an essential difference between Aristotle and many scientific--

S: Yes, sure. Yes, well this whole question has disappeared because prudence, strictly speaking, has no longer a status because the view which prevails today is that all prudence can be subsumed -- prudence is, so to speak, folkloristic, and what we would want to have is a science guiding us: say, for example, probability calculus can replace prudence.

Q<sub>3</sub>: I meant something more simple. For example, when he picks up a newspaper he is disgusted at all these problems, for example, atomic warfare and so on.

S: Well, a situation may be so hopeless that he just takes cover, as Plato puts it in the Republic: because a storm is coming, such terrible weather, what can he do? And the situation may not be entirely hopeless and then he will do something. That depends and that is exactly the point.

Yes; then Aristotle discusses three habits akin to prudence: to be good at advising, understanding, and judgment. We cannot read these things. They are for our general purpose now most important for a negative reason. None of these is a faculty of perceiving of the principles of action. They all presuppose that you know the principles of action, just as prudence does. Now let us turn to a passage where Aristotle brings us back to the issue: in 1143b14, at the end of a chapter.

O: We have now discussed the nature and respective spheres of prudence and wisdom, and have shown that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

S: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. So the relation of prudence and wisdom: that is the key, the highest question raised here. Now he discusses that in the sequel by raising two radical questions: first, and that is very strange, are wisdom and prudence of any use, the most extreme question one can raise here; and second, prudence being admittedly lower in rank than wisdom, how can it be in control of wisdom, for he had said in the introduction to this work that the political art is the highest, the most authoritative. It determines which arts and sciences are to be studied in the community. It's still in a way true, at least in state universities where the State Legislature has any say in these matters. In the European countries, the continental countries, it's, of course, still more the case. Now, as for the first question he says this: wisdom deals with what is always and not with things coming into being and perishing. If it deals with the laws of coming into being and perishing it deals, of course, with what is always, the laws being here understood to be permanent. Therefore, it cannot deal with what makes men happy, because that is a process of coming into being. You are not happy and become happy. As for prudence, moral virtue is something like health of the soul but knowledge of that health is as little needed for being healthy as knowledge of the health of the body, medicine, is needed

for being healthy in body. There are so many people who enjoy perfect health because they have never used a physician. Why should this not be possible regarding the health of the soul? Now these are the questions and he begins to discuss them in 1144a, beginning. Wisdom and prudence are choiceworthy for their own sake as virtues, i.e. perfections of parts of the soul, even if they should produce nothing. In other words, if something must lie waste it is inferior to its being properly cultivated for its own sake. But wisdom is that part of virtue which produces happiness not as medicine produces health but as health produces healthy actions. In other words, wisdom is identical with happiness. That's why it is good. Now let us turn to 1144a6.

O: Wisdom is a part of virtue as a whole, and therefore by its possession, or rather by its exercise, renders a man happy.

Also prudence as well as moral virtue determines the complete performance of man's proper function: virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, prudence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end.

S: Yes; so Aristotle says what is additionally needed, additionally to wisdom, for happiness is supplied by the cooperation of prudence and moral virtue. The end, the principle, is supplied by moral virtue: that is to say, not by any knowledge. Moral virtue makes us do the right or noble things for their own sake. That is what he does. Now let us go on in a23; we cannot read this all.

O: There is a certain faculty called cleverness, which is the capacity for doing the things aforesaid that conduce to the aim we propose, and so attaining that aim. If the aim is noble, this is a praiseworthy faculty; if base, it is mere knavery; this is how we come to speak of both prudent men and knaves as clever. Now this faculty is not identical with prudence, but prudence implies it. But that eye of the soul of which we spoke cannot acquire the quality of prudence without possessing virtue. This we have said before, and it is manifestly true. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct. . . .

S: No, "syllogisms," "the practical syllogisms."

O: . . . always have a major premise of the form 'Since the end or supreme good is so and so' (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for the sake of the argument); but the supreme good only appears good to the good man: vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles of conduct. Hence it is clear that we cannot be prudent without being good.

S: Now let us stop here. So we can say cleverness -- you know what cleverness is. Prudence is cultured cleverness and cleverness presupposes the end, and therefore prudence, as cultured cleverness, also presupposes the end. Prudence is an eye of the soul, as it is here called. But again we raise the question, which eyes of the soul see the principles and the ends? Prudence doesn't see it. Prudence sees only what is good for the end. Which eye of the soul sees that the good is the noble and not the pleasant or the lucrative, whatever it be? This has a further implication. It is clear that not all men are clever. I believe that we can take as a sound major of a syllogism. But if not all men are clever then not all men can be prudent. Does it not follow? And if prudence is a condition of moral goodness not all men can be morally good; and yet moral goodness was said to be available for all men except morons or insane people. Yet we have also read in the first book the quotation from Hesiod about

three kinds of people: one who know by themselves, who have the eye of the soul; those who listen to those wiser than they are; and those who have neither understanding nor do they listen to the others, and the last are, of course, the worst. In other words -- let me say it simply -- if the situation were simply as I stated before it would amount to this absurdity: that you can tell a man, "Be intelligent!" which is manifestly impossible. But we can say to a man, "Be sensible." Sensible and prudent is the same thing. That makes sense. We say it all the time. Why can we say to everyone, however unintelligent, "Be sensible"? Because in order to be sensible he has only to do what we, supposedly wiser, tell him to do. Being sensible can consist merely in listening to others. Being intelligent cannot be commanded; sensibility can be commanded. By the way, the law itself commands it sometimes. What is the legal formula for what a prudent man would do in given cases? What is the legal formula, Mr. Fleming? If a man acts in a way which is very irrational there is a legal formula for that -- in driving or in building a fence or --

O: (Inaudible).

S: No, no, no. There is a more specific formula.

O: Reasonable man test.

S: Reasonable man. Everyone is legally presupposed to be able to do what a reasonable man -- that's it, because you can say to a man "Be sensible" but not "Be intelligent."

O<sub>2</sub>: The technical term is "reasonably prudent man."

S: Yes. The possibility that a morally good man does materially bad things exists. In other words, a nice man who would wish to do what decent men tell him and prudent men tell him and doesn't find anyone, and he is too dumb to distinguish between a clever crook and a prudent man. That can happen. He may do the materially bad thing because he picks the wrong advisor; and it is possible that there may also be a nice advisor, I mean a very intelligent advisor, who himself is not prudent because he lacks the cleverness. There is a present-day writer whose chief subject is this interesting situation and that is Wodehouse, the British humorist, because Bertie Worchester, this very nice young man, is wholly unable to act prudently because it is not given to him, and therefore he turns to his valet, called Jeeves, whom he regards as a paragon of prudence, but Jeeves too is not prudent and that leads to a very amusing situation. But this is a grave moral problem.

Now Aristotle goes on as follows and says here we have cleverness and cleverness cultivated is prudence and now he says there is a parallel to that from the side of desire or will. Here is moral virtue. There is also something which is in proportion. Cleverness to prudence equal to "x" to moral virtue. Now what is that "x"? This Aristotle calls natural virtue, which means not yet virtue, also non-cultivated. Moral virtue is cultivated natural virtue just as prudence is cultivated cleverness, and the two must grow together. The growth of cleverness into prudence and the growth of natural virtue into moral virtue must go together. Then you will arrive at the perfect gentleman at the end.

Q: Is natural virtue similar to virtu?

S: No, no, no, no. Oh no. That's good you raised this question. No, what he means is clear: there are people who are by nature nice. Well, you all see it



sometimes: small kids perhaps exposed to a bad surrounding and are good natured, are not particularly cowardly, and are fair, you know, in their way in which they can be -- nice kids. But, of course, a nice kid cannot be a perfect gentleman. A kid may be nice and clever in its childish way. Now if both are properly cultivated then it can become a perfect gentleman. There are kids who are not nice and who are also stupid. This creates a grave question whether they can ever become perfect gentlemen.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Do you think there is any connection etymologically with the word nice? The word nice originally meant --

S: Exact.

Q<sub>2</sub>: It also meant having a connotation of badness --

S: No, I did not think of that. I did not know it. I did not know this bad connotation. I know nice in the sense of exact. But at any rate, whatever may be true of English etymology, the thesis, I believe, is in itself intelligible. Isn't it? Yes, but still our question is not yet answered. Let us read the end of that book, 1145a5, the last six or seven lines. "The choice, the will, cannot be correct without prudence nor without virtue."

O: . . . our choice of actions will not be right without prudence any more than without moral virtue, since, while moral virtue enables us to achieve the end, prudence makes us adopt the right means to the end. 23

S: Yes, not "to achieve the end." I believe it means also "to see the end." The word is here omitted. Yes. So this is what he has repeated time and again. The end is supplied by moral virtue. Prudence supplies the means. But the end being the principle it means moral virtue supplies the principle. Prudence presupposes the knowledge of the principle. Now read the end first.

O: But nevertheless it is not really the case that prudence is in authority over wisdom, or over the higher part of the intellect, any more than medical science is in authority over health. Medical science does not control health, but studies how to procure it; hence it issues orders in the interests of health, but not to health. And again, one might as well say that political art governs the gods, because it gives orders about everything in the state. 73

S: In other words, while it gives laws and orders regarding the worship of the gods which it, according to Aristotle, does -- does not mean, of course, it controls the gods. So prudence is, as it were -- prudence and moral virtue order the sub-theoretical life of man so that man can devote his life to the theoretical life. That's in the highest case and there they cooperate. But here that is, of course, an evasion of our question because in this case the end is the theoretical life and its state of the will is the desire for the theoretical life. If you have a man who desires the theoretical life and knows in a general way what the theoretical life is then he will deliberate prudently about the conditions of his dedicating himself, circumstanced as he is, to the theoretical life, an extremely simple situation. But what about those people who, for one reason or the other, do not choose the theoretical life? Where do they get the knowledge of the end? Do you see that point? Do you see this difficulty? Where do they get it? Now in one way one can say, and this is the answer which Thomas occasionally suggests in his commentary, which to some extent is true, their nature supplies the end. Nature: there is a natural inclination toward the lower

ends as well as toward the knowledge. But the question, of course, arises: how to discern the natural end from perversions of the natural end. That comes up and how can the non-wise man, non-theoretically wise man, have the proper discernment? Would this not be a form of theoretical knowledge?

Let me state it differently. Prudence does not supply knowledge of the end. But those who possess the natural virtues (you know, in the sense defined) -- they are by nature -- they by nature tend toward the good end. They by nature desire the good end. But they make blunders in detail before they have acquired prudence; obviously. Think of this nice kid confronted with a situation he or she never saw and not being able to put two and two together properly, lacking prudence. The nice kid will make mistakes. That's clear. But if he has acquired prudence he will never make this kind of mistake. According to this interpretation, good upbringing, does not imply the right ends, knowledge of the right ends, but in previous statements we had the impression that good upbringing, moral education, does create this awareness of the good ends. That remains absolutely dark. The characteristic of the sixth book, I believe one can say, is this negative point: that we do not get any clarity about the cognitive status of the moral principles. We get reasonable clarity about prudence; but prudence, to repeat, presupposes knowledge of the ends.

Q: Isn't this clarity in that the end is something higher in our notion of a hierarchy?

S: Yes, but this is of no great help because the majority of men cannot and will not dedicate themselves to the theoretical life and the perfect gentleman is defined as a man who is not a theoretical man, who will lead the political or the economic life but not the theoretical life.

Q: Don't we speak of a well brought up child and he is aware that there are certain authorities. . . ?

S: Yes, but how does he know? Because his parents told him? How did his parents get it? Because their parents told them.

Q: He knows that his parents know better than he does.

S: Yes, all right. Yes, that is not the point, but where did the parents get this knowledge themselves? And you cannot go *ad infinitum*. Eventually you have to come to some knowledge which is not merely imparted by parents. You see, it leads then to a vicious circle. Here is one society which imparts this kind of principles into children. There is another society which includes others. The principles may very well profoundly disagree, I mean not in crude matters, but in matters which are refined in any sense of refined. How is it possible? Naturally the people of the society "A" would say, "We are the ones who have the nice, proper notion of gentlemanship and the others are barbarians." That we know. That happens all the time. But obviously one cannot leave it at that. Ultimately we must raise the question of some standard by virtue of which one can judge whether a given society and to what extent is barbaric or not barbaric. That you have to do and the well brought up people as such cannot answer. Mr. Sabine, who is well known because of his history of political thought, gave once here a lecture in Chicago in which he took a very strong stand for liberalism in no way relativistic and I was quite surprised because the books seem to be thoroughly relativistic. And I asked him, "How come? On what ground do you take this stand?" And then he said, very disarmingly, "I suppose I take this stand because I was brought up in this country." I believe you can all see, that's

not sufficient because on the same ground some cannibals will be in favor of cannibalism: because they were brought up in a cannibal society. That won't do. You have to go to a higher principle and I believe what Aristotle presupposes here is, of course, that there are some people -- he drops this and begins again. No, more radically stated, the end is the theoretical life and ultimately the dignity of moral virtue can only be understood in the light of this end. But the concern with morality, the desire for morality as the end, and not looking beyond that, is a kind of divination of the true end of man which somehow stops, which is somehow thwarted. That would be the way in which Plato would understand it and ultimately Aristotle, I believe, would also have to say something of this kind.

Q: What do you mean by will? Do you translate force by will or desire by will?

S: No, I meant it here synonymously with desire going with reason regardless of whether it is right or wrong, because there can also be a bad will.

Q: It cannot simply mean desire?

S: No, no. The mere desire cannot very well be in man because it will always be affected by the fact that man is a rational animal. Rabbi Weiss.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Would it be proper to say that the nature of morality is such that the ends must be dark, as Aristotle indicated in Book I where he says that the "what" supplies the first principles.

S: No, not the "what"; the "that."

Q<sub>2</sub>: I'm sorry, I meant the "that."

S: Oh yes. In other words, and the "why" doesn't have to be known. But all right: how do people know that the good is the noble? Say because they have been told by their parents who also told them that this is noble, this is noble, this is base, this is base. But we cannot leave it at that, I mean we here; theoretical men cannot leave it at that. We have to raise the question why. And Aristotle has -- I'm sure that Aristotle -- I explained this in a former meeting. Two ends, massive ends, are obviously here although not stressed very much. One is clearly theoretical knowledge, theoria. The other is polis. Man is the rational animal. Man is the animal which possesses logos, which means both reason and speech. The reason in its highest form is theoretical reason. Speech points to society, communication, living together. The most perfect form of that is the polis according to Aristotle. Therefore theoria and polis are the ends within which the whole life of man takes place. The moral virtues must ultimately be understood in the light of these two ends. Now these two ends are not identical. What theoria requires is not identical in every point with what the polis requires. It is not identical. Since, however, the root of both is the same, man's nature, man's nature as a rational animal, therefore there is also a kind of growing together, if I may say so using an Aristotelian expression, of the requirements of theoria, on the one hand, and of the polis on the other, and this web constitutes by this growing together -- this is moral virtue. Now what Aristotle does in a perfectly legitimate way is this: what comes to sight first in our orientation are the moral virtues, not the "why's," theoria on the one hand and the polis on the other. These are the phenomena and we start from these phenomena and try to understand them. I mean, the amazing evidence which Aristotle's statements about the moral virtues have in Books III to V is due to the fact: we still recognize these things when he speaks about liberality or



whatever it may be. We may perhaps say he should have mentioned some other virtues and so on. Perhaps we have to quarrel with him at this or that point, but in the main it is an evidently sensible enterprise and evidently necessary enterprise. So for the understanding of the moral virtues as such, and that means also for the statesman and legislator, the raising of this question of the "why" of the moral virtues, the ends which they somehow serve, is not so important, because the statesman is concerned with having a society in which the gentlemen preponderate. Therefore he has to know what a gentleman is, and if he doesn't know it -- well, he will not know it sufficiently if he doesn't study Aristotle's Ethics or some equivalent to that. That he will do. But the main concern then is very simple: what institutions are most conducive to the rule of gentlemen? (The Politics). And what are most conducive in these circumstances? Well, that you must ask the man on the spot. Look at the map; look at the armament of the various states and all this kind of thing. That's easy; theoretically easy, not a difficult question. So I believe something of this kind is what Aristotle has in mind because it is absolutely amazing how much he pushes back in the Ethics this question of the ends of man. Well, Thomas says, in his truly Aristotelian spirit, that the ends are ultimately the natural ends and the natural ends are, of course, derivative from the nature of man and the nature of man being the rational animal both the polis and theoria follow necessarily. In other words, Aristotle could have written a deduction of the virtues from the nature of man, but because he tried to be as practical as possible, to remain as close as possible to the needs of the legislator and political man, he did not do that. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: In the attempt to understand what he means by the "that" provides the first principles in Book I, I wonder if by a poor analogy such as looking at a beautiful flower -- you can't prove exactly why it's beautiful. That it's beautiful you can see. The same is true within action: that it's beautiful, resplendent, can be seen but you can't always go behind it.

S: Yes, only the trouble is that people ordinarily don't fight about the beauty of flowers. They may fight about the flowers but not about whether it's beautiful or not; whereas they do fight about rule, who should rule, and there the gentlemen are in conflict with the various kinds of non-gentlemen and therefore the issue is -- the gentlemen are challenged in a very effective way every day -- is gentlemanship so terribly important as you claim? Yes? Here you are.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Isn't there some beauty in the act --

S: Yes, sure. Well, I suppose most people would agree regarding the beauty of a particular flower although there is also disagreement there, but this doesn't have this importance for human life as a whole, because gentlemanship as such is questioned by the non-gentlemen and, as it is put in Xenophon's Athenian Constitution which we have read last quarter, the non-gentlemen say we like rather to be ruled by low class people who take care of our interests than by gentlemen who take care of the interests of gentlemen, and they question the relevance of gentlemanship; and therefore it is a much graver issue. In other words, the nobility of many things is not seen -- of these things -- is not seen. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: I'm not sure but I think I disagree with Aristotle.

S: That is extremely important to us but only under one condition: that you have reasons which you can make clear.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Well, first of all I'd like to know whether I understood him properly or not so that I can say I disagree. S: It's too late but why don't you write it.

13th Meeting: May 23, 1963

(Note: A brief part of the beginning of this tape was recorded defectively and pages 1 to 4 can therefore be expected to be somewhat incomplete.)

. . . . Now first you raised the absolutely necessary question, what does Book VII mean. . . . (A few minutes of inaudible exchange).

. . . . You also raised the question, why does Aristotle discuss bestiality at such length whereas he says almost nothing about the divine; and you suggested one answer: that perhaps it would be the question of the contemplative life. Now we have already seen an earlier allusion to that question of the divine in the chapter on magnanimity, which we must also not forget. . . . (Next remarks indicate that Dr. Strauss was pleased with a suggestion in the paper that what was read hitherto was black and white and in Book VII there is also gray). Now what is this most striking gray phenomenon? . . . What is the phenomenon? What is the phenomenon from which Aristotle starts? The virtuous man is the man who knows the right thing and invariably? does it. The vicious man is the man who does not know the right thing and thinks the wrong thing is the right thing and invariably? does it. Now what is the gray phenomenon?

O: He knows and doesn't do it. He knows the right thing.

S: Yes. And doesn't do it. And this would be the gray; neither black nor white. Yes, that is quite true. Now for the terms I suggest this translation: continence. Let us call it continence and the opposite incontinence because continence does take a narrow meaning in English too. This is all right here.

Still this creates a difficulty which you did not mention. Incontinence we know: the man who knows the right thing and doesn't do it. What is the continent man, however? That I believe you did not make clear.

O: The continent is the man who is tempted but does not give in.

S: So. Why is he not perfectly virtuous?

O: Because he doesn't really want to; he doesn't choose to.

S: Oh, no, no, no, no. He chooses. He is tempted! So that the truly virtuous man is not even tempted. That is the point. And how does Aristotle call that truly virtuous man in this sphere who is not even tempted?

O: The moderate.

S: The moderate. So let us stick to these terms. Now once we see that, that the subject is continence and incontinence, and let us call this fellow writing on blackboard the dissolute man or profligate. (But do you not call profligate a man who wastes his money? But you wouldn't call him dissolute. So I think dissolute is probably better.) But the question is this: are there not also in the sphere of the other virtues temptations so that a man, for example, is tempted to be stingy but overcomes it whereas the truly liberal man would not even be tempted to be stingy? Do you see that? In other words, should there not also be a whole rainbow of continences? He says it. There is a kind of continence regarding money, honors, and what have you, but this is not continence proper. Continence proper has to do only with what?

O: With bodily pleasures.

S: Bodily pleasures. That is, here we are concerned only with one virtue, moderation, not with the others. One could add one point to make clear the terminology. There is another thing which is akin to continence: in Greek, I would translate this by endurance. Continence has to do with pleasures and endurance with pains. So that is clear. So in other words if someone is tempted to run away from the dangers of fire or something but doesn't succumb to the temptation is an enduring man. Otherwise he is soft. So what would be the virtue corresponding to endurance?

O: Courage.

S: So. And that's very interesting. . . . And it is quite interesting, however, the emphasis is entirely on this sphere of the pleasures of the body, not on the pains. That is remarkable and however we have to explain that the fact must surely be noted.

Now there was another point which your paper gave occasion to mention. Why are the bodily pleasures -- the right posture toward them or the tolerable posture -- the right posture toward them is moderation; the tolerable posture toward them is continence. Why are they terribly important? That would be the question of which I don't know whether anyone has -- to which anyone including myself has the answer. But that would surely be the question which would have to be answered in the long run. Why is the right posture toward the bodily pleasures of such an importance that Aristotle devotes to it the bulk of a whole book of the Ethics? After all, since the other temptations, say regarding pain and the others, are also important. I leave it at this remark for the time being.

Only a final point which concerns purely your usage, which is not only your usage. You used the word pessimism and by implication, of course, also optimism. Now these terms are truly senseless terms and they have their origin in one of the most common human vices, laziness, thoughtlessness. Optimism is the view created by Leibniz according to which the visible universe is the best of all possible worlds: optimus, optimum universum. Pessimism is the reply to that: the visible universe is the worst of all possible worlds. That was created by Schopenhauer in the 19th century. These are terms which are wholly meaningless when used for other purposes. I mean, why don't we say of a man who is -- there are some people who always think they flunk an examination or, you know, all things will go wrong -- we know such people -- why don't we call them apprehensive or fearsome people and the other ones sanguine people? It is much clearer. And I think only a great lot of nonsense is said if these terms are used. I know that I can at most influence one or two of you to change that but I cannot change the usage because people like, apparently, the high falootin words for their own sake. That cannot be changed by any things done in the classroom.

Before we turn to our text, the question (the author of which is not known to me), what is the difference between the virtue of Rousseau, meaning the virtue of which Rousseau speaks, of course, and Aristotelian virtue? That is a hard question because in a way it is truly the same because Rousseau understands by virtue on the one hand strength of the soul and that is not a bad formula for what Aristotle understands by it. And the second meaning of virtue is performance of duties, the social virtues, what Aristotle would call universal justice. There are differences, but they would not show on the level of a simple answer, a straightforward answer, to this straightforward question. Who raised this question? Mr. McAtee.



Q: I was interested in whether there was a difference with respect to principle.

S: Yes, but there is a whole question of the sphere of the theoretical life, which in Aristotle looks entirely different. I can only fall back on Mr. Rein-kin's famous and beautiful formulation in our Rousseau seminar. What did you say about the contemplation of Rousseau?

O: That it was the secularized beatific vision.

S: Yes, very good. And there is no such thing in Aristotle. Good.

But now let us turn to our discussion and let us first try to understand the beginning of the seventh book. "After that we must speak, having made another beginning." Here a new beginning. Why does he make here a new beginning? That would be the question. Now the subject of the bulk of this part is continence, but a special emphasis on incontinence and the historical reason, one can say, the external reason why this is so important is because Socrates had denied the possibility of incontinence, meaning the possibility that someone can know the better and choose the worse. Well, Socrates had as much common sense as Aristotle. What he meant by that is a long question into which we cannot go here, but on the face of it it is a clear denial of common sense and Aristotle has, of course, to face it. So the pleasant things to which the incontinent man succumbs and which tempt the continent man are, it would seem, things which are by nature pleasant, at first glance, especially the sexual pleasures. This is quite clear: that the sexual pleasures are here of special importance. To be tempted by them and even to succumb to them while knowing that one ought not to desire them is not simply virtue nor vice. To succumb to them is less than vice and to be tempted by them is less than virtue. So virtue-vice doesn't exhaust the moral sphere. Already at the end of Book IV Aristotle had said that continence is not virtue. He made this clear. Book VII deals, then, we can say, with moral phenomena other than virtues and vices strictly understood.

Now we have to consider a few things which we have seen previously. At the end of Book IV there was this remarkable statement about the sense of shame, which is also not a virtue nor a vice strictly understood. It is something for young people. It is something praiseworthy in young people, but not in mature people, and therefore it is not a virtue proper. Now the shamefaced man or young man commits improper acts but deplores committing them, we have seen, and this shows that he is immature. The gentleman doesn't do things which are not being done. (Period.) Therefore he has never a reason for being ashamed. The continent man does not commit them either but he would like to commit them; only he controls himself. Why is this case important? Now we have seen in Book V references to the fact that a gentleman -- there are a number of Greek words for gentleman: one is epikeitai, the word which can also take the precise meaning of the equitable man (epielke is equitable), but it has also a broader meaning where it means -- it is very hard to say. What would be an English equivalent, a quasi-synonym for perfect gentleman?

O: Noble?

S: No, that wouldn't do it because it is too strong. Say a fine man or something of this kind. No, Aristotle says in the fifth book more than once that such a nice man may commit adultery, but nevertheless it is emphasized he will not be an unjust man. I give you the passages: 1132a, 2 to 3; 1134a, 19 to 23. Now at the end of Book IV there was a strict statement. The gentleman never does anything which is in any way improper. He changes it now in Book V. And

what is the subject of Book V? Justice. What is the peculiarity of justice compared with the other virtues? Common sense: I mean not a high falutin thing.

O: (Inaudible).

S: Yes, that's not practical enough. I mean, morality in general has to do with things praised and blamed but in the sphere of justice people go beyond praising and blaming. They reward and punish and especially punish. So justice, we can say, is the virtue which has more teeth in it than the other virtues, which I believe makes sense. Therefore, in this connection -- therefore, because life becomes more tough here one has also to be more cautious and has to consider between forgivable and unforgivable things, between aggravating and extenuating things. And in this connection one must simply say this: this really is a very respectable man throughout his life and then this has happened to him and then to disapprove of it is one thing but to put him in jail or worse things is another thing and there you have to watch your step and make finer distinctions. That would be one reason. I think we can leave it at this remark for the time being regarding the whole context. Yes?

Q: I'm sorry but I just didn't follow the reasoning. I wonder if you would repeat it.

S: Is there not a difference between praise and blame on the one hand and acquittal and condemnation on the other? And acquittal and condemnation are more closely connected with justice than with any other virtue and therefore that is also more the sphere where excuse or aggravation, extenuating or non-extenuating, have to be considered. For example, if someone is stingy he is not a legal offender. You say he is a stingy fellow but if he commits adultery that's a punishable offense.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (As to how a virtuous man not subject to temptation could commit adultery.)

S: Yes -- no, but that is the point. We come to that. We learn from Book VII that he is not a virtuous man but he is --

Q<sub>2</sub>: Not a vicious man either.

S: No, no, he's not vicious. No, no, now let me see.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Inaudible.)

S: Yes, but here we are concerned with a man who is not continent.

Q<sub>2</sub>: That's not a vice or virtue. Right?

S: Yes. Well, but they are still -- they are somehow good -- continence is good and incontinence is bad. That still remains but it is not as radically good as moderation is and incontinence is not as radically bad as dissoluteness is. The dissolute man simply thinks it is not wrong to steal, to commit adultery, or whatever it may be. Do you see that? Is there not a difference between people who say any pleasure which I find, whatever the law or decency says about it, I will try to get, and the other man who says no, I would like very much always to do the right and decent thing, but in certain situations he succumbed? Or another man who never succumbs but is tempted. That is what Mr. Wenger so nicely said: the simple black and white picture of Books III to V is

now abandoned. Now we have to do with what happens mostly among human beings. I will give you an example from the literature. It's not high literature. Unfortunately, it's from German but I can't help it, having been brought up in Germany. There was a well known German humorist called Wilhelm Busch who wrote comical stories in very simple verses and one is called "The Pious Helen." She was a girl, not very strict, and then when she reached a certain age she turned to alcohol and she really detested herself for doing that. She went down on her knees and prayed that she may not do it. So she had really the good intention, but unfortunately the temptation was so great that while kneeling she moved toward the booze. You see: that is a clear case of incontinence as distinguished from dissoluteness. The dissolute individual would not have had any misgivings in emptying one whiskey bottle after the other, you know, except if she would suffer bodily from it. But she really didn't want to do it so she is better than the other. But also the continent man who does not move while kneeling toward the whiskey bottle is less than the man who has not to make a special prayer in order to be protected against drinking unnecessary whiskey, if whiskey is ever necessary.

Q: I think this is all a very interesting argument but you could argue that the incontinent man is worse than the dissolute man because he does know better.

S: But is this not of some importance that he can control himself? I mean, from what point of view do you look at that?

Q: I don't know; I would argue that the man who doesn't know any better --

S: Yes, but this ignorance is guilty. You know, he discussed that in Book II. He should know better. Ultimately it's his fault that he does not, just as someone would say -- an employee is fired because he didn't do his duty and he said I'm so sorry, I forgot my duty. You cannot; you are supposed never to forget your duty. I mean, if he would say he forgot that Mr. "X" was not Mr. "Y" this is surely excusable but forgetting of one's duty is as such the guilt. That we are supposed never to forget.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (As to whether any of the other virtues have teeth; for example, courage and its opposite conceived in terms of deserting in battle.)

S: No, why was Aristotle so silent about the polis when he spoke of courage? He took away the whole basis of courage as justice.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Do the Jewish or the Christian tradition admit the possibility of Aristotelian moral virtue?

S: Well, there are some men here, Father Vaughan, who know the Christian view much better than I do, and Mr.                    too. But I would say that no Jew or Christian would ever admit that there can be a virtuous man in Aristotle's sense. I mean, this is not Jewish apologetics on my part, but they say that the notion of the pharisee in the New Testament is more aptly applied, more simply applied, to the Aristotelian good man at the end of Book IV because the pharisees all admitted, of course, that they are sinners in spite of all merits that may have been claimed for enlarging luxuries and other things. But they admitted always they were sinners whereas the gentleman of Aristotle doesn't admit that he is a sinner. Is this clear?

Q<sub>4</sub>: This clarifies a lot. [S: I'm glad.] This position is absolutely incompatible with the Christian psychology.



S: Oh, there is no question.

Q<sub>4</sub>: This is the point that I had difficulty grasping before.

S: But you see now -- again I quote Mr. Wenger: Now when he comes to the black-white, goes over the black-white discussion, he comes closer to things which -- also to common sense. But the question is why did Aristotle make the black-white picture. That we have to raise. Sure. But I believe -- do you know the reason why he made it? Can you imagine a reason?

Q<sub>4</sub>: No, except if he really wanted to characterize the whole broad picture of what he thought might be possible.

S: He was not a logical positivist so he must have forgotten that. No, a very substantial reason. For example, let us take moderation. Let us grant that no man is moderate, strictly understood. Let us grant that. But we also say to the extent to which he is not moderate he is a sinner; he is defective in some way. It may not be a grave sin but there is some defect in him. But how can you face that if you do not know, in the first place, what the perfectly moderate man is? You know: whenever you speak of an imperfection you claim to know what the perfection is and therefore it is absolutely necessary even if the perfectly moderate man were not possible to know what the perfectly moderate man would be. You see there is also this: immoderate people -- there are all kinds of immoderateness, kinds and degrees, and in order to recognize them, in order to diagnose them, you have to have a picture of the perfectly moderate man just as you cannot diagnose diseases of any part of the body if you do not know the healthy shape and healthy function of that part of the body. Good. But I'm glad that some point became clearer to you. By the way, I must say one point. Unfortunately I have not looked it up. In this very remarkable essay of Winston Churchill on Lord Burkenhead, whose name was Smith -- I forgot his first name, that's the trouble.

O: F. E.

S: F. E. Oh, thank you. F. E. Very good. And F. E. Burkenhead, who was by the way a remarkable lawyer -- there is a wonderful dialogue between young F. E. Burkenhead when he was pleading before a London law court and a very dignified old judge, and how this young lawyer took this dignified but somewhat unintelligent judge for a ride is a sheer beauty, a dialogue improvised by F. E. while he lived. And F. E. Burkenhead -- F. E. Smith, I'm sorry -- gave Churchill Aristotle's Ethics to read, of course in English translation because Churchill, as you know, has an allergy to foreign languages. And when Churchill had read it he said, "That's it." And there is even a remark which he makes, I believe in the very essay on Burkenhead or in some other one when he speaks of some very distinguished British gentleman: well, he always did the right thing, he never made any mistake. He expresses himself even more strongly, exactly along the lines of the end of Book IV of the Ethics: a man who has nothing in him which he could ever rebuke. Oh yes, Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>5</sub>: When you speak of the man who in principle is never supposed to forget his duty this seems to me to deny the possibility of inculpable ignorance.

S: (Several inaudible words.) You may forget that the date is the 15th of April and believe it is the first of May. This is a slightly different thing, although I believe it is not quite different because the duty of paying your taxes means paying your taxes at that date at the latest. But let us now go on because quite a few things, I believe, will become clear.

At the beginning of Book VII we had a beautiful example when he speaks of the divine man and quotes Homer on Hector and shortly thereafter he says beastly men occur most frequently among barbarians, which doesn't mean, of course, that most barbarians are bestial but they are more frequent among barbarians than among Greeks; not more. But Hector too is a barbarian, so you see how foolish these people are who say Aristotle shared 100% the prejudices of the most narrow-minded peasants about the superiority of the Greeks to barbarians. The only evidence they have is a statement, this famous thing which we do not know from Aristotle's own mouth, this famous advice to Alexander that he should not go in for a mixture of Greeks and Persians. You know, but this doesn't have the dignity -- even if it were absolutely true, which I do not know -- which Aristotle's own writings have. So Aristotle surely did not think that. Let us turn to 1145b, 2 to 7. That's the end of that chapter. [Note: not in most translations.]

O: Our proper course with this subject as with others will be to present the various views about it, and then, after first reviewing the difficulties they involve, finally to establish if possible all or, if not all, the greater part and the most important of the opinions generally held with respect to these states of mind; since if the discrepancies can be solved, and a residuum of current opinion left standing, the true view will have been sufficiently established.

S: Yes, what he translates "the current opinion" is in Greek endoxa and that means simply the things which exist in opinion, which are generally accepted. This is a quite remarkable statement. It is interesting that Aristotle did not do this earlier. There he did not start from the rightly held opinions and ascend step by step to the true view. That was done, to the extent to which he did it, very quickly. Here we have a model example of the ascent from opinions to knowledge. Good. And it shows that in a way this is a more sophisticated discussion -- in a way -- than the previous discussions were. Now we cannot possibly read everything; only for illustration there is 1146a21.

O: Again there is the difficulty raised by the argument of the sophists. The sophists wish to show their cleverness by entrapping their adversary into a paradox, and when they are successful, the resultant chain of reasoning ends in a deadlock: the mind is fettered, being unwilling to stand still because it cannot approve the conclusion reached, yet unable to go forward because it cannot untie the knot of the argument. Now one of their arguments proves that folly combined with incontinence is a virtue.

S: I trust you understand that state of mind. Someone gave you a demonstration which is flawless and you are sure the whole thing is wrong. Your mind is fettered, the most uneasy condition of mind. Yes?

O: It runs as follows: if a man is foolish and also incontinent, owing to his incontinence he does the opposite of what he believes that he ought to do; but he believes that good things are bad, and that he ought not to do them; therefore he will do good things and not bad ones.

S: Yes. So is it not beautiful? Well, I thought of a simple example. He believes that suicide is the right thing in the circumstances but then he is too cowardly to shoot himself; so he does the right thing, not killing himself, out of a vice. Now the difficulty, of course, is clear: his doing the right thing is not truly doing the right thing because he does it for the wrong reasons. But from a practical point of view it is better. He has this kind of lack of self-control regarding death in this situation. So that is a nice point. Yes. Now

the difference between the incontinent man and the dissolute man we have discussed before. We do not have to go into that. And then there is a very fine analysis. What does this precisely mean: that the incontinent man knows and he acts against knowledge. Aristotle becomes here very subtle. Does he know both premises of the syllogism? For example, pleasurable things of this kind are bad; this is a pleasurable thing of the kind in question, hence it should not be done -- is not only one thing clear, either the major or the minor, what the case may be. This does not affect the broader issue. Therefore, I pass over that.

In 1147a24, following, he discusses first the simple case of perfect agreement between major and minor premise because there is no desire present. That's easy. This is a bad pleasurable thing -- no. Pleasurable things of this kind are bad but this is a pleasurable thing of the bad kind. Hence, it is bad. It shouldn't be done. That is relatively simple if you do not have any desire for the pleasurable thing in question. I believe we can pass this over. But in the more interesting case what happens is, in Aristotle's analysis, that the desire establishes; as it were, a major premise which suits the desire. Namely, someone desires, say, a woman whom he shouldn't desire and the desire establishes the premise, women of this kind should be desired. But it is not made explicitly but it is implied in the whole mental process. Good. Thomas calls this very nicely the universal of concupiscence, the universal generated by concupiscence. Differently stated, the incontinent man acts not properly on knowledge. No, he has the knowledge: this is bad. But there is no other knowledge which contradicts it. There is not strictly speaking even an opinion which contradicts the major, but an implicit opinion; roughly this -- let us leave it at this case -- he doesn't opine this woman should be desired, but it is only implied in him. Therefore, the Socratic analysis is fundamentally wrong.

Yes, and as we have said before, in the sequel: continence and incontinence, simply stated, have to do with the necessary things which create pleasure, and that is to say, the bodily things, i.e. the subject matter of continence or incontinence is food, drink, and sex. The incontinent man is characterized by powerful desires overcoming his choice of the good. The dissolute man has made a choice of the bad, a deliberate choice for the bad. Let us turn to 1148b, 15 to 19.

O: Besides those things however which are naturally pleasant, of which some are pleasant generally and others pleasant to particular races of animals and of men, there are other things, not naturally pleasant, which become pleasant either as a result of arrested development or from habit, or in some cases owing to natural depravity. Now corresponding to each of these kinds of unnatural pleasures we may observe a related disposition of character.

S: Yes. Now, in other words -- and then he speaks of the bestial, of bestiality. I mean, people who have desires for which no normal human being would have a desire. This is, of course, not incontinence. That's bestiality. Incontinence proper has to do with the things which are by nature pleasant, not with things which become pleasant because of a natural defect or an illness or a custom. Now in the sequel he gives some examples of incontinence in the wider sense, not in the strict sense. We can postpone it.

Then we have to say something about the next chapter because that is important for our broader issue: the section 1149a24, beginning, where the thesis is maintained that incontinence regarding anger is less base than incontinence re-



garding desires. Does this ring a bell, Mr. Dry? It seems.

✓ O: Well, yes, I was thinking that that would be the explanation why continence has to do with moderation regarding bodily pleasures.

S: That is so very good. I didn't think of that, but that's very true, very true. Very good.

Q: The two horses?

S: No, more generally. That is not literally true, what you said, because the two horses -- there is no distinction between desire and anger. Mr. Boyan.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Trying to clear up a point he made earlier, he asks whether the point Dr. Strauss just made is that the dissolute man has made a choice of the bad.)

✓ S: Yes, he is convinced that to enjoy all women who are attractive to him is the right thing, whereas the incontinent man says no, it's wrong, but in a given situation he succumbs. And the continent man says also it is wrong but he is tempted but he never succumbs.

Q<sub>2</sub>: The kind of situation I had in mind has to do with someone who is raised in a slum and he is brought up to think that certain things -- it never occurs to him that --

S: Yes, he is corrupted by custom. He is corrupted; to that extent it is, of course, excusable. At least there is an extenuating circumstance. But it doesn't make him good.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Yes, but I thought he would be less bad than the fellow who was brought up right as the usually good --

✓ S: To some extent, but since custom or habit becomes second nature it is from a certain stage on almost as bad as if he had been born with a bad nature. Aristotle was not sentimental but on the other hand he was, of course, not inhuman; no, very far from it. In other words, quite a few things are excusable surely and we must listen to every reasonable excuse; but whatever is excusable is in need of excuse. It is in itself bad. I mean, you don't excuse yourself if you go and write your prelim papers properly. It's not an object of excuse. If you would, which God forbid, flunk, then, if you are responsible to anyone else, there might be a need for excuse. Yes, do you see that? Good. But the excusable is necessarily bad. But it is necessarily bad. It doesn't mean it is devilishly bad. Of course, then it wouldn't be excusable. But it is bad.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Is it worse than incontinence?

S: What?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Being excusably bad.

*only by writing in context*  
S: But the incontinent man is, to some extent excusable; to some extent. We come to that. But let us -- if you don't mind because we really have so much to discuss. This section is extremely interesting because it deals with a Platonic subject, as Mr. Reinkin divined, namely the famous teaching of Plato according to which spiritedness is higher in rank than desire.

Q: With the two horses --

S: The two horses -- I'm sorry, no. The two horses occur in the Phaedrus --

Q: And one is white --

S: Yes, one is beautiful and the other looks like Socrates. Period. Leave it at the description. But they are both called desires. In the Phaedrus he does not make the distinction between desire and spiritedness which he makes in the Republic. Yes, this is of some importance.

Q: (Inaudible).

S: The dialogues Republic and Timaeus deal with that. The Phaedrus does not deal with the distinction between them. And in the Republic where is that? In the psychology: Book IV. Good.

Now why is incontinence regarding anger less base than incontinence regarding desires? The first argument (that is really Platonic -- now listen to that): in anger there is an element of listening to reason. In desire there is no element of listening to reason. The object of anger is revenge. You want to get at him who hurt you, who despised you, or who acted arrogantly toward you. Thomas Aquinas explains this very beautifully. The object of desire has the nature of an end. The apple; you want to eat it. But revenge has not in itself the nature of an end. Therefore, because revenge is not an end but a means, namely the restoration of your original state -- therefore there is a kind of reasoning applied. For desiring an apple you don't know any reason, you don't need any reason. You just see it. Well, like our ancestors: beautiful to look at and promising good taste. I'm speaking of Eve. Of course it is not certain that it was an apple, as you know. The Bible doesn't have that. Aristotle says anger moves by syllogizing. There is an implicit syllogism in anger. The second reason, and this sounds very strange: anger is more natural than desire, meaning anger is more natural than the desire for the non-necessary things. The desire for the necessary and for mere food and not for dainties is natural. That is not the point. The desire for the non-necessary things; and he gives a nice example of some family inheritance of anger which is very amusing to read where the son was always beating the father and so this is running in our family and therefore the judge found that is not something which can be severely punished. And there was always a limit: he only dragged me to the door and not beyond; so that is all inherited and therefore excusable. The third point, which is quite interesting: anger is less insidious than desire and the proof of that are the descriptions of Aphrodite, the goddess of love whose wiles were famous. Being less insidious it is less unjust. In other words, there is a certain frankness of anger and the other is not frank. And the last item: anger is essentially without hybris because anger is necessarily accompanied by pain. You are hurt. And hybris implies pleasure. I mean, if you are arrogant there is an element of pleasure implied. But actions from hybris are to a higher degree objects of anger, objects of justified anger, i.e. they are to a higher degree unjust. Here we are. That is roughly the brief summary of Aristotle's four arguments.

Now Aristotle follows here the Platonic teaching, with some arguments of his own, regarding the respective rank of desire and anger. Now this Platonic teaching is meant by Plato himself with a great grain of salt, as I have explained in my last course on the Republic and also in my chapter on Plato. So Plato himself didn't mean that so literally. Why does Aristotle adopt it? Now in order to understand this we have to consider the character of Aristotle's teaching as a

whole. Aristotle is distinguished from Plato, especially in the Ethics, by his "narrow" treatment of the phenomena. For example, when Aristotle speaks about moderation he means this virtue concerned with pleasures of the body whereas when Plato speaks of moderation that is so enlarged that it means all forms of moderation. Similarly in the case of courage: courage in Aristotle means -- the matter is the battlefield, conduct on the battlefield. For Plato all kinds of courage; moral courage, are also implied. Of course Aristotle, when he speaks of desire, thinks of Aphrodite, as is shown by the examples here. But Aristotle doesn't use the word eros here, only desire, *epithymia*, [gives Greek]. But when Plato speaks of this whole subject of desire he thinks also and above all of philosophic eros. Aristotle says well, that has nothing to do with our subject here. No one has ever been accused of a crime on account of philosophic eros as such. Of course we must not forget the fact that the word eros occurs in a very high place in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The unmoved mover moves the whole, [gives Greek], as an object of eros, desire. But still that is not a subject with which we deal here, where we deal with strictly human things.

Now one can easily show the difficulties of the Platonic-Aristotelian assertion regarding the higher rank of anger or spiritedness compared with desire. A simple example: a nasty child desires something, an unreasonable desire; the child doesn't get it and then he begins to scream and he makes things, of course, worse by screaming. His desiring it is in a way much [less] worse than his anger. And you could find simple examples from the lives of grown-up people as well. Now let us take first the crude legal case. My example is partly taken from Thomas Aquinas. Now what is the most well known crime connected with bodily desire?

O: Promiscuity.

S: Yes, but is not rape worse? I didn't ask for the most common example. But rape, I believe, is a greater one than promiscuity. Is there any law against promiscuity per se?

O: Only if it means public adultery.

S: All right. So, in other words, promiscuity is too vague a term for our purposes. But rape is surely a statutory crime. Good. Now, on the other hand, what is the worst kind of crime arising from anger? Let us say killing a human being. Now when the man who had killed another man would say, "I am terribly sorry but I did it in anger," and it can be demonstrated by witnesses that he was angered it is an extenuating circumstance. If a rapist would say, "I had to do it because of such a strong desire," this is not an extenuating circumstance. So you have to think always of specific questions in order to understand, because Aristotle always thinks of them. We are in the sphere of practical science. One can, of course, also say, if one wants to be nasty -- and that is, by the way, what Aristotle also implies -- the rapist had some pleasure. The angry man didn't have pleasure. He was pained by his anger and the law has in a strange way a greater sympathy for those who have pain than for those who have pleasure. How to explain this abyss is fortunately not my function.

Q: The obverse of this though is that in the absence of extenuating circumstances the murderer pays the higher price.

S: Yes, but we are speaking now of comparable things. We are not speaking now of murder and rape. We are speaking now of anger and desire. And anger is an extenuating circumstance; desire as such not. Desire could come in in another way: if the so-called victim of the rape had really provoked it, quasi, then I



suppose one would question whether it was rape. Yes, sure. That is a different question.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Doesn't this contradict the statement he made earlier that incontinence regarding anger is worse than incontinence regarding desire?

S: When did he ever say that?

Q<sub>2</sub>: The forgiveableness of murder in anger is greater than that of rape in desire. I thought the original statement made was that it is more reprehensible or more blameworthy to be incontinent in matters of anger.

S: No. No, no, no, no, no. He said the opposite. Then you misunderstood Aristotle's assertion. Yes.

Now a further consideration, and which goes deeper: he who is angry, even that nasty brat to whom I referred, forgets the sensual object to that extent; and in the clear case the angry man, whatever the primary motive for his anger may have been, forgets about it and in the "logic" of his action he is perfectly willing to fight and to die. In a way, he overcomes with a whole adherence to the sensual goods including life itself. This bespeaks a certain superiority of anger and that is, of course, of the utmost importance because this anger is therefore the basis -- not the basis but a very important ingredient of military courage. You say the phrase, "He has never heard a shot fired in anger." Shots are in battle fired in anger. How low the degree of anger in the individual soldier may be, but the whole situation calls for something like anger. Punitive justice is hardly thinkable without a certain degree of anger; still less war. Good. Now I believe this has something to do with the fact that we had first the discussion of justice before we had this section on continence.

Now I go on with my survey -- 1150a, toward the end. To act badly when prompted by a strong desire is less evil than to act badly when prompted by a weak desire. This throws light on our dissolute man. The dissolute man doesn't have to act -- I mean, he is sure any pleasurable thing which is around he is willing to enjoy, you know, and he takes it in his stride, as it were. He is not overcome by a very strong desire; just as beating in anger is less evil than beating a man without anger. But to be prompted by a very strong desire is incontinence in contra-distinction to dissoluteness.

Aristotle says then a few words about the other thing, endurance, which is fundamentally the same, only in relation to pain, and he gives some examples. In a commentary I read some nice examples of the opposite of endurance, which the Greeks called malakia, softness, and the great post-Aristotelian example was the Sybarites. And I read two stories which I thought I should tell you. An example of a Sybarite is a man who got a hernia when seeing other people doing very hard work, and also the Sybarites were extremely sensitive to noises so they prohibited the blacksmiths in their city as well as roosters. They wanted to have it very quiet. You know? Good. I thought that would amuse you. Aristotle has, of course, this phenomenon, the fundamental phenomenon, in mind. 1151a3: I think we should read that.

O: That incontinence is not strictly a vice (though it is perhaps vice in a sense), is clear; for incontinence acts against deliberate choice, vice in accordance with it. But nevertheless in the actions that result from it it resembles vice: just as Demodocus wrote of the people of Miletus --

Milesians are no fools, 'tis true,  
But yet they act as fools would do.

Similarly the unrestrained are not unjust, but they do unjust things.

S: Is this clear? Because they have no set purpose. You remember the man who committed adultery without being an adulterer. That's this case. Yes?

O: Again, the incontinent man is so constituted as to pursue bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to right principle without any belief that he ought to do so, whereas the dissolute, because he is so constituted as to pursue them, is convinced that he ought to pursue them. Therefore, the former can easily be persuaded to change, but the latter cannot. For virtue preserves the fundamental principle, vice destroys it. . . .

S: "The principle": that means of course the end in action. Yes. Yes?

O: . . . and the first principle or starting point in matters of conduct is the end proposed, which corresponds to the hypotheses of mathematics; hence no more in ethics than in mathematics are the first principles imparted by process of reasoning, but by virtue, whether natural or acquired by training in right opinion as to the first principle.

S: Yes. You see here this term is very interesting. Virtue produces orthodoxy, but orthodoxy in the Greek sense, meaning right opinion, correct opinion, not knowledge. How what virtue produces, right opinion, can be transformed into knowledge and whether it can be transformed: that's a great question which is not opened here. The moral man opines rightly. He has no knowledge. That is, of course, a famous Platonic distinction. But a man who has right opinion knows the "that" but doesn't know the "why" and therefore he cannot defend his principles. You see? I mean, there is no possible discussion between the gentleman and the non-gentleman on the principles. Mr. Fleming.

Q: I just wanted a repetition. You say that the man of opinion knows the fact but not the why. Knowledge is the distinction of knowing the fact and the why. Right?

S: Yes, sure. Yes, that means understanding: to know why it is so and not merely that it is so. If you know a certain very strange animal which no one has seen before there are people who have not seen it and will say there ain't no such animal but sense perception will compel him to admit that there is such an animal. But this is not knowledge; this is a mere observation, empirical knowledge in the strict sense of the term. Only if you understand it, if you see what kind of animal it is and how it is related to other kinds, then you can say we have logical knowledge. Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>2</sub>: There is no possible discussion between gentlemen and non-gentlemen on matters of principles. Does it then follow that whether or not you are a gentleman or a non-gentleman is arbitrary?

S: No. Oh, well, life is more complicated. It's not black-white, as we learned from Mr. Wenger. Read the discussion between Alcibiades and Nicias about the Sicilian expedition. Here you have a clear scoundrel if a very able scoundrel, Alcibiades, and there you have a perfect gentleman and they utterly disagree on principles and even on the action, should they go to Sicily, and yet

some discussion is possible because there is then a decision made. You know? Oh, there is always something which brings about some agreement and here the majority decision is we go to Sicily, to which both must bow. And then the question comes up, how shall we prepare it properly? And then even Alcibiades says, "Ask Nicias; he is a much more experienced man than I am." So you know, in practice -- after all, we live together so we don't know whether -- I mean, here in this room we know it but otherwise we don't know when we talk to a man in a shop or so whether he was not an ex-convict, and still he gives us our cigarettes over the counter and we have some agreement here without any difficulty. You know, not always, not all questions which arise and involve transactions among human beings raise questions of principle. You know that. I mean, because you couldn't do anything if you would always have to have recourse to principle. That is not possible.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Well in what spheres then, according to Aristotle, would recourse to principle correctly arise? In other words, when would the gentleman need --

S: Oh, in politics it happens all the time. If we take the strict orthodox Aristotelian view, there is no agreement possible between the gentleman and the non-gentleman. But on the other hand, say some very low class people -- I do not mean now convicts or so, simply not gentlemen -- are in the city, of course, and they probably form the majority. And being gentlemen they are concerned with justice and they will listen to the claims of these non-gentlemen and will see where they've got a point and there they will act according to it. The best help for the understanding of much of Aristotle is surely reading the daily paper or such things; you know, ordinary cases in human life as they arise all the time. We must never forget them if one wants to understand a line.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Then the gentlemen there didn't have any recourse to principle. They simply made firm their right opinion.

S: Yes, sure. That was the point we discussed last time in connection with Mr. Seltzer. Sophists come and question the principles of gentlemen. They say they are old convention-bound fogies. And then something must be done about it. Or philosophers of history come who say they know the wave of the future. Then something must be done about it. And that cannot be done by the gentlemen anymore. Then you need theoretical men.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Does the prudent man have a similar problem to the moral man --

S: The prudent man is the same as the moral man. Oh yes. Oh, they are inseparable. That we have read in Book VI.

Q<sub>4</sub>: Then he also cannot truly defend. He does the right thing. He knows how to make the right choice.

S: No, he can defend on the basis of the principles. He can prove, as Mr. did last time, that it is extremely absurd to buy this kind of stuff in this shop. That he can prove to you and can refute anyone who denies it. But this is, of course, only means to ends. But as for the ends he cannot -- well, he can perhaps use some arguments ad hominem if he is an able, an experienced, man. That he can do. But he cannot give a true establishment of the principles. Let us go on where we left off, Mr. Reinkin.

O: The man of principle therefore is temperate, the man who has lost all principle, dissolute. But there is a person who abandons his choice,



against right principle, under the influence of passion, who is mastered by passion sufficiently for him not to act in accordance with right principle, but not so completely as to be of such a character as to believe that the reckless pursuit of pleasure is right. This is the incontinent man: he is better than the dissolute, and not absolutely bad, for in him the highest part of man, the fundamental principle. . . .

S: Yes, "in him the best, the principle, is preserved," because he still knows or opines correctly, this and this is the right thing, like this woman I gave you as an example who knew she shouldn't drink. She knew that. Knowledge was never for one moment obscured. Only she couldn't help it. Now let us see. We cannot possibly read everything. Yes, we must turn now to the last section: in 1152b.

After having discussed this whole issue of continence and incontinence Aristotle turns then to a discussion of pleasure and pain. It is clear. He had spoken all the time of pleasure and pain and so he must make what was hitherto only implied -- he makes now the theme. This is clear. The difficulty is created by the fact that the section on pleasure and pain is repeated at the beginning of the tenth book. We have this order. End of Book VII: pleasure and pain. Books VIII and IX: friendship. Book X: pleasure again. And there are, of course, many agreements but there are perhaps also some subtle disagreements and it would be good if those who write their papers on the tenth book would consider the relation of these two sections if they find the time for that.

Now the beginning of this section is very dark. I can give you a very short summary. By the way, does it make sense to you that you have first pleasure, which was never thematically discussed although referred to all the time, then friendship, and then pleasure again? Friendship is surrounded by pleasure. Yes, well, in order to understand that one would know what friendship is. Friendship is, in a way, a higher form of living together than the polis. That we will see when we come to friendship. And a characteristic of that is the element of pleasure, I mean in this very simple sense: if you do not like to be together with someone then you can respect him but you are not friends. Friends like to be together and to talk. Yes? That's clear. This is of some importance. I believe Mr. Jaffa has written something about this point in his book, if I remember well. Now let us read the beginning of this pleasure section. First the beginning.

O: It is also the business of the political philosopher to examine the nature of pleasure and pain; for he is the master-craftsman, and lays down the end which is the standard whereby we pronounce things good or bad in the absolute sense.

S: Now let us stop here. This is hard to translate. "To consider, to speculate, about pleasure and pain belongs to the man" -- I give you now the lowest translation -- "who seeks the political art." But the word used for seeking is philosophoun and it might be better to say "who seeks as a philosopher the political art." Yes. "For he is the architect of the end." That's very strange. It is obscure here whether Aristotle speaks here of the political art or the political man, or the kind of political art and the kind of political man. You remember that distinction between the political art proper and Aristotle's enterprise, which he calls a kind of politics? Never forget that. This is dark. Whichever it may be, he is the architect of the end. That's strange: the architect. Is then the end an artifact? I mean, he should look at the end, but why does he call him an architect? Yes?

O: I was thinking that sometimes you can't look at what it is you are going to

do until you've done it.

S: Yes, but the end. He doesn't say the action. You mean that --

O: -- that the end is understood only when it is finished.

S: No, no. You see, the end toward which we look -- we call each particular thing either good or bad simply. So he has not in mind the individual action, individual or political, to be done but the end with a view to which these individual actions are to be judged. That's a hard thing and I don't claim to understand this passage. What I have read in commentaries was absolutely insufficient. I suggest the following consideration as a possible clue. The best regime in the Platonic-Aristotelian sense is a construct. It is a construct, to that extent an artifact. Not only is this particular polis man made. That is easy. But even the model of the best regime is a human construct. In Platonic language, there is no idea of the best city. There is no idea of the just city. There is an idea of justice. There is an idea of the polis, perhaps. But there is no idea of the just city together. There are other difficulties but we don't have the time. Now read the immediate sequel.

O: Moreover this investigation is fundamental for our study, because we have established that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains, and most people hold that pleasure is a necessary adjunct of happiness, which is why the word denoting "supreme bliss" is derived from the verb meaning "to enjoy."

S: Now let us stop here. So Aristotle gives a long argument why it is necessary to discuss pleasure and pain. He would have gotten away without that explanation; we all would have granted it to him on the basis of what we have seen hitherto. But the interesting point is this: here he says it belongs to the necessary things for us to consider them. This is an additional reflection. The previous one, that it is necessary for the man who is philosophically concerned with politics, is not necessary. What does that mean? An older English commentator, Grant, involuntarily helped me in understanding that passage. The way in which he translates it: "pleasure and pain come within the scope of him who makes politics a philosophy; also they are quite necessary for us to consider since we have laid down. . . ." etc. etc. I mean, on the basis of this paraphrase one would come to the conclusion that Aristotle is not a man who treats philosophically politics or is an architect of the end. What this means we would have to figure out. We have simply no time to do it because I must give at least a survey of this section. Now in the immediate sequel Aristotle gives a number of arguments which allegedly prove that either no pleasure is good or only a few pleasures are good or pleasure cannot be the greatest good and this is a view which Aristotle attacks. In other words, Aristotle's argument is a vindication of pleasure. Such a vindication was necessary, as we all can know without knowing all kinds of reports in out of the way places, because we all remember, or most of us will remember, the Gorgias, the attack on pleasure as such. Pleasure is bad versus the good. And also in Xenophon's Memorabilia the story of Prodicus: Heracles at the crossroads and the one leads to virtue and the other leads to vice. The other name of vice is pleasure. So don't believe people who say that this is Puritanism to say pleasure is bad. There have been quite a few non-Puritan Greeks who had the same view; not Aristotle, but surely some. Good.

There are quite a few of these arguments which are extremely interesting. I will give you a very brief report and a few passages we must read. Now one of the arguments and a particularly interesting point which has something to do with

Plato: the depreciation of pleasure is based on the assumption that pleasure belongs to coming into being and coming into being is clearly inferior to being. But Aristotle says there is also pleasure going with being, going with completion, going with being at work on the finer level, what Aristotle calls energia. The error is based on the notion that unchangeable things do not do anything. Well, we can all understand it. We speak of processes all the time and in a way Plato made the same mistake from Aristotle's point of view by speaking of genesis in general. For instance, going into the theater and watching the play are both processes but according to Aristotle they are radically different because you go into the theater for watching the play. The process of going into the theater: that is a genesis, which makes possible. But this is the end. There is no change anymore. You are on that peak, relative peak, here where you watch the play. This is, of course, not the highest example. To be on the peak is better than coming into being. This is the premise common to Plato and Aristotle. But there are also other people who praise pleasure precisely because it is coming into being, because it is change. The most famous example is Callicles in the Gorgias. You know, the dynamic notion of life; you know, to change, change, change, change. Good. (A few inaudible words.)

Now Aristotle distinguishes then here between pleasure belonging to genesis, which is as such a lower pleasure, and pleasure belonging to being in the act, being on the peak. Music played, when you can play: that's in the act. But when you learn music that is the genesis of your becoming a musician and this latter is surely inferior in rank to the former not only because it is worse for the ear to hear someone learning to play than someone who can play, but above all because he learns to play in order to play. Once he has learned it and commands the art then he has reached this peak. Now that is, then, a subtle question: whether there are not peaks above peaks. There would be a difference, I suppose, between someone who can play sufficiently for his local group and someone who can play in Carnegie Hall and whatever the subtle distinction may be.

Now Aristotle makes another distinction which is important between the pleasure belonging to the activity in question, say the pleasure of hearing music, and the pleasure which is alien to it, eating peanuts while music is played. And conflicts are easily possible. Aristotle gives a nice example. He says, if I may change the example a bit, that when the play is bad people eat more peanuts. I don't know whether this has been confirmed by recent research.

O: Today it's popcorn.

S: Popcorn. I'm sorry. Good. And so for example the fact which was used by the opponents: the pleasures of sex are indeed incompatible with actual thinking but that doesn't say anything against pleasure because thinking has its own pleasure and therefore the question cannot be a rejection of pleasure cannot follow from the fact that there are bad pleasures or even pleasures incompatible without being bad, incompatible with the highest pleasures. On the contrary, the pleasure going with thinking is so far from being adverse to thinking, makes strengthened thinking. If you like to study geometry you will be a better geometer than if you do not like it, but to like studying geometry means deriving pleasure from studying it. And then, of course, there is the essential difference of the activities and hence of the pleasures -- leads, of course, to the possibility of conflict so that, for example, thinking may be bad for health but this, of course, is not an argument against thinking. It has to do with a deeper difficulty into which Aristotle will go. Aristotle goes even further. Pleasure may not only be good; it may even be the best although there are bad pleasures. And Aristotle gives this simple example: science or knowledge may be the



best although there are kinds of knowledge which are bad, meaning there are things of which it is much better not to know anything than to know them and this doesn't prove that knowledge as such is bad, of course. The fact that brutes and all men pursue pleasure also doesn't prove that pleasure is something low. It is rather an indication of the opposite. That is in 1153a25. No, no, 1153b. I'm sorry.

O: (1153b25. Section 5, page 441.) Moreover, that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure is some indication that it is in a sense the supreme good. . . .

S: In other words, this was used as an argument: since even the brutes and the lowest of human beings pursue pleasure, hence it can't be something good. And Aristotle turns it around. Yes?

O: No rumor noised abroad by many peoples  
Comes utterly to naught.

But they do not all pursue the same pleasure, since the natural state and the best state neither is nor seems to be the same for them all; yet still they all pursue pleasure. Indeed it is possible that in reality they do not pursue the pleasure which they think and would say they do, but all the same pleasure; for nature has implanted in all things something divine.

S: Yes. Now what does he mean here? The pleasure which dogs or hens or whatever it may be pursue: surely these are not but Aristotle says what they mean by their pleasure -- what they may pursue does not yet show that this is what they intend unknowingly. The beasts who seek the pleasure of copulation do not know that they seek the reproduction of their species. That would be the simplest example. And this is for the sake of the perpetuity of the species, a form of immortality. That is a Platonic thought which is clear. Now then he turns especially to the bodily pleasures. So, in other words, the case against pleasure is absolutely weaker. What people can say with some right is that the bodily pleasures are questionable. We cannot read the whole thing; only 1154a15, following.

O: Now you can have an excess of the bodily goods; and it is pursuing this excess that makes a bad man, not pursuing the necessary pleasures, for everybody enjoys savoury food, wine, and sexual pleasure in some degree, though not everybody to the right degree. With pain it is. . . .

S: And so. That is the same thing. So, in other words, the bodily pleasures are not as such bad, even the unnecessary ones, which is indicated here by the word -- how do you translate opsoi? Dainty food or what?

O: Savoury food.

S: What you eat in addition to the bread, in Greek: the meat, fish, or whatever it may be, which is not as necessary as the bread in the Greek view. And even that is in itself, of course, not simply bad. The beginning of the next chapter is very important. Oh, I'm sorry, you have not this division; 1154a22.

O: (Page 443, bottom.) We ought however not only to state the true view, but also to account for the false one, since to do so helps to confirm the true; . . .

S: No, "contributes toward conviction."

O: . . . for when we have found a probable explanation why something appears to be true though it is not true, this increases our belief in the truth.

S: Yes, or "conviction of the truth." It's the same words. Yes. Yes? "And therefore we must say for what reason the bodily pleasures appear to be more choiceworthy than the non-bodily ones." Now this remark is, of course, of the greatest importance and everyone, at least if he has some experience, knows that it is not sufficient to refute an error. You must also understand why the error is so powerful. Otherwise you cannot see what binds the mind of those who follow the error. I think that is something which we all should ponder over, although it may take some time until you realize the full weight of this point. I make this experience almost every day: the absurdity of this kind of social science positivism. Well, I think that's perfectly evident to me, but how come that so many people, and surely quite a few of them are quite intelligent, cannot get away from it? I mean, it is not due in all cases to the foundations and their money and their research projects. Of course not. There must be something and something of weight which is there. If one does not face that the criticism is necessarily incomplete. Mr. Glenn, you know why I speak to you in this particular connection.

Now Aristotle explains, then, in the sequel why most men regard the bodily pleasures as the highest, and these are very beautiful gems which we unfortunately cannot reach. Either the animal nature in general or the particular nature of certain kinds of human beings leads them not to look beyond the bodily pleasures. The living being is always in toil, Aristotle says; is always in toil and wishes to get out of that toil but relieves the toil with pleasure. Therefore, it belongs to its constitution. 1154b15.

O: Pleasures unaccompanied by pain, on the other hand -- and these are those derived from things naturally and not accidentally pleasant -- do not admit of excess. By things accidentally pleasant I mean things taken as restoratives. . . .

S: Yes, medical things. For example, that is clear, that sometimes a man in pain regards as pleasant what wouldn't be pleasant to a healthy human being because it takes away the pain. That he means by accidentally pleasant. It is pleasant only because he is sick; it is not intrinsically. Yes?

O: . . . really their restorative effect is produced by the operation of that part of the system which has remained sound, and hence the remedy itself is thought to be pleasant. Those things on the contrary are naturally pleasant which stimulate the activity of a given nature.

S: Yes, a given nature in its perfect or healthy form. Good. Yes? Good. And now go on.

O: Nothing however can continue to give us pleasure always, because our nature is not simple, but contains a second element (which is what makes us perishable beings), and consequently, whenever one of these two elements is active, its activity runs counter to the nature of the other. . . .

S: Is this not interesting: "runs counter," "is against the nature of the other nature"? Yes?

O: . . . while when the two are balanced, their action feels neither painful nor pleasant.

S: In other words, our pleasures are somehow connected with the duality of our nature. If there is harmony between them, let us say between the mind and the body, harmony in itself would not be pleasant. Yes?

O: Since if any man had a simple nature, the same activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enjoys a single simple pleasure perpetually. For there is not only an activity of motion. . . .

S: Yes, activity -- energeia, the being in the act, the being in the act of motion -- yes?

O: . . . but also a being in the act of immobility, and there is essentially a truer pleasure in rest than in motion.

S: /A few words difficult to hear in which he either approves of or objects to the translation "essentially." There is more pleasure in rest than in motion. To be in the peak means to be in a state of rest. That is what is so difficult to understand in modern times, attacked at the beginning by Bacon in famous passages when he compares, when he takes the side of Callicles in the Gorgias against Socrates, in The Advancement of Learning and other places. Yes?

O: But change in all things is sweet, as the poet says, . . .

S: Yes, now here comes the difference from the poet.

O: . . . owing to some badness in us; since just as a changeable man is bad, so also is a nature that needs change; for it is not simple nor good.

S: Yes, that is the point. That change is present is due to the fact that our nature is complex, or as Aristotle puts it in the first book of the Metaphysics, our nature is enslaved in many ways and therefore the getting rid of the chains from time to time is pleasant: hunger, thirst. And of course once we have eaten enough eating will no longer be pleasant: ceasing of pleasure; change. And if we had the highest pleasure, which is, according to Aristotle, that of thinking or learning then we can't do this for a very long time because we get tired and that means, of course, we carry with us some heavy weight, the body, and therefore there can never be a state of -- /interrupted briefly by strange noise in room./ Yes.

Now I was unable to elaborate a thought which occurred to me when reading this marvelous passage: the difference of Machiavelli. The key assertion of Machiavelli is that there is no good without an accompanying evil. There cannot be a simply good thing. And then, of course, change is simply good because then we must go over from that where we have too much of the evil to the other one. I have not succeeded, I'm sorry to say, in clarifying that. Now we must see how Aristotle's notion of pleasure will look when we have gone over the repetition in the first part of Book X. Yes?

Q: When Aristotle says that God always enjoys a single and simple pleasure, is that to say that God's nature is simple, not complex as ours of body and soul?

S: Yes, yes, sure. Pure mind. Yes?



Q<sub>2</sub>: Earlier when we read this example of a sophist and their attempts to fetter our minds with arguments, this reminded me of the use of the word sophist in the description of Socrates --

S: Which surely Aristotle did not mean. That is sure.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Would there be a reverse action of this? I mean, what would be the significance of this? It doesn't have to be mainly negative, in other words.

S: No, that I do not believe. Aristotle, I think, means sophist always, as far as I remember, in the same perjorative sense, whereas in Plato it is not so. Plato calls eros a sophist. What here is called Aphrodite, insidious -- that's the same thing. But this is in this connection a praise. Even genuine philosophers are sometimes called by Plato sophists, but in Aristotle this is now settled: a sophist is a sham philosopher.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, does the description then that's here applied to sophists necessarily have to limit itself only to sophists?

S: Well, I mean, if you mean to say to these individuals of the 5th and 4th century who are called sophists in the text books -- there are also sophists in other ages.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Would you grant that it can also be applied to Socrates?

S: No, I don't think so.

Q<sub>2</sub>: The idea of fettering a man's mind so that he --

S: Yes, but Socrates did it for curative purposes. He didn't do it just in order to assert his superiority or to impress people by his cleverness. No, no, I mean, it is necessary to state that against this somewhat simple minded view which one encounters from time to time. From both Plato's and Aristotle's point of view the erring philosopher is not a sophist. That's clear. Democritus was an erring philosopher but he was not a sophist. And that has to do with the character: because the sophist is a man who uses his philosophy for the purpose of gain or prestige. Democritus never did that. He gave away his property and used it only for travelling and finding out all kinds of strange animals and so. He's not a sophist, but he was an erring philosopher because atoms and void are not sufficient for understanding the whole. And this is, I think, important. Otherwise you make Plato and Aristotle in a very narrow sense dogmatic philosophers, which they were not. I can only repeat the same thing: what Plato and Aristotle call a sophist is what we in fact mean without knowing it always by the word intellectual, because no one has ever defined what an intellectual is. If you say -- that's my old story so some of you must forgive me for repeating myself -- an intellectual is a man who lives from reading and writing, then every bank clerk would be an intellectual so you would have to say from reading and writing what kind of things. And there is also the strange thing: there can, of course, not be a sham sophist because the sophist as such is a sham, and therefore I believe there cannot be a sham intellectual and therefore I was quite surprised to read in a column by some noble lord who writes in American newspapers, (I forgot his name) -- he spoke of the fake intellectuals surrounding President Kennedy. Now I do not wish to say anything in defense of these gentlemen but I would say "fake intellectuals" would seem not to be the proper term. The only meaning which "fake intellectual" could have is that there are people, I believe, who never open a book but wish under certain circumstances to be regarded as

bookish men and walk around with books. This is the maximum I would grant, whereas the intellectual does open books and even writes lots of them. Rabbi Weiss.

Q<sub>3</sub>: I'm not sure I understand the exact difference between energeia and genesis.

S: That is what the completed thing does. The genesis is the movement upward toward the completed state.

Q<sub>3</sub>: According to Aristotle?

S: Yes, yes, sure.

Q<sub>3</sub>: But energeia he says also can be this movement upward, I gathered.

S: No, no, no, no. Energeia is the activity of the completed thing. Take my simple example: watching the play as distinguished from going to the theater.

Q<sub>3</sub>: What puzzled me was this passage where there is not only an energeia of motion but also --

S: Yes, yes, but that is a somewhat derivative sense. Oh no, he may mean this. For example, the heavenly bodies, as he understands them, are always in motion and it is, in a way, their being to move locally, in circles and ellipses; it doesn't make any difference. They are in activity at their peak. They are always at their peak, but they are at their peak by motion. And he adds now something and says there is even the possibility of beings which are in action, at their peak, while being unchangeable. I mean, God as here understood is the being which is absolutely unchangeable but always in act, actus purus as it was said in the Middle Ages.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Energeia is always the peak?

S: No, energeia means in itself to be in one's work; in one's work -- and entelechia, which is the other word: that means to be in the end status. But energeia and entelechia belong together. Genesis, understood in contra-distinction to energeia, has this meaning: in a sense of course the house builders are in their activity, they are in their energeia, when building the house -- to that extent it is true -- and not when they deliberate or are hired for building a house; then of course not; but when they are in the act of building a house. To that extent it is true. But the key point for Aristotle in this argument is the radical distinction between genesis and energeia and especially because Plato had brought together pleasure and genesis, pleasure and coming into being. Aristotle says no, there are pleasures also after the completed genesis and these are precisely the highest pleasures. This theme will be taken up again in the first part of Book X.

(End of tape except for discussion of future class schedule.)

14th Meeting: May 28, 1963

S: . . . and Aristotle in the whole discussion points toward philosophy, the philosophic life. That is perfectly sound and you gave quite a few of the arguments. I do not have to enter into that. The only point which I did not understand -- it was very hard to understand this for physical reasons -- is what you said about the relation between the friendship discussion and the continence discussion at the beginning. Can you repeat it?

O: (Inaudible -- defective tape.)

S: Relative to what follows, the discussion of incontinence and the opposite: that showed the inadequacy, the insufficiency, of the discussion of the moral virtues proper. Incontinence is lower than moderation, than moral virtue. . . . (Part of the ensuing remarks of about a minute in length lost due to defective tape. They were to the effect that friendship is connected with moral virtue, but is not identical with it.)

(Turns to the discussion of Book VIII.) Now one can perhaps state it as follows. In Book VII we discussed the fact that the gentleman may be tempted by bad things . . . and he is tempted by pleasure. And therefore Aristotle concludes the seventh book with his first discussion of pleasure. He will discuss pleasure again at the beginning of Book X so that the discussion of friendship is surrounded on both sides by the discussion of pleasure. Pleasure seems to be more visibly an accompaniment of friendship than of moral virtue. Good. Surely friendship is a pathos, an affection; being affected, whereas moral virtue as such is not. It is simply a habitus, a hexeis. At the beginning of Book VIII Aristotle mentions the two considerations why one must treat friendship, right at the beginning, and then toward the end of this first discussion, in 1155a, 28 to 31, he speaks of the duality in friendship itself. Friendship is not only necessary but also noble. Now virtue we have learned is noble but it was somehow understood but never made clear that virtue is also necessary, necessary for something, for instance for the political community. Here this great question of the end which virtue serves -- you know, which bothered us all the time -- this question is explicitly raised and answered regarding friendship and therefore we would have to figure out retrospectively what the reply to the question of the end of virtue is.

Now there are a few details in the discussion which are of some importance. When he speaks of the necessity of friendship he refers to the natural character of friendship, at least for some forms of friendship, in 16. Do you have that, 1155a16? "By nature it seems to exist in the generator toward the generated and in the generated toward the generating, not only in human beings but also in birds and most of the animals." Yes, do you have that?

O: . . . as also is friendship between members of the same species; and this is especially strong in the human race; for which reason we praise those who love their fellow men.

S: Yes, let us stop here. So, in other words, friendship does have a clear natural basis, in a way more than virtue, because virtue also has a natural basis but virtue doesn't come into being by nature. It comes into being by habituation. But friendship has its actuality by nature. To that extent it is more natural. The second example, the love of the generated for the generator: this passage is absent from the old Latin translation, a remark of a recent edition



which I used, because this was a very great question before Aristotle's time. In the case of the human race we find mutual love of parents and children but in the case of the brutes it is not the case. There is a concern of the generators for the generated but not vice versa. In Aristophanes' Birds this theme is developed at great length but we have also some pre-Socratic writings dealing with that. So the implication was that the love of the young for their old parents is due to nomos, to habituation, and not natural. This is probably reflected here. That he speaks of birds in particular couldn't help reminding me of the Aristophanean comedy in particular. Will you read the immediate sequel please?

O: Even when travelling abroad one can observe that a natural affinity and friendship exist between man. . . .

S: Yes, "natural" is too strong: "how familiar and something friendly man is to man." Yes, I can understand how one arrives at the translation but it is too strong. Yes?

O: Moreover, friendship appears to be the bond of the city. . . .

S: Yes, "friendship seems also to keep together the cities." This "also" is very important. That's a different consideration from physis. Yes, and then he makes clear that in the polis friendship is superior to justice. If you have justice you need still friendship in addition, but if you have friendship you do not need justice so friendship is more encompassing than justice. Now the question as it appears from the sequel is this (which was discussed prior to Aristotle especially in Plato's dialogue Lysis): is friendship primarily among similar beings or among dissimilar ones? The question makes sense; doesn't it? I mean, because similar beings are attracted to one another, on the one hand, but on the other they don't need each other so much. You know, there is some kind of supplementation -- seems to be implied in friendship and that requires dissimilarity. Good. At the beginning of "b" Aristotle turns to the physical side of the question because this is a general cosmological principle, whether similars attract each other by nature or dissimilars. Now you can easily see: if similars were attracting each other all life as we know it would be destroyed because everything which consists of dissimilars. I mean, say air would go only in this way, water in that way, fire that way, and there would be no composite for them. But on the other hand it seems there are also some reasons why the dissimilar things are kept together. Now Aristotle excludes this physical discussion from his work because he deals, as he makes clear in 1155b, 8 to 9, with the human things, the specifically human things as distinguished from the physical in general.

Then he begins this discussion by determining first what love is. The word for friendship is philia, which all composites with "phil-" -- philatelics, philanthropy, and so on: loving, friend of or loving. The verb is philein and from this we derive the adjective phileton. We have to say here the lovable because the English word friendship or friend does not permit it. For example, kissing is also called philein so it has to do with what people love but it is not possible to render this in English without a brief comment. But clearly love as philia is not the same as love as eros. I can't change that. In the case where it is necessary I will point out which the Greek word in question is. Eros means primarily something like longing for, desiring, and that is not implied in this meaning, but the phenomena are surely akin. Now he distinguishes, then, three kinds of the lovable: the good, the pleasant, and the useful, and there are therefore three kinds of friendship where the friends are united by the good or by the pleasant or by the useful. The last is, of course, business

friends, and pleasant is they have a pleasure and nothing else, and only the good one is the true one. Now let us read 1156a. That's the end of the chapter, 3 to 5.

O: To be friends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill for each other, that is, wish each other's good, and (2) be aware of each other's goodwill, and (3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities mentioned above.

S: I.E. good, pleasant, or useful. So this is a summary of the definition of friendship. Goodwill: indispensable is goodwill. But you can have goodwill toward someone who lives in Greenland or elsewhere. You never meet; you hear of him, that he's a fine man, and then you have goodwill towards him. But friendship requires more. It requires that there is mutual goodwill, i.e. they must know each other and, in addition, it must be combined with knowledge of this on both sides. So if "A" and "B" have goodwill towards each other but do not know it then they cannot be friends. That's clear. So that is the first answer to this question.

Now genuine friendship is possible only when we love the other for his sake and not merely for our sake, meaning for the utility or pleasure he gives to us. In other words, if we do not have the feeling that it is good that he is, regardless of what he is for us, then it is not true friendship. Let us read 1156b7, at the beginning of the new chapter. Not a new chapter in Loeb edition.

O: The perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue.

S: Yes, "and are similar to each other not in any other respect but in respect of virtue." Yes?

O: For these friends wish each alike the other's good in respect of their goodness, and they are good in themselves. . . .

S: So that the other can say it is good that he is, because if the other were not good he would not derive pleasure from the fact that he merely is. Yes?

O: . . . but it is those who wish the good of their friends for their friends' sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for themselves and not accidentally.

S: In other words, as means for an end. You may love your business partner because he is a good business man. You do not love him for his own sake, but for the reward which he brings. But true friendship, of course, is where you love the other for his own sake. Yes? "The friendship of those. . . ."

O: Hence the friendship of these lasts as long as they continue to be good; and virtue is a permanent quality.

S: In other words, this is indissoluble except by death whereas the other forms of friendship are easily dissolvable. Yes?

O: And each is good relatively to his friend as well as absolutely, since the good are both good absolutely and profitable to each other. And each is pleasant in both ways also, since good men are pleasant both absolutely and to each other; for everyone is pleased by his own actions,

and therefore by actions that resemble his own. . . .

S: And both good friends have actions resembling each other. Yes?

O: . . . and the actions of all good men are the same or similar. Such friendship is naturally permanent, since it combines in itself all the attributes that friends ought to possess.

S: Yes, let us stop here. The thought is clear, and that will be repeated very frequently throughout the book. Perfect friendship is possible only among the good, and there is a certain prima facie evidence in favor of that but nevertheless it gives rise to some difficulties. He makes clear in the sequel that perfect friendship is therefore rare, because good men are rare but also because friendship requires in any case (a lasting friendship), fairly long acquaintance and this is not available every time. Good.

But there are certain difficulties; I mean, if we look at it on the basis of what we seem to have observed. In the first place, is there no friendship possible among non-virtuous people? And I mean not the friendship for the sake of gain or pleasure but that they like each other on the basis of their very defects of character. You know, two gangsters may admire each other because of the kind of "virtues" which they have: cleverness, toughness, and so on and so on. And this admiration may transcend the sphere of calculation. I regard this as possible, although the only evidence I have is from a movie. Good. But surely I see no intrinsic impossibility in that. But the much more serious question is, virtue may be the necessary condition of friendship; is it the sufficient condition? Is it not possible that two perfectly virtuous men may go on each other's nerves, to put it very tenderly. Is this impossible? Well, of course the examples of which I could think are not examples of perfectly virtuous men. They are extremely rare and it's hard to say if I ever met one. But I know highly respectable people who respect each other's characters and can't spend half an hour together without some unpleasantness. In other words, Aristotle seems to speak about a very rare bird, an extremely rare bird, the perfect friend, and is this not only rare but perhaps not even possible? That's the question which one can't help raising. Now Aristotle answers our question to some extent and the answer is very simple: virtue is the necessary but not the sufficient condition of true friendship. Now let us see: 1157a3.

O: Friendship based on pleasure has a similarity to friendship based on virtue, for good men are pleasant to one another; and the same is true of friendship based on utility, for good men are useful to each other. In these cases also the friendship is most lasting when each friend derives the same benefit, for instance pleasure, from the other, and not only so, but derives it from the same thing, as in a friendship between two witty people, and not as in one between a lover and his beloved. These do not find their pleasure in the same things: the lover's pleasure is in gazing at his beloved, the loved one's pleasure is in receiving the attentions of the lover; and when the loved one's beauty fades, the friendship sometimes fades too, as the lover no longer finds pleasure in the sight of his beloved, and the loved one no longer receives the attentions of the lover; though on the other hand many do remain friends if as a result of their intimacy they have come to love each other's characters, both being alike in character.

S: Now let us stop here. So here he explains first how there can be friendship among the non-virtuous. I mean, these lovers are not presupposed to be



virtuous men and they derive pleasure from each other but from different sides of each other, the lover from the youthful bloom -- I think he thinks here of homosexual love -- and the beloved from being courted. So they have pleasure from each other but not from the same thing in each other, and nevertheless it may happen that owing to the long acquaintance and the long living together a more lasting friendship may occur. So this similarity of character may also exist on the sub-virtuous level and cause some friendship which is not simply based on pleasure or on calculation. Now let us go on a little bit further on, in a20. "Only the friendship of the good is unexposed to calumny" or "proof to calumny."

O: Also friendship between good men alone is proof against calumny; for a man is slow to believe anybody's word about a friend whom he has himself tried and tested for many years, and with them there is the mutual confidence, the incapacity ever to do each other wrong, and all the other characteristics that are required in true friendship. Whereas the other forms of friendship are liable to be dissolved by calumny and suspicion.

S: Yes. So we see here now, the two men may be virtuous but they must know of each other that they are virtuous. Therefore, their being virtuous is only a necessary but not the sufficient condition and this knowledge requires testing through all kinds of difficult situations and that two men do not necessarily undergo. A little bit later on, in 33.

O: But these two secondary forms of friendship. . . .

S: Meaning: based on pleasure or utility --

O: . . . are not very likely to coincide: men do not make friends with each other both for utility and for pleasure at the same time, since accidental qualities are rarely found in combination.

S: Yes. So again this lasting and the long time required. There is one passage we omitted, a25 to 30, which we should however read. There we were.

O: But since people do apply the term "friends" to persons whose regard for each other is based on utility, just as states can be "friends" --

S: No, "as the states can call each other friends." (Two or three inaudible words).

O: Our book has it in quotes.

S: Yes. Yes.

O: . . . can be "friends," call each other friends, (since expediency is generally recognized as the motive of international alliances). . . .

S: Yes, now let us stop here. So this raises the question which is, of course, only alluded to here: can there be friendship among cities? Well, business friendships, alliances, of course. That we know. Alliances are possible. But if two men are allies they are not yet friends, and this is a grave question. If friendship is something very high and cities as cities are unable to be friends to each other this shows that in an important respect the individual is superior to the polis. Yes?

Q: If a regime is characterized, at least in part, by what it looks up to, if two regimes look up to the same thing wouldn't it imply that there could be friendship between them, particularly if they look up to moral virtue as aristocracies would?

S: That is a very good point. So in other words one could say there is something at least between -- I don't say between the United States -- but between a very important sector of the United States and Great Britain. That is true and if we take this sector to be the preponderant or authoritative we can simply say friendship. But still, apparently in the polis there is something else to be considered: not only what it looks up to but also the fact, we and they, in a more radical way than among individuals. But I don't draw any more conclusion from this passage than the passage induces us to wonder, can there be true friendship among cities?

Q2: A counter example from modern times would seem to be the relations of Britain and France. Churchill expressed the warmest friendship towards France in 1940. He even offered to marry it.

S: DeGaulle didn't believe it.

Q2: DeGaulle perhaps had a clearer understanding or colder understanding of the political things. Britain has not exactly been beloved of France in the last two years.

S: No, no, and DeGaulle never believed in that. I know. But still, if the needs are extremely grave and the dangers are particularly grave their alliance can look like the closest friendship. Sure. But whatever may be the truth, our primary question here is what Aristotle thought to be the truth and here we have not more except an allusion to the question, can there be friendship among cities? Now let us turn to 1157b5, following.

O: It is with friendship as it is with the virtues; men are called good in two senses, either as having a virtuous disposition or as realizing virtue in action, and similarly friends when in each other's company derive pleasure from and confer benefits on each other, whereas friends who are asleep or parted are not actively friendly, yet have the disposition to be so. For separation does not destroy friendship absolutely, though it prevents its active exercise.

S: Does that make sense? Doesn't it? They are friends. They have the habit, but the habit is dormant and therefore the energeia, the being at work of friendship, the actuality, is not there. Yes?

O: If however the absence be prolonged, it seems to cause the friendly feeling itself to be forgotten: hence the poet's remark

Full many a man finds friendship end  
For lack of converse with his friend.

469 The old and the morose do not appear to be much given to friendship, for their capacity to please is small, and nobody can pass his days in the company of one who is distasteful to him, or not pleasing, since it seems to be one of the strongest instincts of nature to shun what is painful and seek what is pleasant,

S: Yes, "one of the strongest instincts," literally translated: "for nature seems to flee to the highest degree the painful and to strive again to the

highest degree for the pleasant." Yes?

O: And when persons approve of each other without seeking each other's society. . . .

S: No, "and not living together with one another. . . ." Yes?

O: . . . without living together, this seems to be goodwill rather than friendship. Nothing is more characteristic of friends than that they seek to live together.

S: No, "than living together."

O: . . . than living together: poor men desire their friends' assistance, and even the most prosperous wish for their companionship (indeed they are the last people to adopt the life of a recluse); but it is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they give each other pleasure, or have common tastes. The latter seems to be the bond between the members of a comradeship.

S: Yes, we will come to that. Now we see: here we get an answer to the question, what is required in addition to virtue? Friendship requires living together and deriving pleasure from living together. In this connection he points out the key importance of pleasure. One must have pleasure in the same things. And now an interesting case: a morose man is not a virtuous man in Aristotle's sense, strictly speaking, but there is, of course, no reason whatever why an old man cannot be virtuous, strictly speaking, and yet old men who can be perfectly virtuous as such are not good for friends because of the infirmities of old age. I mean, not the infirmities; perhaps even they too. That's also important. So again virtue is the necessary but not the sufficient condition for friendship. Yes?

Q: Aristotle seems to have the notion that the old are concerned with profit and not pleasure.

S: Yes, this is at length developed in the Rhetoric. There is a chapter on the young and the old and this is reflected in many cases. The young seek more pleasure than profit. In other words, a young man who is and calculating all the time is more detestable than an old man who does it, and vice versa. But on the other hand the older men are "cynical" and more concerned with gain than with pleasure. That is a rough description. And the best time of age is middle age, 35 to 49. In other words, the junior executive and the senior executive in present day American life. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Is living together to be taken very literally?

S: As much as they can. Sitting together and talking together rather than working together. You know, there are people who sit together and talk together. There was even a place for it established by Plato and another one established by Aristotle. That was the original meaning of schools, scholē. And now what has happened to schools? Yes. Part of it is, of course, the obsession with examinations, something which could be changed. And in 1157b34: let us read that. Yes, 34 to 36, just the end: "for everyone loves what is good for him."

O: For it is agreed that what is good and pleasant absolutely is lovable and desirable strictly, while what is good and pleasant for a particular



person is lovable and desirable relatively to that person; but the friendship of good men for each other rests on both these grounds.

Liking seems to be an emotion, friendship a fixed disposition. . . .

S: Yes, that is an important sentence. You know, I referred to it before. Yes, an emotion, a pathos in Greek, an affection. You are affected by it. No, but I meant a passage a bit later. "Everyone loves what is good for him and he gives back the equal both in will and in pleasure."

O: Each party therefore both loves his own good and also makes an equivalent return by wishing the other's good, and by affording him pleasure; for there is a saying, "Amity is equality," and this is most fully realized in the friendships of the good.

S: Yes, now let us keep this in mind. Friendship is equality and it means something like rendering the equal but not in a contentious sense. Then it is, of course, no longer friendship. But they give to each other the same. Let us keep this in mind for the following discussion. In the sequel, 1158a10, he makes clear that no one can have many friends. Friendship is an exclusive relation. But of course there might be many virtuous men. But not all virtuous men even living in the same town or village can be friends because of that exclusivist character of friendship. This is another indication of the fact that virtue is the necessary but not the sufficient condition for friendship. Now in the sequel then, 1158b, he explains the two kinds of friendship from another point of view. Here we had three kinds of friendship from the point of view of the noble, the pleasant, and the useful, and now a bi-partition. Is friendship based on equality or on inequality, i.e. on excellence of one part? In the friendship where one part is superior to the other the superior is loved to a higher degree and the inferior loves to a higher degree. It is a loving according to the worth of each. The higher is more worthy of loving and the lower is less worthy of loving. This is a kind of equality, but of course only the distributive equality. You remember the two kinds of justice? That resembles distributive justice. Good. And now let us turn to 1158b29. That's a new chapter, when he explains the difference between justice and friendship from this point of view. Yes?

O: Equality in friendship, however, does not seem to be like equality in matters of justice. In the sphere of justice, "equal" (fair) means primarily proportionate to desert. . . .

S: In other words, distributive justice. Yes?

O: . . . and "equal in quantity" is only a secondary sense. . . .

S: The other kind of justice --

O: Commutative.

S: Commutative. Commutative justice is a lower kind of justice. Yes?

O: . . . whereas in friendship "equal in quantity" is the primary meaning, and "proportionate to desert" only secondary.

S: Yes, that is very remarkable, isn't it? The radical difference between justice and friendship: in justice proportionate equality is higher. The hierarchy within society is the most important consideration in the polis. In friendship, however, simple equality is the fuller form of friendship. Now let us go on

where we left off.

O: This is clearly seen when a wide disparity arises between two friends in point of virtue or vice, or of wealth, or anything else; they no longer remain nor indeed expect to remain friends. This is most manifest in the case of the gods, whose superiority in every good attribute is pre-eminent; but it is also seen with princes: in their case also men much below them in station do not expect to be their friends, nor do persons of no particular merit expect to be the friends of men of distinguished excellence or wisdom. It is true that we cannot fix a precise limit in such cases, up to which two men can still be friends; the gap may go on widening and the friendship still remain; but when one becomes very remote from the other, as God is remote from man, it can continue no longer. This gives rise to the question, is it not after all untrue that we wish our friends the greatest of goods? For instance, can we wish them to become gods? For then they will lose us as friends, and therefore lose certain goods. . . .

S: No, better "we will lose them as friends" and we do ourselves harm if we wish them the best. Yes?

O: If then it was rightly said above that a true friend wishes his friend's good for that friend's own sake, the friend would have to remain himself, whatever that may be; so that he will really wish him only the greatest goods compatible with his remaining a human being. And perhaps not all of these, for everybody wishes good things for himself most of all.

S: Yes, you see, there is a seamy side to that. So there is no friendship possible between men as radically distant as men from gods. I mean, no one can say that he is an intimate of Zeus and Zeus comes to him and asks him for advice. I mean, that would be a preposterous suggestion. Nor between kings and their subjects: let us keep that in mind because kings will be mentioned later on with great emphasis, as Mr. Lyons knows. Also, everyone wishes to the highest degree the good things to himself. Therefore a man might wish to become himself a god but not that his friend become a god and he thus loses his friend. I note this remark, that everyone wishes to the highest degree the good for himself. Bring this together with a passage, 1157b16 to 17, on the key importance of pleasure. Now if everyone wishes to the highest degree good things to himself he might wish to become himself a god although he thus ceases to remain a friend of his friends. This could also happen. It's only the reverse side of what Aristotle says. But how could a man wish to become a god and cease to be a human being in Aristotle's horizon? What do gods have to the highest degree? What do gods get to the highest degree that men do not get to the highest degree?

O: (Inaudible.)

S: Yes, but crudely. Gods are honored rather than loved. I remind you of what he said about this subject in the section on magnanimity, 1123b18, following. In other words, being honored might be thought to be higher than being loved and being loved in its turn being higher than loving because we have seen that the lower loves to a higher degree than the higher. But -- and now let us read 1159a12, where we left off. Yes.

Most men however, because they love honor, seem to be more desirous of receiving than of bestowing affection. Hence most men like flattery, for a flatterer is a friend who is your inferior, or pretends to

18/ be so, and to love you more than you love him; but to be loved is felt to be nearly the same as to be honored, which most people covet. They do not however appear to value honor for its own sake, but for something incidental to it. Most people like receiving honor from men of high station, because they hope for something from them: they think that if they want something, the great man will be able to give it them; so they enjoy being honored by him as a token of benefits to come.

S: Yes, so this is the most vulgar form. They don't really love honor; it's a kind of check for something more useful to them. Yes?

18/ O: Those on the other hand who covet being honored by good men, and by persons who know them, do so from a desire to confirm their own opinion of themselves; so these like honor because they are assured of their worth by their confidence in the judgment of those who assert it.

S: Yes. This is somewhat better although it shows, of course, some basic defect. They have no self-confidence in their being virtuous. /Inaudible question interjected which Dr. Strauss says is irrelevant to this passage./ Go on.

O: Affection on the other hand men like for its own sake. . . .

S: Yes, "being loved" they like for its own sake. In other words, a kind of warmth coming toward you. And I think that's the basis of present day American psychology: the fellow who complains that he's not being loved and that's the reason why he committed arson, to get the warmth. Go on.

18/ O: Being loved on the other hand men like for its own sake; from which we infer that it is more valuable than honor, and that friendship is desirable in itself. But in its essence friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection. . . .

18/ S: Yes, well "in loving rather than in being loved." Yes. So -- and he gives some examples of it.

18/ O: . . . witness the pleasure that mothers take in loving their children. Some mothers put their infants out to nurse, and though knowing and loving them, do not ask to be loved by them in return, if it be impossible to have this as well, but are content if they see them prospering; they retain their own love for them even though the children, not knowing them, cannot render them any part of what is due to a mother.

S: Yes. So, in other words, the clearest case of a selfless love is the love of mothers. So this argument implies that the superior loves more the inferior than the other way around. The mother loves the child more than the child loves the mother, contrary to what was said before. So this all indicates that there is a fundamental difficulty here regarding the friendship resting on inequality. We have seen that virtue is only the necessary but not the sufficient condition of friendship and one reason is that friendship requires equality in addition to virtue. Two men may both be virtuous and yet unequal in other respects but not in virtue. But this creates a new difficulty: namely, the kinship between friendship and justice of which Aristotle had spoken, and in justice inequality is the highest form, as we have seen, but in friendship equality is the highest form. Now this is taken up in the sequel. Let us turn to 1159b25.

O: I see a difficulty in the statement that the mother's love for the child is



the most selfless love. This is not the present day view.

S: It also was not Plato's view. For Plato there is only what is called amor indigention, a love based on need, and therefore there is a need of the mother which is underlying her overflowing love. There is a love based on need and an overflowing love not based on need and Plato recognizes only the love based on need. In the case of Aristotle that is more complicated. . . .

[Note: The discussion beginning here and continuing through 1161a25, inclusive, was recorded defectively. An attempt will be made to transcribe it utilizing the partially audible tape in combination with a partial stenographic transcript taken in class.]

S: Now let us turn to 1159b25.

O: The objects and the personal relationships with which friendship is concerned appear, as was said at the outset, to be the same as those which are the sphere of justice. For in every partnership we find mutual rights of some sort. . . .

S: Literally, "there seems to be something just."

O: . . . one notes that shipmates and fellow-soldiers speak of each other as "my friend," and so in fact do the partners in any joint undertaking. But their friendship is limited to the extent of their association in their common business, for so also are their mutual rights as associates.

S: . . . Both friendship and justice have to do with communities, societies, associations, but there is a variety of associations and hence there will be a variety of rights and a variety of friendships. Now this is developed in the sequel and the main point is this: the maximum of friendship exists where the maximum of right or justice is possible, namely where there is a maximum of association, of society. And where do you find the maximum of association? In the polis. Hence, the polis is the only association which is not partial. . . . Hence, we would expect that the highest friendship is that uniting fellow citizens. . . .

Q: In what sense is the polis least partial?

S: Because it is devoted to the common good embracing all other goods, whereas all other associations are devoted to a partial good, to the good of this group; say, workers. . . .

Q: (Inaudible.)

S: That raises the great question, is there not an essential difference between the gang of robbers and the polis? Now I think there are various reasons which permit one to assert that the polis is devoted to the good. For example, the essentially parasitic character of the gang of robbers. They can only live on the margin of a society. And contrast that the majority of the citizens are not robbers. . . . So, in other words, they live on the fact that the polis is decent or tries to be. In addition, what do they do with the booty and what does the polis do with the booty?

O: That depends on the polis.

S: Yes, but one thing is sure: no polis can use the booty for lower purposes than the gang of robbers. . . . Now let us see. To repeat: it seems to follow from the preceding argument that the highest here is that which unites fellow citizens. Let us turn then to 1160a28 to 30. That's the end of that chapter. "All associations appear to be parts of the political association."

O: All these associations then appear to be parts of the political association; and the limited friendships which we reviewed will correspond to the limited associations from which they sprang.

S: So Aristotle does then not draw the conclusion that the highest friendship is that of fellow citizens, but all forms of friendship have their political equivalent, their political similar, and that is something much more limited. The implication is the polis is not strictly speaking a community of friends. Of course; a man can only have very few friends and the polis are many fellow citizens. Ultimately, one can say, the polis is not a community of friends in the highest sense because the polis does not consist of men who philosophize together but that is here not spelled out. Now Aristotle does then look at the regime from the point of view of friendship. Which kinds of friendship do they desire? And he speaks here first of the three good regimes and then of the three bad regimes: kingship, aristocracy, timocracy (as he calls it here, what he calls elsewhere the polity), and then tyranny and oligarchy and democracy; and kingship is the best and tyranny the worst. So I suppose you all know that. We cannot read the whole thing. Let us read first about why kingship is best in 1160a36.

O: The best of these constitutions is kingship, and the worst timocracy. The perversion of kingship is tyranny. Both are monarchies, but there is a very wide difference between them: a tyrant studies his own advantage, a king that of his subjects. For a monarch is not a king if he does not possess independent resources, and is not better supplied with goods of every kind than his subjects; but a ruler so situated lacks nothing, and therefore will not study his own interests but those of his subjects.

S: That's clear. In other words, the true king is a human being who abounds with all goods: not only food and so on but also wisdom and virtue. Now he explains later on in this chapter what corresponds to the king in the household, and that's the father. So the notion of the king as father plays a very great role in European monarchic tradition and you will find it, of course, most extremely stated in Filmer, the famous book which Locke criticized. Let us turn to 1161a10. That's the beginning of the next chapter.

O: Under each of these forms of government we find friendship existing between ruler and ruled, to the same extent as justice. The friendship of a king for his subjects is one of superiority in beneficence; for a king does good to his subjects, inasmuch as being good he studies to promote their welfare, as a shepherd studies the welfare of his sheep. . . .

S: Literally, "that they do well" and this has of course also and above all the meaning that they act well. In other words, this is not meant to be that he is concerned merely with their welfare, that they are well fed, but that they act well. Yes? . . .

O: . . . hence Homer called Agamemnon "shepherd of the people." The friendship of a father for his child is of the same kind (only here the benefits bestowed are greater, for the father is the source of the child's

existence, which seems to be the greatest of all boons, and of its nurture and education; and we also ascribe the same benefits to our forefathers). For it is as natural for a father to rule his children, and forefathers those descended from them, as for a king to rule his subjects. These friendships then involve a superiority of benefits on one side, which is why parents receive honor as well as service. The claims of justice also, therefore, in these relations are not the same on both sides, but proportionate to desert, as is the affection bestowed.

S: Yes, "the love, the friendship, bestowed." So the love of the father is superior to the love of the king because the father has given the child his being which the king has never done. This means that from the point of view of friendship the household is superior to the city. A much richer form of friendship is possible there. However this may be, in this kind of friendship there is no equality of the father and the children and therefore honor of the higher by the lower. Among equals there is strictly speaking no such honor. We have had a reference to this same question of the complicated relation between honor and friendship in 1158b33, following. Now let us go on where we left off.

O: The friendship between husband and wife again is the same as that which prevails between rulers and subjects in an aristocracy; for it is in proportion to excellence, and the better party receives the larger share of good, whilst each party receives what is appropriate to each. . . .

S: In other words, this is an aristocracy. That doesn't mean the wife is simply ruled. She also participates in the rule but since aristocracy divides honors in accordance with merit and the merit of the husband, other things being equal, is higher than the merit of the wife, therefore the husband has a greater say in the household than the wife. He doesn't have an absolute say. Then it would be barbaric. Now go on. [Tape audibility back to normal.]

O: Friendship between brothers is like that between members of a comradeship: the two parties are equal in station and age, and this usually implies identity of feelings and of character. The counterpart of fraternal friendship is that which exists under the timocratic form of constitution; since the ideal of timocracy is that all citizens shall be equal and shall be good, so that they all rule in turn, and all have an equal share of power; and therefore the friendship between them is also one of equality.

S: Yes, let us stop. Of course "ideal" doesn't occur. He says "the citizens wish to be equal and good," wish or tend. "Ideal" is not an Aristotelian conception. So friendship among brothers resembles that among comrades. That is what we ordinarily mean by friendship; I mean, comrades. It doesn't have the military meaning necessarily. In such a friendship the partners are like in the affections they have enjoyed and in character. And the friendship of brothers resembles the friendship among fellow citizens in what we would call a democracy and what Aristotle calls a timocracy, by which he means a decent kind of democracy. He explains briefly what the analogon of democracy in a household is. We haven't read that; well, where there is no father around; you know, or where the ruler is weak and everyone can do what he likes. That's, of course, something very bad. Good. Now let us pursue this argument in 1161b, beginning, because we cannot read everything.

O: . . . but there can be no friendship, nor justice, towards inanimate things. . . .



S: This is clear. I mean, for example, toward this /object on desk/. You can't be a friend of it and you can't do it injustice. You may do yourself injustice in a metaphoric sense of the word injustice if you are drunk and destroy it, and this kind of thing. That's clear. Good.

O: . . . indeed not even towards a horse or an ox, nor yet towards a slave as slave.

S: Yes. Go on.

O: For master and slave have nothing in common: a slave is a living tool, just as a tool is an inanimate slave. Therefore there can be no friendship with a slave as slave, though there can be as human being: for there seems to be some room for justice in the relations of every human being with every other that is capable of participating in law and contract, and hence friendship also is possible with everyone so far as he is a human being.

S: Let us stop here. So now the first part, what he says about slavery, are the things which you all know from the beginning of the Politics. The slave is simply a living tool and has no of his own. But now, deviating from the Politics, deviating from it, he says there may be a relation of friendship with a slave qua human being because it is in principle possible to have -- wherever there are human beings there are relations of justice at least possible. Every human being as such is capable to participate in law and agreement and therefore there can be relations of justice. But wherever there are relations of justice there also may be relations of friendship. Therefore the master may be the friend of the slave.

Q: The natural slave, the mentally defective slave: would this hold true here?  
/S: Pardon?/ The man who is unable to take care of himself, the mentally defective man as a slave.

S: Yes, what would you say?

Q: I would say no.

S: No. Therefore what does Aristotle do here?

Q: He talks about the conventional slave.

S: Very good. So he abstracts from the natural slave. Sure. That he does without any question because it is clear; I mean, to state it in simple terms: you can't be a friend of a moron and he cannot with you. I think even Mr. Roche of the A. D. A. would admit that so that is perfectly legitimate to say. But the important point here is this: this is the most radical questioning of slavery which occurs in the work of Aristotle. And the reason is this: because the whole context questions, in a way, the polis -- I mean, not the necessity of the polis, that is obviously necessary, but its rank. And this is done in the following manner: kingship as the best regime does not permit friendship proper, which requires equality, between the king and his subjects. The polis as such tends toward a regime which is lower than the best, here called timocracy, and there is no friendship proper between the fellow citizens as such because fellow citizens are many; friends are always few. The number alone would prevent it. And, of course, not all fellow citizens are virtuous men. That would be an additional reason which would prevent that. Friendship transcends the city, and this

was, of course, clearly seen by Mr. Lyons. That is, I think, the key point. Yes, now let us go on in bl2, 1161bl2.

O: All friendship, as we have said, involves community; but the friendship between relatives and between members of a comradeship may be set apart as being less in the nature of partnerships than are the friendships between fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, shipmates, and the like; since these seem to be founded as it were on a definite compact.

S: Yes, what does he mean now? That is a dangerous translation. "Every friendship exists within some community, as has been said. Someone might limit off the friendship based on kinship and that of comrades, but the political friendship and the friendship between members of a tribe and of people sailing together and such like belong rather to the community-like friendships," meaning hear in a lower sense, to the association, to the merely utilitarian associations. That is what he means. "For they seem to be by virtue of some agreement." Yes, what does he mean here by that? The political friendships, the friendship among fellow citizens. Now I think the passage is perfectly explained by Averroes. Averroes says he intends that the one which is based on agreement or convenience of the genus, i.e. of consanguinity, is natural, but the last one which is based on the part of society, as he calls it here, is based on habit, on customs, on manners. In other words, the political friendship as distinguished from that among kin is based on some agreement. There's no agreement between parents and children or between brothers. There's no agreement. They are natural friends. In other words, in a sense the polis is natural as Aristotle makes very clear at the beginning of the Politics, but in another sense it is not natural. It is based on consent and agreement and this means it is less natural. Yes.

O: With the latter friendships may be classed family ties of hospitality between foreigners.

S: In other words, yes, the relations between xeniken, between, say, an Athenian and a Spartan. You know, there were not such hotel arrangements in ancient times. You had a family with which you stayed when you went to the other city and vice versa. There was a friendly relation but it was strictly speaking a contractual relation; I mean, not a crude contractual one, but they stay in your house when they come to Sparta and you stay in their house when you come to Athens. That's clear. So that's not very interesting. Now we come to the one based on kinship. Yes.

O: Friendship between relatives itself seems to include a variety of species, but all appear to derive from the affection of parent for child. For parents love their children as part of themselves, whereas children love their parents as the source of their being. Also parents know their offspring with more certainty than children know their parentage; and progenitor is more attached to progeny than progeny to progenitor, since that which springs from a thing belongs to the thing from which it springs -- for instance, a tooth or hair or what not to its owner -- whereas the thing it springs from does not belong to it at all, or only in a less degree. The affection of the parent exceeds that of the child in duration also; parents love their children as soon as they are born, children their parents only when time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding, or at least perception. These considerations also explain why parental affection is stronger in the mother.

S: Why? The mother spends much more time with the child after its birth. I

believe he means that. I hope he means that. Yes?

O: Parents then love their children as themselves (one's offspring being as it were another self -- other because separate); children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers love each other as being from the same source, since the identity of their relations to that source identifies them with one another. . . .

S: And let us stop here. I think that is now clear. So Aristotle saw these complications to which Mr. Boyan referred. /The reference is to the question at the bottom of page 10 and top of page 11./ Now, and therefore it follows from the same thing: parents love their children more than the children love the parents, but on the other hand the children are supposed to honor the parents, whereas the parents are not supposed to honor the children to the same degree. Of course present day notions of pedagogy, which naturally constitute a great progress, have changed it completely. 1162a16.

O: The friendship between husband and wife appears to be a natural instinct. . . .

S: Yes, well "instinct" does not occur. It "seems to exist according to nature. Yes?

O: . . . by nature; since man is by nature a pairing creature even more than he is a political creature, inasmuch as the family is an earlier and more fundamental institution than the city, and the procreation of offspring a more general characteristic of the animal creation.

S: So it belongs to the whole genus and not merely to the species of man, and therefore it is to a higher degree natural. Yes?

O: So whereas with the other animals the association of the sexes aims only at continuing the species, human beings cohabit not only for the sake of begetting children but also to provide the needs of life; for with the human race division of labor begins at the outset, and man and woman have different functions; thus they supply each other's wants, putting their special capacities into the common stock. Hence the friendship of man and wife seems to be one of utility and pleasure combined. But it may also be based on virtue, if the partners be of high moral character; for either sex has its special virtue, and this may be the ground of attraction. Children, too, seem to be a bond of union, and therefore childless marriages are more easily dissolved; for children are a good possessed by both parents in common, and common property holds people together.

S: Let us stop here. I believe that is clear. So the key point, I believe, is here this: that man is by nature to a higher degree a pairing animal than a political animal. This has all to do with this questioning of the rank of the polis which is characteristic of the whole book. And what he says about the relations of the two sexes: some of you will remember what we read on this subject in Xenophon's Oeconomicus, that it is not merely the cooperation of the two sexes in generation but also the work which they have to do is, as it were, laid out for them by nature. After all, it could be thinkable that in the human race the best fighters might be the females, as I believe it is the case in tigers and dogs and other races. But in the case of men it seems that the protector by nature is male and the protected is the female together with the children, and



therefore that the woman is at home and the man goes out to fight is, in a way, an institute of nature. This he surely has in mind here. Now let us read the immediate sequel.

O: The question what rules of conduct should govern the relations between husband and wife, and generally between friend and friend, seems to be ultimately a question of justice. There are different claims of justice between friends and strangers, between members of a comradeship and schoolfellows.

S: Now what does he mean then? The correct and proper thing in friendship is what is just in these relations. Since the friendships differ radically the justice required on both parts differs radically; hence, also the correct in friendship. But still there must be some difference between the right and the friendship, say between husband and wife or between fellow pupils or whatever the case may be. Well, I think one can say from a practical point of view that in the case of friendship it would be done gladly whereas if it is a matter of right it is not necessarily done gladly because there is the affection there. Yes. Now in the sequel he speaks of specific troubles in friendship: namely, mutual dissatisfactions, and they arise, of course, chiefly in the case of friendships for the sake of the useful because there are clearly defined the business relations, so to speak. We have to consider 1162b21 where he speaks about these mutual rebukes in friendship. Yes? "It seems, then. . . ."

O: . . . that as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other defined by law, so the friendship based on utility may be either ~~moral~~ <sup>ethical</sup> or legal. Hence occasions for complaint chiefly occur when the type of friendship in view at the conclusion of the transaction is not the same as when the relationship was formed. Such a connection when on stated terms is one of the legal type, whether it be a purely business matter of exchange on the spot, or a more liberal accommodation for future repayment, though still with an agreement as to the quid pro quo; and in the latter case the obligation is clear and cannot cause dispute, though there is an element of friendliness in the delay allowed, for which reason in some cities there is no action at law in these cases, it being held that the party to a contract involving credit must abide by the consequences. The moral type on the other hand is not based on stated terms, but the gift or other service is given as to a friend; although the giver expects to receive an equivalent or greater return, as though it had not been a free gift but a loan; and as he ends the relationship in a different spirit from that in which he began it, he will complain. The reason of this is that all men, or most men, wish what is noble but choose what is profitable. . . .

S: Yes, in other words, they wish for themselves that the others act nobly, but they -- yes. Good. You see, that is a somewhat cynical passage as you must have seen. But the most interesting point is this: how did he call that distinction of the two kinds of right in his treatise on justice? Legal and natural. He does not call it natural here. He calls the one legal again and the other unwritten. Now clearly an unwritten law, an unwritten right, is not necessarily natural. It can be merely customary right. But he calls it more precisely here the moral or ethical, no longer natural. And, in addition, he makes this distinction only regarding the friendship based on the useful, on some form of exchange, not the highest form of friendship where this whole issue would not arise. Now that is quite interesting. I think what you will find by going through the book on friendship that the polis is questioned to a higher degree here than

ever before and I believe it is connected with it that he drops here the expression of natural right. You remember, this statement was there that the natural right is but it is changeable. Here it is no longer even called natural. As it were, the treatise on friendship prepares the discussion of that phenomenon which simply transcends the polis and that is philosophy, in the latter part of Book X. Let us read only 1163b12, following. That is toward the end of the book.

O: . . . since requital in accordance with desert restores equality, and is the preservative of friendship, as has been said above. This principle therefore should also regulate the intercourse of friends who are unequal: the one who is benefited in purse or character must repay what he can, namely honor. For friendship exacts what is possible, not what is due; requital in accordance with desert is in fact sometimes impossible, for instance in honoring the gods; or one's parents: no one could ever render them the honor they deserve, and a man is deemed virtuous if he pays them all the regard that he can.

S: Yes, let us stop here. Do you notice here something with a view to what we have read before? Let us limit ourselves to the question of the gods. Men owe the gods much more than they can pay to them and what is the consequence?

O: He honors them.

S: Yes but still -- he cannot honor them as they deserve.

O: He is constantly in debt to them.

S: That is true, but still how much will he honor them, is he obliged to honor them? As much as he can. Of course, part of the honoring is sacrifices naturally and he will sacrifice as much as he can, i.e. the rich man will sacrifice more, the poor man will sacrifice less. Yes, but what we have here seen before in the chapter on munificence -- there it appeared that only the rich man can honor the gods properly. This is now corrected. Everyone can honor the gods properly, i.e. within the limits of his power. Why this correction occurs here I am not able to say but perhaps it has also something to do with the questioning of the polis. The polis is somehow tempted to respect more the rich than the poor, those who can honor the gods on a big spectacular scale than those who cannot do it. Now after we have become somewhat doubtful of the polis and its overall perfection we may also restore the truth, or the sober view, regarding honoring the gods. That is a possible explanation. Yes?

Q: It might be said that this also prepares the way for what is said in Book X: that there the man who contemplates, who is most indifferent to possessions, is the most beloved of the gods.

S: Yes. That's quite true. So there is even this correction. Yes. Now we have a few minutes left and I have prevented discussion as much as I could because I thought we should finish our survey of the book. Mr. Burnham.

Q<sub>2</sub>: What about the difficulty we stated at the beginning of the discussion on the non-virtuous man?

S: You mean to say the two gangsters who are genuine friends.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Yes, okay. You can say that they're friends.

S: Not strictly speaking but in a way, Aristotle, I believe, would say, because the basis of their friendship is admiration for some rudimentary virtues. They are friends qua good. They are good in a very questionable sense but what they admire each other for are things which in themselves are good: cleverness and energy, courage, whatever you call it. These are in themselves good things. They take a very narrow view. They have justice among themselves surely, but they have a very narrow view of justice insofar as there are no relations of justice between them and their fellow citizens.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, suppose you took the case of a skillful administrator or something of that sort. He admires another administrator or another bureaucratic institution that administers well.

S: Do you mean to say we should not grant to administrators what we just granted to gangsters? I mean that is really a very misanthropic view.

Q<sub>2</sub>: No, but I mean wouldn't it then imply that this treatment of friendship assumes some sort of teleological view of different men?

S: Yes, well that is clear, but you can state it simply. Use perhaps a somewhat less obnoxious term and say a 'hierarchical view. There is one form, true friendship, the perfect friendship, telephilia; telos occurs in the translation: the perfect friendship. Now compared with that all other forms are imperfect forms to various degrees and, as Plato would put it and Aristotle to some extent even too, imitations of the true friendship. And what we ordinarily call friends are always imitations of true friendship. The true friendship would be extremely rare because the good man in the full sense as Aristotle understands him is, of course, also extremely rare so that there would be a kind of (almost) continuity from the perfect friendship, what they would now call an ideal, down to these gangsters to whom I referred.

Q<sub>2</sub>: But see, the theoretical justification of that hierarchy has not been given in the Ethics. That's what I was aiming at. There are quite a lot of things here but --

S: But of course it has been given. Why is the perfect friendship the true friendship? You could say Aristotle said it even too often; he repeats this point all again. The only true friendship is that based on virtue. And of course why is virtue the highest? That was stated in Book I but in other ways also in these following books.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, in Book I it was not shown theoretically that -- the hierarchy was only very vaguely described in theoretical terms.

S: Yes, but there was this difficult argument, that man being a being of a peculiar kind must have a perfection of its kind. You remember? That's virtue. Now he arrived at the popular and generally accepted view that the perfection of man is moral virtue indeed only by his subsumption of a minor premise given by popular opinion and not derived theoretically. Do you remember that? You remember this key argument roughly in the middle of Book I. We discussed that at that time. Yes, that is quite true but still, however difficult this argument may be and questionable it may be, this was simply the basis of everything that followed and there was a kind of indirect confirmation of this syllogism of Book I by the detailed description of the various virtues, where Aristotle at the end, say at the end of Book V, simply says, now do you know of any perfection, disre-



garding intellectual perfection -- of any perfection which is missing? Is this not a complete description of the good man?

Q<sub>2</sub>: But it's not a theoretical justification of the hierarchy. It's a different kind of justification. It's not a deduction.

S: That is true. But the question was then always this: does not a theoretical justification run the risk of making moral virtue a means for an end? And there is something in us which hesitates to do so. In other words, that's not a mere academic difficulty, a very serious difficulty. Doesn't it always come down to this: that moral virtue being a means to an end means that it is legitimate to raise the question, why be decent? And if a man raises this question, why should I be decent, he has already ceased to be decent. To that extent it is really a closed circle. This difficulty I think Aristotle recognizes and acts on it. That ultimately a theoretical deduction would be necessary I believe is correct and Plato acts on that and I think in Aristotle you have it in a very indirect way. If you work through the whole Ethics and the whole Politics you would find that argument. You would find the argument that there are these two ends of man as a rational animal, polis and thinking, and both require in different ways and to different degrees the moral virtues. And also the moral virtues as Aristotle described them are not explicable in terms of one of these ends only. I repeat that, what I have often said: these two ends call for moral qualities which are almost the same but not identical. Yes, but both ends are always effective. They always beckon a man. And therefore the means for them, if you can call the moral virtues means, grow into each other, concessere in Latin. The concrete moral virtues are these described in Books III to V. I don't think that one can go beyond that without abandoning the whole Aristotelian work. I think that is what he is driving at. But for practical purposes, for political purposes, it is perfectly sufficient to look at these virtues described in Books III to V as, as it were, the goddesses, statues, at which the legislator must look in order to build up his polis and he doesn't have to go behind them as statues, as forms, in order to understand his work, what he has to do.

You see, the difficulty one can state as follows: the whole history of political philosophy is, in a way, an indirect proof of the wisdom of Aristotle's procedure. It is extremely simple to say the moral virtues are means for living together, for peaceful and prosperous living together: Hobbes and Locke and the Utilitarians and so on. Yes, but that means, of course, a difficulty which I pointed out on a former occasion. The polis can, as it were, suspend its moral orientation when it is not useful; in other words, Machiavelli's point. If everything is fine and goes easy, by all means, but if the going gets rough disregard them. Only cleverness and energy are those virtues which are required under all conditions. All others are questioned and you have no guarantee in principle that the polis will live up to more than mere survival plus prosperity, and therefore the polis must be considered as being in the service of something higher and the only practical form in which this can be done is it must be understood as being in the service of moral virtue.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, what I was wondering is for purposes of action a theoretical ethics is not necessary. I would agree with Aristotle's argument on that point. But for purposes of theory is a theoretical ethics possible even? That's a rather different question.

S: Yes. I think the best man to address this question to would be Aristotle himself. Now which were the alternative -- I mean, I believe he discusses this question, this theoretical question, to some extent, in his discussion of plea-

sure because hedonism in the ordinary crude sense of the term is, of course, the denial that there is something intrinsically noble higher than the merely pleasant. And part of the discussion we have seen in Book VIII and the rest we see in the first half of Book X. And to some extent Aristotle's analysis of pleasure is a theoretical justification of the point of view of the noble as distinguished from the pleasant. Very briefly: we cannot take our bearings by the pleasant because the pleasant is essentially secondary. This is very roughly what he tries to say. Therefore hedonism is as such a theoretically unsatisfactory assertion. This is the only thing, I believe, which he actually does to satisfy your requirement, but he is speaking to people who take it for granted that the noble is higher than the pleasant. But he does face it to some extent in the first half of Book X and let us see whether this is of any help. Mr. Butterworth.

Q<sub>3</sub>: The thing I don't understand against you is that you stated this point that the minute you question, why decency, falls into an indecent act. But I don't see this. . . .

S: Well, you can state it as follows. How can a decent man raise the question, why decency? That's your question.

Q<sub>3</sub>: No, I think that's your question and I don't see why a man is indecent if he raises that.

S: Well, think of a concrete situation. You are in a situation. What shall you do? All kinds of advice is given to you, some decent, others indecent, and it seems to be the simplest in a given case to do the indecent thing. And then if you begin to deliberate, you ask why not the indecent thing suddenly. Something has gone wrong. But I believe I can answer your question, indeed that's the only practical way in which it can be answered and that is this: there are always people around who raise that question, explicitly or implicitly. In literate society there are always plenty of people, intellectuals, who in fact raise the question, why decency, and there these people must be answered, I mean at least in a liberal society. In a non-liberal society one will simply say they will be sent to some farm. I read a story this morning, a remark of Khrushchev, about similar men. People are sent free; they get a free ticket to Siberia, something of this kind. But in a liberal society it must be argued out and there you have it. So the decent men are compelled to reply to the clever indecent. At least on the basis of the Platonic dialogues we know that and therefore it becomes necessary and legitimate.

Q<sub>3</sub>: The thought you have ended with is that the decent man who is trying to defend decency also has to ask that question.

S: Yes, sure. That is what I mean. Yes, but there is a difference -- is there not? -- who takes the first step.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Yes, but it would seem to me that as you stated it before it was all black and white because if a man asks why decency then he is indecent.

S: Yes, but still there is nevertheless something to that and I believe you will never be able to understand Kant if you do not see this point: that in a certain sense there is no possibility of a derivation or deduction of morality from non-morality. That is exactly Kant's point. Certainly, Kant had to give a long theoretical argument to prove the impossibility of such a deduction by proving, allegedly, the impossibility of a theoretical metaphysics. But when you read his more popular introductions like the Foundation for the Metaphysics

of Morals and how it begins, where he does not go into these deeper theoretical questions. The power of his moral appeal is due to this fact, to this simple appeal. Morality is not deducible because it cannot have any but itself.  
Miss Huckins.

Q<sub>1</sub>: Would you say that there is no theoretical justification for moral virtue unless you assume decency?

S: Well I can give you this answer (I don't know whether it will satisfy Mr. Butterworth): that for the gentleman as gentleman the question does not arise, but the gentleman as gentleman is not the highest man according to Aristotle. For Kant the honest man as honest man is the highest man. By the way, Plato knew that problem also very well because in the famous speech of Glaukon in the second book of the Republic Glaukon's notion of the just man is that of a man who has no other quality except being just. I mean, he takes some verses from Aeschylus which are used by Aeschylus in praise of the virtuous man and when he speaks of his shrewdness, of the just man's shrewdness, Glaukon applies that to the unjust man because he wants to have a just man who has no quality other than being just, no quality other, and he demands from Socrates the proof that the just man thus understood who has no quality other than being just is the highest human being. That is a re-formulation of what Glaukon demands and Socrates never delivers that good because he cannot deliver it. He must admit that a man who in addition to being honest knows also what he is doing is superior to the man who is merely honest. And Kant is led into various absurdities, I believe, by his argument. Kant must assume that a 10-year-old child (he says so in the /inaudible title/) can settle a very difficult, complicated moral question immediately. There is no question; where mature people of experience would say, oh well, it is not as simple as that. But that's a necessary consequence: the importance which reasoning, calculating, cleverness, play for morally good decisions. But on the other hand we all understand, I believe, the temptation to dismiss the relevance of cleverness for decency. I think we all understand that and yet there is something not thought through. It is very intelligible to action. In other words, innocence of doves is not enough. You also need certainty and wisdom, but we understand the people who like to forget about certainty and wisdom. This is nevertheless a narrow view and here you see that even in this respect there is no disagreement between Aristotle and the New Testament; in this respect. But on the other hand, the temptation -- and this point, the simple man with his moral sense knows infinitely better, has an infinitely better knowledge than all the sages and fellows, was of course a crucial element in the development of modern democratic ideology. You can easily see that. That is one of the most massive consequences of Rousseau. You know? Then every man is morally as competent, or can be as competent, as everybody else. Unfortunately it is not so simple and therefore we need government and other unpleasant things, schools -- good.



15th Meeting: June 6, 1963

S: The issue of philosophy and the theoretical life is present here in this book, perhaps more than ever before. I did not quite understand your answer or your understanding of Aristotle's answer regarding the question, does philosophy require friendship?

O: Well, I'm not really sure of that either. I can't really see any final answer. . . .

S: I think whether that's the last word or not here in this discussion the philosopher does need friends or cities for reasons partly given by him. Now your paper had one massive defect. There is one discussion which you skip. I mean, everyone is free to skip whatever he likes but you skipped in a way the most important part. You brought it in; you couldn't help bringing it in. Now what is the most massive discussion of Book IX?

O: Whether you can be a friend of yourself.

S: Whether you can be a friend of yourself, and in Greek that's almost the same thing as self-love. . . . But you quoted that passage. We love the friend almost as much as ourselves. Now what is the contradiction regarding beneficence which you mentioned and which I did not quite understand?

O: (Inaudible.)

S: Yes, that is a difficulty but I believe it is not the one which you mean because the relation of a benefactor to the benefitted is an unequal relation but we have learned that friendship in its highest form is a relation among equals. Now there is this difficulty behind it. But this paper was quite satisfactory.

Now I have to say a few words about some papers. The first is that of Mr. Gelblum with which I was greatly pleased. I would only like to make a few points because you can't read my handwriting. You say, "Beginning with Book VII the whole discussion of the matter of human virtue and thus that of human happiness is taken up again from the beginning." This is literally true as is shown by the very beginning of Book VII: "making another beginning."

Mr. Weiss, your paper is also satisfactory. "The distinguishing factor of true friendship, i.e. the expression and feeling of affection for one another, does not guide the movement of the discussion in Book VIII." That's right and it is very necessary to mention that, but it is of course not something forgotten. "Aristotle says with friendship it is as it is with the virtues. He does not say as it is with the other virtues. This further reinforces the point made above that Aristotle in this book does not deal primarily with friendship as one of the virtues." Again, that is very sound. And the last point, "If friendship is necessary for comfort in the polis it must in the main be friendships of the lower sort . . . precisely those friendships in which equality of benefits is a real point of dispute between the friends." That is again true. That is only a connection between the fact that friendship is not a virtue proper and friendship proper is not political. Do you see the connection? Friendship is not a virtue proper and friendship proper is not political. Do you see the connection? The virtues and the polis are somehow coextensive. Yes.

And then Brother Chrysostom who wrote on the ninth book but cannot be here next time. "Aristotle in his discussion of friendship is not meaningful unless it is seen in terms of his stubborn look out for a possible breakthrough toward the uppermost." That's very well put. I mean, he looks somewhere all the time, and only in friendship it becomes particularly noticeable how it tends toward the theoretical life. The term "breakthrough" is perfectly acceptable to me. . . . "Though both friendship and honor are said to be the greatest of external goods, friendship perhaps enjoys a slight edge in one respect. Since a man is related to his friend as he is to himself a good man can appreciate a friendship as simply as he appreciates himself while the nature of honor is such that he is forced to appreciate and depreciate honor at the same time." That is very well put. Only the text -- he seems to say both friends and honor are the greatest of external goods but if you look at the pure text, because you never can tell what the translators do, there is a certain difference. In the case of friendship he says it is thought to be the greatest external good; in the case of honor, no qualification. So, in other words, whether friends are an external good is not so sure. It is, in a way, an internal good for reasons which become clear. And I think you state exactly what Aristotle means. An excellent man can measure his worth fully in friendship whereas the same cannot be said of honor. Honor accentuates inequalities; friendship, equalities. And the subtle shift of accent from honor to friendship would in a new and higher plateau of well being. "Unlike the bad man who is at odds with himself as though his soul were cut up in pieces and warped, the virtuous man is integral and not fractional. He is amicably disposed toward himself because he is not labored with repentance and his soul is not rent with faction. He is in short a psychiatrist." Nothing could be truer. . . . Then you contrast Aristotle with Descartes and Hobbes. "Magnanimity matters to Descartes not as a crown of virtues in Aristotle's sense" because for Descartes magnanimity is a passion which is the source of all virtues. "Hobbes also cannot include friendship among the pleasant things in life." Well, he wouldn't trust it. "Aristotle sees a certain analogy between lovers and friends. . . ." No, this I pass over. This is, I believe, questionable. There is another passage which I thought also valid. Oh yes, "Hobbes' man is too pre-occupied with his grim pursuit of pleasure." This I think is very well put. That's true. Have you ever seen a portrait of Hobbes? Grim. Good. Turns to a discussion of arrangements for the Vico seminar in autumn quarter -- omitted.7

Now Mr. Butterworth has a question. "Speaking of intelligence Aristotle says it is that which apprehends first principles. He never sets down the standard by which this apprehension might be controlled. In fact, he says at one point intelligence apprehends definitions which cannot be proved by reasoning. Doesn't this mean that the greater part of the principles which intelligence gives us are assumptions? If the Ethics is primarily an inductive book, i.e. drawing its conclusions by building on principles supplied by intelligence, is it not then fundamentally questionable?" Yes, these are two entirely different questions. The principles from which the Ethics starts are not these principles which intelligence apprehends: number one. Now as for the principles which intelligence apprehends, say man, dog, cat, courage, justice, these are -- now let us leave it at the simple formulation of Aristotle and not go into that, that this is always presupposed and cannot be demonstrated. But a negative form of demonstration is always possible and necessary, namely defending them against people who question them. So when Aristotle says man is a rational animal and someone says no, that is wrong -- I have read that -- man is the homo fabir, the animal fabir, the fabricating animal, then Aristotle would say, all right, but what does fabrication presuppose, my dear fellow? Or someone says man is not the being which possesses reason but the animal which produces verbal symbols, whereas other kinds of symbols can also be produced by monkeys, I believe, he

would say, can you tell me what verbal symbols in contra-distinction to other symbols are? Do they not presuppose something like concepts or universals, i.e. something which is specifically rational? And so on. That is by no means arbitrary. One can say this -- that is, I believe true of Plato and Aristotle in the same way as a whole -- no nous, intelligence, without logos and no logos without nous. These go together. Logos without nous: that is in a way what modern science wants to be. Nous without logos is mysticism.

Q: Yes, but if you admit that man is a rational animal and so on aren't these assumptions?

S: Yes, but they are assumptions in here, for example, in this book, but these are not arbitrary assumptions. Let us take a simple example and let us not get involved in any Aristotle scholasticism. Did you ever hear the expression a pattern? Yes. All right, you look at all kinds of statistics. Statistics are produced only by logos. No intelligence is required. You see here relations. And then suddenly you see a pattern. That is nous: the perception of the pattern as distinguished from the simple putting together. . . . An insight which is of interest has always a certain element of subtleness. I mean, where you see not the mere fact, the wholly brute fact which merely disturbs you, which is of course a very healthy disturbance but which in itself is merely disturbing, but you understand. You see a whole of sorts and this is a phenomenon which Aristotle had in mind when speaking of nous, intelligence.

Q: But when you speak of this pattern you've moved to another area and I contest this, whether there is such a thing.

S: Yes, sure. That you have to do in one way or the other all the time. Well, look, how does he proceed when he tries to find out what courage is? Or I think the discussion is more dialectical later in the discussion of continence, if I remember well, and also friendship, where he looks around: what he or many gentlemen know or claim to know. And then there are difficulties and these difficulties lead to a qualification or a modification of the primarily known views and gradually a view is reached which covers all that is sound in these opinions and no loose ends left. Then you know that's it. But in a way this guided you already from the beginning. You had an inkling of that whole before. Good. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: In the case of several patterns how do you determine among those which pattern is the essential pattern? That is, John Smith is a ditch digger and a man and an animal. How do you distinguish that most he is a man and not a ditch digger or an animal?

S: I suppose in certain contexts it would be only interesting that he is a ditch digger, but what is ultimately important, I think, for an understanding, is that he is a human being, morally and even theoretically; morally because he would claim some rights ultimately on the ground that he is a human being and theoretically because ditch digging cannot be understood, at least what he is doing, except as some kind of human. That is not arbitrary. I mean, in other words, the question which you raise theoretically stated is why is substance the primary category and not quality, quantity, and so on? Because all the others presuppose substance whereas substance as such does not presuppose the others. A man may be tall or short, black or white -- you know, this kind of thing -- male or female. It may be here or there or now or then. But in all cases it is man; it is a human being.

Q<sub>2</sub>: He's also in all cases a mammal or a vertebrate.



S: All right; very good. That is a very good point. Then the question arises, what is the true substance? Is it such things like man, cat, what Aristotle calls the indivisible eidos; or is it such a thing like mammal, which is divisible into the various kinds, the species? Only the species, not the genera, are true substances is Aristotle's answer.

Q<sub>2</sub>: What about the teaching of modern biology that species change over time?

S: This is not immediately relevant to that because whatever modern biology may teach it doesn't deny the existence of species. It differs from Aristotle regarding the origin of the species. Now honestly, that was the title of Darwin's book, The Origin of the Species. Aristotle denied that the question makes sense because the species are sempiternal. Man generates man; no monkey can generate a human being. Aristotle, of course, would have made it very simple and said, all right, let us have two monkeys of different sexes; let us look at their offspring, and surely he would swear that it wouldn't be a human being and I believe he would be right. They tell us that there are n intermediates between the finest monkey in the world and let's say the most moronic human being. But of course you know that all these links have a wholly questionable character. No, I do not deny that this issue of course ultimately arises and this is the point where Socrates branches off from the others and Aristotle as a consequence. Does the whole consist of essentially different parts or is it ultimately differences of degree, as for example the atomists where the atom is prior and they said every being is a composite of atoms and a different kind of composite; so that fundamentally there is a fundamental homogeneity. And that is questioned. This question, of course, must be faced but it is not affected fundamentally by the fact that there may have been an evolution because then we would go into the question of what evolution means.

Q<sub>2</sub>: (Regarding mutation.)

S: Yes, sure. Well, mutation is already very much. Mutation means a qualitative change, doesn't it?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Well, creatures who would seem to be men in every respect except for the fact that they can't breed. . . .

S: I cannot say anything because I do not know that there is such a case. Let us wait until they land on one of the inhabited planets, whether there are such things. I wouldn't know what to say. I couldn't answer your question. I'm sorry.

Q<sub>3</sub>: (Contrasting Aristotle and Kant regarding categories, among other things. Mostly inaudible.)

S: I'm sorry, that is an infinite question and we have to discuss Book IX. Now let me say only one word. I'll try to state it as simply as I can. Aristotle starts from the completed universe and not from the universe as it has come into being and there is something methodically absolutely sound in that. You cannot explain the genesis of anything if you do not know that anything first. Now then the question is how does Aristotle know that we live in the completed or perfected or finished universe? And then he would say because there are human beings who can think. A universe without thinking men is in a way a desert and it becomes alive only if it is apprehended as what it is. Some apprehension the animals have, the other animals, but they don't apprehend it as a whole. And this surely is beyond the competence of the biologist as biologist although he

may have some subsidiary things of some interest. I must leave it at that. But surely never let us forget this question.

Now in Book IX Aristotle continues his treatment of friendship and we must see the discussion, as all the papers have done, in the context of the whole book, in the ascent from the most undeveloped and primary notions to the fullest possible understanding, possible in this context, of the theoretical life. And we are much closer to that end in Book IX not only in space but also in substance. Surely friendship is closer to the theoretical life than moral virtue as such. Friendship is higher than justice, than universal justice, but justice is the social virtue. Hence, one would expect that the perfect friendship is the polis, that which holds the polis together, but this is not so. Friendship is higher than the polis and some indications to this effect were given in Book VIII. The same thesis, incidentally, is also presented in Xenophon's dialogue Hiero, that friendship is higher than the polis, on the basis of a much simpler argument indeed. Now let us turn to the beginning of the book, Mr. Reinkin.

O: In all dissimilar friendships, it is proportion, as has been said, that establishes equality and preserves the friendship; just as, in the relations between fellow-citizens. . . .

S: Yes, "as in the political friendship."

O: . . . in the political friendship, the shoemaker receives payment for his shoes, and the weaver and the other craftsmen for their products, according to value rendered. In these business relationships then a common measure has been devised, namely money, and this is a standard to which all things are referred and by which they are measured.

S: Let us stop here. So we learn here in passing that the political friendship, the friendship uniting fellow citizens, is unequal, heterogeneous. But in the eighth book he seems to have suggested that political friendship is the analogon of fraternity proper, and fraternity is the relation of brothers, which would seem to be a homogeneous friendship as distinguished from the parent-child relation. Aristotle refers here back to the discussion of justice as reciprocity in the fifth book and this reciprocity has its place in exchange alone as is shown here by the examples, and that would seem to be the sub-political. Yet there is a passage in the Politics, 1261a22, following, which shows you that reciprocity has also a strictly political side. I'll read it to you in Barker's translation. /Page 41 of the Barker translation, paragraph 4./ "A consequence follows /from this conception that the polis is composed of different elements, mutually exchanging different services in virtue of different capacities/. It is that the well being of every polis depends on each of its elements rendering to the others an amount equivalent to what it receives from them. This is a principle already laid down in the Ethics. It is a principle which has to be observed even among free and equal citizens /in spite of the fact that, as such, they appear to be identical in kind/, and not different in kind as a shoemaker and a weaver. While they must be different in kind in their capacity as citizens, "they cannot all rule simultaneously; they must therefore each have office for a year -- or . . . for some other period. In this way it comes about that all are rulers /in turn/, just as /all would be shoemakers and carpenters in turn/ if shoemakers and carpenters changed their occupations, and the same men were not always shoemakers and carpenters. It would be better indeed if the principle followed in the arts and crafts," namely that each should stick to his craft, "were also applied to the affairs of the political association," i.e. there should be no switch between ruler and ruled, "and from this point of view it is

better for the same men always to be rulers wherever possible. But where this is impossible, through the natural equality of all the citizens," i.e. if there are no outstanding men among them, "and also it may be argued too, because justice requires the participation of all in office (whether office be a good thing or a bad) -- there is yet an imitation of it, or an approximation to it, if equals retire from office in turn and are all, apart from their period of office, in the same position." Rule among free and equals is an artificial thing. If they are all equal, that "A" should rule now is an artificial thing. We just lay it down, rule for one year or rule for four years, whatever it is. We think expediently. Now this artificiality which is necessary if there are no natural unequals is the political equivalent to money, money in exchange. Just as exchange doesn't become possible without the invention of money, rule among equals doesn't become possible except by some other nomos. In both cases the shoemakers and carpenters are artificially equalized.

Now this passage sets in beyond all doubt that the political friendship is not friendship proper because of the crucial significance of nomos. In the immediately following passage Aristotle turns to a much more natural form of friendship and that is erotic friendship, because people fall in love with one another without being told to do so, although there may be societies in which it becomes a convention that if a boy doesn't date a girl or if the girl isn't dated that is a defect and therefore they will date and be dated merely by convention. But this is not the natural thing. I mean, you can rightly say being dated is not falling in love and falling in love is not something which nomos as such can regulate. Now this erotic friendship is also between unequals but here the possibility of equalizing claims by money does not exist. I mean, if one is not loved by the other the other cannot simply say, well, I give you so much money and then you will be pleased. The mutual recriminations among lovers of different ages -- this is here the point, he has obviously here in mind homosexual love -- and this leads Aristotle to mutual recriminations among sophists and their pupils because there is also older and younger people, with some irony against the sophists. But there is one implication which was seen by Thomas Aquinas: namely, that Protagoras is not a sophist because he didn't behave that way, in the way in which sophists behave. (This only in passing.) Now we go on in 1164a33. This is the same chapter.

O: But in cases where no agreement is come to as to the value of the service, if it is proffered for the recipient's own sake, as has been said above, no complaint arises, for a friendship based on virtue does not give rise to quarrels; and the return made should be in proportion to the intention of the benefactor, since intention is the measure of a friend, and of virtue. This is the principle on which it would seem that payment ought to be made to those who have imparted instruction in philosophy. . . .

S: Literally, "to those who have been participating in philosophy."

O: . . . for the value of their service is not measurable in money, and no honor paid them could be an equivalent, but no doubt all that can be expected is that to them, as to the gods and to our parents, we should make such return as is in our power. Then on the other hand the gift is not disinterested but made with a view to a recompense, it is no doubt the best thing that a return should be made such as both parties concur. . .

S: And so on. Let us leave it here. You see here from this that the friendship according to virtue is not identical with the philosophical association, but



the latter is a species of the former. This is, of course, a different case from the political friendship discussed at the beginning; erotic friendship and then this kind of philosophic friendship. In 1164b22, at the beginning of the next chapter.

O: Other questions that may be raised are such as these: Does a man owe his father unlimited respect and obedience, or ought he when ill to take the advice of a physician, and when electing a general to vote for the best soldier?

S: And not for his father. Yes. Yes?

O: And similarly, ought he to do a service to a friend rather than to a virtuous man. . . .

S: You see, here Aristotle follows the ordinary views that a friend need not be a virtuous man. Yes?

O: . . . and ought to repay his obligation to a benefactor rather than make a present to a comrade, when he is not in a position to do both? Now perhaps with all these matters it is not easy to lay down an exact rule. . .

S: And so on. So you see the statement of cases regarding friendship which Aristotle will discuss in the sequel. The question of the father is particularly striking because according to the premise one owes the father most of all human beings, and here obviously that doesn't mean that you should listen to him regarding medical treatment even if he is stubborn and says you have to take this pill. This would not be rational. Let us read only 1165a12, only the general statement. "As has often been said. . . ."

O: Hence, as has been frequently remarked already, discussions about our emotions and actions only admit of such degree of definiteness as belongs to the matters with which they deal.

S: In other words, the precise line within which you ought to obey your father as a grown up son cannot be given. In some situations it may be good to vote for your father if he wants to be general. It may happen, but ordinarily, of course, it would not. Good. Yes, and in the sequel there comes also up this question: whether one should help in case of need the wiser man or rather the more close akin, the closer akin; well, in the extreme case the father, of course. Should one help more one's father or one's teacher? You know this kind of question, Rabbi Weiss. In Jewish passages that question is discussed. Yes. I refer you to a parallel to this question in Plato's Laws where Plato leaves it undetermined -- leaves undetermined the order of rank between honoring one's soul or honoring one's parents. I can now quote myself on this subject: in the History of Political Philosophy on page 58. Yes, and in the context of this Aristotle also discusses the dissolution of friendship and especially a most delicate case in 1165b23, following, which we might read, because I think we should also have as many specimens as possible of Aristotle's way of treating these matters, although the passage is not difficult to understand in itself. Yes?

O: On the other hand, suppose one friend to have remained the same while the other has improved, and become greatly the superior in virtue: ought the latter to keep up the friendship? Perhaps it is out of the question; and this becomes especially clear when the gap between them is a wide one, as may happen with two people who were friends in boyhood.

One may have remained a boy in mind, while the other is a man of the highest ability; how can they be friends, when they have different tastes and different likes and dislikes? They will no longer even enjoy each other's society; but without this, intercourse and therefore friendship are, as we saw, impossible. But this has been discussed already.

Are we then to behave towards a former friend in exactly the same way as if he had never been our friend at all? Perhaps we ought to remember our past intimacy, and just as we think it right to show more kindness to friends than to strangers, so likewise some attention should be paid, for the sake of old times, to those who were our friends in the past, that is, if the rupture was not caused by extreme wickedness on their part.

S: Yes. This applies, of course, also and especially to the philosopher and his family. Think of Socrates' thin relations to his kin in Plato. That would be an example. But the statement is perfectly intelligible in itself and I think it is of wonderful delicacy. Now let us turn to the next chapter. This chapter and later on deal with self-love and these are really the most important chapters in the book. Now let us begin at the beginning of 1166a.

O: The forms which friendly feeling for our neighbors takes, and the marks by which the different forms of friendship are defined, seem to be derived from the feelings of regard which we entertain for ourselves. A friend is defined as one who wishes, and promotes by action, the real or apparent good of another for that other's sake; or one who wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the friend's sake. (This is the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of former friends who have quarrelled.) Others say that a friend is one who frequents another's society, and who desires the same things as he does, or one who shares his friend's joys and sorrows. (This too is very characteristic of mothers.) Friendship also is defined by one or other of these marks.

S: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. You see here, Mr. Lyons, the mothers come in again, so they are crucial. We will take this up later. Now this is a summary on friendship and maternal love is, in a way, the most natural love, which will also be explained later. Now this has been emphasized before. The origin of friendship is the friendship for oneself. This is the fundamental friendship and, in a way, also the highest friendship. The question is then what is that primary friendship? What is that self? Let us continue.

O: But each of them is also found in a good man's feelings towards himself (and in those of all other men as well, in so far as they believe themselves to be good; but, as has been said, virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the standard in everything). For the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with every part of his nature. Also he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent, and seeks it by action (for it is a mark of a good man to exert himself actively for the good); and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a man's real self).

S: Let us stop here. Yes, all right, "real self" is, of course, not Greek -- "and that, the intellectual part, seems to be each one's," literally translated, "each," "which one" -- what you would say, "which man himself." A man as himself is his intellectual part, not his nails or ears although they in a way belong to him. Now in order to explain that friendship for oneself is the primary

friendship Aristotle starts from the good man because only in the good man can this become clear. The good man is in agreement with himself, which cannot be said of the bad man. His whole soul, i.e. all its parts, strives for the same. All these parts are friends. He does the good things for the sake of himself, i.e. for the sake of his intellectual part, and that intellectual part is thought to be he himself. The other parts of him are the friends of his highest part and his highest part is also the friend of his lower parts. That seems to be implied. Now let us go on where we left off.

O: Also he desires his own life and security, and especially that of his rational part.

S: Yes, "that through which he thinks." Now here he uses the word connected with phronesis, in Aristotle practical wisdom, whereas before he had used dianoia. Now go on.

O: For existence is good for the virtuous man; and everyone wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the world on condition of becoming somebody else (for God possesses the good even as it is), but only while remaining himself, whatever he may be; and it would appear that the thinking part is the real self. . . .

S: Yes, here is nous; so that the good man wishes to live and to be preserved and in the highest degree he wishes this for that by which he thinks. In other words, he would prefer to lose a leg by amputation than to become insane or to become senile. I believe everyone sees that. Or to have a liver taken over or to lose an eye or what not. This is the fact which Aristotle means. For the good man it is good to be. But now Aristotle enlarges it and speaks of everyone, i.e. not only the good man wishes to have the good things in the highest possible degree. Everyone wishes to be a god. A god is supposed to possess all the good things. No, says Aristotle: everyone wishes to possess the good things while remaining a human being. This is also true of the good man. He wishes to remain a human being. Hence, the best in him will not be so radically distant from the other part in him that he could not be a friend with himself. You remember the statement, a god cannot be a friend of a human being because of the radical distance. But since he wishes to remain a human being the distance will not become extreme. Both parts of him are himself, but to the highest degree the thinking part is himself. So, in other words, you cannot disregard the body. Man can be a friend to himself because of his inner duality. That is a key point, I believe. Whether you say body-soul or soul-mind is not developed here. The question arises, can a simple being, a simple being like a god, be a friend to himself? The discussion of the inner duality of man occurred at the end of Book VII in 1154b, 20 to 31, which you may read. Now let us go on where we left off.

O: . . . the thinking part is the real self, or is so more than anything else.

S: Yes, so in other words, the others are not simply to be disregarded. Yes.

O: And the good man desires his own company; for he enjoys being by himself, since he has agreeable memories of the past, and good hopes for the future, which are pleasant too; also his mind is stored with subjects for contemplation. And he is keenly conscious of his own joys and sorrows; for the same things give him pleasure or pain at all times, and not different things at different times, since he is not apt to change his mind.



S: Yes, let us stop here. Again, these are all applications of what we generally say about friends to the individual: that there can be a kind of sharing of pleasure or pain of the various parts in us. But here again we must not forget the issue of the gods. Does a god feel pain with himself? You know this. What did he say? How did he translate ? "Share in pain." Does a god share in pain with himself? Go on.

O: It is therefore because the good man has these various feelings towards himself, and because he feels towards his friend in the same way as towards himself (for a friend is another self), that friendship also is thought to consist in one or other of these feelings, and the possession of them is thought to be the test of a friend.

S: Yes. Now, in other words, friendship with others is possible because the friend is another self; in a way, yourself again. By the way, Mr. Lyons, that confirms your paper as you can see. But I would mention here only one implication which Aristotle, of course, did not intend but which we can hardly help observing. Aristotle says here by implication one can love others only insofar as they are like oneself. One can love only those others who are like oneself. One can love only one's friends like oneself. Does this ring a bell?

O: To love your neighbor as yourself.

S: Yes, exactly. Sure, that's the difference. In other words, it is an implicit rejection of the Biblical love of the neighbor. That is clear; because the Bible does not presuppose affection. I mean, you are to love people for whom you have no affection, whereas Aristotle presupposes this high degree of concern only when affection is present. Yes?

Q: (To the effect that heterosexual love seems to rest on pleasure.)

S: Oh no, the erga, the actions, the management of the household, upbringing of children. Oh no. No, no, Aristotle wouldn't go in for that. He would not reject or exclude it, of course, but the purpose is in the first place the upbringing of children. That's Aristotle's formula.

Q: But the friendship is inegalitarian.

S: Yes, it is not quite equal between man and woman according to Aristotle, I'm sorry to say. Yes.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Can one say that the friendship that one man has for another because he is like himself must be higher than the friendship which a man has for himself, because it is a friendship of unequal parts, higher and lower?

S: Yes. Well, we will come to that later because Aristotle in the immediate sequel makes clear that he will take up the question of love of oneself later on. This is only the first discussion.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Can you explain why to love others like oneself is a rejection of the Bible?

S: Yes, because the Bible also says love thy neighbor like thyself. . . .(off microphone).

Q<sub>3</sub>: It's not a rejection. They are two different relationships.

S: Yes, but still if you think that through. Explicitly it is not a rejection. Aristotle didn't know the Bible; he couldn't reject it. But if you think it through, what he understands by friendship as appears from this passage, then you will see that the Biblical notion would be excluded. But let us go on and see the further development. In the sequel Aristotle makes clear at some length that the bad men cannot be friends with themselves and therefore not with others. That only confirms the general statement. Let us only read the end of the chapter, b25 to 29.

O: Thus a bad man appears to be devoid even of affection for himself, because he has nothing lovable in his nature. If then such a state of mind is utterly miserable, we should do our utmost to shun wickedness and try to be virtuous. That is the way both to be friends with ourselves and to win the friendship of others.

S: Yes. Now admonitions of this kind are quite rare in the Ethics. It concludes the chapter on friendship for oneself as the origin and, in a way, the end of all friendship. It corresponds to the thought expressed in Book I that the noble and just things are by nature the most pleasant things, but now friendship with oneself and others makes moral virtue worth-while. You have now that premium, if I may say so, which was never stated. What we heard only was it's noble to do the noble and just things and here we learn now what it means that moral virtue is the requirement of happiness: inner peace and peace and more than peace with some other men can be obtained only on the basis of moral virtue. Now before Aristotle continues the question of self-love he inserts three chapters dealing with benevolence, concord, and beneficence. These are phenomena akin to friendship but not friendship; especially good will: you wish a man the best. You don't have to know him and he doesn't have to know you. Aristotle calls it a kind of lazy friendship. You wish him the best; you don't do him the best. More important for our purpose is the section on concord in the chapter after that.

Concord, omonoia in Greek, is not the same as omodoxia, having the same opinion. You may have the same opinions as someone else and one cannot say you are in concord. For example, two mathematicians have the same opinions about the Pythagorean theorem and no one would say they live in concord. Concord requires that those who are in concord know of each other's view and that the object is the human, the useful, and not the heavenly things or mathematical objects and so on. Let us read 1167a28. "They are in concord regarding the things to be done."

O: Concord is said to prevail in a state, when the citizens agree as to their interests, adopt the same policy, and carry their common resolves into execution. Concord then refers to practical ends, and practical ends of importance, and able to be realized by both or all the parties: for instance, there is concord in the state when the citizens unanimously decree that the offices of state shall be elective, or that an alliance shall be made with Sparta, or that Pittacus shall be dictator (when Pittacus was himself willing to be dictator).

S: Yes, because if he refuses to accept if elected there is no concord. Good. Go on.

O: When each of two persons wishes himself to rule, like the rivals in the Phenissae, there is discord; since men are not of one mind merely when each thinks the same thing (whatever this may be), but when each thinks the same thing in relation to the same person. . . .

S: Well, an example: they may agree like Francis I and Charles V agreed. As Francis put it, what my brother Charles wants I too want: Milan. You know, that is of course not concord. Good.

O: . . . for instance, when both the common people and the upper classes. . . .

S: Yes, this disgraceful thing. That's the same epieikeis, the word used all the time for the moral men or the gentlemen. Let us be literal. I mean, let us not improve on Aristotle. Yes. Good.

O: . . . when both the common people and the gentlemen wish that the best people shall rule; for only so can all parties get what they desire. Concord appears therefore to mean friendship between citizens, which indeed is the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life. Now concord in this sense exists between good men. . . .

S: No. It exists "in the gentlemen." Although it is agreement between the gentlemen and the demos it resides in the gentlemen. Yes.

O: . . . since these are of one mind both with themselves and with one another, as they always stand more or less on the same ground; for good men's wishes are steadfast, and do not ebb and flow like the tide, and they wish for just and expedient ends, which they strive to attain in common. The base on the other hand are incapable of concord, except in some small degree, as they are of friendship, since they try to get more than their share of advantages, and take less than their share of labors and public burdens. . . .

S: And so on. They are terrible. Yes, we don't have to read the details. So concord is political friendship which means that friendship proper is not the bond of the city. The bond of the city is this, is concord, and it exists in the gentlemen as distinguished from the demos. The demos and the low class people, morally low class, are used here synonymously. Any reader of Aristotle, of the Politics, should know that. Yes. But, of course, not all gentlemen are friends for gentlemanship is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of friendship, as we have seen before. Yes?

Q: Could you say that the next two sentences are the basis of modern political science? /S: Pardon?/ That the two following sentences where he is speaking about the base would be the basis of the city in modern political science.

S: I know that. Well, did we not discuss it when we spoke of men like Hobbes, Locke. /Q: (Inaudible.)/ I believe that it does. Every moment, every time and place is good enough for seeing something but I think some of you have seen it before. Good.

Now then he turns to the subject of beneficence which is, of course, more than benevolence: doing good to someone else. Now Aristotle gives us his first impression at the beginning, 1167b17.

O: Benefactors seem to love those whom they benefit more than those who have received benefits love those who have conferred them; and it is asked why this is so, as it seems to be unreasonable. The view most generally taken is that it is because the one party is in the position of a debtor and the other of a creditor; just as therefore in the case



of a loan, whereas the borrower would be glad to have his creditor out of the way, the lender actually watches over his debtor's safety, so it is thought that the conferrer of a benefit. . . .

S: You see how tough Aristotle can be, Mr. Johnson; you see how tough. He knows the things which Harold Lasswell knows. Go on.

O: . . . wishes the recipient to live in order that he may receive a return, but the recipient is not particularly anxious to make a return. Epicharmus no doubt would say that people who give this explanation are looking at the seamy side of life; but all the same it appears to be not untrue to human nature, for most men have short memories, and are more desirous of receiving benefits than of bestowing them. But it might be held that the real reason lies deeper. . . .

S: Yes, let me say, "It could seem that the cause is more natural," has a deeper root in nature than that. In other words, this is a crude, superficial explanation which people give; it doesn't go to the root of the matter. Yes?

O: . . . and that the case of the creditor is not really a parallel. With him it is not a matter of affection, but only of wishing his debtor's preservation for the sake of recovering his money; whereas a benefactor feels friendship and affection for the recipient of his bounty even though he is not getting anything out of him and is never likely to do so.

S: So, in other words, in the case of the creditor it is mere calculation. It has no deeper thing. But in the case of the benefactor it is deeper and that he explains. Yes?

O: The same thing happens with the artist: every artist loves his own handiwork more than that handiwork if it were to come to life would love him. This is perhaps especially true of poets, who have an exaggerated affection for their own poems and love them as parents love their children. The position of the benefactor then resembles that of the artist; the recipient of his bounty is his handiwork, and he therefore loves him more than his handiwork loves its maker. The reason of this is that all things desire and love existence; but we exist in activity, since we exist by living and doing; and in a sense one who has made something exists actively, and so he loves his handiwork because he loves existence. This is in fact a fundamental principle of nature. . . .

S: No. "But this is natural." This comes from nature, not from calculation.

O: . . . what a thing is potentially, that its work reveals in actuality.

S: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. Now how can this phenomenon that the benefactor is more concerned with the benefitted than vice versa be understood as a natural phenomenon? The maker in act, I mean not only in potency, is in a way the work. As we say, he lives in his work not only while working but also while the work is completed. Shakespeare lives in the plays. It makes sense to say; it's not merely metaphoric. But both the benefactor and the benefitted love themselves, but the love of the benefactor extends to the benefitted as an extension of his self-love whereas there is no vice versa relation, no opposite relation, in the benefitted because he is only the recipient. He doesn't live in the work as the benefactor does. You see here the difference between Aristotle and, say, Hobbes regarding self-preservation, existence, life. It's never

mere life for Aristotle or hardly ever. To be, to preserve oneself, means to preserve oneself as a living being and living human being: to be in activity, in work, as a human being. The Greek word which Aristotle uses here is energeia. This is, of course, the origin of our word energy which means something very different. Now this means "in" and this is "work" or "activity": the "being at work," the "being in the work." The lyre player when he plays the lyre is energeia a lyre player. When he does not play the lyre he is only potentially so. And this, to be, in an emphatic sense means for Aristotle to be at work in the manner belonging to the being concerned. Say, to be as a human being means to be at work as a human being, to activate the human potentiality.

Q: Excuse me, I've forgotten what Hobbes' position was.

S: Well, no, he doesn't define -- simply to be, to live. It is undefined. Aristotle knows that too. He speaks of that in the third book of the Ethics: that mere living has some sweetness in it. But that is not sufficient for Aristotle. We tend by nature to be and to be as human beings, to act as human beings and to enjoy our actions, to enjoy our activities as distinguished from the sensual pleasures. Not that we do not enjoy the sensual pleasures, but these are not the only and not the highest ones. Therefore, good deeds, good actions, are by nature more pleasant than sensual pleasures, because this goes deeper to the root of our being. Now Aristotle develops then in the sequel, among other things, that the toil and pains going with activity do not contradict this fundamental pleasure going with doing our own work. Let us see.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Would it be going too far afield to say that in a different tone and style the thought raised here is what Nietzsche says partly in The Will To Power?

S: Yes, well, the point of view is very different because there are no ends for Nietzsche. There are no natural ends for Nietzsche.

Now if this is so, incidentally, if this is so that the benefactor loves the benefitted more than the benefitted loves the benefactor -- or let us use now benefactor and lover synonymously for reasons which we will see -- who will be the greatest lover of the polis from this point of view? Yes, who Mr. Erickson?

O: Not Mr. Erickson. The legislator.

S: Not good enough.

O: The ruler?

S: Not enough.

O: The founder.

S: Exactly. It's his work. The only man who can say that the polis is his work is the founder. This is surely what is implied and this is the tacit argument of the Republic, of Plato's Republic -- is exactly this. The tyrant is only at the best the owner of the city, "at the best" in quotation marks, but he is never the man to whom the city owes its being.

Now in the next chapter Aristotle returns to the question of self-love. In the first statement the key point was this: the inner duality of man is the reason why man can be a friend to himself. In the second statement this is not ex-

PLICITLY repeated but it remains implied. Aristotle begins with a difficulty: people both blame self-love and praise it, blame it as egoism and praise it nevertheless. This is the situation. And here is the point where there is only one passage which we should read, 1168a35.

O: But the facts do not accord. . . .

S: Yes, "the facts disagree with these speeches" depreciating egoism. Yes?

O: . . . nor is this surprising.

S: "Nor is this unreasonable," alogos; logoi, alogos. Yes?

O: For we admit that one. . . .

S: No, no. "For people say. . . ." People say. Now that's very interesting. Aristotle has here given certain speeches and then he says these speeches are contradicted by the facts and now instead of giving us the facts he gives us other speeches. It's not strange? Absolutely unintentionally, I had explained that without thinking of this passage in a study of Machiavelli. I'll just read it to you. "While all men praise goodness most men act badly. It seems that the error contained in what is generally said can be recognized by simply confronting the manifest speeches what people say with the equally manifest deeds, but the deeds which contradict the speeches praising goodness do not prove that those speeches are untrue, i.e. that men ought not to act virtuously. The deeds by themselves prove merely that most men do not in fact act virtuously." Here of course the passage does the opposite. I mean the fact that men are not simply selfish doesn't contradict that. It simply means men are unreasonably suckers. That wouldn't be of any interest. "Yet the way in which men mostly act is also expressed by speech. Hence, the laudatory speeches contradict each other." And now you can apply this here. Men blame egoism, self-love in the sense of egoism, but in fact they are not so egoistic. All right, then one could simply say they are not intelligent enough to be egoistic, are not tough enough, but they also praise, say, another kind of self-love conflicting with the first and the contradiction of their speeches shows that there is a real problem. Yes. Now he solves the question, this fact that people both praise and blame self-love, in the most simple way: by a distinction, by distinguishing one kind of self-love which is good and one which is bad. Now let us begin at 1165, following.

O: Those then who make it a term of reproach call men lovers of self when they assign to themselves the larger share of money, honors, or bodily pleasures; since these are the things which most men desire and set their hearts on as being the greatest goods, and which accordingly they compete with each other to obtain. Now those who take more than their share of these things are men who indulge their appetites, and generally their passions and the irrational part of their souls. But most men are of this kind. Accordingly the use of the term "lover of self" as a reproach has arisen from the fact that self-love of the ordinary kind is bad.

S: Yes, because the many are bad.

O: Hence self-love is rightly censured in those who are lovers of self in this sense. And that it is those who take too large a share of things of this sort whom most people usually mean when they speak of lovers of self. . . .



S: Yes, do you see that? The many who are so selfish in the bad sense yet praise those who are selfish in the good sense. In other words, you find more people who know something of virtue than people who are virtuous. Yes. Good. Go on.

O: For if a man were always bent on outdoing everybody else in acting justly or temperately or in displaying any other of the virtues, and in general were always trying to secure for himself moral nobility, no one would charge him with love of self nor find any fault with him.

S: In other words, if he wants to have more good deeds, to do more good deeds, than anybody else people wouldn't call him an egoist although Aristotle says in a deeper sense he is, of course, egoistic. Go on.

53 O: Yet as a matter of fact such a man might be held to be a lover of self in an exceptional degree. At all events he takes for himself the things that are noblest and most truly good. Also it is the most dominant part of himself that he indulges and obeys in everything.

S: Yes, now let us stop here. I think the thought is very clear. The most egoistic man is the virtuous man, in a sense. Plato or Socrates presents this in a -- how shall I say? -- less pleasing manner and the word which they use is love of gain, gives the Greek. Love of gain is, of course -- was regarded as something very low. Very low: love of gain. And the difficulty is this: that rightly understood the most virtuous man is the greediest man in the world because he is most eager to get the most of the highest good. You see? From this point of view there is, then -- this is the same thought. Now why can such a man be said to love himself to the highest degree? Because a man himself is what is the highest in him. Now the immediate sequel.

O: But as in the state it is the sovereign that is held in the fullest sense to be the state, and in any other composite whole it is the dominant part that is deemed especially. . . .

S: In other words, if you say the polis has done something or the country has done something, in fact you mean the government; so the highest, the most authoritative, part. And the same applies to the individual. The individual is primarily the rational part just as in the polis, the polis is primarily the government. Yes?

O: . . . to be that whole, so it is with man. He therefore who loves and indulges himself is a lover of self in the fullest degree. Again, the terms "self-restrained" and "unrestrained" denote being restrained or not by one's intellect, and thus imply that the intellect is the man himself.

S: Yes, now what is that self-restraint? I believe I translated it formerly by continence. Aristotle here vindicates continence, which was previously presented to us as lower than virtue. I believe that is crucial for the understanding of the book as a whole because Book VII, the new beginning, started with the discussion of continence as distinguished from virtue. Now why is this necessary? The following thought occurred to me. The most extreme statement in favor of the virtuous man, the gentleman, occurred in the section on the sense of shame at the end of Book IV, and where it was said he has no sense of shame because he does not do anything improper or wrong. You remember that. So he is not tempted ever. The continent man is the man who is tempted but does not

succumb. But there is this difficulty: when he spoke of this perfect gentleman at the end of Book IV he said there are two kinds of proper things, proper in themselves and proper by nomos, by convention, and Aristotle says that doesn't make any difference because the perfect gentleman will not do anything improper, whether it is intrinsically improper or merely conventionally improper. But now this creates a great difficulty. If something is bad merely by convention it is absolutely impossible not to be tempted to do it. For example, a man may be tempted for a second to drive left when he should drive right. The only point of interest is that he doesn't drive left. And therefore this is, I think, an indication of the difficulty regarding the concept of the perfect gentleman and that it might be more practical to be satisfied with something like the continent man, but this only in passing. Now we have to read a few more passages in this chapter which are also of broad importance: 1169a16. Oh -- a revolution! The remark was a reaction to looking up to find a flood of raised hands.

Q: I was wondering if you could repeat that. I just didn't follow it. If it's bad only by nomos it's impossible not to be tempted? S: Yes. Why?

S: I mean, if something is merely conventionally bad -- in other words, it has no intrinsic, no natural basis -- there cannot be a natural pleasantness in striving for the opposite. I use my simple example: something that is clearly conventional like driving left and right. You can make it a second nature so that it can never occur to you but assuming you were tempted, because the habit was not very strong or you don't drive frequently or whatever it may be, no one would blame a man and, say, if a man had the temptation each time to do something which is only conventionally bad, say one of the rules of the table. . . . If he would do the improper thing I imagine one could say you should be awake.

Q: It couldn't be said if it is merely conventionally bad that the opposite would be pleasurable.

S: I think it is unreasonable to expect that a man should be perfectly free from a temptation to do it or not to do it.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I think it shows that the observance of the conventionally proper, what is strictly conventionally proper, proceeds out of friendship among the gentlemen as much as the justice. To wear black to a funeral is a mark of respect and it is not by nature noble to wear black at a funeral. Other nations wear white. But a gentleman would not think of turning up --

S: Of course not. But that he could be tempted to wear white --

Q<sub>2</sub>: No, he would not be tempted to desecrate the funeral of his friend.

S: No. I do not know which people they are who wear white. . . . (Brief inaudible exchange.)

Q<sub>3</sub>: The thing that I don't understand is now continence and incontinence are here modified. This is almost a third modification if Book VII introduces a new start and modifies that very severe teaching of Books II to V. Would you say, then, that now in Book IX there would be another new start?

S: No, no, no, no. In a way it's the same. The theme from Book II on at the latest was moral virtue. From Book VII to IX continence, which is lower than moral virtue, and friendship, which is higher.



Q<sub>3</sub>: Now are you suggesting that continence is being brought up to a higher status?

S: No, no. It would only mean -- well, if I may use a bad modern word, Books VII to IX are more realistic in this sense, both in speaking of something which is lower than moral virtue, continence, and in speaking of something which is higher than moral virtue, friendship. Now let us turn to 1169a16.

O: With the bad man therefore, what he does is not in accord with what he ought to do, but the good man does what he ought.

S: Yes, the good man, epieikes; you can also translate this as the gentleman.

O: . . . the gentleman does what he ought, since intelligence always chooses for itself that which is best. . . .

S: Literally, "since every intelligence," pas nous, "chooses what is best for itself, and the gentleman obeys the intelligence." Now let us stop here for a moment. This is a vindication of true self-love because every nous, every intelligence, chooses the best for itself. The nous is not identical with the gentleman. The gentleman obeys the nous . . . but there is no possibility of blaming the nous for choosing the best for itself. He cannot help but choose the best for himself. Let us see how he goes on from here.

O: But it is also true that the virtuous man's conduct is often guided by the interests of his friends and of his country, and that he will if necessary lay down his life in their behalf.

S: Let us stop. The country is, of course, "fatherland;" patris. Now before we come to that: he speaks here now no longer of the nous, of the intelligence. The intelligence cannot die for the friends, for the fatherland, but only the gentleman or the good man. So while the gentleman obeys the nous which nous chooses what is best for it, he will also do many things for others. That's different. For his friends and for the fatherland. This is the only time in which the term fatherland occurs in the Ethics, and if the Aristotle index by is of any use the only time when it occurs in the works of Aristotle. So it has to be considered very carefully. You remember that it did not occur where it should have occurred, in the section on courage. We were struck by that. He would do everything by dying for it. Yes. Yes?

Q: It sounds here as though this is fundamentally the same as Plato's Republic, namely the guardians where love of one's own is the same as love of country.

S: Yes, but there is here -- let us see how the argument proceeds. Go on.

O: For he will surrender wealth and power and all the goods that men struggle to win, if he can secure nobility for himself; since he would prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of mild enjoyment, a year of noble life to many years of ordinary existence, one great and glorious exploit to many small successes. And this is doubtless the case with those who give their lives for others. . . .

S: Yes, "doubtless" is one of these cases. What he says is "perhaps." But we never know in such cases: is this the polite, urbane expression of certainty or is it literal? That we never know. Yes?



O: . . . thus they choose great nobility for themselves. Also the virtuous man. . . .

S: No, let us go on in 32, a bit later.

O: It may even happen that he will surrender to his friend the performance of some achievement. . . .

S: "Actions."

O: . . . actions, and that it may be nobler for him to be the cause of his friend's performing them than to perform them himself. Therefore in all spheres of praiseworthy conduct it is manifest that the good man takes the larger share of moral nobility for himself. In this sense then, as we said above, it is right to be a lover of self, though self-love of the ordinary sort is wrong.

S: Yes. Very well. So, in other words, his willingness to give more to the others, to the friends, applies not only to such low things as money and honors. It applies even to noble deeds. Say, only one man can perform a very dangerous mission. Both are eager to do it and he is willing -- yes, well, this must not be understood cynically -- but he is prepared to give this greatest possibility of distinction to the other. A question: what about knowledge? What about knowledge: if it is not action but understanding?

Q: I was just thinking that. When you love truth above friends you can sacrifice the good for a friend but you can't really sacrifice the true for him.

S: Yes, this is also perhaps true, but the more simple thing: the question cannot arise here. An action may be unshareable. Insights are necessarily shareable. This highest possibility of conflict, the noblest, regarding the noble deed, exists only in the sphere of action. The highest form of conflict cannot exist in the sphere of thought because of the essentially shareable character of understanding. And this is the tacit transition to sharing insights: a friendship regarding common thinking as distinguished from common action. Mr. Flaumenhaft.

Q<sub>2</sub>: What about the case of a poor family in a town where there's a great philosopher at the university and one of the brothers goes to work knowing that he's foregoing the leisure and the time to study in order to send the brother to sit at the feet of that philosopher?

S: Yes, well, that is a complicated question. I mean, if he is the one by nature more fitted then it is an action of questionable wisdom. Is it not? But if it is merely a matter, who should go to college to the greater benefit of the family's finances, that is not an interesting question.

Q<sub>2</sub>: I mean if you take brothers of equal ability. . . .

S: Equal ability. Yes. I don't know. They might have to toss coins because it would amount to a form of tossing coins. I mean, if they are both equally decent people no one would wish that the other would lose the very great good which he would get there; and what could they do in such a case? It would be tossing a coin even if tossing a coin consists in the fact that the parents should choose because this would also be not necessarily a rational preference.

Q<sub>3</sub>: Is it in this example that we don't talk about knowledge or insight but we talk about access, opportunity?

S: Yes, but is not the opportunity as a very close potentiality separable from the act of knowledge?

Q<sub>3</sub>: I think it is. (Goes on inaudibly.)

S: Still, but the insights as such are shareable, the insights as such, but if we go into the conditions of insights that's a different question. Yes.

We are not surprised that the next chapter begins with the words, "It is controversial also regarding the happy man whether he will need friends or not." As Mr. Lane pointed out, happiness was not the theme for a very long time but now when we approach that breakthrough, to quote Brother Chrysostom, then happiness also comes up. Good. And let us read 1169b30. Here in this chapter the question of the theoretical life almost comes to the surface. 1169b30. Do you have that?

O: And as he does not need useful or pleasant friends, it is assumed that he does not require friends at all. But perhaps this inference is really untrue. For as we said at the beginning, happiness is a form of activity, and an activity clearly is something that comes into being, not a thing that we possess all the time, like a piece of property. But if happiness consists in life and activity, and the activity of a good man, as was said at the beginning, is good and so pleasant in itself, and if the sense that a thing is our own is also pleasant, yet we are better able to contemplate our neighbors than ourselves, and their actions than our own, and thus good men find pleasure in the actions of other good men who are their friends, since those actions possess both these essentially pleasant qualities, it therefore follows that the supremely happy man will require good friends, inasmuch as he desires to contemplate actions that are good and that are his own, and the actions of a good man that is his friend are such.

S: Yes, let us stop here. The starting point is this: it is easier to contemplate others and their actions than oneself and one's own actions. Therefore, one needs friends. You see, it is a kind of contemplation, the contemplation of noble actions, which is here given as a reason. But let us see the immediate sequel.

O: Also men think that the life of the happy man ought to be pleasant. Now a solitary man has a hard life, for it is not easy to keep up continuous activity by oneself; it is easier to do so with the aid of and in relation to other people.

S: Yes, this applies, of course, also to the theoretical activity. Your attention and concentration lags. Someone is there with whom you talk and he is still fully awake and may keep you awake where you yourself could not keep you awake. And then this is developed in the sequel more fully, all this theme: developed in a more natural discussion, meaning a discussion dealing with the nature of things, 1170a13. To live means to be aware, to be aware either by the senses as all animals or in the higher form of man by the mind, and this awareness is heightened by joint awareness and this is the highest reason why friendship is necessary precisely on the highest level of human life. Yes, I think -- let us read 1170b, just in the middle of this long sentence.

- O: . . . and if to be conscious one is alive is a pleasant thing in itself (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that one possesses a good thing is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and especially so for good men, because existence is good for them, and so pleasant (because they are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsically good). . . .
- S: Yes, but "by the joint perception." That's the friendship: the joint perception. Yes?
- O: . . . and if the virtuous man feels towards his friend in the same way as he feels towards himself (for his friend is a second self) -- then, just as a man's own existence is desirable for him, so, or nearly so, is his friend's existence also.
- S: Yes. This was also seen by Mr. Lane. There is a slight preference for one's own self. To that extent the "egoism" is retained by Aristotle. Yes. And let us go on where we left off.
- O: But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore a man ought also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence, and this is attained by their living together and by conversing and communicating their thoughts to each other; for this is the meaning of living together as applied to human beings, it does not mean merely feeding in the same place. . . .
- S: Now you see the sharp distinction which he here makes: feeding together and sharing thoughts and speeches together. He doesn't speak here about the actions. That's a preparation for the discussion of the theoretical life. Yes. Now in the next chapter he raises the question whether one should have many friends or few and the answer is one can have only a few friends. And there is one passage which we should read, 1171a10. "It doesn't seem to be possible that one can be--
- O: friendly with many people. . . .
- S: Yes, in an intensive way. Yes.
- O: . . . for the same reason as it is impossible to be in love with several people. Love means friendship in the superlative degree, and that must be with one person only; so also warm friendship is only possible with a few.
- S: So you see, Aristotle distinguishes all the time between friendship and eros. He does not do what Plato does: that he blurs the distinction. Yes?
- O: This conclusion seems to be supported by experience. Friendships between comrades only include a few people, and the famous examples of poetry are pairs of friends. Persons of many friendships, who are hail-fellow-well-met with everybody, are thought to be real friends of nobody (otherwise than as fellow-citizens are friends): I mean the sort of people we call obsequious. It is true that one may be friendly with many fellow-citizens and not be obsequious, but a model of excellence; but it is not possible to have many friends whom we love for their virtue and for themselves. We may be glad to find even a few friends of this sort.



S: Yes, you see here, politically one can have many friends, i.e. many fellow citizens. Of course one must have them. If there are not many fellow citizens it wouldn't be a city; it would be a hamlet. But he contrasts here politically, on the one hand, and through virtue, on the other. The polis surely is not held together by friendship proper. That's the least one would have to say. There is a minor curiosity, and then we can have a brief discussion, in the last chapter: 1172a, a few lines, just because it shows what kind of confusing things Aristotle may do. It is a simple example of that. At the beginning. That's shortly before the end of the book.

O: . . . this consciousness is actualized in intercourse; hence friends naturally desire each other's society. And whatever pursuit it is that constitutes existence for a man or that makes his life worth living, he desires to share that pursuit with his friends. Hence some friends drink or dice together, others practice athletic sports and hunt, or study philosophy, in each other's company; each sort spending their time together in the occupation that they love best of everything in life; for wishing to live in their friends' society, they pursue and take part with them in these occupations as best they can.

S: Yes. Now we see here what he says: he gives an enumeration of things which friends may do jointly, drinking together, playing dice together, having gymnastic training together, go hunting together, or philosophizing together. Only the two last items are connected by an "or." Now this would seem to be, well, among the millions of things which may unite friends philosophy is just one, just one and more or less the same as hunting. Or should there be a connection between philosophizing and hunting?

O: I think that there is.

S: Yes, sure. No, in Aristotle there is no example of it, as far as I remember, but in Plato that is quite common: hunting of the truth.

O: They hunted for justice after they --

S: Yes, sure. Yes. Yes, well, the most massive example is that when Plato repeats in the Laws the order of study given in the Republic -- you know, the mathematical sciences and so on in the seventh book of the Laws -- at the end you have in the Laws hunting where you have in the Republic philosophy. That is the most obvious, but it is frequently -- the term hunting for the truth occurs very frequently. Yes.

Q: It reminds me of Rousseau. There's something of a connection with Emile. He hunted first. He never ended up as a philosopher; that's the difficulty.

S: But does hunting play a role in the Emile? Yes? I don't remember. You see how good it is to have companions. Yes, now is there any other point? We don't have much time but a few minutes. There was a kind of rebellion at a certain moment. Mr. Dry.

Q<sub>2</sub>: That distinction between friendship and the political association -- the German language is more clear here than English because we talk about friends, we don't use the word acquaintance, and German has a more special use for the word friend.

S: Yes. Yes, sure. No, in this country friend is used freely in the sense of

acquaintance. By the way, in Greek ordinarily you would not use it but Xenophon, who is confronted with the grave question, who precisely are Socrates' friends, is compelled to make distinctions and does in some cases use friend in the sense of mere acquaintance. But ordinarily friend has a more emphatic meaning. Sure. Brother Chrysostom.

Q<sub>3</sub>: I was wondering whether the Greeks hunted on foot or on horseback.

S: I believe on horseback. We have here an expert in Greek hunting, Mr. Kendrick. On horseback. Did they hunt on horseback?

O: Yes, they do, but they don't hunt on horseback in the hunting.

S: Oh, they go only to the starting point of the hunt on horseback.

O: No, it's all on foot.

S: All on foot. You see. I didn't really know that.

Q<sub>1</sub>: Could you comment on this statement that nous or intelligence always chooses for itself that which is best? Nous I thought was a general apprehension of something.

S: No, that is in the more precise sense, but nous can also be used in the broader meaning where it is all forms. Mr. Glenn.

Q<sub>5</sub>: In this statement that conflict may exist in action but not in knowledge in what sense is knowledge meant?

S: Well, if there is a conflict regarding priorities of discovery this, of course, can exist, but that has nothing to do with the insight itself. I mean, you may be deprived of certain honors if you are the second. You know, if someone else has found out something about, say, civic leadership in suburbs and is publishing in the next issue of the A. P. S. R. and you can't come in before a quarter later. You know? Then you lose much of the distinction. But you must admit, the insight is not affected by it, only the external consequences of the insight. So men can share insights perfectly. They cannot share under all circumstances actions, because a very important action may not be able to be done except by one man. Think of astronauts. There are a few, but still in each case only one man. Or President of the United States, Mayor of Chicago. There are quite a few forms of action which can be done only by one man. This cannot exist in the sphere of insight, but only the externals, priorities, you know, which does not affect the insight itself but only the rewards?

16th Meeting: June 11, 1963

. . . I'm very happy to see progress. [Complimenting the paper.] Now you started very well by reminding us of the discussion in Book I of the three ways of life and you said that the whole structure of Book X reminds of this tri-partition: pleasure, political life and theoretical life. But then you said, however, Book X does not deal with the three lives. This was the part which I could not understand.

O: Oh. Well, I didn't mean to deny what I said first. What I mean is that if it does deal with the three lives one would expect Aristotle to have the first part of the book about the first one, the second part about the second one, etc. but since the apparent structure is not that of the three lives we must look for a reason why the second and third seem to come together.

S: I see. All right, let us forget about the three lives and see, pleasure, polis, contemplation, the three themes of Book X. . . . But also you emphasized the differences. For example, in the first book the posture taken toward pleasure was at least at first glance negative and in Book X it is positive. This is one of the great difficulties to which you referred. And what you said about the erring philosopher, that the gentleman is wiser than the erring philosopher, although he is unable to defend his position: that was also very well stated. Now you interpreted the book somewhat differently than I do, but that, of course, doesn't mean that you are wrong. Now you were particularly concerned with the kinship between the gentleman and the philosopher. You saw, of course, the differences. You said, for example, that the philosopher is presented as a purely theoretical man in the second part, and then, in the third part, when he speaks of civic duty (?) then the philosopher comes again to the fore, although he is hardly mentioned at first, namely the teacher of legislators. So both are political men but the gentleman is simply political and the philosopher is political in a sense -- you know, as he calls his whole enterprise: a kind of politics. Now the other point which was very well stated: the gentleman also beholds or looks up -- to the gods. . . . Here of course a difficulty arises to which you alluded, because the gentleman's looking up to the gods would not be theoretical. It would be pious and the book is silent on piety. The discussion of the gods in Book IV, munificence, has nothing to do with looking or beholding. This question cannot be settled on the basis of the Ethics. One would have to go into the discussion at the end of the Politics about the proper use of leisure. There you would find what kind of beholding the gentleman does and this is what now would be called enjoyment of art, of music, of sculpture, and so on. So this we cannot settle on the basis of this context. And the point which was useful was what you said that first we have the impression that the gentleman must be wealthy . . . and later on it appears that the gentleman does not have to be as wealthy as it seemed. . . . So then let us turn to our discussion of Book X.

So that we will have time for that section which for us as political scientists is the most important I propose that we start with the third part of Book X, with the conclusion. That begins in 1179a33. I remind you: the first section was pleasure and then we had the comparison of the theoretical and the political life and then the third is the conclusion. Now Aristotle begins this with the following remark. He tells us that we have now discussed sufficiently the virtues, friendship, and pleasure, as well as happiness. So these four subjects have been discussed. The treatment has been completed in outline, i.e. it is not exact. It is only an outline. But the whole work was meant as a teaching only in outline. So we know now what the virtues are, what friendship is, what



pleasure is and so on, but in matters of action knowledge is not sufficient. This applies especially to the virtues. It is of very little use to know what the virtues are if you don't do the right things in order to become virtuous. Aristotle restores here the emphasis on virtue in the sense of moral virtues, an emphasis which had shifted in the earlier parts of Book X to the theoretical virtues. But here we are in a difficulty. Now let us begin to read at b4, 1179b4. "Now if the speeches were sufficient for making men morally good. . . ." Yes?

O: Now if discourses on ethics were sufficient in themselves to make men virtuous, "large fees and many" (as Theognis says) "would they win," quite rightly, and to provide such discourses would be all that is wanted. But as it is, we see that although theories have power to stimulate and encourage generous youths, and, given an inborn nobility of character and a genuine love of what is noble, can make them susceptible to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to stimulate the mass of mankind to moral nobility.

S: "To perfect gentlemanship." Now of course not theories; speeches. In other words, the speeches, as Aristotle has given them here in the book and as many other writers have given them, are not sufficient for arousing the desire for perfect gentlemanship in the many and this is a crucial limitation valid for everything else. Aristotle discusses now how to get virtue of the many, not of the well-born, those who have by nature a desire for perfect gentlemanship. Let us go on. Omit the next. Line 16 of that. "Which speech could then. . . ." Yes.

O: Which speech then can reform the natures of men like these?

S: Well, not natures. "Which speech can reform men like these?"

O: Which speech can reform men like these? To dislodge by argument habits long firmly rooted in their characters is difficult if not impossible. We may doubtless think ourselves fortunate if we attain some measure of virtue when all the things believed to make men virtuous are ours.

S: Do you see? Aristotle is now again concerned with us, i.e. not merely the many, because we can assume that he would not count himself among the many. So now he generalizes. . . . But even here this only makes the question more difficult. Perhaps speeches are of no great use in the case of any man. What then shall be done? And then he develops in the following the theme, returning to the many: the man who lives according to passion, not guided by reason, does not listen to reason but only to force and that is the reason why laws are needed. So laws are necessary because of the weakness of logos. This is the theme. Now let us see what that means in 1180a1.

O: But doubtless it is not enough for people to receive the right nurture and discipline in youth; they must also practice the lessons they have learned, and confirm them by habit, when they are grown up. Accordingly we shall need laws to regulate the discipline of adults as well, and in fact the whole life of the people generally; for the many are more amenable to compulsion and punishment than to reason and to moral ideals.

S: "Than to speech or the noble."

O: Hence some persons hold, that while it is proper for the lawgiver to encourage and exhort men to virtue on moral grounds. . . .

- S: Literally, "to call men toward virtue and to drive them on for the sake of the noble." Yes?
- O: . . . in the expectation that those who have had a virtuous moral upbringing will respond, yet he is bound to impose chastisement and penalties on the disobedient and ill-conditioned. . . .
- S: "On those who are by nature less fit." In other words, those not gifted by nature or less gifted must be punished. Yes?
- O: . . . and to banish the incorrigible out of the state altogether. For (they argue) although the virtuous man, who guides his life by the noble, will be obedient to reason, the base, whose desires are fixed on pleasure, must be chastised by pain, like a beast of burden. This indeed is the ground for the view that the pains and penalties for transgressors should be such as are most opposed to their favorite pleasures.
- S: In other words, he is a glutton; we must give him Spartan soup. Yes?
- O: But to resume: if, as has been said, in order to be good a man must have been properly educated and trained, and must subsequently continue to follow virtuous habits of life, and to do nothing base whether voluntarily or involuntarily, then this will be secured if men's lives are regulated by a certain intelligence, and by a right system, invested with adequate sanctions.
- S: No. "Having force." Having strength; possessing strength.
- O: Now paternal authority has not the power to compel obedience, nor indeed, speaking generally, has the authority of any individual unless he be a king or the like; but law on the other hand is a rule, emanating from a certain wisdom and intelligence, that has compulsory force.
- S: "The law however possesses compulsory power since it is" -- "being a speech derived from some wisdom and intelligence." So law is both. It must be, as he later says, a dictate of right reason, but this is not sufficient for the time being. The law must also have the power of compulsion. So, in other words, law is a speech. Of course it is a speech. This and this is a punishable offense is a speech. But it is not merely a speech. It has also a compulsive power. Both are needed. Without compulsory power it would be a mere speech. It would have no teeth, in the beautiful American expression. So we have seen laws would not be necessary for men who are by nature good. Now that doesn't mean what Rousseau might mean when he said that all men are by nature good, but it means those who have a natural tendency toward the noble, good natured in this sense, which doesn't mean what is now meant. Now let us turn to b3, 1180b3. We cannot read everything.
- O: Public regulations in any case must clearly be established by law, and only good laws will produce good regulations; but it would not seem to make any difference whether these laws are written or unwritten, or whether they are to regulate the education of a single person or of a number of people, any more than in the case of music or athletics or any other form of training.
- S: Now here we come to the passage which I meant.



- O: Paternal exhortations and family habits have authority in the household, just as legal enactments and national customs have authority in the state, and the more so on account of the ties of relationship and of benefits conferred that unite the head of the household to its other members. . . .
- S: In other words, the speeches of the father have power in the household and they have a greater power than laws because of the kinship, father and son, and the benefits. I mean, there are many kings who have been called paternal kings but this kind of benefits is surely smaller than that which a child receives from his parents. Therefore in the household it is much easier to rule only by speeches, because of the nearness in kinship, but in the polis, there being no such kinship, it is hard to rule by mere speeches. Therefore we need laws. Go on.
- O: . . . he can count on their natural affection and obedience at the outset. Moreover individual treatment is better than a common system, in education as in medicine. As a general rule rest and fasting are good for a fever, but they may not be best for a particular case; and presumably a professor of boxing does not impose the same style of fighting on all his pupils. It would appear then that private attention gives more accurate results in particular cases, for the particular subject is more likely to get the treatment that suits him.
- S: So, in other words, the reason why the education by the father is better than the education by the polis through laws: because the father will treat -- or can treat his children individually. The polis cannot do that. I mean that would be infinitely cumbersome: laws which would be so flexible that they would be applicable to every particular case. The theme here is throughout the essential limitation of law, the theme of Plato's Statesman, and all these themes would be found in different formulations in Plato's Statesman. Now let us go on.
- O: But a physician or trainer or any other director can best treat a particular person if he has a general knowledge of what is good for everybody, or for other people of the same kind. . . .
- S: Now here another consideration comes in. Hitherto we have compared the speeches of the father with the laws, i.e. a particular kind of speeches pronounced by the polis. Now we turn to the arts, which also reveal themselves in speeches of physicians or the artisans, and they are, of course, in themselves superior to the speeches of the father because the father doesn't have to be an expert in education as in music, in boxing, or whatever it may be: what the teacher of boxing, the teacher of music, is. Because the father gets the routine by being constantly confronted with the problem of how to make a human being out of a brat, but he doesn't have a doctrine as the gymnastic teacher or music teacher does. So then art is higher, it would seem, than what the father can do, and of course more important, the propositions of the art are general just as the laws are general. And it is here implied already: art is superior to law. But let us see 1180b16, in the immediate sequel.
- O: Not but what it is possible no doubt for a particular individual to be successfully treated by someone who is not a scientific expert, but has an empirical knowledge based on careful observation of the effects of various forms of treatment upon the person in question; just as some people appear to be their own best doctors, though they could not do any good to someone else.



S: Now let us stop here for one moment. "But a man of experience without science or art can treat individuals who he knows better than the legislator can," because the legislator doesn't know the individuals to whom these laws will be applied. Yes. Go on please.

O: But nevertheless it would doubtless be agreed that anyone who wishes to make himself a professional and a man of science must advance to general principles, and acquaint himself with these by the proper method: for science, as we said, deals with the universal. So presumably a man who wishes to make other people better (whether few or many) by discipline, must endeavor to acquire the science of legislation -- assuming that it is possible to make us good by laws.

S: You see. That is crucial: assuming. That's left open. But if we become good through laws, i.e. through obeying laws, and if that is the way toward virtue then we must have a legislative art. In every field the expert is superior to the layman and especially since the true expert, say a physician, does not only know the universals of his art, how to treat of this kind in general but he also has the ability to make the deviations in particular cases. . . . Pure Socrates. Good. Up to this point the argument, I believe, is clear. If we could become better through laws one should become a man possessing the legislative art, an artisan who as such is concerned with the universals, naturally, and does not only know what might be the best laws for this community at this time in this respect, say taxes, but who has the whole theory of legislation to fall back on at his disposal. Of course it would not be a Benthamite legislator but another one, but fundamentally the notion of Bentham is, of course, this. Good. Now that is clear. The next practical question: how can a man become an expert in the legislative art? Two alternatives: by sitting at the feet of the statesman, the practitioner -- this is tacitly denied. Again the Socratic reason. What did Pericles do? Look at his children. They were the worst citizens

. Now if he had possessed an art of making citizens good would he not have applied it in the first place to those nearest and dearest him? And there can also be given more subtle reasons, but this is clear. One can state it more generally: because the statesman is always concerned with this particular society at this particular time. He is not as such concerned and able to elaborate the universals, what is universally true. But there is an alternative. Say politicians are out, but there are people who claim to teach the legislative art, the art of making men good. These are the sophists. What about the sophists? Now let us turn to 1181a12.

O: On the other hand those sophists who profess to teach politics are found to be very far from doing so successfully. In fact they are absolutely ignorant of the very nature of the science and of the subjects with which it deals; otherwise they would not class it as identical with, or even inferior to, the art of rhetoric. Nor would they imagine that it is easy to frame a constitution by making a collection of such existing laws as are reputed to be good ones. . . .

S: Well he doesn't say "reputed to." "They would not believe it is easy to give laws." If you want to use a broader term: "to give a code by collecting the famous laws." Yes?

O: on the assumption that one can then select the best among them; as if even this selection did not call for understanding. . . .

S: Or judgment let us say.

O: . . . judgment, and as if to judge correctly were not a very difficult task, just as much as it is for instance in music.

S: Let us stop here. So now let us consider the sophists for one moment. The sophists identify politics with rhetoric. Perhaps they say politics is lower. What does this mean? What is rhetoric? The art of speaking, of persuasion, of making persuasive speeches. But how do they identify rhetoric and politics? They must assume that politics is the art for making men good, that men can be made good by speeches. That, of course, practically would be the political life. This aspect of the conflict between classical philosophy and the sophists is, I believe, generally disregarded. Here we have it. We have a more beautiful example in Xenophon's Anabasis, where he presents himself -- you know, Xenophon as a Greek general who saves the Greek army from the barbarians, almost founds a city in Asia Minor . . . and there is another man with him, Proxenos, who happens to be a pupil of Gorgias, the most famous teacher of rhetoric. And he is a charming little man. He is fascinated very soon with war. Now, and he had one quality. He was excellent in dealing with gentlemen but couldn't handle the non-gentlemen. In other words, he could bring people to act nicely by praising or blaming, but he couldn't punish, and Xenophon could punish. That is the difference between the sophist or rhetorician and the pupil of Socrates. This absence of the nasty (?) -- one might say the superior toughness of Socrates -- I believe is generally disregarded and it is actually crucial. The awareness of the limitation of speeches: that is a very important part of Socrates. So, in other words, the sophists are of no use. The consequence: we can't learn the legislative art from the politician; we can't learn it from the sophist; where can we learn it from? What would you suggest? What would you say? You know this about the age of Aristotle. What is the alternative to the sophist and the statesman?

O: Aristotle.

S: Yes, that is the rebuttal but the first answer would be Plato or Socrates, but then Aristotle shows in the second book of the Politics that Plato is not good enough and therefore let us not trouble but let Aristotle take the trouble of becoming a teacher of legislators and that is what he is doing in the Politics. Now let us read only 1181b12.

O: As then the question of legislation has been left uninvestigated by previous thinkers, it will perhaps be well if we consider it for ourselves, together with the whole question of the constitution of the state. . . .

S: Yes, "of the regime." I mean, this is here understood. The laws depend on the regime and therefore you cannot have good laws if you do not have a good regime and therefore the primary question will prove to be the question of the regime. Yes?

O: . . . in order to complete as far as possible our philosophy of human affairs. We will begin then by attempting a review of any pronouncements of value contributed by our predecessors in this or that branch of the subject. . . .

S: That is roughly Book II of the Politics. Yes?

O: . . . and then on the basis of our collection of regimes we will consider what institutions are preservative and what destructive of states in general, and of the different regimes in particular, and what are the reasons which cause some states to be well governed and others the



contrary. For after studying these questions we shall perhaps be in a better position to discern what is the best regime simply, and what are the best regulations, laws, and customs for any given form of regime. Let us then begin our discussion.

S: "After having made a beginning." So there will be a new beginning. Now this is in a very rough way the program of the Politics, but only in a very rough way. And one can discern that line in the Politics. Book II is implied, Books IV to VI, Books VII to VIII. But Book I and Book III, at least Book I and Book III, are not provided. Now that doesn't mean it is necessary that Aristotle changed his mind. He could have changed it, but negatively this is the most necessary framework, Book I and Book III -- Book III is the most important book of the Politics. It is not mentioned here because from the point of view as stated here it is not immediately evident that Book III should have been written. I mention in passing he says one must contemplate on the basis of the collected regimes or constitutions. Now it is well known that Aristotle had such a collection of 158 constitutions made, but it does not necessarily mean, in my opinion, that he refers here to a collection which he has himself made, because there were some. The men who said one should collect -- the sophists said -- had in a way this kind of collection. But that is a very minor question. So this is then the transition to the Politics and what does it imply? Now I would like to discuss this very briefly.

The need for laws so that we may become virtuous, but with a big question mark: do we become good by obedience to laws, even to good laws? But disregarding this qualification, the need for law and therefore for the art of legislation. But did we have anything about the art of legislation before in this book?

O: It's related to prudence.

S: Very good. Book VI. When he discussed there prudence, phronesis, he said roughly that the most comprehensive form of prudence is the legislative, : . . So it is a form of prudence, i.e. it is not an art. Prudence, you recall, is higher than art. So we can speak of legislative art only in a loose sense of the word. It is strictly speaking a form of prudence. Now this of course implies (the fact that it is a form of prudence) that the laws which it produces are essentially rational. They stem from some intelligence. Furthermore, since law is a product of legislative "art" -- "art" in quotation marks because it is not an art simply -- law is higher than art. Now this is, of course, elementary. We have seen it on the first page because the laws determine which arts are good for society and which arts are not so good for society. The laws are concerned with the common good. No art is as such concerned with the common good. So this is one point of the argument, but then there is of course another which doesn't appear explicitly in this book but which is indicated in this book especially in the section we have read. It becomes clearest in the second book of the Politics in the discussion of Hippodamus. There it is said that law in contra-distinction to the arts owes all its power to habituation, to custom. The art, say it can be medicine -- I mean through medical treatment -- convinces the physician immediately. . . . Laws cannot be immediately convincing because laws owe their power decisively not to their evidence but to habituation. From this it would appear that law is lower -- intellectually, rationally, lower -- than art because it depends so much on habituation. That is in a way confirmed by what we have read in 1180b8, following. But above all, I have said hitherto that legislation is a form of prudence, not an art. But in the light of the end of the Ethics must we not say it is an art and not merely a form of prudence, since it is compared with all the kinds of the arts? And if this were true then art as



such, as shown by the highest art, the legislative art, is higher than prudence. All moral acts take place within the framework of the polis. . . . that is to say, within the context of laws. These, if they are good laws, are the subject of the legislative art. Prudence is subservient to an art. This is, of course, the Socratic teaching.

Yet -- the other side of the picture -- as we have seen, law is required only for inferior men and it is essentially defective, and this leads to a questioning of the dignity of the legislative art as a whole, 1180b24, where he says if it is true that we become good by laws. And furthermore the highest, as we know from the preceding section, is altogether trans-political, contemplation, and therefore of course also trans-legal. The life of the wise man as life of the wise man is wholly trans-legal. But, as is stated there . . . the wise man who leads a godlike life must nevertheless lead also a human life . . . and this human life of his is subject to law and is part of the polis. So the wise man is a man who in one respect transcends the polis and in another respect is subject to the polis. This thought I believe is not difficult to understand. I mean, what the physician does . . . is in itself wholly beyond the law in this sense but he may drafted. . . .

But since the wise man belongs to both worlds he must in each case strike a balance between the requirements of political life, the citizen's duty, and the requirements of the theoretical life. Now this kind of striking a balance, of figuring out, is the immediate requirement of wisdom. No wise man, no man of theory, can live without this kind of figuring out which is not part of wisdom but is a requirement of his wisdom. This is the highest kind of reasoning below that implied in wisdom itself. But what is the character of this reasoning, how to strike a balance between the requirements of wisdom and the requirements of the polis here and now, as circumscribed as he is? What kind of reasoning is that?

O: Prudence.

S: Exactly. So from this point of view we must say prudence is higher than art because it is an immediate implication of wisdom itself. Prudence proper, which is concerned with the good of the individual, is higher than art in general and the legislative art, even understood as a form of prudence. Yes. Good. And now, after we have discussed that, let us turn to the second, central part of this book, dealing with the theoretical life. That begins in 1176a30. Yes, Mr. Butterworth?

Q: Regarding 1180a, 6 to 14, this seems to be an excursus from the regular argument because in the next paragraph he says "but to resume."

S: Yes, what do you mean by the next paragraph? /Q: (Explains further)/ "As has been said." This is not a digression. But it is clear, I mean, this is an argument which also reminds of the Socratic discussion because Socrates was accused of being good enough in arousing people toward virtue but not leading him up to it. We will find this in Memorabilia, I: iii, the beginning, if I remember well, and you find it also in the , Plato's introduction to the Republic. . . . /Mostly inaudible exchange regarding the large number of recurrences to Platonic thought in Book X. Dr. Strauss indicates that he hasn't made a study of this./

Now let us then turn to the central part of the tenth book which is, in a way, the most important part because it is clear now the subject becomes again,

after an interruption of eight books, the highest good, happiness. "After we have spoken about the virtues and friendship and pleasure it remains to go through in outline, to discuss in outline, happiness, since we posit happiness as the end of human things." Now on the basis of the first book it follows that happiness consists in the acting according to virtue, to do the noble and serious thing. The word serious is used here by Aristotle and also by Plato in this sense of the good man. I mean, there are various words for the good man in the sense of the gentleman. One of them is the serious man and it occurs to us also to do that. . . . The opposite of seriousness is, of course, play. A life of play, the life of a playboy, is obviously not a serious life. It is not a good life for that very reason. Life is too serious to be spent in playing and therefore this is the discussion here to begin with.

Now what then is happiness? It is the activity, the being at work, of the best in us according to the virtue peculiar to that best and therefore happiness consists in the theoretical activity, because this is the activity peculiar to the best in us, namely the mind. The best is the nous, the mind. This by its nature rules and grasps the noble or beautiful and divine things. It is very interesting that he doesn't here speak as he did before of the beautiful and serious things but of the beautiful and divine things. This substitution of the divine things for the serious things is a kind of vindication of the playful. . . . /The immediately following is off-microphone. Dr. Strauss indicated that a favorite word of Plato was education, peidaieia, which is almost the same in Greek as the word for play, peidia. The divine goes beyond the distinction between the serious and playful. It has no serious purposes in the way in which the gentleman has serious purposes. / Now we read in 1177a27. Aristotle proved, a detailed proof on the basis of generally accepted opinion, that the contemplative or theoretical life is higher than the life of action. Yes?

O: Also the activity of contemplation will be found to possess in the highest degree the quality that is termed self-sufficiency; for while it is true that the wise man equally with the just man and the rest requires the necessities of life, yet, these being adequately supplied, whereas the just man needs other persons towards whom or with whose aid he may act justly; and so likewise do the temperate man and the brave man and the others, the wise man on the contrary can also contemplate by himself, and the more so the wiser he is; no doubt he will study better with the aid of fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient of men.

S: Yes. Let us stop here. : . . The wise man is distinguished from the just man or the other virtuous men, let us say from the moral man. The wise man as wise man is not a moral man. This is stated very clearly, more clearly than anywhere else, by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa in the section dealing with the virtues. The only intellectual virtue which requires moral virtue is prudence. The other intellectual virtues, especially the highest of them, wisdom, do not require moral virtue. That is surely here implied. But this sentence of Thomas Aquinas like many of these very paradoxical statements which we find in the higher literature would need a long discussion. Does he mean that a man who would be completely prudent in every respect would be a wise man? That needs a long discussion. . . . You see also here one point which hadn't become clear at all before. All moral virtues are social virtues. . . . For example, continence or moderation regarding food and drink are not as such social virtues but here it is said that all moral virtues are social virtues. Now read on, Mr. Reinkin.

O: Also the activity of contemplation may be held to be the only activity that is loved for its own sake: it produces no result beyond the actual



act of contemplation, whereas from practical pursuits we look to secure some advantage, greater or smaller, beyond the action itself.

S: Yes. Now this is also a very grave statement. The exercise of the practical or moral virtues is not simply chosen for its own sake whereas we have seen throughout the virtue of the moral man is that he chooses, say, liberality, the liberal action, for its own sake. . . . Go on.

O: Also happiness is thought to involve leisure; for we do business in order that we may have leisure, and carry on war in order that we may have peace. Now the practical virtues are exercised in politics or in warfare; but the pursuits of politics and war seem to be unleisured -- those of war indeed entirely so, for no one desires to be at war for the sake of being at war, nor deliberately takes steps to cause a war: a man would be thought an utterly bloodthirsty character if he declared war on a friendly state for the sake of causing battles and massacres.

S: More literally, "if he would regard his friends as his enemies so that there may be wars and butcheries." Now what does this mean? Now if war were choiceworthy for its own sake we would, of course, have to have war all around, not only between different cities but within the city and even within the household and within ourselves. In the first book of Plato's Laws this is developed at great length. Now go on.

O: But the activity of the politician also is unleisured, and aims at securing something beyond the mere participation in politics -- positions of authority and honor, or, if the happiness of the politician himself and of his fellow-citizens, this happiness conceived as something distinct from political activity. . . .

S: This, of course, is clear now. I mean, we must follow Aristotle's argument. In order to understand moral virtue, its field, its extent, we must of course look at the most completed form of action and this is the action of the statesman much more than that of any private man. Now look at that. This is, of course, full of unrest necessarily. It is full of unrest whereas the activity of contemplation is in rest. But the main point: it is chosen for the sake of happiness and happiness means here something different from the practice of the political or moral virtues themselves. Again what we have seen before: the moral or practical virtues are not in the last resort chosen for their own sake although within a certain limit they must be regarded as choiceworthy for their own sake. Now go on.

O: If then among practical pursuits displaying the virtues, politics and war stand out pre-eminent in nobility and grandeur, and yet. . . .

S: You see now, that is this: they stand out. . . . Therefore the limitations of them are still more the limitations of the humbler practice of the moral virtues.

O: . . . and yet they are unleisured, and directed to some further end, not chosen for their own sakes. . . .

S: Now he couldn't be more explicit. Could he? They are essentially without an end. They are incomplete. They point toward something higher. Yes?



O: . . . 'whereas the activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious worth, consisting as it does in contemplation, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to contain a pleasure peculiar to itself, and therefore augmenting its activity: and if accordingly the attributes of this activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisuredness, such freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, and all the other attributes of blessedness it follows that it is the activity of the intellect that constitutes complete human happiness -- provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete.

S: Yes, let us stop here. The acts of moral virtue, to repeat, are not choice-worthy for their own sake for the highest acts of moral virtue are not choiceworthy for their own sake. . . .

Q: (Regarding the reference to pleasure in the passage just read.)

S: Yes, but there is a more emphatic statement and that is in 1169a19. When he has made the distinction between the nous, the mind, which chooses necessarily and only the best for itself, and the perfect gentleman who obeys the intelligence and who therefore is also concerned with others and even willing to die for them, for the friends and the fatherland: the only mention of the fatherland occurring in the whole book. And there it is said that the good life may very well be a very short life. Now here when he comes to speak of the highest life of man he retracts it. As he said in the first book already, the life must be fairly long. . . .

Q<sub>2</sub>: Is this really a retraction? He said before that a short, happy life is preferable to a long, dull life.

S: Yes, but that goes without saying. I mean, a wholly worthless life is, of course, not comparable to a short and noble or fine life. But comparing a noble and short life and a noble and long life the latter is preferable.

O: Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life.

S: So happiness, the being at work according to the excellence of the highest or best in man, means of course the true activity according to a part in man for man is a composite being. This is the activity of the divine in man, that by which man transcends his mere humanity. Yes?

O: Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him. . . .

S: Yes. The meaning of this is this: the praise of the theoretical life, of the most divine life which man can lead, contradicts certain common notions of piety and Aristotle has to take issue with them. He does the same also in the first book of the Metaphysics. The difficulty can be stated very simply as

follows: according to the common notion piety consists in doing what the gods tell man to do. According to Plato or the Aristotelian notion, piety consists in doing what the gods do, in imitating the gods. That is the point. Good. Now let us read a few passages in the next chapter beginning at the beginning.

O: The life of moral virtue, on the other hand, is happy only in a secondary degree. For the moral activities are purely human: justice, I mean, courage and the other virtues we display in our intercourse with our fellows, when we observe what is due to each in contracts and services and in our various actions, and in our emotions also; and all of these things seem to be purely human affairs.

S: Here again, all moral virtue is radically social. Now let us skip something and turn to a23. "Theoretical virtue seems to need also the external equipment to a lesser degree." Do you have it?

O: And such happiness would appear to need but little external equipment, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue. Both, it may be granted, require the mere necessities of life, and that in an equal degree (though the politician does as a matter of fact take more trouble about bodily requirements and so forth than the philosopher); for in this respect there may be little difference between them.

S: In other words, for keeping body and soul together there is not such a great difference. A philosopher may have -- may need more food than a given general. It's possible, but this doesn't apply to their activities. Yes?

O: But for the purposes of their special activities their requirements will differ widely. The liberal man will need wealth in order to do liberal actions, and so indeed will the just man in order to discharge his obligations (since mere intentions are invisible. . . .

S: Yes, "immanifest." You know, you can't look into the hearts so intentions are immanifest. You can judge men only from their actions and an absolutely poor fellow who never engages in transactions of any kind because he is too poor for that -- you can never see whether he is just or unjust. Well, you could of course see his justice in other matters: whether he would steal and rob and so on. Yes?

O: . . . and even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly); and the brave man will need strength if he is to perform any action displaying his virtue; and the temperate man opportunity for indulgence. . . .

S: In other words, let us say, Mr. Profumo would have had no opportunity of showing moderation. Yes. Good. Yes?

O: . . . otherwise how can he, or the possessor of any other virtue, show that he is virtuous? It is disputed also whether purpose or performance is the more important factor in virtue, as it is alleged to depend on both; now the perfection of virtue will clearly consist in both. . . .

S: In other words, even granting that intention should even be somewhat more important than the external action both are important and therefore we have to consider whether the man has the opportunity for acting and this opportunity requires equipment. Yes.

O: . . . but the performance of virtuous actions requires much outward equipment, and the more so the greater and more noble the actions are. But the student, so far as the pursuit of his activity is concerned, needs no external apparatus: on the contrary, worldly goods may almost be said to be a hindrance to contemplation. . . .

S: Yes. So the wise man needs moral virtue only -- no. The moral virtue needs equipment which, so far from being necessary for wisdom, is even a hindrance to it. Therefore, also the virtues connected with these things are rather a hindrance than a help to it. Yes. Now the immediate sequel.

O: . . . though it is true that, being a man and living in the society of others, he chooses to engage in virtuous action, and so will need external goods to carry on his life as a human being.

S: Yes. The Greek word anthropeuesthai, which is very rare, is not easily translatable into English. Is there one among you who understands some German because I have a German expression? Menschen. This is a perjorative: mere men, a perjorative implication. I don't think that you can render it in English in any way.

Q: Well, how do you use it in a sentence?

S: Sein menschen. For his living as a mere human being. Yes, one point: so the moral virtues are required only for his lower part of his being and this is, of course, a depreciation of moral virtue. Now from here we understand a passage which is so difficult to understand at the end of the fourth book, when he spoke of the sense of shame and said for the perfect gentleman it doesn't make any difference whether the things which he shouldn't do are base by nature or base by convention because the whole sphere is ultimately not important enough and therefore the difference between nature and convention ceases to be as important. In the sequel it is made clear, in 1178b33, following, that the need for moral virtue is rooted ultimately in the needs of the body. Now this, of course, would need a long comment because one can easily show, even on the basis of explicit utterances of Aristotle here and more clearly in the seventh book of the Politics, that the theoretical life obviously is not possible without the satisfaction of some primary bodily needs and without society. There is, for all practical purposes, no philosophy possible without the polis and therefore the philosopher is concerned with the polis. But still, the moral virtues as required for the theoretical life are not simply identical with the moral virtues as required for the polis. It is obvious that both ends require control of one's extreme desire for alcohol. I mean, you cannot fulfill your citizen duties properly if you are drunk most of the time and still less can you think if you do that. That goes without saying. Also cowardice is very bad for thinking. If a man is a coward and is apprehensive of everything he cannot think. But on the other hand regarding precisely some of the more magnificent virtues like munificence and magnanimity, as defined by Aristotle, they are not absolutely necessary for the theoretical life; and this has other implications. Mr. Dry.

Q: Does the perfection of the theoretical life require friendship? If it would in itself it would seem that moral virtue could be given a slightly more elevated position.

S: Well, who will answer that objection?

O: The less he requires friends to talk with the wiser a man he would be.



S: But still he admits that fellow workers are desirable. Yes, but what is the absolutely devastating reply to Mr. Dry? Friendship is not moral virtue.

Q: Yes, but somehow it seems more natural for two good men to become friends. Two wise men may not be friends. What is it that draws them together? Perhaps they both must have some moral virtue.

S: Yes, sure. Sure, as wise men they must have moral virtue in some sense. That goes without saying as I showed before; but whether they are the moral virtues as required by the gentleman as gentleman is another matter. Now as for the crucial importance of friendship and the difference from moral virtue: a simple illustration is offered by the Platonic dialogues. Now when you watch Socrates there in the various situations, in some cases he likes to converse with that individual and in other cases he has no choice but to converse. Now to take the simplest example which occurred to me, the beginning of the Charmides: Socrates comes back from a war, the battle of                     , an Athenian defeat. And then he is back and the first thing in the morning he goes to the gymnasium, to a training place, where he finds nice and intelligent young people and they ask him about his war experiences and he is not interested and asks what's going on in philosophy, which has here a loose meaning. That's his question and then it goes on. Take another example. He is accused of a capital crime. He is by law obliged to make a speech of defense and he calls this speech a dialogue, a conversation, with the Athenian demos. Now this was surely not a conversation which he sought. Or you have the conversation he has with Euthyphron, you know, when he comes out of the court building, you could say, and meets here Euthyphron and Euthyphron begins to chat with him; he is quite surprised to see Socrates in a law court. Again compulsory; compulsory, imposed. The difference between what men gladly do and what they do merely from a sense of duty. Now what they gladly do they do better than what they do merely from a sense of duty, as Aristotle has told us all the time, and now this is the difference between a society of friends and any other society. So the men who associate are friends in order to share the pleasures of contemplation. This is different from a trade union; I'm sorry to say, even than a faculty.

Q: Does one mind need another in order to reach its perfection?

S: No, I believe, although I couldn't quote chapter and verse, that Aristotle means here not necessarily of contemporaries. There are also bad men who have left books behind which one can open and study and that is, in a way, a conversation. It must become a conversation; otherwise you don't understand. You know, you have to raise questions, address them to Aristotle, for example, and since unfortunately he is not present you have to wait until you come to some page where he does give you an answer. That's also a conversation to that extent.

Q: Well, certainly there's a difference between the spoken word and the written word.

S: Oh yes, an enormous difference, but still, I mean, they belong together because the written words are only frozen spoken words. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: You said that friendship is not a virtue for Aristotle.

S: It's higher than a virtue.

Q<sub>2</sub>: Because when he introduces friendship he says it is a virtue or at least it involves virtue.

S: Yes, well there is a certain ambiguity but then also there are very clear passages where he says the virtues and friendship, distinguishing them, and the simple point is that the highest virtue appeared to be justice and what he says about justice: when people are friends they do not need justice but when they are just then there is some defect until it becomes a friendship.

Now as for the first section of the book I do not know whether we have time for it. By the way, this is, I believe, the most theoretical part of the whole work: the discussion of pleasure in the first third of Book X of the Ethics. One point I would like to mention. Friendship is discussed in the first third of Book X and it is also discussed at the end of Book VII, and in between we have the two books, VIII and IX, on friendship. This conveys the lesson that friendship is an essentially pleasant relation. And Aristotle doesn't mean of course by that that kind of friendship which is for the sake of having fun. This is not true friendship. This is here a minor matter, but genuine friendship is essentially pleasant and this is indicated very clearly. Yes, we can read a few points of very broad bearing and which are easily understood. At the beginning of Book X, 1172a26. Well, what is the context? Well, some people say the good is pleasure; pleasure as such is the good. Yes?

O: Some people maintain that pleasure is the good. Others on the contrary say that it is altogether bad: some of them perhaps from a conviction that it is really so, but others because they think it to be in the interests of morality to make out that pleasure is bad, even if it is not, since most men (they argue) have a bias towards it, and are the slaves of their pleasures, so that they have to be driven in the opposite direction in order to arrive at the due mean. Possibly however this view is mistaken. In matters of emotion and of action, words are less convincing than deeds; when therefore our theories are at variance with palpable facts, they provoke contempt, and involve the truth in their own discredit. If one who censures pleasure is seen sometimes to desire it himself, his swerving towards it is thought to show that he really believes that all pleasure is desirable; for the many cannot discriminate.

S: Yes, let us stop here. Now is this not of interest, this remark about people who say the opposite or teach the opposite of what they think? What does Aristotle say about them?

O: They should be sure to be at least consistent in their actions.

S: Yes. Now Mr. Winiarski, you smiled. You must have seen something.

O<sub>2</sub>: Well, I was thinking that a man should be very careful. (?)

S: No, that's not the point. The limitation. Aristotle limits this statement to the speeches about the things existing in the passions and in action. It would not apply to other subjects. That, I think, is the point. I mean, that is, in Aristotle's view, literally true, what he says here, but it is a qualified statement. Then he comes back to that when he speaks shortly after of Eudoxos, a pupil of Plato; a famous mathematician who was a teacher of pleasure. His speeches were trusted, he said, because of his moral virtue rather than for their own sake for he seemed to be moderate to an extraordinary degree. In other words, if a man of such morality says this and this about morality you have to trust him more than anybody else because he is notorious for his virtue, which of course can lead to great errors. You see even today sometimes logical positiv-



ists and such people can be extremely decent men and look what would happen if we would argue as these contemporaries of Eudoxos did, because perhaps they can afford, because they had such a wonderful upbringing in a vicarage or somewhere, to hold these doctrines. And what would happen to us if we would hold them? Mr. Burnham.

Q: I wasn't clear. What statement did you say was qualified?

S: The statement about the speeches differing from a man's convictions which are not possible.

Q: In that paragraph that he only answers these views insofar as they are held by the men whose actions oppose their convictions?

S: No, he /limits himself only to/ speeches about actions, about moral matters. Well, to state it very simply, for example what about the gods? No, I mean, if someone says -- say, if Aristotle makes from time to time statements along the lines of the popular opinions about the gods, views which he does not hold, this can never lead to this kind of contradiction because this doesn't apply to his actions. Except, of course, he would say that Aristotle would speak in praise, say, of sacrificing to the gods and it would happen to him what happened to Socrates: that he was extremely rarely seen sacrificing. Yes, and then he forgot to sacrifice. That was his last thing, you know, when he said to Criton we forgot to sacrifice to Asclepius, and I believe part of this long story is also that he forgot to sacrifice not only this particular cock to Asclepius, but he was a bit oblivious in these matters. That is incidentally confirmed by a passage in the Euthyphron where he compares himself, if I remember well, to Menelaus and, of course, not with a view to the fact that Menelaus was the husband of Helen and he was the husband of Xanthippe. That is not, I think, although I would regard it as possible. Xanthippe must have had some qualities which Socrates liked. I don't believe he married her for her money. There is no evidence whatever and I don't really believe that. But the point is this: if you look up the passage in Homer you will see that Menelaus got into the troubles into which he came because he had forgotten to sacrifice, just like Socrates had done. But disregarding this matter, generally speaking speeches about non-practical things are, of course, of a different kind. That is what I meant. There is another passage which has something to do with that. Yes, Aristotle, in a way, applies this criterion to himself later on, in 1179a20. No, let us start a bit earlier. After he had quoted Solon and Anaxagoras he says, "To these speeches about the necessity of moral virtue for the wise man -- "

O: So our speeches seem to be in agreement with the opinions of the wise. Such arguments then carry some degree of conviction; but it is by the practical experience of life and conduct that the truth is really tested, since it is there that the final decision lies.

S: The payoff, we would say. So, in other words, not what a wise man says about action but what he does. Yes?

O: We must therefore examine the conclusions we have advanced by bringing them to the test of the facts of life. If they are in harmony with the facts, we may accept them. . . .

S: Yes? Yes? Yes? Yes?

O: . . . if found to disagree we must deem them mere speeches.



S: In other words, the function and significance of morality for the life of the wise man cannot be established by what the wise men say. You have to look at them and see whether it is true that they are in principle moral men, and I believe that study would prove that's true with very few exceptions. I mean, we are speaking now of philosophers, not of specialists, because there it is as little to be expected as in the case of our famous carpenter whom we discussed on an earlier occasion. There is no need for that. In the case of philosophers I think it is, generally speaking, true that the genuine philosophers, especially those of whom we know most, the great men, were really very decent men. There is hardly any exception. In 1172b35 -- so that is again at the beginning, where we left off. Yes, now then he speaks of these two schools which he attacks, those who say pleasure is simply the good and the others who say pleasure is simply bad. In 1172b35.

O: Those on the other hand who deny that that which all creatures seek to obtain is good, are surely talking nonsense. For what all think to be good, that, we assert, is good; and he that subverts our belief in the opinion of all mankind, will hardly persuade us to believe his own either.

S: Yes, more literally, "For what seems to be to all, of that we say it is. He who destroys this conviction, this reliance (pistin), is not likely to say more reliable things." In other words, there is a fundamental reliance and if that is questioned what will come out will surely be less reliable than it. This is Aristotle himself, but it is not entirely Aristotle. The word used here, pistis, is of course used in the New Testament for faith but it was not a religious meaning in Plato and Aristotle. I translate it by "reliance," also because the adjective pistos means also a reliable man, a man you can trust. The word reliance is used by Plato in one of the central passages of his whole work: in the Republic in the divided line. You remember the divided line in the end of the sixth book of the Republic? Four things. [Indicates a proportion between two ratios.] Image making: sense perception, to reasoning (figuring out) to nous, to intellect. This is the famous proportion. Now this [sense perception] he calls, this kind of awareness he also calls reliance. That's very remarkable. Why? Plato does not merely mean -- he also means that -- that this is not simply knowledge. There is a tree. This is not strictly speaking knowledge because knowledge is never knowledge of a mere fact but also of the reason, the cause. Plato means this also but not merely. He also means these are the kinds of things on which we rely. Our reliance is on the primarily given. That is simply reliable on which all men rely. For example, say particular Greek notions, opinions, are not relied upon by all men, but that on which all men rely: that is reliable. Well, the famous objections: well, we all rely -- all men rely -- that the sun is rising in the East and setting in the West and the Earth stands still. And then there came the famous Copernicus and he has shown how little reliable that is. Yes, there is something to that but in the decisive respect it is irrelevant. We still rely on that when we take our bearings on Earth and we try to find out in which direction to go; and the natural compass, we still use that. For us it is still the reliable thing and Copernicus' work and all later work of this kind is ultimately based on this reliance, because certain consequences followed from it which didn't jibe with other things and therefore one had to reconsider it. But the starting point always remains the same and Aristotle is the man who took this more seriously than any other man, Plato included, and therefore he taught, among other things, the eternity of the visible universe; because nothing is more reliable in this sense than whenever we see a human being he was generated by other human beings, just as you see a cat, he was generated by a cat. Therefore it is unthinkable, unintelligible, that there should have been a first man. I mean, try to think of evolution, this first human being among a herd of monkeys. How

strange must this first have been, however dumb we suppose him to have been, but still he was different so radically. We really cannot think that out. Now of course that doesn't mean -- that indeed it doesn't mean -- that these reliabilities are the last word. That is a point where, among other things, modern science comes in, but of course modern science is not alone. There were people who doubted the eternity of the visible universe among the Greek philosophers. But that every clear understanding of anything must start from what has this character of primary reliability and universal reliability: this, I believe, cannot be denied. We must always return to that if we try to understand anything. Yes?

Q: How much of this reliability cannot even be questioned? For instance, you can question that it's really agreed that you see when you happen to be standing in this position and you can make sure that what you see --

S: Yes, sure. But generally stated, that is the meaning of -- I mean, the antipode to Aristotle is Descartes: to doubt of everything, as he called it. Whether he in fact doubted of everything is another matter but that was the point: to find an academical point outside all reliances. That was what he wanted, and in a modified and partly mitigated form this is, of course, what modern science does, as you see especially in the social sciences when all the reliances by which we take our bearings in life are questioned. How do you know? You know, they have not been scientifically established. But of course they rely on their part on natural science of which they claim that it is truly reliable because it is science and not mere reliance. But then the great questions arise. To what extent is this whole science not based on fundamental hypotheses which as such are not knowledge? Assumptions. So I thought we should at least mention this point.

Now what is the key point of his teaching regarding pleasure? As I say, it is the most theoretical part of the whole work and I believe it is not an accident that this is followed with the statement about the theoretical life. Aristotle gives us, as it were, a specimen where he makes almost explicitly use of his Physics. He says "elsewhere" but he means his Physics and, to some extent, his Metaphysics. Now what is the key point?

O: Pleasure is not a disposition; it is not really an activity, but is something added to an activity.

S: In the first place, pleasure is always secondary.

O: Secondary and yet an added bonus.

S: Yes, but still it is, one could say, the unbought grace added to the activity. Now the hedonists say pleasure is simply the end. Aristotle denies that. He says, however, it is an end but an end which supervenes, i.e. an end which is not the primary end. Yes, bonus is not a bad word, but the unbought grace of which Burke spoke also points in the right direction. Now every pleasure -- for example, the pleasure derivative from eating, the pleasure accompanying eating, is a pleasure accompanying eating, the activity of eating. More generally, all pleasures are secondary, derivative, although essential to the activity; not essential in the sense that every activity is necessarily followed or accompanied by pleasure. We know there are many activities which are unpleasant. But there can be -- there is a possibility in each activity, at least in every activity which is not merely instrumental, to be pleasant. And the activity is more perfect if it is accompanied by the peculiar or specific pleasure. Now what is true of the activities is then ultimately true also of the beings because the

activities of different beings, different kinds of beings, differ. The activity of a horse is different from that of a dog and from that of man and therefore the pleasures of these various beings differ. We cannot understand pleasure properly except in connection with the constitution of the various beings. And so that when we speak about pleasures in general we have in mind, and Aristotle surely has throughout in mind, the human pleasures, the pleasures which man does not share with the brutes. And to what extent his analysis of pleasure would apply to the pleasures common to men and brutes is a difficult question. It makes most sense, what he says about pleasure, when we think of the human pleasures. Yes?

Q: What is the significance of the fact that this contradicts his teaching in Book VII in that in Book VII he said that pleasure was an activity and an end?

S: Yes, does he say -- let me see. If I remember, the most striking difference, I believe, is -- what does he say in Book VII? What are the main points? I believe the difference: in Book VII he is much less sympathetic to pleasure, I would say, (that is my overall impression), than in Book X.

Q: Well, in Book VII he said in places it is the supreme good.

S: In which passage? I mean, perhaps reporting someone else.

Q: 1153b27 and even stronger than that is line 13 on the same page.

S: Yes, but is this not still the report?

O: He's refuting the third opinion that pleasure cannot be the supreme good. He says that "the supreme good will be a particular kind of pleasure."

S: Yes. That I could not tell you now. Now let me see. Yes, that is correct. He discusses here only opinions opposed to pleasure, whereas in Book X he discusses also the hedonistic doctrines.

Q: I didn't follow you. I'm sorry.

S: No, I mean the opinions discussed in the last section of Book VII are against pleasure and in Book X he discusses also the opinions favoring pleasure. Yes, but I'm sorry; I cannot now -- to that extent surely, but --

O<sub>2</sub>: He is not asserting that pleasure is the supreme good.

S: No, that it is the best he denies there.

O<sub>2</sub>: He is simply denying that this argument that there are some bad pleasures proves that pleasure is altogether bad, and even on the basis of that argument it may be the supreme good.

S: Yes, well, my general impression is that the case for pleasure as such is more clearly and strongly stated in Book X than in Book VII. That is my overall impression. I'm sorry I cannot now prove it. Now the difficulty, for example, is this in Book X. The view which he criticizes, the Platonic view that pleasure is a motion or change and since every motion is as such incomplete, because if it were completed the motion would cease, therefore pleasure is as such incomplete. And Aristotle's point is that pleasure is not a motion, and this is based on the Aristotelian distinction between activity and motion or coming into being. In more precise terms, being at work, activity, is not coming into being.



You go to a dance: motion, locomotion. You go from your home to the dance. But the dancing itself while in a sense of course it is locomotion -- but you are at it, at the activity. You go there for dancing and the dancing is not meant to bring you elsewhere. That you move in dancing is not a locomotion in the primary sense of the word: namely, that you want to go from here to there. In many cases in fact you dance in a circle. Or take lyre playing because there is no locomotion involved. Becoming a lyre player or what you do before you play: these are all changes, motions. But the lyre playing itself is the activity. There you are at work. This is absolutely crucial for Aristotle, for the whole teaching, and this Aristotle means in order to get rid of the Platonic dualism between simply becoming and simply being; because being at work are activities of the full human being, the mortal human being, in which he fulfills himself, which do not point toward something which a man can never become, whereas the impression one gets from Plato at least -- in a general way that is true -- that all human doings have this character of imperfection and in this sense becoming which never comes to an end. Aristotle denies that and therefore he says -- on the basis of this he says, as sure as there is a fundamental difference between the activities and the coming into being of the activities as surely is it not necessary that pleasure must be imperfect. Pleasure can be complete at each moment. Now whether Aristotle means to say this is true of all pleasures he doesn't make clear here and I doubt this, but the difficulty, I think, can be disposed of because he is thinking only of the higher pleasures, of the specifically human pleasures, and with regard to them he indeed asserts that. Yes, but this whole passage would require a discussion of the passages in the Physics and the Metaphysics where he makes clear this fundamental difference between motion, change, and the activity. Yes?

Q<sub>2</sub>: Is there a problem here if the activity in question is not an end in itself but only a means to some other end like making a chair?

S: No, the being at work is an end in itself. Yes? I explained that. The being at work. Not everything. Well, we must distinguish. There is a being at work of the house builder which is clearly -- Aristotle uses that -- which is necessarily incomplete until the house is finished, and he points to that. But say if people dance, that is something different, although the dance also has a certain rhythm and a certain end. This incompleteness is a radically different one from that of house building, because they dance at each point and they don't wish anything but to dance whereas the house builders wish to get it over with. You know, necessarily they wish to finish the house. But in the case of the activity of dancing and such things, or lyre playing, no end outside of the activity is intended. Well, if they dance in order to get a prize or so then it is, of course, no longer dancing pure and simple.

Q<sub>3</sub>: This would be in the strict sense because one could think of many ends for which dancing is only a means, such as getting acquainted.

S: Yes, sure, and then to that extent it would cease to be merely an activity. No simple and very clear example occurs to me at the moment. Well, take hearing music. Everything you do in order to be able to hear it, to enjoy it, like learning to play or going to that place where the music is played: these are all changes. But every change leads to an end. That indeed is a key Aristotelian assertion. It points toward its completion and what is at the point of completion is not merely negatively cessation of change, cessation of activity, but on the contrary, activity. That is the point. For us in our language we hear all the time of processes. Everything is a process. This is, to begin with, wholly unintelligible. But even apart from our present day notions, it is not so easy

to understand it. You see that there is no equivalent to that, for example, in Plato. It is really the peculiarly Aristotelian teaching: that all change points toward a peak of activity and not toward a peak of non-activity, of rest. Rest belongs to the same sphere as motion does. I mean, that is only, you can say, a negative state of motion. But activity belongs to a different sphere. We learn -- that's a change -- in order to understand, but when we understand that doesn't mean that we are now blank. On the contrary; then we are at the peak of this particular thing. Is this clear? Understanding is an activity which is no longer a change because a change would then be only a deterioration. You forget. Now if you take a particular part of understanding, say Euclidian geometry, especially in a simple school manual, this you can master, and once you have learned it you possess the mastery. The mastery consists, of course, in the activity, in the actual understanding. The same applies to other things too: dancing, the lyre player, or whatever you take. In other cases, in the case of the arts proper, the end is the finished house. Here the actual house now standing is not active. It is there. But in all action as distinguished from production the end is an activity, a being at work. Yes?

Q<sub>3</sub>: Since this is our last class, I wonder if you could return to the problem of why the wise man is not necessarily a moral man. My difficulty is understanding how a man who is truly wise would not also have pre-existing in him the necessary moral qualities.

S: Yes, this is a very difficult question. I mean, in one sense one can say that if the moral qualities are for him only conditions for the activity of wisdom, if they are not in any way chosen for their own sake but only as that, to that extent he is not a moral man.

Q<sub>3</sub>: He is good just as the other man is good, but --

S: There is a discussion of this subject clearer than anything in the Ethics, in the Nicomachean Ethics, toward the end of the Eudemean Ethics, and I believe this is ordinarily not properly understood. There Aristotle makes a distinction between two kinds of men. The one he calls the kalos kagathos, what we ordinarily translate by perfect gentleman, the noble and good, and he is the moral man as described here. And then there is another type of man called the good man, where noble or fine or beautiful does not occur. Well, Aristotle proceeds always in this manner: he gives first a crude example. The Spartans are not perfect gentlemen although they always claim to be; but they are only good men, i.e. they do the proper things for ulterior purposes, for the sake of Sparta . . . et cetera. And then he goes, however, on to state a question. Yes, but precisely if there is an ulterior purpose what then is that ulterior purpose? I mean, the true ulterior purpose for the good man, not for the perfect gentleman? The answer is knowledge of god. So you have it. The good man in the full sense is the man who chooses the right actions, the right means, in order to know the highest. That's his end. He does not choose them for their own sake. The perfect gentleman chooses them for their own sake. The perfect gentleman, for example, is liberal because he enjoys the liberal actions as such. This other man would do them only because he thinks they are conducive to his end. That's the best way of settling this sub-theoretical problem. You know, he has money, he has to live with others, and the best way of doing it is, for example, to be, if he happens to have money, to be really liberal but not as something which he does for its own sake.

Q<sub>1</sub>: From what point of view are the moral virtues incomplete? The man who is a theoretical man is somehow defective from the point of view of moral virtue.

S: From what point of view can one say that the moral man is inferior to the wise man?

Q<sub>4</sub>: Yes.

S: Because the moral man is unable to give an account of what he is doing.

Q<sub>1</sub>: Yes, well, that's not immediately my question. I'm wondering from what point of view the theoretical man is somehow not completely virtuous as the moral man is.

S: Yes, but if you say, and this makes, to begin with, very much sense, that the moral man is a man who regards the moral actions as choiceworthy for their own sake, to that extent he transcends morality, the good man transcends that. But on the other hand he knows what he is doing. But it is clear from Aristotle's discussion at the end of the tenth book that for the theoretical man his social obligations are only obligations and are not, as it were, the green pastures toward which he is by nature running, whereas the perfect gentleman is by nature running toward these green pastures. That's the difference and that is Aristotle's understanding of the situation.

Q<sub>1</sub>: Then it does seem that it is difficult to make an independent case for the moral virtues.

S: No, that is the miracle; and I think that is the miracle which no one has so clearly seen, as far as I have seen, as our Aristotle. And I repeat what I said on another occasion. Here we have theory and here we have the polis, and the polis means, of course, in the best case the gentlemen, the desirable citizens' acting. Now you cannot engage in contemplation without . . . other conditions, without eating and drinking. This applies, of course, to both. Aristotle in his wisdom says regarding food and drink there is no essential difference between the two. You know this. A theoretical man may need even a bit more food than a general and vice versa. That is wholly irrelevant. . . . Now the activities, the actions, the moral virtues: both need the moral virtues. I mean, take the crudest view of the situation: a man who wishes to think cannot be always drunk and afraid of everything and have a bad conscience because he hasn't paid his bills and so on and so on. That is clear. In this respect there is no difference. Both must be somehow decent. But the moral virtue as required by will (?) and, on the other hand, as required by the polis are not identical but they overlap to a considerable extent and so that in a crude inspection they appear to be identical. But in closer analysis it is not so. We saw a beautiful example in the discussion of magnanimity where parts of it were simply valid only for the perfect gentleman and surely not applicable to the theoretical man, but there was also something in it. It was true of the perfect gentleman, he must be concerned with honors. The theoretical man is as such not concerned with honors and this leads to an open break. So they overlap to a large extent but they are not simply identical. But there appears a crude union. So these two rivers flow into the same sea, fed by theory on the one hand and by the polis on the other. Let us call that moral virtue /i.e. the sea/. I do not know whether that is the best picture you can draw, but it is sufficient for the purpose. Now this is then in a way a somewhat spurious union because of the heterogeneity of the two sources, and yet this unity is not simply spurious because there is a profound connection between theory and the polis. Not that the theory requires the polis and the polis requires theory. This, by the way, is also not altogether unimportant. But the main point: man is the animal which possesses logos: reason, speech. Reason, intellect, ~~theory~~ speech, society, polis; and therefore the one root of



both is the nature of man.

(Note: At this point the tape ran out. What follows is an almost literal paraphrase of the remainder of the session, taken from stenographic notes.)

Aristotle's empirical proof of this is that he gives a description of the virtues and asks, is that not so? Don't you recognize men whom you know or praise, defects which you blame? The greatest difficulty we have is in understanding magnanimity or the magnanimous man. Because of the fact that feudal notions have gone that is no longer intelligible to us. Also in the analysis of courage: the complete silence about courage in the context of the polis. Aristotle speaks of courage on the battle field but makes no reference to the polis. Political courage is a lower form. Certain indications are given of that.

We talk about moral virtue, but who was the first to coin that term? Aristotle. Plato never speaks of it. . . . For Plato genuine virtue is possessed only by the philosopher. All other virtue is vulgar virtue. Regarding vulgar virtue it is said in the Phaedo that the non-philosophic man is courageous out of cowardice, fear of bad reputation, great pains etc., i.e. a modification of the ordinary vulgar concern with bodily pleasures or at best reputation. Only the man fully dedicated to the genuine is the one who has an inkling of the genuine, i.e. the philosopher. We only have to think of Nicias. From Plato's point of view he has vulgar virtue. That is implied but not said by Thucydides. He does what is thought to be virtue, customary virtue.

The harsh doctrine of Plato is contradicted by the facts as presented. Every reader of the Republic is charmed by Cephalos, a wonderful old man, wealthy, the pillar of society, etc. Life would be terrible without a reasonable supply of such people. What Aristotle means by moral virtue is something like this. It is not based on understanding, but on habituation. Plato applies X-rays. The virtue of Cephalos becomes questionable. He is not a hoodlum, but according to Book X of the Republic the best-bred gentlemen who have virtue without philosophy would choose in the next life the life of the tyrant, i.e. in their inner heart they are not converted by truth. Plato shows this by the presentation of his characters: charming on the surface, but like Charmides they become tyrants.

Aristotle says no; you cannot have political life on this basis. I will make clear what we mean when we call a man a gentleman. Even if there never was one, that is what we mean. Let us build and adorn that statue of the just man. He does it thoroughly. He gives each virtue as popularly praised and this is not meant to be a mere noble lie; it is there. But the background, the deeper context, Aristotle does not make clear. For our purposes it is necessary to know only the "that," not the "why." The "why" comes in the latter half of the book.

Q: Is the perfect gentleman in a sense a deficient philosopher?

S: Yes, or mutilated, manque. If he would understand himself he would be a philosopher. The difficulty is with the men of the higher arts. They also have something akin to philosophy, as is indicated by Book II of Plato's Laws. For example, a carpenter: by definition he is not a gentleman, but he has something which the gentleman lacks which distinguishes the gentleman from the philosopher, and that is exactness. The gentleman who is exact is a penny pincher. The Aristotelian point of view is that there is a variety of human pursuits. They all point, without being aware of it, towards their completion. They all flow together. The gentleman, the lover, the techne; all these fully understood are philosophy. This is not sophistry. Aristotle means it seriously. Man has one end.

On a lower level this splits into other ends.

Q: This leads to the problem of piety, due to the fact that the gentleman takes as a standard piety. If piety from the philosopher's point of view is like the noble lie. . . .

S: Not quite. Piety is understood as knowledge of the highest, knowledge of God. This leads to this conclusion for Aristotle: piety is not a virtue. It is in the Republic: wisdom, courage, justice, moderation, piety. But it is dropped later on. Piety in the form of worship is not there.

Q: It seems that Aristotle in a sense subscribes to a limited relativism. The philosopher regards the moral virtues as means while for most men there is really a sense in which they are an end.

S: That the same thing is not right or fit for all: is this what you mean by relativism? Relativism today means something below serious discussion: that all preferences are merely arbitrary. If you mean that absolutism means there is one and only one set of rules absolutely binding equally on all men, and every deviation from that view is relativism, then Aristotle is a relativist.

Q: How does Aristotle indicate that the moral virtues are desirable in themselves?

S: Aristotle moves within the horizon of most men. Towards the end, Aristotle removes the "screen" and shows there is something above it: contemplation. The bulk of the work is devoted to the moral virtues. That is demanded by the practical character of the book. It is meant to influence all literate people. Most of them are not willing or able to become theoretical men.

Q: . . . How does Aristotle stand regarding the situation at the beginning of the Minos: the possibility that these things come into being not by logos, but in an unknown way.

S: Do you mean that for the perfect gentleman the various noble and just things as described in Books II to V are simply noble or choiceworthy? But he is not able to give an account. To that extent there is no reason. Reason is not operative, or only on the basis of the acceptance of these noble and just things. For him they are the irrefutable principles. In the Minos the fact is that we do not know how they come into being.

Q: (Regarding laws.)

S: The gentleman can distinguish between good and bad laws, between civilized and savage society.